THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE POLITICAL SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000700010005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 25, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
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25 August 1971
SUBJECT: The South Vietnamese Political Situation
I. THE CURRENT SITUATION
1. In recent days, South Vietnam's political leaderbi. especiLy
President Thieu, have given a graphic display of what h4;n
pronounced national ;:rait: a penchant for shooting ones' e
foot (politically speaking) at the worst possible time. Until rev,
Thieu held all the high cards and had a golden chance to play t in
a way that would have greatly solidified his position and that o. h.
government, both domestically and internationally, in a nanrLer. 06,
advantageous to overall allied interests in the Vietnam strugg,le -
very much to the detriment of the Communists' inters Wit
own growth in political acumen and skill, his careful
cultivating key constituencies (rural leadership, the :iLtarv
the civil service an.a the latter two's families and depenaer.,$)
enjoyment of the advantages of incumbency (including contrc,
governmental machinery) coupled to a keen appreciation of ho-.N.,
to exploit them, known U.S. support, a generally favorable
and economic situation, and a solid four-year record of accomp-:isrin.f,
on which to run, Thieu could have handily beaten any rivals or combi.i.z..
tion of rivals in a completely open and honest election. By doirif2 so,
he could have rendered virtually unarguable his own and his government's
claim to constitutional legitimacy and put his critics and opponents --
Communist and non-Communist, Vietnamese and foreigr_ in very
awkward spot. Instead, he has blown it, and put hirn&.?:1.1 in an untenable
position. If he backs down, he will lose face, and possibly power.
If he persists in his present course of action, he may find his ,ountry
ungovernable; and will certainly afford his and his government's
critics ample reason to argue plausibly (whether or not correctly)
that he represents nothing but himself plus whatever bayonets he can
personally command and that he has little valid claim on anyone's suppc.
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There is no easy way to extract Vietnam's major political figures,
including Thieu, from the corners into which they have painted
themselves. This memorandum does nonetheless attempt to examine
various directions in which the course of South Vietnamese politics
might move -- or, perhaps, be moved.
3. All of the above factors have helped shape Thieu's recent
actions, and will influence his future behavior. He has climbed the
slippery pole of Vietnamese politics to the top, likes it there an wa
intends -- to stay. He is a nationalist patriot wedded to his concept
his people's destiny, but in his mind, national interests and his in.tel
are intertwined ideas. He has also convinced himself (angl many oth rF.)
that he is far and away the one best qualified to lead South Vietnam in as
present struggle. He regards both Minh and Ky as dangerous threats to
the national interest, both of whom have proved themselves iftcompetent
to govern: Minh (to Thieu) is lazy, soft-headed and stupid, easy prey to
unscrupulous or self-seeking advisors; Ky is vain, unstable, childish
and incapable of persisting in any serious course of action. Neither, to
him, can guide the country half so well as he.
4. Constitutional democracy is an alien graft on the Vietnamese
body politic. Partly because of their awareness of U.S. interests and
their need for U.S. support, the Vietnamese have not outwardly rejectod
this foreign concept, but they have certainly adapted it to fit the realities
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of their own political traditions. In their culture, there is no tradition
or precedent whatsoever for the peaceful surrender of power to a rival.
Nor is there much historical sanction for our notion of fair play in the
sense of gratuitously giving a known rival a chance to best you (behavior
that in the Vietnamese tradition is patently stupid). Thieu is very much
steeped in Vietnamese tradition. He does not have nor has he ever had
any intention of turning his office over to Ky, Minh or anyone else save
(perhaps) a hand-picked successor at the end of his career. His view
of the whole electoral process is shaped by this perspective. It is useful,
hence attractive, to him primarily as a device for extending his tenure
and reinforcing his authority.
