(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000400100006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 4, 1975
• Content Type: CABLE

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1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF INTERAGENCY {DIA/CIA/YINR} MEMORANDUM
ON THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM'Y
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3. BEGIN TEXT.Y
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY SITUATION AND PROSPECTS FOR
SOUTH VIETNAMY
1. SOUTH VIETNAM'S MILITARY FORTUNES CONTINUE TO DECLINE.
THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES {RUVNAF} HAVE RELINQUISHED
WELL OVER ALF THE COUNTRY, LOST NEARLY HALF OF THEIR REGULAR
COMBAT FORCES, AND SUFFERED EXTREMELY'HEAVY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY
LOSSES. THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP IS DEMORALIZED, AND THE MORALE
AND DISCIPLINE OF REMAINING GOVERNMENT FORCES ARE OPEN TO
SERIOUS QUESTION. TAKING ALL FACTORS INTO ACCOUNT, THE ONLY
QUESTION OVER THE,DEFEAT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IS TIMING --
DATE:
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4 APR 1975
BELAYTON
A/DCI/NIO/SSEA
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WHETHER IT WILL COLLAPSE OR BE MILITARILY OVERWHELMED IN A PERIOD
OF WEEKS OR MONTHS?Y
THE CURRENT SITUATIONY
2? THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE RECOGNIZED SOUTH VIETNAM'S
VULNERABILITY AND APPEAR DETERMINED TO TAKE RAPID ADVANTAGE OF
IT?Y
3.. AT PRESIENT, THERE ARE EIGHT WELL-EQUIPPED AND WELL-
SUPPLIED NVA INFANTRY DIVISIONS IN MILITARY REGIONS {MR} 3 AND
4 AND AN ADDITIONAL TEN DIVISIONS FARTHER. NORTH IN SOUTH VIETNAM.
MOREOVER, HANOI IS COMMITTING THE-BULK OF ITS REMAINING RESERVE
.FORCES TO SOUTH VIETNAM. THE COMMUNISTS COULD DEPLOY A DECISIVE
FORCE TO THE BATTLE AREA IN ABOUT A MONTHI, IF A CRASIH MOVE WERE
ORDERED. THEIR LOGISTIC CAPABILITIES ARE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
SUCH FORCES?Y
4. THE GVN HAS SEVEN INFANTRY DIVISIONS, RAN4ERS, TERRI-
TORIAL FORCES, AND THE REMNANTS OF THREE DIVISIONS EXTRACTED
FROM THE NORTH. ADDITIONAL COMBAT UNITS WILL BE FOR)ED FROM
THE GVN FORCES EVACUATIED FROM MRS 1 AND 2, BUT THEIR COMBAT
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EFFECTIVENESS, EXCEPT PERHAPS FOR THE MARINES, WILL BE DOUBTFUL.
SOME TERRITORIAL FORCES ARE NOW BEING INTEGRATED INTO REGULAR
ARVN UNITS. FINALLY, THE GVN STILL RETAINS A SIZABLE AIR FORCE.Y
5. WE NOW SEE TWO GENERAL COMMUNIST COURSES OF MILITARY
ACTION.Y
-- THE APPLICATION OF MASSIVE FORCE TO INFLICT FINAL
DEFEAT.Y
-- ENVELOP SAIGON, CUT OFF ITS SUPPLIES, AND THEREBY
BRING THE GVN TO ITS KNEES.Y
6. THE COMMUNISTS WOULD HAVE TWO OPTIONS WITHIN THE FIRST
COURSE OF ACTION. IN ONE, THE NVA COULD CHOOSE TO EXPLOIT TO
THE MAXIMUM THEIR CURRENT MILITARY MOMENTUM AND RVNAF WEAKNESSES.
THIS WOULD INVOLVE THE RAPID, ALBEIT PIECEMEAL, REINFORCEMENT OF
MR 3 AND CONTINUOUS LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS BEGINNING AT ANY TIME.
