NOTES ON A POSSIBLE GAME PLAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000400090004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 23, 1972
• Content Type: MF

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23 December 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
SUBJECT : Notes on a Possible U.S. Game Plan
.l. Musing over the matters we discussed in our 21 December telephone
conversation has stimulated some thoughts that are outlined below for your
consideration. These are personal views, not official ones. They get into
matters far outside my (or the Agency's) official parish. Since I am currently
on leave, please take them as the informal thoughts of a private citizen who
would like to help the President in any way he can. These thoughts are
offered in a full awareness that some of them are rough or embryonic. I
also recognize that some of my suggestions may not be i--sible for reasons
of which I am ignorant or have not considered, some may relate to actions
that are already in train, and some may have already been considered and
rejected for good and sufficient reasons of which I am also unaware.
2. Desiderata. It seems to me that there are three things we need to
accomplish, if possible, as soon as we can.
a. We need to get Hanoi off its wicket of stonewalling
on the 20 October draft and attempting to use that draft to
torpedo our relations with the GVN and thus enormously
improve Communist political' rospects in South Vietnam.
(1) I have given considerable thought to
the concept we discussed of trying to pitch Hanoi
with a purely military deal that avoids the polit-
ical thicket by ignoring all political questions.
I may be suffering from a lack of imagination, but
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this seems to me to be a blind alley. - For one
thing, Hanoi's primary interests are political,
not military, hence it is hard to envisage Hanoi
seriously entertaining, let alone buying, any such
proposal. For another, given the Politburo's
psychology it would be counterproductive for
us to float any such proposal at this time. Hanoi
would read it as a sign of weakness demonstrating
that we are prepared to give them a politically
free hand in return for our prisoners and U.S.
disengagement. This, in turn, would probably
serve to make the North Vietnamese even more
intransigent.
(2) The Politburo has endeavored to structure
a situation where the process of negotiation and
settlement of itself cripples the GVN -- by poisoning
.our relations with Saigon -- and thus gives the
Communists a clear shot at victory. Our best
counter would be to outplay Hanoi at its own situ-
ational game (where we really have much greater
resources) by creating a situation in which con-
tinued stonewalling on Hanoi's part becomes even
more disadvantageous than the unpalatable (to
Hanoi) course of engaging in serious negotiating
dialogue on our terms.
b. We need to get, and keep, the GVN in tandem with us, (1) I know full well how exasperating,
intransigent and downright unreasonable Thieu
can be and apparently is being. As I told you on
21 December, I have watched Thieu operate for
more than a decade, rising in the process from a
relatively obscure colonel to the most powerful
-- and most effective -- political leader South
Vietnam has ever had. I also recognize and cer-
tainly agree that, in the final analysis, U.S.
interests. can never become hostage to the whim
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or veto of any foreign power or foreign leader,
We may eventually (or soon) have to go it alone;
but if we do, Hanoi will have achieved one of its
highest ambitions, that of rupturing the bond
between Saigon and Washington which has long
served as a major obstacle to the achievement of
Hanoi's ultimate objectives.
(2) Both we and the GVN need to remember,
and remind each other, how much it is in our mutual
interests not to fall victims to Hanoi's Iago gambit.
I am ignorant of what oral or written views were
exchanged during General Haig's most recent Saigon
visit and hence am ignorant of the current state of
play in our dealings with Saigon. Nonetheless, I
am still convinced that the only issue on which
Thieu will not budge (because he is unshakably
convinced that he cannot) is the juridical one of
not signing or concurring in any formal agree-
ment which has the net effect of erasing his
govern4nent's legal status and claim or right to
existence. To Thieu, the issue of NVA troops in
South Vietnam (in their present numbers) is
almost certainly less important than the issue of
North Vietnam's juridicial right to have such troops
there. And Thieu believes that the present text
of the agreement gives North Vietnam that right --
because the text does not give his own government
any legal status. If we can somehow devise a way
of accommodating Thieu on this issue -- without
sacrificing our interests in the process -- I think
he can be brought around to a reasonably cooperative
posture on all the other points of current contention.
