THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000600020017-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: February 23, 1969
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Releas~L2004/10/12 ELP80RO1720R00060Q020017-2
23 February 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable William P. Rogers
The Secretary of State
Attached is a summary memorandum on the Vietnam
Situation drafted at 0500 EST, Sunday, 23 February and
based on all information available at that time from
our Vietnam Station and all other sources.
25X1
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant For Vietnamese Affairs
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000600020017-2
 Approved For Releass.2004/10/12 I , IP80R01720R0006,0020017-2
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
23 February 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
For National Security Affairs
SUBJECT : The Situation in Vietnam
Attached is a summary memorandum on the Vietnam
Situation drafted at 0500 EST, Sunday, 23 February and
based on all information available at that time from
our Vietnam Station and all other sources.
25X1
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant For Vietnamese Affairs
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000600020017-2
 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000600020017-2
MEMORANDUM FOR: TCG
GL 1,-j
4 '- ie ec l~acil P~
t~o r "} ref r Perc95o~/
VI 0- 0 Gor,
C~~hkers I`h
aur
`
M
-r I
IQJ.
{~vlowllP(lv e Os a4- 0730
FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM fo-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000600020017-2
 Approved For Releaso 2004/10/12: CIA-RDP80R0l720R000600020017-2
23 February 1969
SUBJECT: The Surge of Communist Offensive Activity in South
Vietnam
1. The Situation Summarized. At approximately 0100 hours on
Sunday, 23 February (Vietnam time: noon on 22 February in Wash-
ington) the Communists initiated an obviously coordinated series of
over 160 attacks against province capitals, district towns, allied
military bases and lines of communication throughtout South Vietnam.
Action within Saigon itself has so far been limited to a ten man sap-
per strike at a police substation in the outlying 9th precinct, plus
light, scattered and indiscriminate mortar and rocket attacks against
the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 9th precincts. (The 1st precinct is the heart
of downtown Saigon, including the Palace, American Embassy and central
business district.) Danang City has also been shelled, with an esti-
mated six rockets impacting in the ammunition storage area of Danang
East, with resultant heavy damage as the fire spread and explosions
continued throughout the morning of 23 February. Contact was made
with a sapper unit at 2230 hours on the night of 22 February with two
sappers captured and four killed. Hue has reported no attacks on the
city itself, though it did report the ambush (presumably nearby) of
a Revolutionary Development team late in the afternoon of 22 February.
2. On the basis of information received as this is written,
the action seems to have been heaviest in III and I corps and light-
est in IV corps. The attacks have been predominately attacks by
fire (mortar and/or rocket), with some ground force harrassment
and a few fairly serious ground probes. For example, Song Be,
the capital of III corps' Phuoc Long province seems to have been
partially over-run and the US Province Senior Advisor was killed
(though whether by rockets or ground fire is not clear). An esti-
mated VC company attacked downtown Bien Hoa City (III corps
Headquarters) and the capital of Bien Hoa province). There is
still fighting in Hoi An, capital of I corps' Quang Nam province.
This Memorandum is based on information available in CIA's
Washington Headquarters at 0500 EST, Sunday, 23 February
1969.
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000600020017-2
 Approved For Release 200 / 2: C` IIA-RDP80R01720R000,~0020017-2
In several instances, the attacks were thrown off base at allied ac-
tion (e. g. Bien Hoa, where ARVN successfully blocked the apparent
VC reinforcement unit) or sloppy execution (e. g. II corps, where on
some occasions 40 or 50 rounds of mortar fire against selected
targets resulted in no damage). Our information is presently too
fragmentary to permit meaningful damage or casualty assessments,
but in all reported instances (with a few execptions), the Communist
attacks to date seem to have been contained, coped with or handled
with relative ease.
3. The Immediate Future. Allied intelligence had the onset
of these attacks pegged almost to the hour and so far their scale
and scope have generally followed the estimated pattern. The
Communist effort will almost certainly continue over at least the
next 48 to 72 hours and some serious attempts at ground force in-
vestiture will almost certainly be essayed, most likely against
outlying III corps targets such as Tay Ninh City. Further mortar/
rocket harrassment, augmented by attempts at sapper er terrorist
activity, can be anticipated in Saigon. Danang and probably Hue.
The Communists are practicing economy of force tactics thusfar,
however, and the extent of the it actual total effort will be heavily
influenced by COSVN's reading of the success (or lack thereof) of
its initial efforts and the openings or opportunities developing
therein.
4. The GVN Reaction. The GVN reaction at the national and
(generally) the local level so far seems to be cool, professional
and confident. President Thieu is reported to be fishing. No
particular concern was expressed at the 23 February Joint Opera-
tions Center briefing in Saigon. Senior Vietnamese Police offi-
cials in Saigon stated that as of 1015 hours on 23 February they
regarded the attacks on Saigon to be low level harrassment with
more to come. These officers were confident they could handle
the situation in terms of Saigon's internal security.
