U.S. INTERESTS AND THE VIETNAMESE ELECTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000500070150-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2004
• Sequence Number: 150
• Publication Date: June 8, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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8 June 1967
MEMORANbUM
SUBJECT: I.T.S. Int rests and the Vietnamese Elections
25X1 This memorandum addresses itself to three questions which have
been posed regarding the forthcoming national elections in Vietnam:
(1) Will Ky win. the *-It ction? (2) Is it in the U.S. interest for him to win?
I. Will Ky Win the Electign? Ky will almost certainly win if Thieu
withdraws from the contest. Kylechances of wjtp6bg will be slightly better
than even if Thieu resigns from the Army and rtm i ae a civilian candidate,
thereby minimizing the prospects for an open epllt bf theebstablishment.f'
If Thieu remains in the Army and runs as an alternate government candidate,
however. Ky's chances of victory would be less than even, since Ky and Thieu
would be competing not only for the military vote but also for the support of
essentially the same pro-Government, nationalist groups. Under these circum-
stances, Ky's entourage (e.g., Loan) might be able to salvage victory through
blatant manipulation and fraud, but such a victory would be Pyhrric in character,
would open serious wounds within the military, would sow seeds of instability
and. popular revulsion, and would negate the progress made thus far in the
political development process.
2. Do We Want Ky to Win? Among all the potential contenders. Ky
offers the most net it tractia$s. He has demonstrated political skill and
increasing maturity; he has. grown steadily into bis responsibilities. We know
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we can work with him and that he can produce results as an executive.
His ideals are basically sound and have potential. political appeal. His
policies and aimrs are generally consistent with ours. His victory would
offer optimum prospects for continuity and momentum in our jointly
developed programs, for cooperation between military and civilian elements,
for development of a genuinely broad political organization, and for effective
communication between the urban and rural masses, on the one hand, and
the governmental and national political leadership on the other.
3. A victory by Thieu would be less compatible with U.S. interests.
Th .e.u probably would not have the full support and cooperation (cver after
winning of thy, r ~t ra ll~ unpo rtant. Young Turk military element, and he
would riot attract as wide. a political base as Ky among civilian groups. A
government headed by Thieu would mo*t likely be less flexible, dynamic
and progressive in A& approach to solutions of Vietnam's problems and
more inclined to be Mandarinal, rigid and paternalistic in the Diem pattern.
Thieu'? principal support stems from the older political generation, which is
steeped in traditional (and ineffectual) Vietnamese political forms and
practice s and which has little appeal to the youth.
4. A victory by T ran Van Huong would be potentially disruptive.
particularly if it were achieved at the expense of the Thieu-Ky rivalry.
Although much of Huong's appeal derives from his integrity and southern
origin, his victory would be dependent on strong support from extremist,
anti-establishment elements -- Gaullist-oriented southern separatists and
militant Buddhists -- whose views he would be unable .to ignore. While he
had indicated he might be able to work with Ky after the election, his corn-
pulsion to do so would diminish if the military establishment were split
during the campaign, and his ability do do so effectively would be limited by
virtue of the character and prejudices of his political base. The factors which
contributed to the instability of his brief tenure as Prime Minister in late
1964 -- the fundamental clash between the military and the Buddhist extremists --
would militate against the prospects for success another time around.
5. A victory by Phan Khac Sau -- which is most unlikely in any event --
would not offer hopeful prospects either for stability or for effective government.
Suu himself has never demonstrated political astutemas or effective leadership
ability, and It is unlikely that the more dynamic and progressive Dr. Dan --
his prospective running mate -- could effectively counter Suu's unfortunate
weaknesses.
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6. On balance, U.S. interests would beat be see rved if Ky were to
win in a reasonably clean contest, and if he were to broaden the base of his
post-election government by honoring his reported commitment to incorporate
Huang acs Prime Minister. Such a government would offer optimum prospects
for stability. continuity, and development of a mass, popular base. Moreover.
it would represent the optimum political challenge to the Communists, since
any other result would offer prospects for instability which the Communists
could nurture to their ultimate advantage.
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