5. For four years Thieu has been rankled by his status as a
"minority" president. He has long intended, and worked, not only to win
the 1971 election but to do so in. a way that would erase this stain. As
with everything he does, in pursuit of this objective he has wanted to leave
nothing to chance. He misread the position taken by the U.S. and its
Ambassador early this year, construed manifestations of support as a
blank check, and decided he could play his hand the way he wanted to
play it without getting any serious static from the U.S. so long as he was
careful, tactful and played his cards one at a time. He took legitimate
procedures to freeze out vote-absorbing frivolous candidates and transmuted
them into the 40/00 bill designed to freeze out Ky. This left him precisely
where he wanted to be: head to head against Minh with no others capable
of beclouding the result. He knew he could beat Minh handsomely if Minh
stayed the course. It is hard to guage whether Thieu privately expected
Minh to do so. He probably did not really care, believing (as a Vietnamese)
that either defeat or withdrawal would engender a loss of face sufficient
to erase Minh as a rival. He also clearly felt that if Minh withdrew,
the 1971 election could be transmuted into a "referendum" that would
equally well serve the purpose of confirming his rule. (Here he may
have had in mind the 195irreferendum by which Diem confirmed and
legitimized his already accomplished deposition of Bao ) When
Minh did in fact withdraw, Thieu was probably surprised by the intensity
of the U.S. reaction. He decided he had misestimated the American mood
and slightly overplayed his hand, so he gear-changed smoothly and
presto ? the full Supreme Court validated Ky.
6. Neither Ky nor Minh, however, likes to play a stacked deck,
each realizes that he has no chance (under current circumstances) of
beating Thieu in a two-man race, and neither wants to be simply a vehicle
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for enhancing Thieu's prestige and claims to constitutional legitimacy.
Also, both Minh and Ky have personal scores to settle with Thieu and
neither is averse to seeing him publicly put in the most awkward possible
spot. Ky may not be strong on sustained endeavor but he has great
capacity for rising to a specific occasion and in the past 48 hoilrs he has
played a virtuoso performance -- winning sympathy and support in
Vietnamese eyes, making Thieu look foolish, and leaving Thieu holding
the bag of a no-contest race.
II. WAYS IN WHICH THE CURRENT SITUATION COULD DEVELOP
7. At this writing, the political scene in South Vietnam is (to
put it mildly) confused. So many complex objective and emotional factors
are at work that no one -- including Thieu, Ky, Minh and other key
players in the game -- can now confidently predict how the situation
will evolve, and some of these key players have probably not decided
what they themselves are going to do. From an analytic standpoint, however,
there are at least five different general directions in which events could
begin to move, or in which properly placed persons might try to move them.
A. Adhering to Present Policies
8. Thieu can, of course, simply stick with the hand he is now
playing. He can argue (correctly) that the timing of the presidential
election is dictated by sections (3) and (4) of the Constitution's Article 52,
that the current election law is a valid statute properly passed by the
National Assembly and upheld by the Supreme Court, that Minh withdrew
his candidacy of his own volition, that Ky is lawfully on the ballot and will
legally remain a candidate, that how hard Ky chooses to campaign is his
personal affair, and hence that holding the election on schedule in its
present form is a procedure dictated by the law of the land. If the election
is so held, Thieu will of course win. He may then choose to portray the
election as a referendum-type approval of his stewardship. In any event,
if this tack is taken, Thieu will argue that he has a lawful mandate to rule
as President for,four more years. This is certainly the course of action
Thieu would find most congenial and all indications suggest this is the
course he currently intends to pursue.
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9. Thieu unquestionably recognizes that pursuing this course
will produce grumbling in Vietnam and distress in the U.S. Government.
But Thieu has always been very stubborn and clinically cool. At several
critical junctures in his political career, Thieu has won his point by the
simple expedient of refusing to budge (e. g., in the summer of 1967 when
he was vying with Ky for the top spot on the military's presidential ticket
and in November 1968). During such crises, Thieu simply let his
critics or opponents fulminate while he plugged methodically ahead
without swerving one millimeter from his chosen line of action, believing
correctly so far -- that he had more patience than any who wanted him to
act differently. In the current imbroglio, Thieu will certainly fine-tune
his antennae, but at the moment he probably believes himself well
enough in control of the government machinery to stifle disaffection or
block any challenge before it becomes serious. He is also probably
convinced that despite grumbling in the Saigon coffee houses, his continued
rule will be sufficiently beneficial and well enough clothed in technical
legitimacy to be generally accepted by the bulk of South Vietnam's people.