5. Communist Objectives. The full range of Communist ob-
jectives can not be discerned until we see the full scope of their
intended offensive. The attacks thus far launched, the intelligence
on troop movements and deployments of recent weeks and other
indicators such as Liberation Radio's -J,9 February call to urban
revolutionary arms all collectively suggest that the Communists
want to go as far as they can toward re-creating in South Vietnam
and in the US the mood and atmosphere of post-Tet 1968. They
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000600020017-2
 Approved For Release,2004/10/12 : ,CIA 19r80R01720R0006,QD020017-2
want to demonstrate the continued potency and power of Communist
arms and erase the image of allied progress projected by events
since last fall. They want to exacerbate tensions and concern
within South Vietnam, build a mood of defeatism, and--probably
above all--induce the new US administration to draw the "correct"
conclusion from current events, i. e., that allied progress will
be forever illusory and continued US prosecution of the struggle
will produce nothing but longer casualty lists. In launching even a
limited offensive to achieve these ends, however, the Communists
are perforce taking the gamble of failing in a manner which will
produce an effect on Vietnamese and American opinion adverse to
Communist interests.
II. THE TACTICAL SITUATION
6. Preliminary figures gleaned from our Station and MACV
reports indicate that the Communists struck wide1far, and in some
cases with a great deal of severity. By Corps, the breakout of attacks
reported so far appears to be as follows:
7. I Corps - At least 18 attacks by fire occurred in this corps.
Major targets were Da Nang Air Base, Marble Mountain, and the
Da Nang deep water pier area. Several large fires were started
in POL storage areas and ammunitb` ri supply points in Da Nang
and the Da Nang AB. Additionally, Hoi An, and Chu Lai have
been attacked with Hoi An coming under heavy fire and a substantial
ground attack, which was still in progress as of our last report.
Numerous military outposts were also hit by enemy standoff attacks.
8. II Corps - The enemy has confined himself, so far, to
indirect fire attacks against military installations and outposts.
In at least 13 such attacks, he has caused only moderate damage and
loss of life.
9. III Corps - No fewer than 23 attacks against military iinstalla-
tions and population centers have occurred since 1400 Feb EST on
22 February. Saigon received two shellings -- at 1330 EST three
mortar rounds hit in the 9th Precinct near the GVN naval head-
quarters and at 1530 EST nine rounds of 122-mm. rocket impacting
in the 4th and 9th precincts. Rounds are also reported (without
details) in the 2nd precinct. Human and property losses were
minimal. There was also a ground attack against a police sub-
station in the 9th precinct, the only ground action reported within
the city limits. Several scattered ground probes were reported in
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000600020017-2
 Approved For Releag2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP80R01720R0006,QD020017-2
the Capital Military District some up to company size, but none
were close to the city boundary.
10. Elsewhere in III Corps, there were moderate to heavy
attacks by fire and ground probes. Song Be the capital of Phuoc
Long Province was hit by an unknown size enemy force and the
M4 CV compound was overrun. The Senior MACV advisor and one
advisor were killed and six others wounded in this action. In
Binh Duong Province, two battalion probe preceded by a mortar
barrage was launched against the 3rd Brigade Headquarters of
the 25th Division near Dau Tieng. The perimeter of the camp was
breached twice, but the attackers repelled. The contact continues.
The Long Binh camp base in Bien Hoa Province was hit by a mixed
barrage of 78 rockets and 82-mm. mortars, followed by a ground
probe. Some 10 Communists penetrated the defenses. Contact
ceased at an unknown time and the area south of the installation is
being swept. Enemy losses are at least 20 killed with friendly
casualties placed at 5 killed and 71 wounded (63 US).
11. TheBien Hoa AB was hit by an enemy barrage of enemy
fire from undetermined weapons. Losses, at the base included
the destruction of one light aircraft and one F-100, and the apparent
destruction of a liquid oxygen plant. In Bien Hoa town, a local
force platoon attempted to overrun the national police station. The
attack was aborted by friendly reinforcements who currently have
the enemy unit surrounded.
12. IV Corps - Nearly 60 incidents were recorded in the IV
Corps zone with no ground attacks against major strong points. My
Tho, capital of Dinh Tuong Province received approximately 100 rounds
of 88 and 129-mm. mortar fire--apparently without causing signifi-
cant damage or loss of life. At Cau Ke, a district town in western
Vinh Binh Province.,the enemy penetrated the town and currently
has the defenders trapped in the district headquarters compound.
Except for the incidents at My Tho and Cau Ke the incidence of
enemy action is considered normal for the corps zone.
Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000600020017-2