CHECKLIST OF IMMEDIATE MEASURES WHICH WOULD IMPROVE THE GVN'S POSITION BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER ANY CEASE-FIRE IS SIGNED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000400090014-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: November 4, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT: Checklist of Immediate Measures Which Would Improve
the GVN's Position Both Before and After Any
Cease-fire is Signed
1. The following checklist outlines specific measures which, if
implemented now, would help to improve the position of the GVN as it
jockeys with the Communists during the process of negotiations. It would
also improve the GVN's position in any cease-fire, post-hostilities
political struggle environment. The list does not include a number of
measures which either the GVN or the U.S. is already undertaking,
such as ',^) maximum efforts to destroy enemy military units, base
areas, and rear service areas contiguous to contested populated areas
right up to the instant of a cease-fire; (b) maximum air interdiction
operations (at least below the 20th Parallel) to slow down Communist
efforts to build up stocks of "in-place" supplies and equipment inside
South Vietnam; (c) provision by the U.S. of the largest possible amount
of military equipment to South Vietnam before a cease-fire takes effect;
and (d) the formulation of plans which will provide the best possible
unilateral U.S. intelligence verification of the terms of the cease-fire.*
2. Also not included in the following checklist is a key prerequisite
to all the measures suggested below -- successfully inducing President
Thieu to stop expending energy on fighting his major ally and concentrate
all his efforts on (1) improving the GVN's position in the immediate
climate and (2) posturing the GVN to translate any negotiated settlement
*We are providing under separate cover the texts of a number of recent
intelligence reports, and reports from the American Embassy in Saigon,
which describe measures already undertaken by the GVN in preparation
for a cease-fire.
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into a de facto Communist surrender. A discussion of factors that might
be exploited to get Thieu thinking more positively is contained in a
separate, parallel memorandum.
3. The following measures should be implemented immediately. by
the GVN:
A. SECURITY MEASURES
(1) Plans should be made now to improve security
throughout the county side to the maximum extent
possible . The GVN already has all its forces -- the
ARVN, the RF and PF, and the National Police --
on full alert to prevent the Communists from
establishing a presence in additional areas in
the few days just before and after the signing
of a cease-fire. RF and PF units, and the police,
should provide a local guard force for all hamlets
and villages. To the extent possible ARVN units
should be dispersed to locations from whit-Ii they
can provide quick reaction reinforcements to all
hamlets and villages. ARVN regiments and
battalions will be of limited value in a cease-fire
environment if they remain in their base camps.
(2) In addition, rather than merely reacting to
Communist initiatives , the ARVN should make
plans for maximum offensive activity to be carried
out in the 72 hours or so before the cease fire
becomes effective. The ARVN should initiate
preemptive actions and go on the offensive
wherever possible in an effort to roll back the
Communists in areas where they are seeking to
establish a presence.
(3) One very important offensive action which ARVN
should undertake is to air-assault units by heli-
co ter into positions west of Pleiku or Kontum
from which they could block all north-south enemy
movements. The objective would be to disrupt a
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potential NVA north-south supply line within
South Vietnam. The Communists now control areas
in the western part of South Vietnam, along the Lao
and Cambodian borders, which could provide them
with an in-country supply route running from
the DMZ through MR-1 and to the region south of
Pleiku in MR-2. By undertaking a fairly modest
road-building effort after a cease-fire, they could
develop a motorable route wholly within South
Vietnam from the DMZ all the way to western MR-3.
The proposed ARVN operation would cut Communist-
held territory into two parts, and would force the
enemy's supply lines, at least near the area of
the operation, to remain in Laos or Cambodia
where they now are. NVA supply activities in
these countries would presumably more clearly
contravene the proposed peace agreement than
would the same activities inside the Communist-
controlled areas of South Vietnam. For maximum
effect, and to prevent Communist counteraction,
this ARVN operation should be undertaken in the
brief period between the signing of the agreement
and the time it goes into effect. The exact location
of the operation should be the subject of immediate
military planning. The region west of Pleiku along
Route 19 might provide the most favorable area,
but there may be military or other factors which
would make a different area more feasible.