(3) As we have discussed on several
occasions, Thieu has always been difficult to
deal with. He is a stubborn loner who has
developed stonewalling to a fine art, partly
because it is a tactic congenial to his nature and
partly because it is a tactic that, to date, has
almost always been successful in getting him what
he wants or feels he has to have. The best and
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most fruitful approach to Thieu -- and the only
one I have ever known to influence his behavior --
is through his pragmatism. But anyone else's
conclusions concerning his best interests are
nugatory unless and until they become his con-
clusions. The technique that works with Thieu
-- and, again, the only one I have ever seen
work -- is the Socratic. In the course of non-
polemic dialogue, you plant the conceptual seeds
and stimulate the chain of reasoning which Thieu
then follows (with non-obtrusive guidance) until
he reaches its logical conclusion. Telling him,
in all sincerity, what you believe he ought to do
or has to do does not work -- or at least it never
has worked in the past.
(4) Though the nature of his conversations
with General Haig and the content of his personal
reply to the President may seem to belie this,
there are two considerations which greatly influence
Thieu's po.0.?4cal perception: (a) Privately, he
is acutely aware of his country's need for continued
U.S. support and backing. (b) He has the highest
personal regard and admiration for President Nixon.
Why then, one may understandably ask, is he being
so intransigent and unreasonable -- if not (from
our perspective) downright irrational -- in re-
sponding to our requests for cooperation, even
personal requests from President Nixon? The
answer, of course, is that from his perspective,
Thieu does not think he is being unreasonable.
Instead, he thinks we are being unreasonable.
More importantly, he also thinks he has a much
better, much more clear-eyed understanding of
Vietnamese political reality, including Vietnamese
psychology, than we do. This attitude is rein-
forced by a grim fixation on the fact that the
adverse consequences of a settlement disastrous
for non-Communist Vietnamese in South Vietnam
will be borne and suffered by the latter, not by
Americans living in comfort and safety an ocean
away.
-4-
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(5) We see Thieu faced with a choice between
a politically fatal loss of U.S. support and coop-
erative compliance in a course of action whose
risks for him and his government -- which may be
great -- can be attenuated and diminished by the
continued U.S. backing and protection such com-
pliance (alone) will make possible. Thieu, however,
sees it differently. He sees himself being driven
toward a choice between two extremely unpalatable
alternatives: a choice between a rupture with
Washington that will probably prove politically
fatal and acquiescence in a settlement that is tanta-
mount to a death warrant for a non-Communist
government in South Vietnam. In his eyes, this
is the choice between going down fighting even
though your cause is probably hopeless and
surrendering when you can see the "no quarter"
flag flying. To Thieu, no matter how risky or
unpalatable the former alternative may be, it is
clearly; the lesser evil .
(6) Our problem with Thieu is thus a
problem of communication rooted in different per-
ceptions of the Vietnam situation that produce
two quite different sets of cost-benefit calculations.
It would seem to me that the solution to a commu-
nication problem has to lie in an improved commu-
nications. In Thieu's case, this is most likely
to be achieved by a kind of Socratic dialogue
(Plato's fundamental philosophical interest,
after all, was the problems of perception), a
dialogue -- by Ambassadorial conversation,
emissary visitation and written messages -- where
ultimata, when or if they have to be conveyed,
are relayed as informational data defining the
givens in a problem to which two interdependent
allies must somehow find a joint solution.
c. We ought to develop our own draft agreement -- with
truly; matching English and Vietnamese texts -- embodying
what ;we would consider the schematic outlines of a fair and
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reasonable settlement while affording what we consider adequate
protection to interests or concerns we deem essential.
(1) This is not a proposal to start from
scratch with a blank piece of paper. I am
instead suggesting that we take the entire record
of the' past several months -- including the Hanoi
language we feel we can accept, the changes we
have proposed or intend to propose, plus any
other pertinent ideas we may have developed --
and meld them all into a clean draft with an eye
to insisting that future negotiating sessions operate
from our text(s). This would get us permanently
off the 20 October wicket. It would also accomplish
two other useful things.
(2) First, if I have learned anything in almost
.two decades of working in a bureaucracy it is that
regardless of the subject under consideration or
nature of the group convened to consider it,
in any process of coordination or negotiation
the person (or party) who wrote the draft from
which .everyone is working has a tremendous
advantage . He sets the tone and terms of reference.
