COMMMUNIST INTENTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000700020035-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2005
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: September 23, 1971
• Content Type: MF

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Z9 Sept. 1971
Attached are some thoughts and
ideas of my colleagues here which
I distribute for your consideration
and, if you so feel, comment.
George A. Carver, Jr.
S"Decial Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs;:,
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23 September 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: George A. Carver, Jr.
SUBJECT : Communist Intentions
1. There is no direct evidence that the Communists are contem-
plating a major change in strategy in Vietnam. Neither reports nor force
deployments suggest that the enemy is preparing for large-scale e action.
The evidence that is available from clandestine reports, prisors,
ralliers, and captured documents suggest that the major emphasis in
South Vietnam continues to be on terror, subversion and small scale
guerrilla operations, on attempts to disrupt the elections, and on trying
to rebuild the shattered cadre network. Most of our reporting, however,
is local in nature and probably is not valid for more than a few months in
the future. It is entirely possible that Hanoi could be contemplating a
change in strategy for early next year without yet having passed the word
down to COSVN or the lower echelons.
2. To a large extent Hanoi's strategy probably is dependent upon
the pace of our withdrawal program. Hanoi may anticipate that U. S. with-
drawals will continue at a brisk pace with the aim of reducing U. S. forces
to a minimum prior to the U.S. presidential elections. If they remain
satisfied with progress toward this primary objective, there seems to be
little reason for them to ur resources, major
us to slow down thew with-
drawals, and material re Pos
drawals, and jeopardize their long-range prospects for taking over the
country. On the other hand, should they become dissatisfied with the
pace of our withdrawals or with our plans for a residual force, they may
calculate that attacks on U. S. forces in order to inflict casualties might
well increase the domestic pressures on the administration for a total
withdrawal.
3. If the Communists were planning military action on a nation-
wide scope during 1971, we almost certainly should be seeing indications
of it by now in reports or by noting preparations such pasthe forward
placement of supplies. In addition, manpower and supply problems,
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particularly in MR 3 and MR 4, would seem to limit any intensification of
military activity this year to a series of relatively small-scale actions
designed primarily to recoup some of their position in the countryside.
4. It could be a different story in 1972, however. By next year
the GVN forces will not have reached their full capabilities under Viet-
namiza.tion, and the remaining U. S. forces may be reduced to the point
where they will no longer be decisive. Moreover, the Communists have
always closely correlated their military and political actions. The Com-
munists may well conclude that the 1972 election year would be a good
time to prove to the American people that Vietnamization is not working
and that a new, anti-war president should be elected. We should soon
see a major intensification of infiltration and logistical activity if the
Communists intend to escalate the war significantly in 1972.
5. One could argue with equal conviction, however, that the
Communists will lack the capability for any large scale military action
before early 1973. The loss of the Cambodian sanctuaries, the setbacks
in the infrastructure, the depleted supply and manpower situation have
created problems that might require two dry seasons to overcome.
Although the GVN will be stronger militarily in 1973, U. S. forces pre-
sumably will have been further reduced from the 1972 level.
6. There is nothing, of course, to prevent the Communists from
raising the level of activity at any time in specified places, such as the
DMZ area, or from concentrating their forces for an attack on vulnerable
South Vietnamese units. They could also do this against isolated American
units if they decide that this would speed U. S. withdrawals. If the Com-
munists are planning to change their strategy at all, this appears to be
the most likely course over the next year.
7. Whatever option Hanoi chooses, there are no manpower
restraints. OER estimates that Hanoi could send 200, 000 men down the
trail annually for several years before feeling the pinch. This would
sustain a high level of combat; in 1968, the year of the big offensives,
244, 000 men were infiltrated into South Vietnam.
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8. Attached hereto are comments prepared by
on some of the things you suggested we review.
Vietnamese Affairs Staff
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Captured Documents
Information garnered from captured enemy documents was one of
the key signs indicating a shift in enemy strategy and tactics that cul-
minated in the Tet offensive. In contrast, the important enemy documents
available at the present time do not as a whole tell us that a strategy
shift or an impending major offensive is brewing. For example, the
latest COSVN resolution, designated as the 10th COSVN plenum resolution
or the COSVN Standing Committee Directive 01/71, stresses that the
main missions of the Communists in South Vietnam are the building up
of the revolutionary forces and the further development of the armed-
political-proselyting movements. The document cautions against rightism,
pessimism, asserts that the revolution is not in a defensive position, and
yet proclaims that efforts are to be made to attain victory in a short period
of time. Aside from the COSVN level documents, the lower echelon
materials are replete with general professions of victory and talk of per-
severance in the revolution. This is not to say that there may not be
exceptional documents which could indicate a strategic offensive may be
afoot. (For example, there is a document dated 31 July 1971 captured
from the 31st Regiment of the 2nd NVA Division which is operating in the
Quang Nam Province area that contained rules of personal conduct for
the liberation troops who may operate in cities and towns.) However, the
bulk of the currently available relatively important captured documents
offer no tactical tip-offs of an impending period of intensified combat
activity that approaches the 1968 Tet offensive.
