AN ASSESSMENT OF ALLEGATIONS REGARDING AN 'INTELLIGENCE FAILURE' IN CONNECTION WITH LAM SON 719

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000600100003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 30, 1971
• Content Type: MF

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30 March 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: An Assessment of Allegations Regarding an "Intelligence
Failure" in Connection with Lam Son 719
1. THE CHARGES
1. Background. In recent days there have been remarks in
the press and other media -- plus, apparently, at least some conversa-
tions in the upper reaches of the official community -- regarding an
alleged "intelligence failure" which purportedly contributed to
problems encountered in the execution of Lam Son 719. Two fairly
specific and representative examples of the charges now in circulation
can be found in the Tuesday, 30 March 1971, city edition of the New
York Times in by-lined articles filed from Washington by Max Frankel
(on page 1) and from Saigon by Iver Peterson (on page 15).
2. Mr. Frankel's article is headlined, "Nixon Aides Insist
Drive in Laos Was Worth Price. 10 It opens with the following lead:
"President Nixon has begun to review the post-
mortem studies of the South Vietnamese invasion
of Laos, which cover some serious military
misjudgments as well as claims of strategic
benefit. "
"The most conspicuous tactical setbacks are
being attributed to intelligence failures. Mr.
Nixon is being told that no one expected the
North Vietnamese to be able to reinforce their
units in Laos as quickly as they did or supply
them with 150 tanks and other heavy equipment
in time to stage a massive counterattack. "
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On the intelligence issue, the key paragraph is the fifth:
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This thought is echoed in a sentence in the eighth paragraph, which
reads:
"The surprising enemy resistance, it is
acknowledged, cut short both the reach and the
duration of the invasion. "
It. appears again in a sentence in the article's final paragrapi:
"At the middle levels of government here, the
re-examination of the Laos venture have (sic)
provoked quarrels about responsibility for poor
intelligence. 11
3. Mr. Peterson's article is headlined, "Americans in South
Vietnam Attribute the Setback in Laos to Faulty Planning and Intelligence.
It plays similar themes from a Saigon perspective:
"United States Army advisers and other
observers in the field are ascribing the South
Vietnamese Army's performance in Laos to diff-
iculties the allies had failed to anticipate ....
"Both American and South Vietnamese officers
have also conceded that poor planning and a lack
of intelligence coordination contributed to the
South Vietnamese problems. They confessed
early that they had not allowed for the enemy's
use of tanks ....
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"The lack of sound intelligence about the enemy's
movements and assets was compounded, the
American advisers say, by traditional rivalries
which
units
tnamese
th Vi
h
S
,
....
e
e
ou
between t
f
often failed to share what they knew .... }
"The magnitude of the enemy's anti-aircraft
firepower also caught.the allies by surprise."
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C: .
4. Specific Allegations. Embedded in statements such as those
cited above, and others of similar ilk now in circulation, are four sets
of specific charges on areas of alleged "intelligence failure" with
respect to the Vietnamese Communists' response to Lam Son x1.9.
a. That US intelligence.failed to estimate accurately
the intensity with which Hanoi would resist the Laos'' in-
cursion and, hence, seriously underestimated the severity
of combat that actually took place -- i. e., we misread
Hanoi's intentions.
b. That US intelligence failed to estimate accurately
the forces Hanoi had available in Laos to contest Lam
Son 719 and, further, seriously underestimated the
reinforcement capabilities Hanoi in fact demonstrated
during the course of the fighting.
c. That US intelligence in particular underestimated
the Vietnamese- Communists' anti-aircraft artillery
capabilities in the Lam Son 719 operational area.
d. That US intelligence failed to recognize the North
Vietnamese capabilities in the field of armor.
5. We have not had time to research the record of the entire US
intelligence community in light of the above charges, but we have examined
the Agency's record in considerable detail. Because the charges deal
primarily with alleged prediction failures we have concentrated on those
portions of the record dealing with predictions of future enemy behavior
rather than our reportage of events and enemy deployments as the
actual battles evolved. Lam Son 719 was launched on 8 February. The
Communists initially avoided major contact as they endeavored to size
up the situation and in the operation's early days, enemy activity was
largely confined to scattered harassment. The first major enemy effort
at serious resistance came on 19 February, when the Communists
launched an intense attack against the 39th ARVN Ranger battalion on
high ground just above Route 925, some three miles inside Laos. The
comments and findings outlined below are based on Agency assessments
and reports published between 14 December 1970 and 11 February 1971.
