NOTES ON BUNDY'S OPTION PAPER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000500100011-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2004
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: May 25, 1968
• Content Type: MF

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25 May 1968
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
S ,U BJECT: Notes on Bundy's Option Paper
1. Attached is the option project description that Mr. Bundy
tabled at the Friday. 24 May committee meeting. He asked that
we (CIA) prepare draft inputs assessing the probable South
Vietnamese and North Vietnamese reactions to each of the five
options under consideration. The schedule announced at the 24 May
meeting was that all draft inputs would be given to Bundy at our
Monday. 27 May meeting. he would prepare a rough total draft
(so labelled) that could be circulated and discussed at the 28 May
Tuesday lunch. After receiving further guidance and direction from
the lunch, the committee would then shake out a final draft to be
ready for submission to the President at the end of the week (i. e.,
around Friday. 31 May).
2. I gather from our telephone conversation in the late afternoon
of 24 May that the above schedule has been foreshortened. After
You called. I convened
is preparing the draft South Vietnamese assessments, (t NE),
the draft North Vietnamese assessments. These will be circulated
and coordinated Monday morning in time for me to meet my commit-
ment to Bundy.
3. All participating in our 24 May session felt that you should be
apprised of the draft SNIE on "The Viet-:yam Situation" (copy attached).
which needs a little further tinkering but even in Its present form is
a good paper accurately reflecting the Agency position.
4. On the general issues raised by the Bundy project:
a. All agreed that none of the options - - I. e.. no feasible
(non-nuclear) bombing program -- was likely to have an
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appreciable short term effect on Hanoi's military capability
to prosecute the war.
b. All agreed that, after only four meetings in Paris. the
world at large would find it hard to understand and would be
unlikely to support any public manifestation of U. S. impatience.
At I out resumption that the U. S. wwaswould
notg'?~fncslre~ about
generally read as a sign
the talks in the first place.
c. The group split sharply over its estimate of the varying
effect of the five options on Hanoi' s continued presence at the
negotiating table. Graham and I (a minority of two) both argued
that Hanoi probably wanted to keep the negotiations going for its
own reasons and hence, despite bluster and perhaps temporary
suspension of the talks or withdrawal from Paris, would Ibrobably
keep the negotiations going under at least option B and probably
E; perhaps not under C; and probably not under D. Hyland was
of the strong and well argued opinion that any increase in present
bombing patterns (i. e. , even B and hence certainly C-E) would.
make Hanoi break off the talks altogether. The others ranged
in between but werd` more of Hyland' a persuasion than Graham's
or mine.
d. After considerable discussion and argument we came out
about as follows, though these are most accurately reported to
you as my views with which I was generally able to get my
co ileagues to agree and not as a complete concer-Susc
(1) Hanoi now believes that if it stonewalls l g will
enough, international and domestic political pressure
compel the U. S. to offer some "carrots" (i. e.. substantive
concessions) to keep the talks from foundering. Any such
unreciprocated concessions will have a very adverse effect
on South Vietnam, attitudes and opinions --- these being
among Hanoi's chief current targets.
(2) Hanoi also probably believes the de-escalatory
process enunciated in President Johnson's 31 March speech Hency the is, for the U. S. politically al risk for?North Vietnam.
outlined in (1) involves minim
(3) Little real progress is likely to be made in Paris
(from our standpoint) in (1) and or until Hanoi is disabused of
the notions outlined
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(4) For maximum mileage from international opinion,
the U. S. should probably follow option A for another week
or two, to prepare the propaganda ground and let Hanoi's
absolute intransigeance be unmistakably apparent to everyone
willing to recognize facts as facts.
(5) If. as will probably prove to be the case, Hanoi
fails to budge during the next week or two (i. e.. by mid-June),
the U. S. should begin quietly but unambiguously registering
its impatience. Some of my colleagues favored a delicately
worded private statement by Governor Harriman that was
clearly a non-specific ultimatum. I personally am more
in favor of starting in a slightly lower key with something
like the British gambit we have discussed, then moving to
quiet indications to the Soviets, press leaks and finally a
defacto ultimatum.
(6) Once the propaganda case has been hammered
home and the diplomatic, public opinion ground prepared,
a "signal type" turn up of the bombing would probably be
politically useful, though it would have a negligible military
effect. The majority view here was that the first step
should be raids on clearly defined military targets directly
(or plausibly) related to expanded activity in the south, e. g. ,
Bai Thuong airfield. If this message did not get through,
a further turn of the screw to
util ty. of the Ohowever,
parallel could have further poftics
the targets selected should be politically defensible ones.
(7) The group divided sharply over the impact of
retaliation-type raids in the north keyed to specific hostile
acts in the south such as intense attacks on specific cities.
The majority felt these would work against the U. S. in the
propaganda field since up to now our public "no advantage?
statements have been tied to infiltration rather than southern
activity. Graham and I. however, share Emerson's estimate
of foolish consistency and believe that surgical retaliatory
strikes would be politically useful, particularly in their effect
on South Vietnamese attitudes and morale.
SAVA:GACarver;rad George A. Garver, Jr.
0 & 1 - Addressee w/atts- Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
L 1 - GAC Chrono W
1 - Bundy Ctte. t-A _3
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