THE VIETNAM STUDY {'UNITED STATES - - VIETNAM RELATIONS 1945-1967'}

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000400120017-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 23, 2006
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: June 25, 1971
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2006/10/31 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000400120017-3
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
25 June 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Melvin R. Laird
The Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT : The Vietnam Study ("United States -- Vietnam
Relations .1945-1967")
1. I am writing to review where we stand with respect to the
46 volume Vietnam Study that has been leaked (at least in part) to
various newspapers around the country. From his conversation with
you on Monday, 21 June, Mr. Carver got the impression that you were
perhaps under the misapprehension that the Agency or certain Agency
officers were engaged in a systematic review of the whole study,
screening it for material which would compromise intelligence sources
and methods if it were put in the public domain. As Mr. Carver in-
formed Admiral Mur h on 22 June this is not the case. Our Deputy
Director for Support Mr.
Coffey did assist on Saturday, 19 June, and through most of Sunday,
20 June, in a discussion and review of the situation created by the
leak of the Vietnam Study that was chaired by Mr. Buzhardt and con-
ducted in his office in the Pentagon.
2, At the time of Mr. Carver's 22 June conversation with
Admiral Murphy, no Agency officer -- other than Mr. Coffey -- had
ever seen the Vietnam Study or any portions thereof. We did not have
a copy in the Agency, nor were we engaged in -- or able to engage in --
any review of its contents. As Mr. Carver told Admiral Murphy, we
stood ready to help out in any way we could, but without access to the
documents there was little we could do.
3. On Thursday morning, 24 June, Assistant Secretary of State
Marshall Green called Chief of our 'Far East
Division) to request the assistance of knowledgeable Agency officers
in a quick screening of the 46 volumes in order to meet a Friday, 25 June,
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deadline for the U. S. Government's response impo&ed by the New
York court. In compliance with Mr. Green's request, we dispatched
a team of nine experienced officers, all thoroughly versed in Vietnamese
affairs, to assist the State Department in its screening process.
4. Also on Thursday, 24 June, Mr. Carver had a lengthy session
with Mr. Buzhardt and made a personal inspection of the copy of the
study in Mr. Buzhardt's office.
5. We will of course do everything we can to assist you, the
Department of State, or any other U. S. Government component in
this matter. Our officers' quick examination of the whole study
today, however, has convinced us that to do a proper job of review
we will have to have sustained access to the study for at least several
days and preferably here in the Agency, where all of our other records
and background materials are readily available -- including the full
texts of the many Agency documents cited throughout the study. I
recognize the difficulties you have in meeting needs or requests for
copies of the full study, but I still need to ask that we be given at least
the loan of a full set so that we can do the kind of proper, professionally
thorough job of review that we need to do in order to provide you, the
White House and other concerned Government components our best support.
R. E. Cushman, Jr.
Lieutenant General, USMC
Acting -REFXmtV Director of Central Intelligence
ra~
O/DCI/SAVA:GACarver, Jr. / (25Jun71)
Distribution
Orig - Addressee
1-ER
1 - Ex. Dir-Compt
1 DDI/ADDI
1 - D/ONE
1 - D/OCI/DD/OCI
1-C/FE
SECRET)
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I'll [l in
Laos and South 1'icinanl. Oni.'
Laos would
definitely folleir into the Ca;;,rnunisl of-hit."
In toiril: rejec~iag the so-cal!cd domino
Iht or} on ick L .S. polio v..i !used in the
Eiseni;r,,y(r. Kennedy and .Jobe;on ndrninis-
trations, the CIA tool; a posh o Con:,'istent
With long line of
back to
of what would happen if President Nixon,-at
the start of his administration, had pulled all
U.S. troops out of Vietnam and opened the
way to a !ile Viet Cong take over of the
Saigon ,ot erfl e, :
"We would lose Laos irnr,;ediatel}. Siha-
nouk would preserve Cambodia by a strad-
dlng effort. All of Southeast Asia would remain
just as it is at least for another generation,
"Thailand, in particular, t';ould continue to
maintain close relations with the U.S. and
would seek additional support. Simulta-
neously, Thailand would make overtures and
move toward China and the Soviet Union. It
would simply rake aid from both sides to pre-'
serve its independence.
"North Vietnam would carte,,
1'Gl' Cx:La ple Cllr (M u;t'~(-t;, ,,!;!Ih l
?clay tr l9ui, the CIA ci rlr.r,,l ?t a ;lit on
lnlcki;:r ,,,,; , , , ? t tntiaJ
nCC lis...,. t,(. tn.tl the ('n!ied Stales
ti'.~,akl "retain ccasider.d,le l(^:r?rn~_e in Soeib-
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By Morhon Kondracke
and Thomas B. Ross
Sun-Times Bureau
CoPyr; f'f, 1971, Chicago Sun-Times
WASHINGTON -- The Nixon adminfs-
tralion as advised by the Central In-
1e11igence Agency in lf' 9 that it could imme
diately r,ithdj-aw from Vietnam and "all of
Southeast Asia v,otd(I remain just as it is at
-ast for
r,notl;er~~enerafion."