(4) The GVN should establish a reporting system
through which a continuous flow of information
on implementation of a cease-fire will be funneled
to regional headquarters and Saigon from all hamlets
and villages. An adaptation of HES reporting
channels could be used for this purpose, with
all hamlet and village chiefs being required to
respond each week to 10 or 12 simple questions
on the security and control situations in their
areas. A system of independent roving teams
(perhaps composed of RD cadres) should also be
set up to make on-site inspections in any areas
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where the situation appears to be deteriorating or
where the local reporting is suspect.
(5) All known Viet Cong legal cadres should be
immediately arrested and temporarily detained,
until the situation following a cease-fire has
-stabilized. In addition, planning should start
now to transfer certain RF units to the National
Police Field Forces. to give the police a greater
capability to counter subversion in the new period
of political struggle.
(6) President Thieu should use his emergency authority
to promulgate an expanded Vietnamese "GI Bill of
Rights." Such a bill should include more veterans'
benefits and better rehabilitation measures for
wounded veterans than those now in effect. The
immediate value of the bill would be psychological,
raising ARVN morale and discouraging desertion of
troops who do not want to be the last to die before
a cease-fire. Benefits would be limited to honorably
discharged veterans. Over the longer term, the bill
could have economic benefits in facilitating transition
from a war to a quasi-peace economy, both by
easing unemployment problems and by augmenting
the supply of trained manpower for economic
development.
B. POLITICAL MEASURES AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE MEASURES
(7) The GVN should make a major effort to expand the
Chieu Hoi (Rallier) program by all possible means.
The government should embark on a large-scale prop-
aganda campaign to induce Viet Cong troops and
cadres to rally, using the theme that the Viet Cong
have been abandoned by the NVA. Also, all
differences between the North Vietnamese and the
Viet Cong should be exploited.
(8) The GVN should step up its propaganda emphasis on
the surrender program aimed at NVA troops in South
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. The main theme to be
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(9)
used against NVA troops should be that they no
longer have a cause worth fighting for. With the
U.S. out of Vietnam, anti-imperialism is no longer
an issue. Surrender will provide a free ride home
to North Vietnam.
The GVN should make an all-out effort to gain the
support of nationalist and anti-Communist political
groups in South Vietnam who 'are in opposition to
Thieu. Thieu is currently seeking to gain the
support of these groups -- but against the agreement
itself. Once persuaded, however, that an agreement
was the best one that could be obtained, he might also
be persuaded that his own future interest would be
served by taking concrete steps to improve his
relations with the non-Communist opposition groups. *
(10) The GVN should promote the formation of anti-
Communist "coalitions" in legislative bodies at all
levels -- National Assembly, Provincial and Village
Councils. The GVN and Iz ders of the various
"coalitions" (i.e., political alliances) would then
denounce the concept of coalition with the Communists,
at whatever level, and maintain that true nationalists
already had formed "coalitions" in the legislatures.
This tactic would not only furnish an additional
propaganda weapon against Communist efforts to
upgrade the "councils of national concord and recon-
ciliation" to governmental organisms, but it would
also provide a framework to facilitate cooperation
among anti-Communist legislators and councillors.
Most supporters of the An Quang Buddhists and a.
few other staunch oppositionists might remain outside
the nationalist coalitions, but many independents
and moderate oppositionists -- such as followers
of Senate Chairman Huyen or of the Progressive
Nationalist Movement -- would probably join.
*Several specific. suggestions for political action which would contribute
to this objective -- and bring into sharper focus the fundamental anti-
Communism of nationalist groups opposed to Thieu -- are presented in
and Annex to this memorandum.
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(11) The GVN should organize a program of briefings for
middle and upper echelon administrative officials
and cadres. These briefings, to be held in Saigon
and lasting a full day, should include a "pep talk"
by the President as well as more detailed explanations
and instructions from ministers and other officials.
Bringing provincial officials to Saigon has in the
,past proved effective not only as a means to impart
instructions but also to boost morale and convey a
sense of purpose -- of being "on the team. " The
briefings should be tailored to the needs of the
different audiences -- village and provincial officials,
RF and PF officers, GVN administrative cadres,
Ministry of Information officials, etc. Subjects
to be covered would include explanations of the
dangers ahead in a post-cease-fire period; the GVN's
basic strategy for overcoming them; actions,
whether administrative, security or political,
to be undertaken; and enemy strategems to watch
for and ways to counter them. If all briefings cannot
be held in Saigon, some might be organized at the
Military Region level. Again, however, Thieu
should personally participate where possible.
