LAIRD S LATEST ALARMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000700050001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 25, 1972
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

Appro Y For Release 2004/12/02: IA-RDP8O1720RQ00700050001-5
A
VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS S
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
DATE'. 23 Mar 72
ToMr. Carl Duckett
FROM'.GACarver, Jr.
SUBJECT
REMARKS'.
Attached is the NEW REPUBLIC
article I mentioned to you at of Z3
March Morning Meeting. All o
is far afield from my parish, but
Scoville does soffhandorecall bever having
details I cannot
heard or seen outside of the DCI's
highest classification briefings before
our various Congressional al committees. former
I wonder, hence,
colleague has let out of the bag cats
that might better have been kept
confined.
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
Attachment dated
NEW REPUBLIC article, da dat
25 March 1972, by
Scoville, Jr.
Approved For Release 2004/12/02 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000700050001-5
 "S-~ifficiency Is Superiority in Another Cloak
by Herbert Scoville, Jr.
Over and over again, Secretary Laird and other De
"The Soviet Union is continuing to create strategic fence officials have stressed the nromenti nl of the
capabilities beyond a level which, by any reasonable Soviet strategic build-up as justification for these
standards, already seems sufficient." So said President Nixon in his State of the World message on February additional weapons on the part of the US. On January
9.. The point can be conceder!. The -Soviets have stra' 25, Laird prefaced his request for supplemental ap-
tegic forces well beyond those needed to deter a US propriations in this fiscal year with the statement:
attack, even if our strategic arsenals continue to in- "These funds will be used for programs that we need
crease at a high rate. - to start now to meet defense requirciuents as a result
But what President Nixon's message did not say is of the Soviet weapons momentum."
that the US is also building forces greater than needed . What is this "momentum"? In his Annual Report of
to deter a Soviet attack and prevent us' or our allies February 15, Laird described the Soviet strategic
from being coerced. The administration policy of "suf- weapons developments which presumably worry him
ficiency" is only superiority in another cloak. the most. The following item by item analysis of all
We are now placing MIRVs (multiple, warheads of these. leaves some doubt as to whether his concern
which can be aimed at individual targets) on a large is warranted. .
fraction of our land- and seabased ballistic missiles.
Secretary Laird reports that during the past year we Continued Deployment of ICBMs
added warheads to our missile force at the rate of
almost three a day. MIRV deployment as an alterpa- The increase in Soviet landbased ICBMs has in the.
tive to building more missile launchers has long had past always been cited as the dominating element in
strong support by the joint Chiefs of Staff, and most the threat. The Russians now have 1520 ICB11v1 launch-
of those who are now leading the hue and cry about ers as compared to 1054 US launchers. Though some
Russian superiority in missile launchers are ignoring 100 new Soviet silos have been identified for new or
this warhead expansion. Our total offensive force modified ICBM systems, the build-up has been slow-
loadings will, according to Secretary Laird, increase ing down. Indeed, Mr. Nixon in his State of the World
between mid-1971 and mid-1972 from 4700 to 5700 message noted that the USSR added only 80 ICI3Ms last
weapons while, during the same period, the Russians year, compared to 256 the previous year. Secretary
will only add 400 new weapons to their stockpile of Laird now projects an increase of only 30 between
2100. At this rate, it will.be a long time before they November 1, 1971 and mid-1972, and points out that
catch up. the SS-9, SS-11 and SS-13 programs may be over. So
All, elements of our strategic forces are being im- the "momentum" in total numbers of Soviet ICBM
proved far beyond the requirements of "sufficiency.". launchers seems to be petering out.