On the U.S. question, Thieu undoubtedly believes he is the one whom the
U.S. considers best qualified to be President and probably considers this
"fact" his ace in the hole. Furthermore, Thieu is very prone to the
ethnocentrism prevalent among his countrymen. He almost certainly
believes (privately) that an acceptable solution to the Vietnam struggle
is politically essential to the U.S. Government, hence in the final
analysis the U.S. will have to support the GVN which -- in his eyes
means him. He will therefore be strongly inclined to discount the
ultimate credibility of any U.S. pressure or threats to curtail aid to
South Vietnam and hence inclined to tune out any U.S. complaints about
his present course of action.
10. If Thieu holds to his present course, the international
consequences, especially in the United States, are easily predictable.
Critics of the war and the GVN will have a field day and, indeed, their
chorus is already rising. Hanoi's propagandists and North Vietnam's
supporters in other countries will have a propaganda windfall they will
waste no time in exploiting: The probable net impact of this course of
action in South Vietnam is much harder to assess. ThieuTs domestic
critics are often articulate but this does not necessarily make them
representative. Also, the accessibility of his Saigon critics, many of
whom speak English or French, to journalists and diplomats facilitates
even unconscious distortion of press, television or official reporting.
Vietnamese sentiment is always difficult for foreigners to guage, particularly
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foreigners consciously or unconsciously prone to apply western concepts
to their analysis of Vietnamese politics. For example', there is no
Vietnamese historical precedent whatsoever for transferring or losing
power at the national level by an electoral contest. For that matter,
national elections with a near universal franchise are strictly a' post-
1954 import. None to date -- from Diem's 195rreferendurn to the
military ticket's 1967 presidential victory -- has ever done anything
but confirm power positions that already existed.
11. Many Vietnamese -- though not ones that journalists or
diplomats are most likely to talk to -- will think Thieu very clever. He
has outmaneuvered and rendered impotent all his domestic rivals and,
in the process, end-played the Americans as well. In so doing, he has
already won the real struggle and, by demonstrating his superior political
? skill, demonstrated the validity of his claim to primacy. What is an
election supposed to be anyway but the formal ratification of a victory
already won, the ritual investiture of one who has successfully gained
the throne? Vietnamese who think pragmatically or traditionally in this
fashion, and many do, will not be unduly disturbed if Thieu wins a fore-
ordained victory on 3 October. Nor would they necessarily be troubled
if Thieu's slate were the only one on the ballot.
12. But times and attitudes are changing in Vietnam and views
such as those just described are far from universal. Furthermore,
though Vietnamese are generally pragmatic, they also have a keen sense
of what is usually described as justice but is probably better termed as
"fitness. " Among most Vietnamese, a high official who leaves office
without wealth is regarded as stupid, one who fails to take proper care
of his family and friends is morally suspect, but one who was too
rapacious or blatant is held in contempt. Though many of his compatriots
will understand Thieu's actions to date and perhaps even admire him for
them, Thieu is right on the borderline of going too far. Domestically
Thieu has three real dangers: One is acting ma way that Vietnamese
(not Americans) regard as overplaying his hand. The second is showing
weakness or vulnerability. ? The third is that of handing those who oppose
or dislike him for various reasons a single issue around which their
opposition can coalesce. These dangers are all compounded by Thieu's
increasing isolation and reliance on a small circle of Palace favorites
strongly inclined to tell him what they know he wants to hear. Thus
his antennae may be dulled just when he needs them most.
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13. The current Vietnamese political climate will be materially
affected by the 29 August Lower House elections. Both their outcome
and their manner will have an impact. If pro-Thieu candidates win a
solid but not an intrinsically suspicious majority, Thieu's hand will be
strengthened. If his supporters take what is regarded as a drtibbing,
Thieu's opponents will be much emboldened. Whatever the actual
declared outcome, if the events of 29 August produce any widespread
belief (much more important in this context than facts) that there was
blatant and/or pervasive fraud, pressure and vote-rigging, the political
climate will sour perceptibly.
14. In sum, acknowledging the fallibility of foreign analysis
performed from the wrong side of the Pacific, Thieu is probably not in
real domestic political trouble -- yet. Depending on the skill with which
he plays his hand (and his luck), he may be able to pursue his currently
favored course without damaging his domestic political position --
unless the international repercussions, especially in the U.S., prove
so severe that they have domestic impact within Vietnam, e. g., by
obviously improving Communist prospects or calling into serious question
Thieu's ability to obtain continued U.S. support. It would be foolish to
be apocalyptic at this moment, but it would be equally foolish to ignore
the clouds clearly gathering on the Vietnamese political horizon and
the clearly rising chance of severe turbulence.
