REVIEW OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CIA'S VIETNAM STATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000500070080-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 14, 2006
• Sequence Number: 80
• Publication Date: July 25, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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2 5 JUL 1967
i EMOR ANDUM
5SUBJECT. Review of the Activities of the CIA's Vietnam
THE OPERATING CLIMATIE
I obtained of the CIA Station's activ'iti*s in
Vietnam on this trip are significantly different from the in,-preset
obtained on previous visits= During earlier periods. in looking at the
Station one saw a harassed but laaginative band of officers wrestling with
a variety of challenges
launching new programs in an effort to throw
up so e obstacles to slow the Viet Cong mozrfentw= and protect u
the fragility of the Sat
at (the GV . On this occaoi
saw, a Station with a clear and I portant role in the overall American
effort, working as a full and highly regarded member of a Country Team
and possessing the initiative in the contest with the Viet Gong. The
Station is still over?coriA itted, but is efficiently structured to make a
signific
II. OR
contribution for
,ON AND P'
a of its sine.
tationts pro
at were r arkabte
innovations. vAique in the quality of their a cution. Yet since they
were srmall, even though welt polished, they were precious indications of
State Dept. review completed
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future pro x ise i ore than major contributions to a current war effort.
That day is nom- over for several reasons, iacludin
on the scene. the vast inkprovei nt of th
real groups under effective chiefs, and
the fact that our officers are approaching programs as participants its
a joint effort and as co-workers ' ith their colleagues in der agencies,
rather than as parecbislists.
members *
is milita
AM's str
American personnel
of r hieh about 10, 000 are intelligence personae
Station. By contrast. there are around 460, (00
a Vtetnsaet is
e, and USIA ab
responsibilities it
2, 000, the Embassy has about Z31
Although in light of our total a orld ide
gee our career personnel in
our activities in Vi*tnazr& must and will be supplemented by the utilization
oral military and contract perso
order to provide the
naaapower necessary to execute prograe ,s of the scope and variety of those
. PR
engaged.
as -.aa=uaist Altus: As the immediate
military threat is pushed farther fron, the populated areas. It becorr. ens
over more it .portant to eliminate the Viet Cong apparatus (also awn as
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the political coat
olruet
twists' covert authority-
is well rove
knowled
factl#tat
70 000-OW
acb n
s task has been underlined by Ambassador Kor=?:er tad
.d by the
the ideatlfication and capture of key
tear) in order to free the
,anist cadre- The
to our n ilitasy C
of battle type info
n on the
watts but are including a
strength and
steadily gro
their
Of intelligence on w1pa tt Cons Unist
identities, ctions and physical locaticens. This is a he slthy
Station, is exptoitia a Variety
so of detailed
? of our best
officers are
level CO'Car **d structure in order to open channel* of
j0&,tduals in thin key target group so that we can tsu"
The stag is hard at
the Ytet Cong political structure at *li levels in order
,ation of Cor - mi i
ceeivv
Profess
teechaiques in pursuing about
covert operations air od at key =::.=-X er$ of the e
info r~attoa-
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to act as we would haves them act or, at a u ini urn, sow
U.
o y Devel e!ts The reorganization of the Ai
u tionary Developn~ ent effort has est. a major step toward irrr proving
the control of US efforts in the der W ar, 'It and will help to
rograr s of all US as
will aim at concentrated objectives.
24, 000-odd Revolutionary Dov,*Joprnont cadre currently iil
a prcogran, operated by our Station censtitut
RD program.
re are by no means perfect,
ant of this
techniques have stimulated a series of efforts to emulate
ad thereby extend their effect veneas ar profit from{ the experience
d in developing the concepts which guide their activities. It is
indeed to sees
ext pie
self-defense fo:
months ago an RD
its work w ith 12 f0 w,
rx-or* or less under Viet Cong authority. It is even more heartening to
and hove thee. com
are succeeding in throwtl
The Station has conclusively proved the importance of the cadre progran,
to this "Other ar. 11 it has also shown that this program. can carried
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suits of this activity. to visits for
Use with an elected causeeil and a
78 YMMS seven, located in an area where only six
,Orr ssrmU ittes have been stimulated and supported
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cto rie s as has happened, for example, around
Two years ago
;Ong sea, NO w, in its environs, the Viet Cong are being washed
Ord and ever farther away.
6. Political Intelligence and Action: In the political field,
r relies heavily on the judgment, initiative
techniques of our Station and its officers. The Station to
opera
specific an detailed co x4rr a e4 and providing hi-r" the
ode in. the delicate process of constitutional and electoral
devslo ent. On the Ambassadors behalf we are developing di
provisions and electoral pla
we network of relationships and assets will also help provide
e of a VN political plans and Intentions and *arty warning of
political so
tld be counter to US interests.
7. Other roa,:s= While the manifold programs outlined above
are n=assive by our Agency's standards, they do not con=prise the whole
of our Station's eforts. In addition to these pprograms, the Station is
also carrying on other activities:
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by working with Vietnamese youth in
the countryside. Through other Station progrsxa s, North VL*tvWLm to
being subjected to a variety of psychological pressures, including pressures
from clandestine radios spreading defeaatia and arousing fear of .ae's
PROBLEMS
bleu s have been solved. many still remain. We still
TRI F 'unction of Civil ntrol: I do not mean to
art property organised
en forced out.
Ambassador I-Comor
pared at Ambassador Kamer's request. ILEX is in its earliest eta
d keeping the Fist Cong away once they
effort in this field is being built around
cture Intelligence Coordination and
tatio&' (ICEX) organisation which. is largely based on a Station proposal
nh see have yet rcc
IC EX approach is going to work. Much needs to be done to improve the
effectb'eness
cope of the staffing
that this Agency and the military will have to m *#t if the
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order to pens it the coverage Of a
tion. various tentative efforts are
sejf..d.feanse a:terOnto quad ot'bers; but both a cee
practical Job still needs to be done is this vital area,
xaar sat roll" -UP: It is also clear that some
at be developed to ensure a proper follow-up of tae
which has been provided by an RD ton=
Which it has
on ,ateeadin,
the team leaves
working, Other i00 there is a pronounced
o fall back to earlier Vieetaa1Uess gone
rfted to produce the problem in that
This is Prim
job for Ambassador
c,rtae i work closely with hin in att
1 failings which
'Station will
as to solve it.
it is also
i 1ederel C?rgasri~iaties and Political Intations'
goal forms o
organization. especially in the n-
tat, field (c,. S. . trade unions and, event , Political parti
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must be developed in order to strengthen the fabric of Vietnamese
the V traru a 00 capable of protecting then-, selves
s# Cong probes, political as well as n litary. This is only
1 roblerA of assisting Vietnam in its
process, of transition fror govere lent by mandarlnai or r .ilitary
&w1h*ritarriara ian to Bove rrra s
aa. common endeavor. A
gag'
ent of the people
overall American problev~ but
contribute substantially thr
officers and through some of our third country
on direction can eateend their own Asian Influence to
Vietnamese in
as of political evolution.
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V. CONC
12.
over and there are c*
it appears to rr;ee tb
political
is by means
y fragile elements in the overall picture, it
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ar that my Soviet or Chinese c terpart's report r iust
the Viet Cong's me seMag parabler: s and the
a people's w&r. My c? rIterpL't can quito prop.
of both the nth Viet esa and
f responsibility
* ti-C
DOV m
Station.
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