Communist Territorial Reorganization
Unlike the establishment of subregions around Saigon in late 1967,
the recently reported Communist territorial reorganizations do not seem
to have been undertaken in order to prepare for possible renewed large-
scale offensive activity. In MR 1 there are reports of a minor restructuring
of province administrations and base areas. In MR 4 several sources
have indicated that the Communist MR structure in the lower Delta may
have been radically altered with new provinces and a subregion jurisdiction
reportedly established. The exclusive explanation by these sources for
the Delta reorganization lies in the necessity to arrest and repair the
dismal situation which the Communists have been facing in the area during
the recent past. While it is too soon to predict what effects the Delta
reorganizations may have, it appears that the Communists are primarily
hoping to ease their supply-logistics problems in the lower Delta through
a more rational MR setup. Only time and the effectiveness of Market
Time will really tell, however. The Delta reorganizations seemingly
are thus dictated by a declining situation and the statement in the DIC
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item that the reorganizations may possibly be a prelude to larger scale
military action in the coming dry season is a "cover the waterfront" type
statement, according to the OCI author of the item. The reorganizations
in the lower Delta seem to be more typical of the standard Communist
way of coping with their serious problem areas -- if you have a problem.,
"reorganize. "
Propaganda
There is no apparent indication from DRV media pronouncements
of a strategy shift regarding the war. Aside from the recent series --
apparently stopped, albeit temporarily, several weeks ago -- of polemical
articles pegged to the impending Nixon trip to China, there is nothing
currently noteworthy in the media on which one can conceivably hang any
policy shifts. OCI's alleging a possible policy shift from a couple of
recent Hanoi articles was, in my view, an inaccurate judgment and reading.
From our experience prior to Tet 1968, it is very unlikely that we will
be able to observe signs of an impending strategic offensive in DRV media
pronouncements.
Negotiations
The Communist position is frozen on the basics. Notwithstanding
the appep. ice of flexibility which Communist spokesmen. portray to
visiting .tors and journalists with regard to the separate settling of
points 1 and 2 of their settlement position, the basic Communist position
remains unchanged from what it was when the four party talks began in
early 1969. The 16 September meeting confirmed that the Communists
consider the 7-point proposal as a single package. Since there is little
likelihood that our side will accept this position, and little indication that
the Communists are willing to compromise, the prospect is for a continu-
ation of the war. At present, Madame Binh's sojourn to Hanoi may be a
development worth watching. Conceivably, she might bring back some
new formulations upon her return to Paris -- possibly new phrases
designed to exploit the prisoner-withdrawal issue -- but it is extremely
doubtful indeed whether she will be returning with anything substantive.
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Past Military Indicators and Their Current Status
1. In view of the disengagement of U.S. combat forces,
the loss of intelligence due to the reduced flow of captured
documents, prisoners of war, and ralliers, and the expected
degradation of signal intelligence, all of which had pre-
viously provided a wealth of data, it will be more difficult
than ever to predict with as high a degree of confidence as
in the past what the enemy?s intentions and capabilities will
be over the short term. Fortunately, information on a number
of key indicators is still available though the timeliness,
in some cases, has been degraded.
2. Changes in Communist strategy and plans which have
led to major offensive actions have most frequently and ac-
curately been forecast by evidence of the following: a) the
deployment of Communist main forces; b) the heavy expenditure
of effort to maintain, expand, and/or improve infiltration/
logistics associated facilities (roads, pipelines, storage
areas, landlines); c) the increased movement of men and
materiel southward from North Vietnam; d) the strengthening
of the defensive posture along the infiltration/logistics
corridor; e) the reopening of traditional supply corridors
into and within South Vietnam; f) the prepositioning of
supplies in forward areas; and g) the improvement of command
and control mechanisms within South Vietnam.
3. In assessing these indicators, it is noted that in
the field of deployment of Communist main forces there have
not been any recent significant and ominous moves. There
are, however, tenuous indications that the 304th and 308th
NVA Divisions, which have been in the North Vietnamese
Panhandle, are about to move, but the destinations for these
moves are as yet unknown. Regarding the main force divisions
now involved in Cambodia, there has been no evidence that
these divisions are planning or are moving from Cambodia to
South Vietnam at this time. Any of these units, of course,
could deploy toward South Vietnam at any time, but it is
-probable that such movement would be detected in SIGINT well
before they arrived in South Vietnam.
4. Following past cyclical patterns, the movement of
men and materiel during this dry season has been at avery
low level. An exception to the pattern of the past, however,
has been th.. retention of most elements of the 559th Trans-
portation Group in the Lao Panhandle to maintain the road
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system. While some antiaircraft elements moved back to
North Vietnam during this rainy season, the bulk of the 559th
units remained in an unprecedented effort to repair and main-
tain the route structure in southern Laos. These extra-
ordinary efforts could enable the enemy to begin moving both
men and materiel earlier this season than in the past.
5. Perhaps it is in the strengthening of the air
defense posture in southern North Vietnam that we have our
earliest indication of the enemy's intentions. The augmen-
tation since January from three to fourteen AAA regiments
and to six the number of SAM regiments in the North Vietnamese
Panhandle, along with the increased MIG-21 activity below the
20th parallel can be interpreted as being infiltration
associated. The movement of some of these air defense units
into the Lao Panhandle this season will probably portend in-
creased efforts to protect the infiltration/logistics corridor.
6. The latter three indicators (opening supply lines,
prepositioning supplies, and internal reorganizations),
unfortunately, are more dependent on timely, reporting from
_.`1-country assets (aerial recon and photography, ground
recon, informants, penetrations). Some of the recent Station
reporting on these subjects has been helpful, but much more
of this type reporting will be required to enable the analysts
to pull together the bits and pieces needed to complete the
picture of developing enemy intentions and capabilities.
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