15. Thieu's present course of action also risks producing another
type of consequence, much less dramatic or obvious than immediate
manifestations of overt unrest, but over time at least equally corrosive
and prejudicial to South Vietnam's ability to cope with COmmunist pressure.
In South Vietnam, the concept of nationhood -- as opposed to simple ethnic
pride -- is of quite recent origin. Concomitantly, notions of national
interests to which, in times of stress, personal pique or ambition ought
to be subordinated are tender plants with shallow roots. Here, the
Constitution, elections for both Assembly houses, and the 1967 Presidential
elections have played a valuable, catalytic role. In non-Communist circles,
relatively few of ,Thieu's opponents really question the legitimacy of the
present GVN's claim to be the rightful custodian of the national interest.
But if Thieu "steals" the 1971 election by eliminating even the possibility
of meaningful challenge, his non-Communist critics and opponents will
find it increasingly easy to rationalize devisive or even subversive activity
on the grounds that Thieu has forfeited any claim to a rightful mandate.
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Hence, if Thieu forges unswervingly ahead to win an effectively uncontested
election he may be able to install himself in office for. another term with
what looks at the time like no more than surface political grumbling.
A slight scraping bump, however, was all that the Titanic's passengers
and crew actually felt when it hit the fatal iceberg.
B. The Article 56 Gambit
16. From this side of the Pacific, the legally simplest and
theoretically most tidy way out of the current South Vietnamese situation
would involve exploiting the provisions of the Constitution's Article 56,
with Thieu and Ky resigning their offices and the presidency temporarily
passing to the President of the Senate, Nguyen Van Huyen, for not more
than three months. During this time Huyen would be enjoined (by the
Constitution) to organize new elections for President and Vice President.
A new election law could thus be written and the candidate lists re-opened.
This is a nice theory, but the chances of Thieu's acquiescing in such a
scenario are virtually nil. To take this tack would involve a grave -- and
for Thieu almost certainly unacceptable -- loss of face, doubly so since
this is a procedure Ky has publicly recommended. Hence, to Thieu it
would look as if he were giving ground to Ky.
17. Quite apart from important questions of personal face, Thieu
and his senior colleagues, including key figures in the military establish-
ment, would have serious, legitimate substantive reservations about this
procedure. Whatever be its other theoretical advantages, this scenario
would create an uncertain interregnum of three months duration with the
powers of the Presidency at least legally vested in a colorless politician
with no backing in the Army or civil service. Thieu and the senior
echelons of the military establishment would be convinced and could most
plausibly contend that this would be a virtual guarantee of disaster,
particularly since this period of inexperienced, uncertain authority
at the GVN's center would clearly coincide with a period of severe
Communist military, political and diplomatic pressure.
18. Thieu has already voiced to some of his key subordinated
his strongly negative reaction to the Article 56 gambit. In fact he has
described it as "illegal. " It is not (quite the contrary); but Thieu knows
-- as do his opponents -- that if he backs down to the extent of giving up
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power, even "temporarily, "he may never regain it. He also knows that
if he surrenders even titular authority to an interim President, much
that has been accomplished under his leadership may swiftly begin to
unravel. Given Thieu's attitude, however attractive the Article 56 gambit
may appear on paper in the U.S., it is a practical non-starter' in South
Vietnam unless it is preceded by Thieu's loss of effective control
over the whole situation.
C. Re-Opening the Lists With Thieu Remaining in Power
19. From the standpoint of international reaction, particularly
?reaction within the United States, the principal requirement is obtaining
the appearance of a reasonably open and genuinely contested election
that offers the voters of South Vietnam a valid choice, or at least a
meaningful way of registering their opinions. In this problem there are
two givens: (a) The clock cannot be turned back, hence the chance Thieu
had last spring to improve his international image as well as consolidate
his internal authority has been thrown away by events of recent weeks.