(12) The GVN should accelerate its organization of the
Democracy Par . Whatever its deficiencies, the
Democracy Party is the only large, unequivocally pro-
government party in South Vietnam, and it is
completely responsive to the GVN. It can be used
as a "parallel hierarchy" to the official governmental
structure for a great variety of political purposes:
collecting low level political intelligence, dispensing
patronage, organizing "spontaneous" demonstrations,
getting out and helping to count the vote, etc.
While pressing on with recruitment and organization,
however, Democracy Party cadres should be urged
to avoid alienating other nationalist parties by
cannibalizing their cadres.
(13) The GVN should prepare now to assist the international
press and other observers to travel anywhere they
desire in South Vietnam to inspect the operation of
the cease-fire. Plans should be made for the efficient
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provision of helicopter transport, communications
facilities, and accommodations for representatives
of the news media. Requests for assistance by such
representatives should be welcomed and met with
full cooperation by the GVN. The GVN should come
up with a proposal that all correspondents should be
officially accredited -- either by the GVN, the PRG,
or by whatever "neutralist" element finally emerges
in the National Council for National Reconciliation and
Concord. The GVN should also propose that any
accredited correspondent be allowed to visit any part
of South Vietnam he desires. Whether or not the
Communists accept this, the GVN should lean over
backwards to ensure that all correspondents whom it
accredits may travel to any part of South Vietnam
under GVN control.
(14) The GVN should publicly announce that it stands
ready to accept and assist refugees from areas which
fall under Communist control as a result of the cease-
fire. The government should embark on an acceler-
ated program to deal with the whole refugee problem,
so that those who "vote with their feet" will be
adequately cared for and resettled. Where refugees
desire to return to hamlets which have been deserted
because of the war (and which are not actually
occupied by Communist military forces), the GVN
should insist that a free local referendum is held in
such hamlets to determine whether the population
desires to remain under GVN control.
(15) President Thieu should publicly renew his October
1971 proposal to establish postal exchanges, family
visits, and, above all, commercial relations between
the two Vietnams. The proposal would undoubtedly
be a popular one. Northern refugees who came south
after 1954 would welcome an opportunity to communicate
with their relatives in the North; southern farmers
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would see possibilities for large and profitable sales
of rice (until the 1954 Geneva Accords the North had
traditionally imported rice from the South); and
Saigon intellectuals would approve as a matter of
principle. Both within South Vietnam and abroad,
Thieu would appear sure of himself and his position,
unburdened by the inferiority complex vis-a-vis
North Vietnam which caused Ngo Dinh Diem to reject
similar exchanges. By vigorously advocating such
proposals, Thieu would gain politically, whatever the
North Vietnamese response.
(16) The GVN should announce now that governmental
funds will be available for selected public works
projects in villa es and hamlets which are under GVN
control after a cease-fire is declared. This would
provide an inducement for villagers to fight to remain
under GVN control in the last few days before a cease-
fire took effect. The implementation of such public
works projects after a cease-fire would further
strengthen the position of the central government in
rural areas. (The funds, of course, would probably
have to come largely from the U.S.)
(17) The GVN should work out plans now to emphasize the
"free enterprise" aspects of its economy, in contrast
to the "controlled economy" of Communist-held areas.
New free markets should be opened in villages where
possible. GVN planners should set up the methods
and channels now to assure that local markets are
provided with sufficient supplies not only of
necessities such as fertilizer but also of luxuries
such as Hondas. Plans should be made now to improve
roads between villages and towns where markets are
located and the surrounding hamlets. The government
should encourage local initiative in building schools,
medical dispensaries, etc. In general, the GVN must
be able to show that it has better plans to improve
the lot of its people than do the Communists.
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(18) The GVN should announce Plans to accelerate the
implementation of its land reform program. The
announcement should emphasize that the conditions
for more rapid land reform will be significantly
improved after the fighting ends, and that the
government intends to give the program top priority
in all areas under GVN control.
4. The following measures should be implemented immediately by
the United States:
A. SECURITY MEASURES
(1) A U.S. military contingency plan -- providing for B-52
backup of ARVN ground units -- should be drawn up,
to be implemented in case of major cease-fire violations
by the Communists. It would perhaps be helpful if
hints that the U . S . was working on a contingency plan
such as this were deliberately leaked to the Communists.