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the heavy manpower losses this might entail. "
"For all these reasons Hanoi can be expected
to contest the Tchepone raid with whatever
resources it can muster. "
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6. The Intentions Question -- Predictions of Overall Enemy
Behavior. On 18 January 1971, Dr. Kissinger requested an Agency
assessment -- to be prepared quickly on a very close-hold basis, but
drawing on all intelligence available -- of probable North Vietnamese,
Soviet, Chinese Communist, Lao and Thai reactions to a raid into the
Tchepone area of Laos mounted by an ARVN force of at least two
divisions backed by US air support (of all types) but with no US ground
force participation. This memorandum was prepared by a small group
of senior Agency officers with, collectively, a broad spectrum of
expertise. It was sent to Dr. Kissinger on 21 January. At his request,
copies were also sent to the Departments of State and Defense and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We know from oral comments and
reactions received that this 21 January memorandum was circulated
among the command and senior staff levels at the White House, State
Department, Defense Department and the JCS involved in planning or
approving US participation in Lam Son 719.
7. This 21 January memorandum (Attachment 1) merits rereading
in its entirety, especially paragraphs 10- 15, which deal with "Probable
North Vietnamese Reactions. " We explicitly noted Hanoi's anticipation
of allied ground attacks against its infiltration routes in south Laos,
the large deployments of North Vietnamese troops dispatched in the
,second half of 1970 to protect these routes, and the additional deployments
within North Vietnam to facilitate defense of the Laos Panhandle --
deployments which we said put the Communists "in a good posture to
contest such an operation vigorously and promptly. " We then went on
to observe that if such an operation were launched, the Communists
might evade combat "fora few days or even longer, " but predicted
that in the face of a sustained allied drive:
"Hanoi would be likely to do whatever it could
to make the position of the South Vietnamese in
Laos untenable and it would be prepared to accept
We concluded the North Vietnamese section by noting, again, that
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8. Our 21 January memorandum accurately predicted not only
the North Vietnamese response but also the responses of the Lao,
Communist Chinese, Soviets and the Thai. In short, there was no
"intelligence failure" so far as this Agency's predictions were,-concerned.
Instead, in this instance we came about as close to calling the 'shots.-
as one is ever likely to come in the real world.
9. The Overall Enemy Strength and Reinforcement Capability
Question. The question of Communist strength in Laos has long been a
matter of major concern to the whole intelligence community. During
November and early December 1970, CIA -- in coordination with DIA,
NSA and the Department of State -- prepared a thorough, detailed study
on this topic entitled, "Communist and Friendly Forces in Laos. " This
study was published on 14 December 1970 and would have been readily
available as a base-line work to all senior US officials involved in or
witting of plans for Lam Son 719. The study (Attachment 2) flagged in
explicit detail the expansion and buildup of Communist tactical strength
in south Laos then in train. It noted the creation of new tactical control
elements (e. g., the 968th Front) and the expansion of logistic commands
(e. g. , the 559th Transportation Group) in the Panhandle area. It
estimated overall NVA combat strength in south Laos at about 27,?000
men -- 22, 000 infantry plus 5, 000 artillery/armor/anti-aircraft --
augmented by about 8, 000 Pathet Lao forces, many NVA-er cadred.
10. In discussing the Communists' south Laos buildup, this
14'December 1970 memorandum made the following explicit observations
(in paragraph 31) about what came to be the Lam Son 719 operational area:
"The largest concentration of the newly arrived
NVA forces is in the vicinity of Tchepone, where
the headquarters of major combat units are located
along the major lines of communication to the west,
southwest, and southeast of this area. Forward
elements of the 320th and 308th Division headquarters
have been identified west of Tchepone near Route
23, while the 48th Regiment, 320th Division, has
been operating to the southwest, just north of Muong
Phine. The headquarters of the 2nd NVA Division,
the 141st and the 9th Regiments, and 5th Independent
Battalion also have been located
Tchepone along Routes 23 and 9.