(b) Thieu will never give up the reins of power if he can possibly avoid
doing so.
20. Within this restricted framework there are several options,
none of them simple and certainly none sure to work. What we are talking
about is, if it can be structured, a situation in which when South Vietnam's
voters go to the polls they can express a reasonably unfettered preference
for Thieu, Ky or -- if possible -- Minh. These are the only candidates
who count. There are no other dark horses in the pasture who remotely
class as serious contenders for power.
21. The simplest (not necessarily easiest) way to achieve this
result would be to get Ky and Minh to agree to make a serious campaign.
Despite the corner into which it has painted itself (probably in response
to Thieu's clear wishes), the Supreme Court should be agile enough to
devise a superficially plausible way to put Minh back in the legal
running if directed to do so. Thieu would certainly make no move in this
direction, however, unless he had advance private assurances from both
Ky and Minh that both were willing to play the game. It is at best
debatable whether Ky or Minh, let alone both, would be willing to go
along in their present mood and given the limbs onto whose further
extremities both have publicly climbed.
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22. Given Vietnamese psychology, Thieu would probably stand
a better chance of improving his image and at least his international
position by calling Minh. and Ky's bluff. This would involve a re-deal
of the cards, i. e., a new election law, a fresh start to the campaign and
Thieu's publicly expressed willingness to stand against anyone man
enough to oppose him. The only avenue that this writer sees as even
conceivably leading to such a result involves exploiting (and, to be frank,
twisting) the Constitution's Article 65.* Its drafters patently never
intended this Article to encompass extending the President's term,
but that is not necessarily an insuperable obstacle. In light of the objectives
such procedures would clearly be intended to further plus the fact that
any moves in this direction require the concurrence of two-thirds of
the whole National Assembly, a move along this line would be more
likely to dampen then to intensify the charges that Thieu was acting
? dictatorially even though his current term of office would be extended
somewhat beyond its present 31 October limit.
23. Actually it is pointless for American officials to play at
being Vietnamese politicians or lawyers. From the U.S. standpoint,
the challenge lies in convincing the GVN, especially Thieu, and probably
Ky and Mirth as well that (a) there is a problem and (b) it must be solved.
If the Vietnamese can ever be brought to grasp these points, they will
be much better than we at devising a workable solution.
D. A Coup
24. Whenever South Vietnam's political waters get ruffled, coup
rumors inevitably start circulating. They are beginning to circulate now.
The longer the situation remains unsettled and/or the more unstable it
becomes, the greater will be the circulation of coup talk. At the moment,
a serious coup attempt is quite unlikely. Thieu's present control over
the military establishment and the police and security services is almost
certainly good enough (and the services themselves sufficiently adept)
to minimize the risk of any real coup plot's getting off the ground. This
situation could change if the level of disaffection mounts appreciably,
*Article 65: In a state of war, and when elections cannot be held, the Presi-
dent, with the approval of two-thirds of the total membership of the National
Assembly, shall extend the terms of office of certain elected bodies and
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the current contretemps evolves into a full blown crisis, or Thieu shows
public signs of vulnerability by backing down too hastily or running scared.
For the nonce, however, circulating coup rumors are in all likelihood
nothing but reflections of the kind of speculative gossip that politically
conscious Vietnamese enjoy so much.
E. An .Assassination
25. Though a serious coup plot (for now) is unlikely, an assassination
attempt is an entirely different matter. Tempers are already running high,
and the volatile Vietnamese have a long tradition of settling political
disagreements by violence. Many individuals and groups wish Thieu ill
and some will inevitably wonder whether Vietnam might not be better off
if he were removed from the scene. Those opposed to Thieu of course
include the Communist Party, which would stand to gain a great deal
from the turmoil and uncertainty that would inevitably follow Thieu's
demise at the present time. At least some of those who might like to see
Thieu out of the way, including the Communists, might also like to see
others blamed for any such act. For example, if the Communists were
to mount an assassination attempt, they might not wish to take credit for
it but, instead, might prefer to spread the notion that the deed had been
the work of disgruntled supporters of Minh or Ky. Given the Vietnamese
psyche, an infinite number of changes can be rung on this theme.