We are deploying a new generation of missiles in both What about the large ICBMs- the SS-9s which were
our land- and seabased launchers when no current most feared as potential first strike threats to our
threat requires them. We are planning to build still Minuteman deterrent? Here, the pace has slowed even
more advanced missile submarines (ULMS) before more dramatically. In August, 1969, the Soviets were
there is any conceivable danger to the existing ones. reported to have more than 275 SS-9s operational or
We are building a new bomber, the B-1, years before under construction, and Secretary Laird predicted an
the B-52s will beconie obsolete. We are deploying an increase of 50 or more per year in then justifying the"
ABM defense of Minuteman missiles which is not need for the Safeguard ABM. Now, two-and-a-half
needed to preserve our deterrent, and is, moreover, years later, he reports that there are only about 300
inadequate and poorly designed to protect these of these large type ICBMs operational or under con-
missiles if the Soviets do develop a MIRVed ICBM struction-hardly a cause for new alarm this year or
requiring major increases in funds for new US stra-
HERB1RT SCOV.ILLE, JR. has been assistant director of the
tegic weapon systems. Included in this Soviet total
are the same 30 new large launchers that were first
Arnms Control and Disarm pprDltit9d!Fyeff1Rdt#aSg (29 /1'4Pgrk QATWP& O-t720RUO)G700,0500?'b .5w Soviet
tor of the CIA. missile has been tested for these launchers even a year
 later, and even if a new missile were to be deployed quired before it could be developed, tested, and
'in"them, it would not signify ' increase in pre- deployed in signif t quantities.
viously estimated tlltrca-pprtOve- Reltaase 200' h12/02 : CIA-RDP80R 720R000700050001-5 -
SS-9` is capable of launching any MIRY system the
Soviets chose to develop. If they need a different Submarine Missiles
missile to have a INIINV to threaten Minuteman, then .
our previous worries were greatly exaggerated. It is The Soviets have during the last' three years been
rumored that the Russians may accept a ceiling on building up their submarine ballistic missile force.
large missiles at SALT (Strategic Arms Limitations They have 25 operational Y-class submarines, each
Talks). If-so, that would publicly Co11111lit them to /trip With 16 missiles; they are turning out additional sub-
a pro cram their i;at,c almost stopped unilaterally, marines at the rate of 9 to 10 a year as corllpared with
Secretary Laird also refers to extensive testing since the eight a year estimated earlier. When all those now
1965 of a modification of the SS-9 which would permit under construction are completed, however, they will
it to be fired on a depressed trajectory or used as a only have achieved approximate numerical parity
fractional orbit bombardment system (FOBS). This was with the US. They will still be below the total Western
mentioned years ago by Secretary McNamara and is forces, since the French and the British also have
not provocation for increased concern today. Such a small missile submarine fleets. More important, Presi-
systent would be less effective than the basic SS-9 in dent Nixon recently said that "our missiles have
destroying our Minuteman missiles.. longer range and are being equipped with multiple
independently targetable warheads. Moreover, our
MIRVS submarines are now superior in quality." This year,
as last year, authorities have referred to a new long-
The Russian MIRY program is now behind where it range Soviet submarine missile, but it has been
was said to be in 1969 by the administration. At that reported that this missile could not be fired from the
time, Mr. Nixon and defense officials reported that Y-class submarines unless these are modified.
the Soviets had been testing a multiple reentry vehicle Since missile submarines are primarily deterrent
system which had a "footprint" that appeared to weapons and cannot be 'used to attack either the
threaten our Minuteman silos. Now Secretary Laird Minuteman or Polaris portions of the US deterrent,
states that, "while the Soviets probably have not it is hard to see how this Russian build-up would
tested MIRV missiles thus far, they have conducted justify adding to US strategic forces. Our submarine
.many tests of the SS-9 with multiple reentry vehicles strategic forces are "highly survivable," says Mr.
(MRVs) since flight testing began in August 1968. Laird, and while there are indications that the Soviets
The last MRV tests were in late 1970." What kind *of are attempting to establish an area surveillance system
'"mon entum" is this? The testing of a MRV on the and associated ASW (anti-submarine warfare) strike
small SS-11 ICBM, or even the deployment of MRVs as forces, they do not as yet have this capability. Other
recently reported by Laird, subsequent to his report officials have testified that they have not been able to
to Congress, calls for no panic. All authorities have identify airy developments that indicate a Soviet threat
conceded that MIZVs, whether on the SS-9s or SS-11s, to our seabaseci missile deterrent.
do not endanger our Minuteman. Cries of alarm for None of the reported Soviet weapons programs re-
three years cannot alter the fact that there is no present quire the construction on a crash basis of a new sub-
evidence that the Soviets have started a MIRV program. marine missile system (ULMS), which may cost tens
The President correctly states that the Russians have of billions of dollars and may be designed to cope with
the basic technological ability to develop MIRVs, and the wrong threat. This is not security; it is insanity.
