(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000700090022-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: August 23, 1972
• Content Type: MF

Approved Forelea
rfA
OR017000700090022-8
23 August 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chief, Far East Division
SUBJECT
discussed in previous conversations, two things about the
case bother me very much.
a. I do not wish in any way to seem critical about
the past work done on this case, particularly by
all praiseworthy. Nonetheless, the fact remains -- as
whose dedication, effort and resu' L.: are
himself would be among the first to contend
that is holding back on a wealth of infor-
mation on topics of major interest-and significance to
the U. S. Government. As we all know, he is a very
cool, tough, disciplined Party professional. Hence
he has been very reluctant to provide much information,
particularly information that (in his opinion) might
compromise his former Party associates and/or their
activities. To date, I is clearly the net
winner; on points, in his almost two-year battle of wits
with his GVN and/or U. S. interrogators.
however, the Agency should ever be taxed with accounting
CL"'SIFT U BY SAVA
in light of known importance. If,
b. In thel channel, the other
swa
side has offered to plus other
unspecified prisoners forl and one of his
colleagues. Quite properly, we have resisted this exchange
The attached note was written at my request by F___
I think it merits careful consideration. As we have
-Y:
Approved For a4~'i - DPB~~Q080~022-8
 Approved For'Kelease 2~wtw
for the use made of in terms of
additional information obtained, during the additional
time he has remained in allied custody, we would find
it difficult at this juncture to make a very impressive
case.
2. Granting the difficulties involved in cracking this tough a nut
without resorting to professionally and morally unacceptable methods,
I still think part of the problem lies in our past focus and approach. To
be blunt, the record of this case strongly suggests to me that we have
been too parochially narrow in our concerns. We have concentrated,
understandably, on topics of major CI/CE interest to a professional
intelligence service (e. g., the wiring diagram of th
precisely the topics on which equall a , y,
is most reluctant to tali. In the process, however, we have paid dispro-
portionately little attention to what might be termed strategic intelligence
background topics that bear only indirectly on our professional interests
but are of considerable importance to our policy-level masters. Never
before have we had this kind of a potential window into the upper levels
of the Lao Dong Party -- one who certainly knows a great deal abou' the
personal relationships between and among the members of the Politburo,
how the decision to resume armed struggle was made in the late 1950s,
who advocated this policy, who opposed it and on what grounds, what
really lies behind the Hoang Minh Chinh affair, etc. , etc. These are
questions of much more than historical interest, since their answers
could give the U. S. Government a much clearer fix than it now has on how
policy is actually made in Hanoi, whose voices count, and what latent
splits or factional polarization may exist within the Lao Dong's top echelons.
3. One theme is recurrent i account of his dealings
with namely the latter's intellectual arrogance and love
of lecturing his interrogator. It seems to me that the right kind of
interrogator who could ask the right kind of leading questions -- i. e. ,
one sufficiently well versed in Party history and the North Vietnamese
leadership structure to recognize significant new data the moment he
heard it -- might be able to tap fund of strategic intelligence.
I regard finding this type of interrogator and assigning him promptly to
this case as matters of considerable importance and urgency. I, therefore,
suggestion warrants very serious consideration.
251
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Geo e A. Carver, Jr.
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Approved-**r RA~
23 August 1972
MEMORANDUM
25X1 SUBJECT:
1. The Vietnam Station has asked Headquarters to furnish PCS
25X1 For family reasons cannot return to Vietnam, but it is his
opinion as well as the Station's and Headquarters that there is still a
great deal of valuable information be be obtained from
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a replacement for
2. One solution might be the use of I on the
case: This would have several advantages:
F
already is in aigon (and has extended until January 1973); he has been
devoting most of his time for some two years to North Vietnam, and he
is, according to the Chief of the Embassy External Political Section, the
Mission's leading expert in this field; his nearly flawless French and very
onnd Vietnamese might prove very helpful. The main problem in using
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XiI : i
Approval of DCI
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for interrogation of
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