GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S EYES ONLY MESSAGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000500070003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 28, 1967
• Content Type: MF

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28 September 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: General Westmoreland's EYES ONLY Message
1. General Westmoreland says that we are paying a high price
to maintain our present positions near the DMZ and that we are unable to
relieve the enemy's pressure. He says major offensive operations are not
feasible until the dry season (May or June), but he does not rule out smaller
scale raids into the north if they receive political approval.
2. As a consequence, General Westmoreland plans to "thin out"
our positions near the DMZ. He has abandoned DYEMARKER for the time
being, using the barrier resources instead to harden our positions along
Route 9 to the south. Those positions are being reinforced with two ARVN
Airborne battalions. III MAF is to reinforce the area between Route 9 and
Danang. Westmoreland is considering further deployments which would
thin out our forces somewhat in II Corps to enable the Marines to shift
additional forces northward from Danang. He will rely on intensified
artillery and air strikes to inflict heavy losses on the enemy in the DMZ
area.
3. COMMENT: The adjustments undertaken and proposed by
General Westmoreland -- however justified for climatic and geographic
considerations -- will be widely interpreted as a net setback to our military
position. The Communists will claim a military victory, and their forces
in South Vietnam will be encouraged. Our own forces -- and more significantly,
those of our Vietnamese allies -- will be discouraged at the seeming impotence
of our military position. Critics of our position here at home will have a
field day.
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4. The only alternative to the proposed limited withdrawal would
be to stay in place and trust that the cumulative effect of the rainy season
and our counterfire will reduce the enemy's ability to inflict a high level of
attrition on our forces. We would recommend that a comprehensive reading
on this cyclical pattern of enemy operations be made after the Route 9 defenses
have been strengthened, and before any final decision is taken to withdraw
from positions near the DMZ.
25X1
Ge rge A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
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I)EPAIITMENT ()F FATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
September 27, 1967
FOR: The Honorable
Richard Helms
Director, CIA
FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary
Nick Katzenbach intends to discuss
this at the Non-Group meeting
tomorrow.
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