PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITIES IN THE NORTH VIETNAM/ CHINA BORDER AREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000600100015-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: March 9, 1971
• Content Type: MFR

TOP SECRET
LEA]
Approved For ReleWSe 2004/12/02 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000100015-5
9 March 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Photo Reconnaissance Capabilities in the North Vietnam/
China Border Area
1. Two factors must be considered regarding photographic recon-
naissance in the North Vietnam/China border area. Weather is a very
important limiting factor since heavy cloud cover during much of the
year precludes good quality photography from high level reconnaissance.
An equally important factor is that no aircraft can overfly China without
40 Committee approval.
2. To acquire coverage inside China it is necessary to overfly
China at some point, even if the aircraft is flying a course parallel to
but south of the border. This is especially true with the SR-71 because
of its high speed and wide turning radius. There is little possibility
that the SR-71 will be allowed to fly over Communist China. An alternate
means of obtaining the desired photo coverage is the use of the U-2 R
for overflights of China. This, of course, also requires 40 Committee
approval.
3. The SR-71's are currently authorized by the 40 Committee
to fly ten missions per month over northern North Vietnam, but seldom
is this number flown due to the adverse weather conditions in that area.
On 1 March an SR-71 flew this northern orbit and on- 7 March an SR-71
flew a mission over northern Laos. No SR-71 flights are scheduled in
the northern area for the next 24 hours.
4. Other alternate means of photographic coverage in this area
are via satellite -- no KH-4 satellite coverage will be possible until
after 24 March -- and drone. The normal drones in use in this area
only give spotting coverage and have been primarily utilized south of
25X1
Copy No.
25X1
Approved For Release 2?04/12/02: CIA-RDP80R0172 du~a0015-5
 TOP SECRE
Approved For Rel se 2004/12/02: CIA-RDP80RO172OR0 00100015-5
220. Two Tagboard, long range high speed drones, missions have been
flown over China but both have failed on recovery. These assets can
be tasked on short notice and 17 of them are available. Based on their
performance to date, however, this does not appear to be a practical
approach to the problem.
Vietnamese Affairs Staff
-2-
TOP SECRET I kcludad from automotlc
25X1
25X1
5X1
25X1
"p 411Y
day iaS."Itio'801
 S,;? 25X1
Approved For ReIeSe 2004/12/02 : CIA-1, ~ 0R00D60100015-5
10 March 1971
SUBJECT Requirements for Photographic Coverage
of South China
1. The following targets, if covered on a regular
basis with adequate photographic resolution, are those
most likely to provide indications of Chinese Communist
military activities related to Indochina. In order to
identify types of military equipment and provide an
.accurate count of transportation vehicles, ground res-
olution should be on the order of three feet or better.
2. The first.priority targets are:
a. Chang-chiang (21-12N 110-23E). A naval
headquarters, rail terminus and transhipment
point for military supplies to North Vietnam.
b. Ping-hsiang (22-04N 106-44E). A trans-
portation center and rail crossing point into
North Vietnam.
c. Hokou (22-30N 103-58E). A border trans-
portation center for rail and road traffic into
North Vietnam.
d. Ssu-mao (22-47N 100-59E). A transpor-
tation center for military traffic into northwest
Laos.
e. Ning-ming (22-08N 107-04E), A tactical
airbase and transportation center.
f.. Meng-tzu
(22-22N
103-24E).
A military
staging area and
tactical
airbase
near the North
Vietnamese border.
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Strategic
Research and coordinated within the Directorate of
Intelligence and with the Directorate of Plans.
25X1
Approved For Release 20
 TOP Sr,,.11n:Y
Approved For ReleMe 2004/12/02 : CIA- 1720R00 '00100015-5
3. Targets of second priority include:
a. Nan-ping (22-49N 108-19E). A transpor-
tation center and military headquarters for the
region. (An active SA-2 site was located near
Nan-ping in 1969. This site has not been observed
since.)
b. Meng-la (21-30N 101-33E). A military
staging area near the Laotian border.
c. Kun-ming (25-04N 102-41E). A transpor-
tation center and military headquarters for the
region.
4. Coverage of the above targets would provide
information on the status of major military installa-
tions and transportation facilities adjacent to North
Vietnam. It would also indicate levels of supply
activity and the status of major troop deployments.
Because of the absence of recent photographic coverage,
however, a single mission would not enable us to
detect dynamics of movement or of activity. Repeated
coverage over time would enable us to establish an
intelligence base against which to detect divisional
movements and major changes in the level of supply
activity. We could not be certain, however, of
detecting the infiltration of smaller units and
quantities of supplies into North Vietnam.
5. Increased coverage of transportation centers
and military staging areas within North Vietnam could
-also provide evidence of Chinese Communist military
assistance to Indochina. A better photographic base
exists for targets in North Vietnam, and coverage of
this area could be done on a regular basis with less
risk than similar coverage of China entails. Targets
in this area should include facilities where Chinese
Communist forces previously were located, particularly
along the major lines of communication in the northwest
and northeast which 1connect with major transport
arteries in China.
Approved For Release 200mog/O t'~g"D720R000600100015-5
25X1
25X1