TARGETTING SUGGESTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000400070002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 22, 1972
• Content Type: MF

Approved For ReI ase 04/Q6/14 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR0 004400070002-5
CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
22 September 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., USA
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
SUBJECT : Targetting Suggestions
1. Pursuing our recently commissioned endeavor, I asked one
of my senior associates to take a quiet, private re-look at the targetting
problem. His thoughts are appended hereto in a memorandum he wrote
personally for me and which, for security reasons, no one else has seen.
For the same reasons, I have not had it edited or re-typed but, instead
am forwarding it exactly as received.
2. The gentleman in question isi the head of the
Indochina Division in our Office of Economic Research, which is charged
with keeping our book on North Vietnam's economy, manpower, logistics
and all cognate matters. (Norm is, I think, well and favorably known to
Dr. Kissinger; he has accompanied the Director and me to WSAG meetings
where logistics matters or studies were agenda items for discussion.)
His attached note is, in essence, an extension of and should be considered
in conjunction. with our two memoranda of 22 August, * both of which were
prepared under his aegis.
3. In reading the attached analysis, please bear in mind that it
is not crisply focused on our precise concern, hence it will have to be
read with a kind of corrective filter or lens . The treatment given Dong
*Modifications Which Might Enhance The Impact Of The U.S. Interdiction
Program Against North Vietnam, TS No. 203097/a/72 and An Assessment
of the US Bombing and Mining Campaign in North Vietnam, TS No. 203097/72-B.
TS No. 203099/72
Copy No. Q
Approved For Releasq.2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80RO172OR000400070002-5
25X1
 Approved For Rele 04/06/14: CIA-RDP80RO172OR0004 0002-5
Dang on pages 4-5 illustrates the point here involved. I asked Norm to
assess potential targets for an intensified and generally unrestricted
bombing effort, making no reference to any such program's duration or
when it might be initiated. Norm's point is that an attack on Dong Dang
(which the North Vietnamese almost certainly now believe is "off limits")
would catch the North Vietnamese by surprise and throw a big wrench
into the gears of the logistic system they are currently using. Norm's
cautionary remarks are not intended to downgrade Dong Dang as a viable
target, even though they might be read as such. Instead, he is simply
warning that, in time, the North Vietnamese could-probably make compen-
sating adjustments. If I correctly understand the President's wishes,
however, the President wants us to outline a sharp, surge action program
which, if successful, would be of relatively short duration (almost by
definition).. Thus Norm's caveats (the one on Dong Dang is but one ex-
ample) derive from his perception of the problem (which by design is
limited and a trifle off the mark). These caveats would not necessarily
carry the same weight under our perception of the problem, which is some-
what different.
4. One matter not directly addressed in the attached note is the
general question of attacking population centers. This is probably a
subject our group should address frontally, even if o i considered rec-
ommendation proves to be negative. My own views on hitting urban centers
as targets per se are decidedly negative -- on grounds of political impact
and pragmatic practicality, not to mention morality. (In Tallyrand's words:
"Crest plus qu'une crime, c'est une faute. ") Terror bombing, or anything
that could be persuasively described as such, is likely to yield a counter-
productive stiffening of North Vietnamese will and have the net effect of
enhancing the regime's position. It is also certain to generate political
and propaganda problems for the U.S. around the world and in the United
States, problems that would not be offset by compensating advantages
within North Vietnam.
5. Selective attacks on particular, specific targets that happen
to be located in urban areas is another matter entirely. These might
include such things as the Hanoi railroad station and classification yard,
the Hanoi thermal power plant, key communications facilities and the
offices of major DRV government or party components. Sensible, serious
recommendations with respect to such targets would require staff work
and homework that to my knowledge has not yet been done. First, we
would have to have an accurate assessment of the true CEP of the weapons
systems to be employed (e.g., "smart bombs") -- and I mean a realistic
assessment of probable CEP in a flack-filled, hectic Hanoi combat environ-
ment, not a theoretical estimate derived from level flight tests at optimum
Approved For Release 2004/06/14 :CAA=RDP80R01720R000400070002-5
 Approved For Release 04/06/14: CIA-RDP80RO172OR0004000 0002-5
altitudes performed undisturbed under a cloudless Arizona sky. Secondly
we would have to assess each putative urban target -- in light of these
realistic CEP estimates -- with respect to what was in immediate or near
proximity to it: detention facilities in which U.S. prisoners are known to
be or even might possibly be housed, hospitals, orphanages, schools,
etc. I have already initiated quiet survey work on the latter, but for
obvious reasons your office is in the best position to get the kind of CEP
data that will be required.
6. Finally, it would probably be useful if you were to adopt a
code-name for our exercise which could hP used on all written material
relating thereto. uggest themselves for con-
sideration. If you want the connotations to be less obvious, you might
consider - which to some would suggest a frisky young stallion
but to us could privately echo a weapon our grandfathers dubbed the
"peacemaker. "
Ge rge Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
Attachment
TS No. 203099/72/a
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/06/14 :CjA=RDP80R01720R000400070002-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80RO172OR000400070002-5
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80RO172OR000400070002-5