THIS WOULD ENTAIL RISKS FOR THE COMMUNISTS BECAUSE IT WOULD NOT
CONFRONT THE GVN WITH OVERWHELMING FORCE AT THE OUTSET. MOREOVER,
COMMUNIST LOSSES MIGHT BE HIGH, THEREBY WEAKENING THEIR MILITARY
PUNCHY
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7. AS A SECOND OPTION, THE COMMUNISTS COULD DELAY AN
ASSAULT ON THE CAPITAL FOR A MONTH OR SO, WHILE CONSOLIDATING
THEIR GAINS IN THE NORTHERN HALF OF THE COUNTRY, DEPLOYING
ADDITIONAL INFANTRY DIVISIONS SOUTH, AND PREPARING THE BATTLE-
FIELD. THIS WOULD GIVE THE GVN TIME TO RALLY ITS FORCES AND
POPULANTION AND TO RECONSTITUTE SOME OF THE UNITS EVACUATED
FROM THE NORTH. WIIITH THEIR BACKS TO THE WALL, MANY RVNAF UNITS
WOULD FIGHT WELL. SOUTH VIETNAMESE CONFIDENCE WOULD BE BOLSTERED
BY ACCELERATED US ASSISTANCE AND BY EVIDENCE THAT THE US WILL SEND
MORE. CORRESPONDINGLY, THE DETERIORATION AND ULTIMATE COLLAPSE
OF THE GVN WOULD BE ACCELERATED BY A NEIGATIVE RESPONSE ON THE
PART OF THE US?V
8? CONSIDERING HANOI'S ^OIOUIRIABILITY TO MASS GREATLY
SUPERIOR FORCES, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT UNDER EITHER OF THESE
OPTIONS, THE GVN WOULD COLLAPSE NOR BE DEFEATED BY THE END OF
JUNE, IF NOT CONSIDERABLY SOONER?Y
9. THE OTHER MAJOR COURSE OPIEN TO THE COMMUNISTS WOULD BE
C
TO ENVELOP SAIGONIWITH AUGMENTED FORCES, BUT OFF ITS SUPPLIES,
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AND SIMULTANEOUSLY ATTRITE DEFENDING FORCES. THE RECENT MOVE-
MENT OF ELEMENTS OF TWO NVA DIVISIONS FROM TAY ININH PRO/1UVINCE
TO THE NOIU/RTHERN DELTA IS IN LINE WITH SUCH A STRATEGY. AT
PRESENT, THESE UNITS AND OTHERS ALREADY IN MR 4 ARE THREATENING
MAJOR CITIES AND THE IMPORTANT RICE DISTRIBUTION ROUTE FROM THE
DELTA TO SAIGON- THIS WOULD ADD TO THE ALREADY FORMIDABLE
PRESSURES ON THE CITY. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS LIMITED COURSE OF
ACTION MIGHT ALONE BE SUCCESSFUL SO THAT THE GVN WOULD FALL BY
THE END OF JUNE-','
10. HANOI RECOGNIZES THAT POLITICAL AND MILITARY FACTORS
WILL CONTINUE TO INTERACT. GOVERNMENTAL CHANGES IN SAIGON, GVN
MILITARY PERFORMANCE, AND THE EVOLVING STATE OF PUBLIC AND
RVNAF MORALE WILL CONDITION ITS FINAL PLANNING. THE FACT THAT
THERE IS LITTLE ROOM FOR RETREAT MAY STIFFEN THE RESOLVE OF SAIGON'S
FORCES. NOINETHELESS, A SUDDEN P113111IIIIIUISYCHOLOGICAL UN-
RAVELING ALONG THE LINES THAT OCCURRED IN THE NORTHERN HALF OF
THE COUNTRY IS DISTINCTLY POSSIBLE. IN SUCH AN EVENT, A COM-
MUNIST VICTORY WOULD FOLLOW IN SHORT ORDER-',
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11 IN THIS REGARD, HANOI PROBABLY HOIPES THAT A COMBINATION
OF THE ABOVE FACTORS WILL MAKE IIIUNNECESSARY A FINAL DIRECT
ASSAULT ON SAIGON. THIS WOULD SPARE THE COMMUNISTS THE PROBLEMS
OF FEEDING AND HOUSING THE POPULATION OF A CITY DESTROYED BY A
PIITCHED BATTLE. AND IT WOULD MINIMIZE DAMAGE TO VITAL FACILITIES
AND RESOURCES WHICH HANOI WOULD PREFER TO CAPTURE INTACT- THESE
INTERESTS ISEEM REFLECTED BY RECENT COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA AND BY
THE 10-POINT POLICY TOWARD "LIBERATED AREAS" BROADCAST BY THE
COMMUNISTS ON APRIL 3. ALTHOUGH PRIMARILY DESIGNED TO BRING ORDER
AND STABILITY TO NEWLY CONQUERED REGIONS AS FAST AS POSSIBLE,
THESE PRONOUNCEMENTS'.. RE PROBABLY ALSO DESIGNED TO INCREASE
PRESSURES IN SAIGON FOR A "NEGOTIATED" SETTLEMENT AND TO HASTEN
THE POLITICAL CRUMBLING THAT IS ALREADY IN TRAIN- FURTHERMORE,
THE POLITICAL ADVANTAGES GAINED BY SOUTH VIETNAM'S COLLAPSE WITH-
OUT A MAJOR BATTLE FOR SAIGON WOULD BE SUBSTANTIAL.Y
12- IN SUM, HANOI IS IN GOOD POSITION TO TAKE\'WHATEVER
ACTION IT CONSIDERS NECESSARY TO WIN THE WAR- WHILE'A QUICK,
DECISIVE MILITARY, STROKE MAY BE IN. THE WORKS, WE BELIEVE THAT
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HANOI WILL OPT FOR A LESS COSTLY AND POLITICALLY MORE EXPEDIENT
ALTERNATIVE, CALCULATING THAT A SOUTH VIEOTNAMESE COLLAPSE FROM
WITHIN IS NEAR AT HAND- AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, COMMUNIST
UNITS WILL POSITION THEMSELVES FOR A FINAL ATTACK SHOULD THEIR
PREFERRED COURSE FAIL- WHATEVER THE CASE, SOUTH VIETNAM'S FATE
APPEARS TO BE SEALED- TAKING ALL FACTORS INTO ACCOUNT, THE ONLY
QUESTION IS TIMING -- WHETHER WEEKS OR MONTHS. E2 IMPDET?d
DATE: 4 APR 1975
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