COMMITTEE PAPERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000500060016-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: May 23, 1967
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2006/11/06: CIA-RDP80R01720R000500060016-0
SECRET
23 May 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Committee Papers
1. Your 25 April terms of reference (attached) asked you
(i.e.. CIA) to prepare three papers:
(a) An analysis and estimate of the situation
(b) An estimate of the consequences of several
military courses of action
(c) An assessment of whether (and how) the
US-GVN intelligence relationship could be
improved and targetted more effectively.
2. As you will recall, we reviewed the terms of reference and
factored out seventeen separate topics therefrom. These were assigned
around the Agency as separate papers. Our thought was that once they
were done, I would write a single paper. based on these inputs, which
would serve as the analysis and estimate requested. To satisfy the dual
requirements for a usable paper plus an in-depth study, we subsequently
decided to bind the separate papers as a back-up book to my single paper.
3. As I explained yesterday, things got slightly snarled as the
result of actions taken by R. J. Smith with the best of professional intent
but in ignorance of the precise nature (or, for that matter, the existence)
of your White House requirements. Mr. Smith rejected the draft summary
I had prepared (tailored to these requirements) and used a summary
prepared on his instructions by OC1. This will be coming to you from the
DDI along with the back-up book and multiple copies of the lZ May ONE
paper "Reactions to Various US Courses of Action." The latter is the
"consequences estimate" mentioned in paragraph l above.
SECRET
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4. Attached herewith are
(a) A copy of my analysis paper, typed in final
form per your instructions. This document
has not been coordinated outside of SAVA
(for the reason explained above) but does
faithfully reflect the judgments of the inputs,
which were coordinated
(b) A paper called "The Intelligence Attack on the
Viet Cong Infrastructure. "" which discharges the
third of the three requirements outlined in
paragraph 1. This paper has been coordinated
with FE Division.
5. I am only attaching single copies of our two VA documents
to this memorandum. My secretary. however, is glum
eight extra sets, each including both papers. so you will have enough
copies for all the committee members, if you want them.
6. The 25 April Cataenbach memo spoke of actions which could
be taken to bring the Vietnam situation to a successful conclusion. I do
not know how deeply you wish to get into the action recommendation field,
but there are four things that urgently need to be done in Vietnam:
must stop the Communist attempt to regain
the strategic military initiative and compel fit-to
disperse our forces to check our offensive opera-
tions and make at least some pacified areas
vulnerable. This means more allied troops, soon.
We think it means a minimum of one additional
division and preferably two.
(b) ARVN. somehow, has to be persuaded to dig into
its pacification security mission and go about it
the right way. We do not need a "screen, " for a
"screen" will never work. ARVN, province-by-
province, must identify, seek out. harrass, and
eliminate the VC village platoons, district com-
panies and provincial battalions. This offensive
rooting out of Communist local forces is the only
road to local security.
?E N%lr
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(c) Working covertly (e.g. through
and other station assets) we have got to try to
reach Ky and Thieu and shortstop their
burgeoning rivalry before it does irrevocable
damage to the unity of the military establish-
r ent.
(d) We must avoid adopting a bombing strategy
that Hanoi can construe as a political and
psychological victory or a vindication of their
estimate of our political inability to stay the
course.
Attachment a
(1) 25 April Katzenbach Memo
(Z) Analysis and Estimate
(3) Infrastructure Attack Paper
Distribution:
Original - Director, w/atts.
I - GAC Chrono, w/o4O aI#s.
1 . w/o all atts. (Katzenbach memo excepted)
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
L
Approved For Release 2006/11/06: CIA-RDP80R01720R000500060016-0