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indicates that the 9th Regiment has relocated
to an area southwest of the town of Saravane in
Saravane Province, however, and its former
role in Savannakhet Province appears to have
been assumed by the 48th Regiment. The forward
element of the headquarters 24B Regiment, 304th
Division, and the headquarters of the 3rd Regiment,
2nd NVA Division, are both south of Tchepone,
the latter near Ban Bac. The 1st Regiment, 2nd
NVA Division, is currently unlocated but is believed
to be in the general area south of Tchepone. In
addition, two battalions of the 675B Artillery
Regiment have been identified in Saravane Province. "
11. This December 1970 base-line memorandum was also quite
explicit (in paragraph 38) on the reinforcement cability question:
The flow of Communist combat forces to south
Laos appears to reflect Hanoi's concern for the
security of its remaining logistical route to its
forces in the south.... In addition, one or more
of the nine regiments of the 304th, 308th, 320th,
and 325th Divisions not currently in Laos or
known to be deploying southward in North Vietnam
could be deployed southward. Elements of all
of these units have had combat experience
against allied forces.
12. On 3 February 1971 we published a memorandum entitled,
"Disposition and Strength of Communist Combat Units in South Laos, Southern
North Vietnam, and South Vietnam's Military Region 1. " This paper was
distributed on 4 February to Secretary Laird, Deputy Secretary Packard,
JCS Chairman Admiral Moorer and Joint Staff Director, Lt. General
Vogt in the Defense Department,. Dr. Kissinger in the White House and
Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson in the Department of State. In
essence, it constituted an amplification adding details to some of the
estimates given in our 21 January predictive memorandum and an
update of those portions of the December' 1970 base-line study immediately
relevant to the impending Lam Son 719 operation.
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13. This 3 February memorandum (Attachment 3) also merits
rereading in its entirety. It flagged the presence in the Tchepone
(i. e. , Lam Son 719) area of 11, 000 NVA combat troops plus a pool
of about 70, 000 in immediately adjacent areas (11, 000 elsewhere in
south Laos, 40, 000 in North Vietnam below Vinh, 19, 000 in South
Vietnam's MR 1), any of which could be easily deployed to :the
Tchepone area within a week's time. It noted unit shifts ar a patterns
keyed to enhancing Hanoi's considerable reinforcement capabilities
in opposing Lam Son 719. This 3 February memorandum explicitly
stated (in paragraph 9):
The size of the commitment Hanoi is willing to
make cannot be quantified with high assurance.
Hanoi is obviously determined to fight and to
make things as difficult as possible for the
South Vietnamese. Hanoi could, for example,
decide to send some troops directly across the
DMZ in a flanking maneuver against the forces
deployed along Route 9. But assuming a decision
to reinforce Tchepone, we would estimate, given
the large number of forces currently deployed
north of the DMZ, that a reinforcement of as
much as a division equivalent -- some 10, 000
men -- could be made without seriously impairing
North Vietnam's defensive capabilities. Whether
Hanoi would be willing to raise the ante even
further depends on a number of considerations.
Foremost among these are Hanoi's view of the
urgency of keeping the Laotian supply route
operative and its readings of US intentions north
of the DMZ.
14. In sum, the level of expanded and expanding Communist
strength in south Laos was unambiguously flagged by this Agency, in
coordination with other concerned community components, on 14 December
1970. On 3 February -- five days before Lam Son 719 was launched --
we informed senior policy-level officials that the NVA had 11, 000 first
line combat troops already deployed in the Lam Son area (plus logistic
and other elements also armed), that reinforcement preparations and
movements were already in train, that this 11, 000 figure could easily
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be raised by 10, 000 additional first line NVA combat troops within a
week's time, and Hanoi had ample additional combat troop resources
nearby if it wanted to dispatch further reinforcements to the battle.
We also observed (as cited above) that "Hanoi is obviously determined
to fight and to make things as difficult as possible for the South' _
Vietnamese. " In the strength and reinforcement capability area,
therefore, we also called the shots on developments much as they
actually occurred as the battle unfolded (NVA ground combat strength
in the battle area peaked at around 30, 000). Furthermore, we
submitted these reinforcement estimates well before the allied operation
commenced.