(2) The U.S. should take whatever steps are necessary to
assure that the GVN has sufficient radios and communi-
cation equipment to provide direct and continuous
contact with hamlets which are contested during the
period immediately before and after a cease-fire.
B. POLITICAL MEASURES AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE MEASURES
(3) The U.S. should continue and further expand its
psychological warfare campaign against both the
Viet Cong and the NVA. The line used against the
Viet Cong should be that the North Vietnamese are
exploiting them. E.g. , the North Vietnamese have
signed a cease-fire, leaving the Viet Cong holding
the bag on terms that are highly unfavorable to them.
Against the North Vietnamese the line should be,
The war is over, what are you doing here? Surrender
and we will help to send you home, or desert and
return to the North yourselves. "
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(5) The U.S. should immediately move to revitalize the
Mekong Development Project for Laos, Cambodia, and
Vietnam (plus Thailand).
(6) The U.S. should make a hard decision as quickly as
possible on the extent to which it is willing to spread
its future aid among all the countries of Indochina,
and the extent to which it ?ishes to concentrate its aid
on projects which will encourage a political resolution
favorable to the GVN. The economic progress of the
two sides will play a major role in the ensuing political
struggle. In this struggle, the economy of the GVN --
though presently distorted by years of war and
massive foreign aid devoted to war-related
purposes -- is potentially stronger than that of
North Vietnam. It should be capable of fairly rapid
growth and able to provide its people with substantially
improved living standards once the burden of war is
removed.
(7) The U.S. should encourage the sending of international
and third country experts to South Vietnam. The war
and the controversy surrounding it have discouraged
a great many nations and groups from sending economic,
technical and even humanitarian assistance to Vietnam.
The period following conclusion of a cease-fire will
be especially propitious to obtaining the services of
both governmental and private technical assistance
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teams. Sponsors of such teams could include UN
and church affiliated organizations, non-sectarian
private groups such as CARE (American) or OXFAM
(English) and "third countries." Sharply increased
assistance from countries like Japan should be
sought, and new programs can probably be obtained
-from certain countries (e.g. , Scandinavian) which in
the past have been inhibited by misgivings about
contributing to the South Vietnamese war effort. A
post-cease-fire South Vietnam should be able to
put to good use technical assistance teams in a great
variety of fields, notably agricultural and industrial
development, medical rehabilitation, and education.
The GVN should be advised to set up an adequate staff
to oversee and to coordinate all foreign assistance
efforts .
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Suggestions for Political Action 'to Help Thieu
Gain Support of Anti-Communist Opposition
Elements within South Vietnam
1. The Central Intelligence Agency has contact with a wide spectrum
of politicians, religious leaders and other opinion makers in South Vietnam.
Practically all of them are strongly against a coalition government. Most,
however, can probably be convinced that the projected agreement does not
call for coalition and should therefore be supported. Ironically, it may be
easier to obtain support for the agreement from the opposition, notably the
An Quang Buddhists, than from more "hawkish" pro-government leaders.
When he wishes to do so, however, President Thieu will doubtless be able
to bring his supporters, including the pro-government majority in the Lower
House, into line behind the agreement.
2. Many politicians loyal to the An Quang Buddhists, by far the most
important non-Communist opposition force, are already ^i record against
coalition. While they can probably -- and in fairly short order -- be per-
suaded that the agreement does not call for coalition and should be supported,
they will all see a need to maintain an oppositionist image and any statements
they make will have to include criticism of Thieu. Most of this criticism will
concentrate on Thieu's failure to unite the non-Communists. If it is not too
vituperative, such criticism could actually be salutary in demonstrating that
even Thieu's staunchest political adversaries are strongly opposed to
coalition.
3. Specifically, CIA assets might be able to bring about the following
actions:
A. A communique from Vu Van Mau's (Buddhist) Senate group
denouncing coalition, but explaining that the agreement does not
provide for coalition The communique would then call upon
Thieu to sign the agreement and to get on with the task of uniting
the non-Communists for the political struggle against the Communists.
B. A similar communique from the Lower House opposition People's
Society Bloc or, alternatively, a joint communique of the Senate and
Lower House opposition groups.
