DOMESTIC ATTITUDES AFFECTING THE GVN'S POSIITON ON NEGOTIATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000500020031-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2004
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: September 16, 1965
• Content Type: MF

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16 Septomber 1965
Mitle3RANIMM * Par aat Staff
Office of Maticral Estimates
Domestic Attitudes Affecting the OVN
Position on Negotiations
of Vietnamese, attitudes affecting the
must recognize that to virtually all
at Vietmkalese in South Vietnam,
hard= for ?surrenders and US efforts
e generate (in almost Pavlovian
which the Communists' Vietnamese
enemies' mercy. Unlike many Americans,
eh extend for more than a decade. Their
a on the proaect of tioms in 1965 are shaped by vhat they
say happen in 195k. In Vietnamese eyes, the negotiations leading tc
he 1954 Geneva Accords were a successful Ceramist political tactic with
got the Trench out of Vietnam (vie commitments the Communists hae no
intention of honoring) but posed no serious bar to continuation of the
Communist drive for political domination over the article country. During
the Geneva discussions* the views, feelings, and aspirations of anti-
Communist Vietnamese Imre cavalierly disregarded or ignored by the
negotiating powers. /be individual responsible for voicing these views
eme personally required to bear the indignities involved was /tan Van
Dor principal representative at Geneva of the Associated State of Vist-
as* in 1954 and now the present Gres Permian Minister.
2. Local attitudes toward the whole 'Object of negotiations are
shaped by regional factors and functional responsibilities. /be
mmamrity of ethnic northerners now in South Vietnam mme there because
they fled in 1954 to avoid coming under Communist control. WAY see
themselves as having umber* else to go. Nence their actions, Should
negotiations again seem imminent, could be those of desperation and
not shaped by what we would call rational logic. Centrist** (particularly
those from south of the 17th Parallel) and ethnic southerners have less
prima facie grounds for fearing Communist domination, but even in these
groups persons who have been active in opposing the Communists mill feel
a sense of desperation if they think arrengements are in prospect Which
will permit the Communists to come to power.
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3. nonctiana the most edema opposition to
almost certainly come from the Army. Mere there is wsltkely to be much
middle ground. Officers who remain steadfast vill almost c
attempt to ssbotage negotiation proposals and to prevent the
cooperating with the US in this regard. A tow, if faced with the prospect
of early negotiations, will, probably consider the dame lost and decide
that they have no alternative but to make their own personal arrangements
elth the melee.
v.
4. Among the religious groups, Catholics probably feel they have
to lose from Commueist domination and almost certainly will
most active role opposing any near term political settlement
This will be particularly true in the case of the northern
refugee Catholics, who are generally more militant and better organised
southern coereligioalsts. The Ihmddist position is more
t, partly because there is really- no single anhuddist* position.
must consider the individual positions of various influential
ire. Opposition to the idea of negotiation at the present
rong among the more influential bonzes. Tri emang,
es a desire for eventual peace, has taken great pains
en of American officials (includieg the undersigned)
political trap which must be avoided since
es they could only benefit the Communist*. Ten
ken, but even he has a sense of realism about
practices which many emerican proponent* of au
to lack.
5. In the political field, the 11Qm has waged the knife
she redo-Chine*. Communist Party for about 30 Dal nets,
more than 2o. Despite the fact that both of these parties are
toyed into contending factious, TD and Dal fist sentiments will
ly be as strong as those of the northern Catholics of whom,
se, belong to one or the other of tbese two political groups).
6. At all levels of politically articulate Vietnamese society,
attitudes toward negotiations are influenced by historical memories,
visceral emotions, and concern over such basic matters as physical
survival. Consequently lie cannot expect any aspect of this problem to
look the same to Vietnamese AS it mieet through American eyes. Discounting
those who weld privately switch to the Communist side (a group which
the prospect of early negotiations might sigmificantly increase), I
believe that virtually all politically influentiel segments of Vletaamese
society are already nervous on this topic, mistrust US motives and
intentions, and weld react violently should a conference become imminent.
At best, the present military regime vii] be uncooperative with respect
to any MS efforts to arrange a conference in the near future. The Army
would be unlikely to tolerate any successor governmeatinhich adopted a
more pliable position.
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Jtit I
7. The key point iL all this busieess is one of timing.
Vietnamese are undoubtedly sick of war and Pnvious for peace. Few with
present political influence in South Vietnam, however, twos) any illuelons
about what a Communist-domineted Ppeace" would mean for them. Despite
recent military improvements (duo largely to the quantum iacrease in US
involvement), most politically influential Viets are still inclined to
think that any negotiated settlement effected in the near fUturc will
inevitably result in Communist domination. This attitude may change
in time; but until it does, such Vietnamese will almost certainly regard
negotiations as a =mace to their personal safety and that of their
families and a threat to everything for which they have been struggling
since 1934. This assessment or the likely consequences of a negotiated
settlement, is turn, will influence the personal and political actions
of the Vietnamese who subscribe to it.
/3i
OCR A. CARVER, JR.
Vietnamese Affairs Asir
iSACarver Jr: mee
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 Mt. de Silva,, VA
1 - Chrono
1 - Mt. Carver
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