VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS STAFF CONTRIBUTION TO DCI BRIEFING BOOK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000700080045-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: July 11, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

UCR 1
'WAIV
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11 July 1972
SUBJECT: Vietnamese Affairs Staff Contribution
to DCI Briefing Book
1. Three of the four WSAG projects extant at the time
of your departure were completed and sent to Kissinger, the
other WSAG principals, Secretary Laird and General Bennett.
Attached hereto are reading copies of the three memoranda in
question:
a. The Impact of Events Since 8 May 1972 on
North Vietnamese Capabilities to continue the War
25X1 3 July 1972. This is the re-
quested summary or distillate of our two earlier
memoranda of 8 and 27 June, i.e., the original
capabilities piece (8 June) and the detailed answers
to Kissinger's and his staff's questions thereon
(27 June).
b. The Effect on the North Vietnamese Economy
of a Reduction of Imports to 2,700 Tons Per Day
25X1 6 July 1972. This is the requested
response o issinger's "What do you mean by
'minimum levels?'" question.
C. Population Control Map of South Vietnam
(No. 0791 72), 8 July 1972. This is our cut at
Kissinger's request (growing out of his interest in
our previous control maps) for a picture of how things
actually stood at the present. This project was con-
ducted with enough Defense consultation to keep Laird,
the Chiefs, and DIA happy but not enough to get the
25X1 project untracked or keep us from meeting our deadline.
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2. Colonel Kennedy's comments indicate the above docu-
ments have been well received and well regarded. We still
have, however, an undercurrent of the problem that showed up
in April and with which you are quite familiar. Joe Alsop
called me on 6 July (prior to taking off for Miami). Among
other things, he said (with a rather self-satisfied purr)
that an "unimpeachable source" had told him that an Agency
"estimate" (his word) had alleged that the attacks on the
North were having no effect whatsoever on the Communists'
military capabilities and that said estimate had been
"remanded for redrafting." I told Joe rather tartly that
his source might be unimpeachable, but in this instance his
source was wrong. The Agency had never claimed or said that
the attacks on the North were without effect and, further,
no "estimate" or any other paper on Indochina had been
"remanded for redrafting." This incident is of little in-
trinsic importance, but since it does not take much imagina-
tion to guess the identity of Joe's "unimpeachable source,"
the incident does serve as a telltale symptom of the way some
winds are still blowing.
3. On pending business, we are still working on the
fourth -- and in some ways, diciest -- WSAG project, namely
the ceasefire maps. These are due by COB 12 July, a deadline
we will meet with relative ease. We have been working har-
moniourly with State and Defense on this and have a package
assembled that makes reasonable sense, reflects a consensus
judgment, and is responsive to the White House request. We
are all well aware, of course, that even if the White House
likes this package as a first cut, the project will almost
certainly have to be re-done several times if the subject re-
mains a live one.
4. Thanks to the Democratic Convention and other matters
of greater immediate interest, there have been no further de-
velopments on the related front of major consequence
since our 3 July . oldsmith has asked some questions,
explaining that he was sure Stennis would want to be briefed,
but these were not hard to stall until after your return.
Hersh had another article in the Sunday (8 July) New York Times
News of the Week in Review section, but this was essentially an
abridged re-hash of his 3 July story with no new allegations.
So far, the Agency is truly innocent of everything we have
actually been charged with. We have, for your perusal, a de-
tailed memorandum on the charges surfaced to date in light of
the background of what has actually been done by the military
services and by us.
5. Laird has been in high good humor, grumbling a bit
about publicly expressed White House (read Kissinger) optimism
regarding possible progress in negotiations (an optimism for
which no supporting evidence has crossed my desk) but with no
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apparent heartburn about anything connected with the Agency.
He seems to have liked our WSAG output and seems well pleased
with the extent to which we have worked with his associates
on these projects.
6. The'psychological warfare effort perks along in a
way the White House, according to Kennedy, considers praise-
worthy. We were probably at least partially responsible for
the rumor about Chinese and Soviet pressure on Hanoi to
negotiate, which UPI played out of London. This ricocheted
around for several days and sent the Dow Jones up 28 points.
The White House apparently considers it the fruit of successful
Apenev eF-Forts and is very pleased-
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Geo ge A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
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