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C. Helpful editorials and analytical articles in several newspapers moderately pro-government, independent, and opposition.
D . An official An Quang communique welcoming a cease-fire but
warning against all attempts to violate it, from whatever side.
4. None of the above proposals would require any action by President
Thieu. They could all be encouraged, unilaterally and covertly, by the U.S.
Some of them might not in the end prove to be feasible, but most of them
probably could be carried out quite rapidly, perhaps with some modification.
5. Another measure, which would require Thieu's authorization, would
be for the GVN to allow the establishment of an An Quang-oriented daily news-
paper. (No such newspaper now exists, for the very good has not wished one to exist.) The argument in favor of a BuddhsttnewspaperN
at this time is basically that, whereas in the past it might have attacked the
GVN more damagingly than the Communists, in present circumstances it would,
while definitely not supporting the GVN, depict the Communists as a far greater
evil. It would of course take some months actually to set up an An Quang-
oriented paper, but Thieu's willingness to authorize it now would have more
immediate impact in fostering among Buddhist leaders a less hostile attitude
towards the GVN. As fo.- the longer term, the CIA could probably exert a
certain amount of influence upon a Buddhist newspaper.
6. Whether we could persuade Thieu to authorize a Buddhist newspaper
is problematical. He would have to give An Quang at least a tacit understandin
that he would not arbitrarily use his powers under the press decree law to g
close the paper down. If the publishers, however, who would be lay Buddhists,
expressed a willingness to keep their criticism within reasonable bounds, there
is at least a fair chance that Thieu could be convinced to give the necessary
authorization
7. A final measure which we could conceivably persuade Thieu to
take in the interests of better relations with the An
Q under-
resolve the long-festering Buddhist charter issue. This suelr vbe to to
olvestarouund
the question of which Buddhist faction -- An
Quang a semi-official government charter as the cor Quc Tu -- should be
ognized Buddhist leader-
ship of South Vietnam. The' Quoc Tu faction, a small minority of South
Vietnamese Buddhists, now possesses the charter. The An Quang Buddhists,
who are far more numerous, would like to have it. Since the August 1970
Senate elections, the Buddhists have increasingly participated in the system
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as a kind of "loyal opposition. " Moreover, they are not at present clamoring
for immediate resolution of the religious charter issue. Hence the GVN could
address itself to the issue without losing face and without appearing to give
in to political "demands. " On the contrary, a GVN move to resolve the problem
now would be seen, at home and abroad, as an indication of self-confidence
and magnaminity.
8. The method of resolving the charter issue poses a problem. The
GVN would be .understandably reluctant simply to take the charter from Quoc
Tu and restore it to An Quang. Thieu might, however, use his emergency
powers to promulgate a decree regulating religious associations. (Or, it might
be wiser to seek legislative approval, which could easily be obtained. This is
a matter which could be left up to Thieu and his advisers to decide.) Such a
bill, superseding previous legislation, need mention no religion by name.
Rather it could set general criteria for defining bona fide religious associations
in South Vietnam -- e.g., minimum numbers of adherents, some facilities for
educating and training of clergy, etc. The result would be that both An Quang
and Quoc Tu -- as well as Catholicism and various Hoa Hao and Cao Dai
factions -- would be recognized as legal religious associations.
9. This would still leave Quoc Tu in possession of most of the property
which belonged to the United Buddhist Church before it split in two. That
problem might be solved by directing the Ministry of Interior to take a elig-
ious census. Such a census, if carried out more or less honestly, would find
An Quang far more representative of Vietnamese Buddhists than Quoc Tu.
An Quang would then seek a court order requiring Quoc Tu to turn over to it
certain properties formerly held in common. The courts would doubtless find
in favor of An Quang, if that were what Thieu desired.
10. Resolution of the Buddhist charter issue along the above lines would
not cause An Quang's followers to support Thieu. It would, however, remove
one of their principal (and largely justified) complaints, quite possibly making
their opposition less bitter and systematic and making it easier for them to col-
laborate with the GVN on matters of overriding anti-Communist interest. It
would facilitate the task of An Quang leader Thich Tri Quang in maintaining
present moderate policies; and it would tend to weaken the position of those
leftist elements within An Quang who look upon the PRG as a "lesser evil"
than the present GVN. It would also improve the GVN's image abroad.
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