this can be the only explanation for Secretary Laird's
prediction that the "Soviet MIRV capability could be
achieved next year." But there is no factual evidence Strategic Bombers
to support such an estimate since testing has not '
begun. It would appear that Laird's prediction is even Both the President and Secretary Laird have warned
less valid and even more misleading than those Made of a new Soviet supersonic bomber. What they have
in 1969. For although the Soviets could begin testing in mind is a medium-range aircraft, probably pri-
at any time, it would almost certainly be more than marily designed for use in Eurasian situations and
three years before they could deploy any system that of little direct threat to the continental US. Laird
could even marginally threaten Minuteman. With the reports "a probability that it has a capability for in-
limited number of large missiles that will be available flight refueling. With refueling-it could reach virtually
to the Soviets iii the near future, such a MIRY system all US targets." I le does not say whether these bombers
would have to disperse accurately six or more war- could ever got back to Russia, if they were used against
heads per missile. Thisp(fopyb i{type of
bili ty of the SS-9, but a very long time would be re- Soviet bomber, about which we have known for several
 years, does not require, expanded US programs in ploying a new mod'l ICBM, Minuteman 111, and
resTInnse. We oow have an verwh! king quantitative modif in our subr acs to fire the new Poseidon
and qualitative lead in strafe e~$0?`ti'tieQS elease 2004~J /R RQP8t~~j7?F,yOQA7PgQA0QQ~r.5as the
I
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ABMs
-Laird also reports that "constrtiction of the Moscow
ABM system has resumed and testing of an improved
ABNI missile continues." Ile referred to this resump-
tion last year and to the testing back in 1969. Never-
theless, Admiral Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of staff, has just said that the Moscow system, even
with improved radars and more and better inter-
ceptors, could still be saturated by a very small part
of our total missile force. It does not, therefore, en-
danger our deterrent. The US has apparently been
seeking at SALT, ABM limitations at levels greater than
the present Moscow system, so it is hard to believe
that the administration is really worried about the
Moscow ABMs. Furthermore, the Soviets have been
eager for an agreement to limit ABMs, and President
Nixon has expressed optimism that this can be
achieved at an early date, so the long-term danger
from ABMs may never develop. If the SALT negotia-
tions break down, the Soviet ABM program still does
not warrant increases in US strategic force levels
for many years. We have ample lead time to put into
effect any necessary countermeasures.
The deployment of a widespread space tracking
system that would enable the Russians to predict the
position of near-earth orbit satellites is described by
Secretary Laird as a Soviet research and development
effort worth mention. Presumably this system is
composed of the same surveillance radars that a year
ago he sought to associate with a Soviet ABM system.
Apparently, the association is no longer considered
quite so valid, and the fears generated in some quar-
ters in past years are no longer as great. A space track-
ing system is not a major security threat; the US has
had one for more than 10 years.
In sum, in its current round of budget requests the
administration has been crying wolf: it has not cone
forth with a single new development in the last year
that' in any way demonstrates a new threat to Our
strategic deterrent. The Soviet ICBM program is wind-
ing down and its MIRV program is many years behind
original predictions. Only in the area of submarine
missile deterrent systems has the Soviet program con-
tinued to roll forward, and here the US is more Chan
one generation ahead. The Russian strategic weapons
programs are continuing, but their monlentunl is
faltering.
In contrast, we have been moving forward with
increasing speed on all fronts. We are deploying
MlRVs rapidly Sc) as to increase our force loadings at
e
Polaris. We are not building any addutIOna missi
launchers, but no one has seriously advocated our'
increasing these for many years. We have a far more
extensive anti-submarine warfare program both in
terms of deployment and in terms of research and
development than the Soviet Union. We are proposing
to commit large sums to a new missile submarine
(ULMS), though our present system is far superior
to the Soviet Union's. We are building a new inter-
continental bomber. We are proceeding with an ex-
panded ABM deployment and carrying 'out extensive
research and development on next generation systems.
Restraint in US weapons programs is hard to find.
The administration ought to drop the double standard.
by which it evaluates US and Soviet strategic weapons.
the rate of 1000 warhead -PMedWon, Re4l?'SL02ON/12/02: CIA-RDP80ROl720R000700050001-5
new guidance systems for these MIRVs. We are de-