(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000700110032-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: October 2, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

Apprgve fr[ , R ~ea QR 800070 100$
October 1972
The Honorable William H. Sullivan
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs
3U 81RCT:
REMARKS:
1. Attached for your information are two
notes done by one of my associates. One is a
comment on South Vietnam's new press law,
the other on the recent abolition of hamlet
elections. The author of these notes is a very
able officer who has spent the better part of a
decade in Vietnam and is about as perceptive
and knowledgeable an observer as can be found.
2. I had thought of distributing these pieces
at the next Indochina Committee meeting but I
am a trifle reluctant to do so. Its membership
has expanded to the point where comments
relating to specific areas of Indochina -- if
sent to all Committee members -- inevitably
wind up on the desks of persons who have no
real need to see them.
/s/
George A. Carver, Jr,
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
cc: Mr. Kennedy, NSC Staff
GAC:mee
25X1 1- 1
1 - GAG Chrono w/atts
1- - VAS Chrono w/atts
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29 September 1972
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Comment on South Vietnam's Press Decree-Law
1. President Thieu promulgated on 4 August 1972 a
decree-law regulating the press. The two most important
and controversial features are: A requirement that pub-
lishers deposit a substantial sum (in most cases VN
$20,000,000 or about U.S. $46,000) to guarantee payment
of fines, court costs and reparations to plaintiffs; and
a provision that any paper confiscated a second time could
be ordered by the Minister of Interior to suspend publica-
tion. Not surprisingly the reaction among ss irclesi-
politi-
and among all but the most ardently pro-government
cians was highly critical. Even Senator Dang Van Sung,
publisher of the'highly respected, right-of-center and
independent but usually pro-Thieu Chinh Luan was threat-
ening to cease publication. Inded.d, an issue of Chinh
Luan containing an editorial critical of the new law as
unconstitutional was confiscated, making the paper liable
to suspension if confiscated a sedond time.
2. There was on 23-24 August a fairly successful two-
day protest strike by 20 out of the 27 Vietnamese language
newspapers in Saigon, but the general public has remained
apathetic. A threat to press freedom is far from being
the kind of bread-and-butter issue which might stir a popu-
lation justifiably cynical about Vietnamese journalism.
After a two-week extension the deadline for making deposits
fell on 15 September. Some 18 Vietnamese language dailies,
of which 14 are currently publishing, made the deposit. This
is rather more than the 10 or 12 survivor papers which most
observers had predicted.
3. The 14 papers which are still publishing reflect
most of the non-Communist political spectrum; On the right
are three papers more or less openly subsidized by the
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government and another which is probably subsidized. None
bf these is influential, and the first three have neglible
sales. Near the center are Chinh Luan, which Senator Sung
decided to continue publishing in spite of his misgivings,
and Cap Tien, the organ of the "loyal opposition" Progressive
Nationalist Movement (PNM). In contrast to Chinh Luan, which
sells well and is very influential, Cap Tien is seldom read
except by PNM members. Both papers, however, tend to support
the government on "gut" issues -- foreign policy and the "one
man electiori'of President Thieu -- but to criticize it on
less fundamental issues -- e.g., the press law itself. On
the left are two strongly oppositionist papers, Dien Tin and
Dai Dan TaG. The former, which staunchly supports General
Duong Van Minh, published a farewell edition and then quietly
paid the deposit and reappeared a few weeks later. Dai Dan Toc
is put out by a group of mostly Catholic Southerners who were
in the past closely associated with Ngo Cong Duc, but it is a
good deal less extremist than was Ducts new defunct paper, Tin
Sang. The rest of the 14 papers still publishing may be
classified as mainly commercial or sensational but without any
consistent political line.
4. Thus, in spite of the press decree, South Vietnam
still appears to be more than adequately provided with news-
papers, including several represAnting genuinely independent
and opposition viewpoints. On the other hand, the decree will
make it easy for the executive to eliminate any paper which
displeases it in the future. The government can simply con-
fiscate two editions of any newspaper, and then suspend it.
Doubtless the judiciary -- and a fortiori the military courts
which would try most cases under the new regulations -- would
find in favor of the executive in any case in which President
Thieu was really interested. Opposition and independent
papers, acutely aware of their vulnerabilities, will probably
moderate their criticism of the government and avoid printing
articles which might be interpreted as pro-Communist. (This
may, incidentally, leave the government subsidized papers --
none of which are noted for responsible journalism -- with
a near monopoly on really scurrilous writing.)
5. In brief, the effects of the press decree-law depend
upon how President Thieu implements it. He now has legal means
to dose out as much or as little press freedom as he wishes.
On the other hand, the long term prospects for independent and
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opposition papers are probably not very bright, since Thieu's
own inclination-, will be to exercise a fairly heavy hand. It
is?furthermore, a moot point whether outside pressure of a type
which could realistically be brought to bear would, over the
long run, hold Thieu's hand. It should be reiterated, however,
that for the moment there is still a sufficient number of
newspapers representing different 'viewpoints to provide South
Vietnam -- in striking contrast to North Vietnam -- with a
reasonably healthy press.
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29 September 1972
SUBJECT: Abolition of Hamlet Elections in South Vietnam
1. Other than criticism from a wide spectrum of politicians,
President Thieu's recent decree abolishing the election of hamlet chiefs
is not likely to have much impact, at least in the near or medium term.
Under the decree, province chiefs will henceforth appoint hamlet chiefs.
The province chief, however, always had a substantial, probably a
predominant de facto influence on the hamlet chief elections. In addition,
he had de jure authority to veto the electim-n of any hamlet chief
considered "unqualified. " Nevertheless, the GVN presumably feels
that clirec appointr lent of hamlet chiefs by province chiefs will insure
an even higher degree of loyalty to the central government. The
appointment of village administrative officials by province chiefs --
rather than, as previously, by the elected village chiefs -- should
similarly serve to tighten central control over the local administration.
2. Direct appointment of hamlet chiefs and most village officials
village chiefs, contrary to a Stanley Karnow article in the Washington
Post, g September, are still to be elected -- seems likely to produce
a marginal increase in efficiency as well as further increase in loyalty
to the central government. On the other hand, the hamlet chiefs and
village officials are likely to become somewhat less responsive, to the
local population and its needs. Certain kinds of corruption, notably
purchase of jobs, are likely to be facilitated by the new method of
election. Although preparation for a cease-fire may have had something
to do with Thieu's decision to abolish hamlet chi-f elections, this is by
no means a necessary hypothesis. Thieu's natural desire to tighten
his control of the rural administrative apparatus, to the detriment of
na..tionaltst as well as of Communist adversaries, provides an adequate
This tightening should be especially helpful during elc ctio
E Dl?rla'tiC1l. [1
chiefs
P( riods. It would not be surprising to discover that many hamlet chiefs
and village officials are joining 'T.'hieu's "Derrocra.c:y Party,.
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3, The abolition of hamlet chief elections is much less signi-
ficant in itself than as an indication of the general direction -- towards
GVN is pointed. The concept of
a Thieu dictatorship -- in -which the
hamlet and village elections was especially clear to r _y of the
civilians of the U.S. Mission during the 1966-68 period, when Vietnam.
was, with American guidance, being endowed with democratic institutions.
its logical political concomitant
W ith Vietnamization proceeding apace,
would seem to be the dismantling or e-masculat o t ofinericanf ithe~xence.
ins titutions acquired during the period of
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