Governniem drxaunmts revealed Friday
that the CIA offered the following prediction
Robert McNartara's doubts in 19Gu ou es
caiatin?
the war revealed, I'a;e 6.
east Asia even if Laos and South 1'ieunaof
came under North Vietr;n-u control."
The CIA
its pessimisfic aassessment of the y value of
launching a bombin; Campaign against North
Vietnam, It argued that air attacks were un-
likely to break Hanoi's will and can-ied the
danger of escalating the war into a direct
confrontation, With Communist China and the
Soviet Union. .
RLCih"iG:ti m?asurec n:'hich the 'l
might to c i;, orth
os roil S u u t h t,?:el?
nam,' l;-
cr?asin1h? t:`; ''clarcd. Inil,!;t mia'ce i( in?
for the "
.~,
objectives r.. I~' iaea
.,?.,.,r::htc ~~}limih~tl ir,eans.
Thus, co.np,eb- nsion r , crease , - h t
in?
sides as scale of~ action
mounted."
Former Pr: ,': . Johnson re-
jected tl.c Ci.; s n lsice and started sustained
bombing is F : u: i-- 11k 5,
Simihulr, Pre;i;tent Nixon dista 'OCT :rthe
Tttrn to Pave S
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Continued from Page 1
CIA estimate in lOG9 and decided on a slow
tvithldrawal, an expansion of the war into
Cambodia and Laos and a partial revival of
the bombing of North Vietnam.
On several occasions since coming to office,
Mr. Nixon has referred to immediate, total
U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia as "pre-
cipitate" and the equivalent of "our defeat
and humiliation."
In various ways, he has signaled an in-
tention to preserve non-Communist govern-
ments in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.
Instead of pulling out of Vietnam rapidly,
Mr. Nixon has withdrawn gradually, to give
the South Vietnamese a "reasonable chance"
to maintain their present government.
U.S. troop levels were at 540,000 when Mr.
Nixon took of ice. They are scheduled to be
down to 184,000 by Dec. 1, close to the end of
Mr. Nixon's third year in office. The Presi-
dent has not said when - if ever - U.S.
forces will be completely gone from Vietnam.
Meanwhile, Air. Nixon stoutly denied that
inc invasions of Cambodia in 1069 and Laos in
1970 constituted expansions of the war or
were even related to political conditions in
those coulltrieS.
In 1060, U.S. troops joined South Vietnam-
ese forces in the invasion, while the Laos in-
cursion was conducted by Vietnamese ;round
forces supported by U.S. planes and helicop-
ters.
Mr. Nixon defended both actions as efforts
to speed the "end of the war" in South Viet-
nam. Nevertheless, the administration has
exhibited interest in preserving the non-Conl-
ni mist character of the governments of Laos
and Cambodia.
There has been a massive infusion of miii-
tary and economic aid to the anti-Communist
regime of Lon Nol in Cambodia, and U.S. air
power continues to support South Vietnamese
and Cambodian army combat operations
there. ;
The lCap hodian operations began on the
Ll 'e y to ~.i V l ',.. `~::_~ :i ? ... ~" i' .= a
heels of Lon Noi's overthrew of Sil,r:;soul;,
the man the CIA predicted would retain pow-
er if the United States left Soutl;ea ;t Asia.
The United States did not leave, and Sihanouk
fell. In some quarters, his overthrow has been
ascribed to the CIA.
In Laos, the Unircd States has continued
extensive bombing raids both along the iio
Chi Minh infiltration routes in t're southern
part of the country and in north Laos near
Plain of Jars.
The north Laos operations - bombing and
aid to anti-Communist guerdilas-are Ii:ikcd to
retention of a neutralist government in Vien-
tiane, the capital.
The government documents, disclosed to
The Sun-Times by a number of reliable
sources, show the CIA consistently reported
that the bombing of North Vietnam was not
effective, either in military or political terms.
The CIA's estimates, the documents also re-
veal, provided the basis for former Defense
Sec. Clark Clifford's silent campaign to net
the bombing stopped in 1963.
The CIA's Office of National E.~;imates ad-
vanced the case against the horn:'du : In 1055
despite CIA Director John A. N'cConc's
vice that U.S. planes "hit thorn harder, more
frequently, and inflict greater damage.,,
In an April 2, 1065, memo to Sec. o.' State
Dean Rusk, White House adviser McGeorge
Bundy and Ambassador Maxwcl D. Taylor,
McCone argued that Mr. Johnson's decision
the previous day to commit U.S. troops to
combat would: work only "if our air strikes
against the north are sufficiently heavy and
damaging really to hurt the North Vietnam-
ese."
lie warned that a slow escalation of the
bombing would open the U.S. government to
"increasing pressure" from the press and
public opinion to stop the raids.
Then, McConc concluded: "We will find
ourselves mired down in combat in the jungle
in a military effort that we cannot win, and
from which we will havQ extreme difficulty in
enacting out:selves."
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