Furthermore, the mechanics of group endeavor
psychology somehow make it easier to resist
changes than to insist on their incorporation.
(3) Secondly, .even if the substance and
much of the language is virtually identical, the
GVN will be much more comfortable (and cooperative)
if subsequent negotiations are based on our draft
agreement, not Hanoi's .
3. A Possible Scenario. It seems to me that the above desiderata
might be realized, and a negotiated settlement achieved, if we were to try
a scenario roughly along the lines outlined below. Such a scenario could
not be completed before Congress reconvenes on 3 January, but with a
little luck it could be well launched by the President's inauguration on 20
January -- certainly producing outward manifestations of potentially useful
activity and possibly some promise of productive results.
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4. This suggested scenario has two integral components:. One is a
set of "pressure actions" designed to alter the overall situation in ways
that make a negotiated settlement we would consider acceptable look increasingly
to Hanoi like the' least unpalatable alternative open to the Politburo. The other
is a game plan of sequential specific moves, to be played out against the con-
tinuing backdrop of the ongoing pressure actions.
5. The Backdrop 'of Moues Pressure. The proposed mix of pressure
actions is designed to compound Hanoi's current problems, undercut the
Politburo's current position, and make continuation of the Politburo's current
course of action an increasingly unattractive prospect.
6. The first component of the pressure mix would be relentless con-
tinuation of the bombing over all of North Vietnam, though perhaps with
somewhat less reliance on B-52s if the requisite targets could be hit as
effectively and at less cost with other types of aircraft. The objective here
would be not only logistic harassment but, particularly, the exertion of
political pressure by erasing everything of physical value the North Vietnamese
have built -- power plants, factories, bridges, radio stations, etc. -- and
implacably preventing any reconstruction. (Straight terror bombing of
targets such as population centers, schools, hospitals and the like should
be strictly eschewed -- on pragmatic grounds as well as moral ones.) Where
feasible, this bombing would be augmented by naval gunfire; and North
Vietnam's ports would of course be kept closed by mining.
7. This "ordnance" effort would be augmented by an overall campaign
along the lines of the project General Haig and I developed in September.*
A key ingredient would be intensified psychological warfare of all kinds (radios,
leaflets, perhaps airdropping the single shot pistols described in the September
proposal, etc.) targetted against the North Vietnamese population and the rank
and file of both the Party and the Army. We know the Politburo is hyper-
sensitive to any form of pressure that has a potential for threatening Party
discipline or the Party's control over the Army and the North Vietnamese
people. Hanoi's manifest alarm and outrage over the psychological warfare
efforts we have already mounted demonstrates that to the Politburo, this is a
*See my draft "Pressure Package" inputs of 29 September and 4 October.
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very tender nerve. It is therefore a nerve we should press hard with all
available resources Serious reconsideration should be given to ploys or
gambits previously ruled "off limits.." For example, we know that photographs
of President Nixon being feted by top Soviet and/or Chinese leaders have
a devastating impact on NVA troops and Party cadre. Restrictions on the use
of such photos (e.g. , in leaflets) or other proscribed gambits may still be
valid; but they should be subjected to careful review and not'imposed by
reflex fiat.
8. In South Vietnam, we should exhort the GVN to use some of that
newly furnished ENHANCE PLUS hardware in offensive activity targetted
against NVA units, ideally augmenting any ARVN ground action with a
perceptibly increasing amount of ?VNAF activity to demonstrate the trends
the future will hold if a reasonable settlement is not soon reached. Simul-
taneously, and in conjunction with other approaches to the GVN noted below,
we should encourage the GVN to press forward with the kind of steps
described in my 4 November checklist. What we want, of course, is a
projected image of GVN activity, initiative and (ideally) progress in the
military and the political arena.
9. Under this scenario, we would seek to undercut Hanoi by quiet
(though, of course, separate) overtures to the Soviets and the Chinese,
trying to persuade them why -- in each case -- it was in our mutual, larger
interests for Moscow/Peking to, at a minimum, refrain from publicly backing
Hanoi's strident insistence that there is only one Vietnam and that the 17th
Parallel is not even temporarily a de facto international boundary. If at all
possible, we would try to get at least one major Communist power (both
would of course be ideal) to take the public position that what was accepted
as de facto current political reality in Korea and Germany also ought to be
accepted as de facto current political reality in Vietnam.
a. Such an approach to the Soviets ought to be facil-
itated by the fact that we have now at least tacitly acknowledged
this -- their -- position with respect to Germany, hence they
ought to be willing to acknowledge a parallel position -- ours --
with respect to Vietnam, a position they themselves sanctioned
when they proposed that both Vietnams be admitted to the UN
in January 1957.