26. Thieu is well protected, is certainly aware of the physical
risks to his person, and does have a quite efficient police and security
service. On the other hand, an assassination is never that difficult to
attempt, particularly in a country at war and especially when the intended
target is anxious to move around, show himself, and go through the motions
of campaigning for office. We are certainly not predicting that Thieu
will be assassinated. Such an event, almost by definition, is inherently
unpredictable. Given the climate and circumstances, however, it is
more than likely that someone or some group -- Communist or non-
Communist -- will give serious thought to mounting an assassination
attempt between now and the October elections.
27. If Thieu were to be assassinated -- or otherwise put out of
commission by natural or non-natural causes -- between now and 31
October, Article 56 of the Constitution would come into play. Ky would
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become Acting President for three months charged with organizing a
presidential election within that time. The situation would be a trifle
murky, however, since the Constitution makes no provision for the
President's removal from office (for any reason) within three months
of the expiration of his term, i. e. , 31 October. Hence, there is a
conflict, since it could be argued that a Vice President who becomes
Acting President loses his authority when the original Presidentt.s term
expires. This is a problem that would have to be swiftly resolved if the
assassination (or, more generally, removal) contingency occurred.
Despite its inherent "non-predictability, " this contingency is now a very
real one which could arise at any moment and for which the U.S. would
be well advised to be prepared.
28. The above remarks are keyed to an assassination or some
other event that removes Thieu physically from the political scene. No
legal issues would be raised, but assassination attempts targetted against
Ky or Minh should also not be discounted. The Communists particularly
would derive great benefit if they could arrange Ky or Minh's death in
a manner that pointed the finger of suspicion at Thieu, a development
sure to exacerbate an already tense situation.
III. THE U.S. ROLE
29. It is out of bounds for us in the Agency to offer comments on
Our own government's policy. The U.S. Government's dilemma, however,
is not hard to discern. Minh, Ky and Thieu have all had their innings
as head of the GVN. Thieu's performance has been so far superior to
either of the other two (particularly considering all Minh had going for him
in November 1963) that it is hard to deny that he is clearly the one best
fitted to be President. He knows this full well. What is more to the
point, he knows we know it. The problem is, however, that his current
course of action -- whether or not he gets away with it in South Vietnam
may generate difficulties abroad, particularly within the U.S., that far
transcend any abstract judgment of relative competence.
30. As noted earlier, Americans should not try to devise Viet-
namese solutions. If we want to do anything, we should concentrate our
efforts on convincing Thieu (and other key players in the Vietname se
political arena) that there really is a serious problem here involved (not
just heartburn).and that it must be solved. Threats will not work on
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Thieu., partly because he will not believe them. The only thing that
might work -- and there is no guarantee that it will is what could be
termed the "intelligence" approach as opposed to the hortatory or arm-
twisting approach. This would entail focussing on themes already
sounded by Ambassador Bunker and making roughly the following pitch:
We have worked together for a long time in a common struggle. In this
struggle, both of our countries have made great sacrifices. We are
not trying to interfere in your internal affairs, nor would we presume to
lecture you on Vietnamese psychology or politics. But as you know
Vietnam better than we, we know America better than you. In our
government and political system, the Executive Branch can go only
so far without the support of Congress for in the final analysis, Congress
is the source of the funds and resources without which Executive Branch
policies cannot be implemented. The Vietnam war is misunderstood in
the U.S. and increasingly unpopular. Congress naturally reflects this
mood. If you persist in this course of action, there is a real risk that
Congress will take steps that will make it legally impossible to give
your government and people our continued support. This is not any
kind of threat but simply a fact of U.S. political reality you must
understand and for Vietnam's sake you cannot ignore. Such an approach,
in this writer's opinion, is the only one that has any genuine chance
in penetrating Thieu's thinking enough to influence his behavior in a
constructive fashion.
31. The only other concrete suggestion we have to offer is that
contingency plans should be quietly drawn while time permits reflection
for what the U.S. would want done if Thieu (and, for that matter, Minh
or Ky) were to be assassinated. Events would move swiftly in a super-
heated atmosphere after such a development and there would be no
time for consideration after the fact. No such contingency thoughts,
however, should be broached to any Vietnamese. In the present climate,
they would be certain to be misread as a signal of U.S. desire.
Ge/orge A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
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