COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED US ACTION IN THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000600020083-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 83
• Publication Date: December 5, 1968
• Content Type: MEMO

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IqQW
5 December 1968
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SUBJECT: Comments on the Proposed US Action in the Demilitarized
Zone
Summary
the southern half. of the DM Z.
behaving in a provocative fashion, the actual extent of their provocations
would not yet appear to warrant retaliation as massive as a US occupation of
all bombing of North Vietnam. Nonetheless, though the Communists are
a substantially increased threat to the lives of our troops. The Communists
are, of course, making some use of the DMZ and have some troops therein.
They can plausibly and legitimately be taxed, both privately and publicly,
with cheating on the "understandings" which led President Johnson to stop
1. The political costs of moving US forces up to the Ben Hai River
would appear to outweigh whatever tactical military advantages might be
gained. In large part the political difficulties would flow from the fact that
it would be hard to demonstrate to the world at large that there has been a
buildup of Communist forces in or just north of the DMZ sufficient to pose
The Facts of the Current Situation
2. There is no firm evidence that the North Vietnamese have
dramatically increased the size of their combat forces in the DMZ
saint-ca I Noypmber1
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reconnaissance units, however, are still operating within the DMZ and
just south of it and small mortar squads are also known to be operating
just within the southern boundary of the zone. F7
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4. It is also worth noting that the largest enemy unit detected
within the DMZ since 1 November has been a platoon, approximately
30 men. Two men captured in contact with platoon-size unite on
allied sweeps into the DMZ stated that they were from recon companies
of the 138th Regiment. A third prisoner may have been from the 27th
Regiment which operates just below the DMZ.
S. A further problem which would arise in demonstrating ar
substantial threat to our forces arises from the fact that although
some 480 "incidents" have been reported by MACV in the DMZ since
1 November, none of these involved significant enemy troop movements.
The great majority involved observations of enemy bunkers or the
movement of very small groups of personnel -- two or three in each
group. Moreover, many of these people appeared to be unarmed.
6. There have been only 13 incidents of enemy mortar firing
from within the DM Z at allied positions. Total US casualties from
these shellings have been light. ARVN casualties have also been
light. In addition, although the enemy has regularly fired at US
aerial reconnaissance aircraft over the DMZ, to date, no US aircraft
have been lost to this firing from within the DMZ,
Political and other Considerations
7. The enemy has not significantly increased the volume of supplies
moving to the D.M Z .
 The North Vietnamesep
however, have been quick to capitalize on the opportunities presented
by the bombing halt to move their logistical bases southward from the
19th Parallel to Vinh, Luang Khe, and Dong Hoi. The enemy has been
quick to restore rail service, repair roads and bridges, and build
.additional storage and transshipment areas in the area now freed from
bombing. Large North Vietnam coastal ships of up to 2, 500 tons
are moving supplies directly from Haiphong to Quang Khe. There is no
doubt that more supplies, including civilian goods, are moving into
the southern panhandle than ever before.
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8. The fact that we have not even begun the formal second round
talks adds a further dimension to the political difficulties we would
face in justifying US troop deployment up to the Ben Hai. Since we
have all along taken the initiative in demanding that the neutral character
of the DMZ be restored, it will look bad if we unilaterally put troops
on the southern bank of the DMZ before we have even attempted to firm
up the DMZ portion of the agreement in formal talks.
our forward elements right on the Ben Hai. The threat to our aerial
reconnaissance pilots flying over the northern portion of the DMZ will
also not be reduced by such an action on our part.
9. The question is also bound to come up as to whether placing
our troops right at the Ben Hai will actually reduce the threat to their
lives., At present, the only imminent threat to our men comes from
mortar and artillery fire. This threat will not be reduced by putting
10. There is a strong possibility, furthermore, that the
Communists would mount new military operations of their own in
reaction to a US move into the DMZ. These might include redeployment
of additional major combat units into the southern part of North
Vietnam and perhaps into the northern half of the DMZ as well, A
step up in Communist military action in South Vietnam probably would
occur. Shellings of urban centers, including major cities, might well
be conducted as part of a new offensive effort.
11. Given this situation, unilateral US occupation of the southern
part of the DMZ, would solve few current problems and almost certainly
re? `a number of new ones. If it its judged, nevertheless, that such
action must be taken, it might be better to follow up Ambassador Vance's
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4 December conversations with Colonel Lau with a proposal that a joint
DMZ commission, composed of the DRV on one side and the US/GVN on
the other, be created to patrol the DMZ. We would undertake to patrol
the southern half up to the Ben Hai and they would do the same in the
northern half. This approach has the advantage of making it easier to
justify unilateral US action if the Communists reject our overtures.
12. Hanoi would probably conclude from a US move up to the Ben
Hal that this administration is not serious about the Paris talks, that it
is just marking time until 20 January, and that there is no possibility of
even procedural progress prior to the new administration taking over.
13. Hanoi would probably not break off the talks on the basis of
such a US move. The North Vietnamese seem to consider that their funda-
mental demand for a full bombing halt has been met, despite the limited
defensive air strikes being conducted in connection with reconnaissance.
Hanoi would certainly attempt to make propaganda capital out of any US
intrusion into the DMZ, but Hanoi's basic line would. probably be that US
and Communist activities south of the Ben Hai River are matters to be
discussed with the Liberation Front and thus need not be an obstacle at this
stage of the Paris talks.
14. Finally, while we are not professional military planners, we
believe any serious attempt to occupy the southern half of the DMZ which
the Communists contest would require a large number of troops ?- at least
one full division, probably two or even more. Assuming no significant
additional deployment of US forces to Vietnam, these troops would have to
be provided out of resources already in-country. The progress now being
made in the pacification field and the Phoenix program is materially aided
by the fact that, for the moment, there are now available US forces for close
support of pacification and anti-infrastructure operations. A major force
`deplornnent to' the' DMZ area would drastically curtail the forces available
16'r pacification and Phoenix support missions. We believe there is much
`rz ore'po'iitical mileage to be made out of an effective pacification and anti-
infr,structure effort than out of occupying the southern half of the DMZ.
t~0b5fi0020'083-9.,
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5 Dec. 1968
Attached is our memo on the DMZ
issue. It is a effort Participated
in by Messrs.
and myself.
did the basic draft which we all pus o reyI
reviewed and worked over. We have been as
noncontroversial as possible in our language
but the views expressed herein would still
almost certainly displease our military
colleagues. The paper was written to brief
you on the views of your associates.
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
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