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b. The Taiwan factor might complicate any such overture
to Peking, but in conducting their foreign policy the Chinese
Communists have never let themselves be hindered by the hob-
goblin of foolish consistency. The Chinese (more than the
Soviets) have certainly endorsed Kim 11-sung's "sud-politik"
and might be willing to acknowledge a Vietnam parallelism in the
interest of frying other fish deemed of greater importance in
Peking. The Chinese might never openly admit this to us, but
Peking is certainly aware that, whether Communist or not, a unified
Vietnam on China's southern border could develop delusions of
grandeur and get a trifle big for its britches.
10. The Sequential Game Plan. Against the backdrop of the' pressure
actions just described, a sequential game plan might unfold roughly as
follows.
a. Within the next few days, we publicize -- and keep
open -- a standing invitation to Hanoi to resume private talks
whenever the North Vietnamese are ready to resume serious
negotiations.
b. We prepare, as quickly as possible, our consolidated
agreement draft -- with matching English and Vietnamese texts --
as described above. This draft should embody what we consider
fair and acceptable proposals affording essential protection to U.S.
interests (e.g. , prisoner return), reasonable protection to legit-
imate GVN interests (including language that, at a minimum, elim-
inates any North Vietnamese right to send or station NVA troops
in the South), and establishing a meaningful inspection/super-
vision system.
c . We ll etl take that draft to Saigon and go over it with the
GVN. We allow some give and take, being particularly receptive to
GVN suggestions for modifications in the Vietnamese text to make it
as close a match as possible to the tone and substantive content of
the English text. Nonetheless, we stick firmly to the line --
ostensibly "advisory" and not explicitly threatening -- that with
Congress reconvening and obviously restive, if the North Vietnamese
show themselves willing to buy such a package, the' U. S . Government
will have no option but to sign it promptly.
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d. Either alone or in concert with .the GVN (particularly if
the latter..has cooperatively concurred), we add some additional
language to or make a few modifications in the agreed "minimum
position" draft to facilitate horse trading with the North Vietnamese
by giving us a few throw-away counters to bargain with.
e. If we and the GVN are still in tandem, a face-to-face
meeting between President Nixon and President Thieu is then held in
some place such as Guam or Honolulu (but at least as far West as San
Clemente)'. This meeting produces -- and it is not held unless Thieu
has previously agreed that it is going to produce-- a joint public
reaffirmation of our mutual abhorrence of war and the suffering it
entails and our joint determination to seek a fair negotiated settle-
ment at the earliest possible time by all possible means.
f. We then open an all-out, all-channel effort -- some
channels being public, most private, with the latter including, if
possible, the Soviets and/or the Chinese -- to get Hanoi back to
some forum, in Paris or elsewhere, permitting direct, top-level
dialogue.
g. In that dialogue, we are personally civil but substantively
tough. We take the line that we are not willing to engage in further
charades and Hanois performance last fall has left us skeptical of
any professions of North Vietnamese good will or "serious intent."
The options before us both are simple: continuation of the (then)
current situation for at least four more years, which is in no one's
interest, or serious discussions and negotiations based on our
draft.
11. Conclusion. The above game plan may be unrealistic and/or unwork-
able.. Many of its components have been discussed before, some tried and
some perhaps rejected for good reasons, In any event, essaying some such
sequential plan would be less frustrating than sitting tight and leaving the
initiative with Hanoi while political pressures mount on us here at home.
(As explained in my 21 December. memorandum on Hanoi's game and game
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plan, Hanoi's next move will have to be decided by the Politburo, which is
a committee -- and committees can take a long time to make up their minds.)
I offer these thoughts in the' hope that they' may be of some use -- even that
of stimulating a rejection process that produces better ones.
J
Geor
ge A. Carver, Jr.
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