15. The Anti-Aircraft Artillery Question. The specific issue
of Communist anti-aircraft artillery capabilities was covered in the
general surveys of Communist strength in Laos mentioned above. The
14 December base-line memorandum noted the 5, 000 NVA and 1, 000
Pathet Lao combat forces in south Laos assigned to artillery/armor/
anti-aircraft units. That same memorandum observed (in paragraph 10)
that nearly 60% of the Communists' artillery, armor and anti-aircraft
units in Laos were deployed in the south. It noted specifically:
"The higher percentage in the south results
from the large number of anti-aircraft
personnel assigned to the 559th Transportation
Group to protect its routes and way stations. "
16. After the 3 February Tchepone area combat strength/
reinforcement capability study, we did an update assessment of "The
Growth And Current Deployment Of The Laotian-Based 559th Transpor-
tation Group. " This memorandum was distributed to all concerned
customers on 11 February, three days after Lam Son 719 was launched
but eight days before major enemy resistance and counter-attacks
commenced. Table 1 of that memorandum (Attachment 3) specifically
cited, by number, 31 anti-aircraft artillery battalions known to be
subordinate to the 559th. It also identified 13 such battalions (again by
individual unit number) known to be associated with the four Binh Trams
whose immediate operating areas were to be encroached upon by the
ARVN incursion (BTs 9, 27, 33 and 41). Since we flagged the enemy's
anti-aircraft artillery strength clearly (and accurately) and stressed
that Lam Son 719 would be resisted with all the resources Hanoi could
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muster, we find no basis for the allegation that US intelligence
seriously underestimated the enemy's anti-aircraft capabilities or
the intensity with which these capabilities were used.
17. The Armor Question. Our memoranda and estimates
submitted before Lam Son 719 was launched did not highlight the
probable enemy use of tanks. The 14 December base -line",4-nemorandum.
however, did make explicit reference to the 5, 000 NVA artillery,
armor and anti-aircraft forces in south Laos and that memorandum's
summary again makes reference to armor units (paragraph 42).
The 3 February memorandum updating, and concentrating on, the
immediate threat to the impending tam Son 719 operation specifically
noted (in Table 1) the presence of the 198th Armor Battalion whose
precise location could not be fixed but was flagged as being possibly
near Muong Phine, the intersection of Routes 23 and 9 (i. e., about
30 kilometers from Tchepone via the easily traversable Route 9).
Thus our pre-Lam Son 719 memoranda did note the presence of enemy
armor as a resource already available to the Communists who, we
also noted, would probably resist Lam Son 719 with every resource
they could muster.
18. The Special Operations Situation Reports. In addition to the
memoranda and estimates cited above, on 29 January Dr. Kissinger's
office requested that we begin submitting daily situation reports recounting
and assessing all available intelligence, signs of enemy foreknowledge
or activity, etc. that might relate to or affect Lam Son 719. These
reports (SOSRs) were submitted from 29 January through 8 February
to the White House, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In them -- as illustrated by the
excerpts appended hereto as Attachment 5 -- we flagged, reported and
assessed the clear and steadily mounting indications that the
Communists were readying themselves for battle, intended to put up
the fiercest possible resistance, and were particularly intent on
maximizing their use of anti-aircraft artillery to harass and contest
allied troop landings and the aerial support of ARVN ground operations.
These intelligence warning flags were hoisted in virtually every report
submitted during the ten days prior to 8 February when the first Lam Son
719 units actually crossed the Laos border.
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III. CONCLUSIONS
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19. The above data, in our view, conclusively demonstrate
that in a variety of written documents submitted to senior US policy
echelons well in advance of the actual events, this Agency correctly
predicted the nature, pattern and intensity of the North Vietnamese
military response to Lam Son 719, the combat troop resources available
to the North Vietnamese in the target area and their reinforcement
capabilities, the Vietnamese Communists' anti-aircraft capabilities
and their firm intent to make maximum use of them, and the presence
of North Vietnamese armor in the proposed battle area. We therefore
believe that the charges and allegations of "intelligence failure" now
coming into circulation as noted in paragraphs 1 and 2 above are
demonstrably without foundation in fact.
G
Special A
Attachments
eorge A. C
ssistant fo
arver, Jr.
r Vietname
se Affairs
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"Probable
Reactions o
f Various Concerned
Parties to a Possible Allied
Action in S
outh Laos, " Copy No. 7
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"Communist A
nd Friendly.
Forces In Laos, " Copy No. 8 ?
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"Disposition an
d Strength
of Communist Combat Units
in South Laos, Southern Nor
th Vietnam,
and South Vietnam's
Military Region 1, " Copy No
. 8
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4.
"The Growth And Current Deployment
Of The Laotian-Based 559th
Transporta
tion Group, " Copy No. 16
5. EXTRACTS FROM SPECIAL
OPERATION
SITUATION REPORTS
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Copy No
. 1
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