A WARNING FLAG ON POSSIBLE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST MILITARY PLANS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000800050004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 27, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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27I4~Iarch 1973
SUBJECT: A Warning Flag on Possible Vietnaxese Communist
Military .Plans
1. At the time the Paris Agreements were signed on 2? January,
the general view within the U .S . intelligence community was that
Hanoi, by and large, intended to abide by the overall provisions
of these agreements, at least for a considerable period of time.
Though no one felt the Vietnamese Communist Party had abandoned
its objective of acquiring political control over all of Vietnam, there
teas a widespread belief throughout the intelligence community --
and the U .5 . Government in general -- that at least over the
immediately foreseeable future, Hanoi intended to pursue its southern
ambitions by concentrating primarily on political action. It was
accepted that such political action would certainly be supplemented
by subversion, terrorism and small-scale (guerrilla-type) military
pressure in the provinces. Nonetheless, it was deemed unlikely
that Hanoi would soon initiate another round of mayor offensive
activity involving large military units .
2. The above-described judgment was based on the best
~,vzclence available, It may sv411 havQ been accurate as of early
t rub-rua:ry and, indeed, may still be accurate. Some of the past two
month's events, however, strongly suggest that even if this was the
Hanoi Politburo's policy as of late January, either (1) the Politburo
has changed its mind or, at least (2) is rethinking its decision and
reassessing. its options .
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3. In any event, developments have occurred over the past
eight weeks which, of themselves, can legitimately be read as warning
signs that a sharp rise in the level anal extent of Communist military
offensive activity in South Vietnam may be imminent. Admittedly,
not all the signs point. unambiguously in this direction. Enough of
them do, however, to warrant the raising of this warning flag.
II. RELEVANT EVIDENCE
4. The most significant evidence is, of course,' the overall
pattern. of post-January Communist behavior with respect to the
augmentation of their southern forces' personnel strengths and
equipment inventory . The details of this infiltration activity have
been extensively discussed in our last five weekly "violations"
memoranda and need not be rehearsed here.
a . In manpower, Communist farces in South
Vietnam's Military Region 1 are virtually up to
their peak level of the 19?2 offensive. Communist
forces in South Vietnam's other three Military
Regions are not yet up to this level, but their ranks
have been greatly replenished over the past several
weeks and. even the clearing of what is now in the
infiltration pipeline would go a long way toward
putting them in a combat ready position.
b . In terms of equipment, the Communists now
have as many tanks, as much artillery, and above
all, more AAA and other air defense resources in South
Vietnam than they have ever had before. In some
politically key areas (e , g . , MR 3) the Communists
r_ow have resources (e , g . , 130mm artillery) they slid
not have last year.
5. Since the end of January, tive have received more than a
dozen clandestine. reports of alleged cadre briefings saying that the
Communists are now planning to resume large-scale rziilitary action
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in South Vietnam. These reports come from all regions of South
Vietnam and many come from reliable sources . Though legitimate
questions can be raised with respect to each individual report (e. g. ,
-could it be morale-building exhortation xather than a real reflection
of higher-level decisions) , they all fall into an increasingly widespread
and generally consistent pattern.. Also, such reports are becoming
steadily more frequent. These reports tend to converge around ttivo
alternate dates for the initiation of their alleged upsurge in Communist
military action: shortly after 28 March and shortly after 28 April.
6. There are other straws isx the wind, each of. which can be
given a different explanation but. all of which are consistent with the
hypothesis that a sharp rise in Communist military activity nzay be
imminent. For example:
a. Communist foot-dragging on the Laos
negotiaia.ons could be designed to keep the 60-day
"withdrawal clock" from starting.
b . The rapid augmentation of Communist AAA
capabili?ies, particularly in MR 1, is the type of
augmentation noted on the eve of the 30 March
1972 offensive, i.e. , an augmentation suggesting
the Communists are about to do something they
think will provoke retaliation .
c . Communist actions at Tonle Cham and Rach
Bap certainly look like efforts to unblock the Saigon
River corridor to permit the movement of heavy
artillery and/or major units toward the immediate
Saigon area.
d. The 23 march P:RG anno~Yncements (reported
in the Can Tho Consulate General's telegram 0083)
that its- delegates in My Tho and Can Tho are
~vithdracvino -- without any accompanying explanation --
could b~ read as a classic :indicator that an enemy
offensive in the Delta is imminent.
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?. Logic lends further credence to evidence. such as that
z?ecounted above . The Communists are understandably bearish about
their prospects for achieving much success in South Vietnam through.
political action ar_d primarily political competition. (They probably
share the view recently expressed by a member of the Hungarian.
ICCS contingent, namely that the Communists currently exert control
over only a small part of the population and in an election could. win- only
about 2Q o of the vote .) The record of the past several months strongly
suggests that small-scale Communist military action is not likely tv
produce many gains that GVN counteraction cannot soon erase. If.
the prospects for political action and/ar small-scale military action.
look gloomy, that leaves basically t~vo broad options:
a. Deferring the Party's southern ambitions
for an indeterminate period, or
b . Sharply increasing the level of military
pressure.
In the Vietnamese Communist lexicon, (a) spells acceptance of defeat.
If the Party is unwilling to accept defeat or the serious prospect
thereof, then ifs thoughts and plans must perforce focus on (b) ,
IV . CQNCLUSI(JNS
$. In light of the above,. we have two further projects urgently
in train:
a. A "net assessment" comp~.rison of the
prese:~;t relative military stre*_-tgths of GVN and
Communist forces in South Vietnam,
b . Amore thorough, detailed analysis of
the evidence summarily cited above designed
to put it i.n the best perspective possible.
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9. This memorandum does not attempt to convey a net or balanced
judgment, Its object is to raise a clear and unambiguous tivarning
flag, namely that a plausible case can be made for the thesis that Hanoi.
plans to initiate major offensive military action in South Vietnam
within the next few tiveeks and perhaps within the nett fe~v days .
Ge axver, r .
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
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~~.a?`C ol:
anz`et~aclc:t
gttmmar~, o~ ;:2e~nrt
I~ET'S7;3TG SI:~G~k'Sii;G 111`1 ZS?L~,~i}]I~IG C0;~~U~IIS'~ ~1~ ~E1`ISIVi:
I?`~ VI ~`1'i{;11'~
aL+~ January 1973 Sav~ra~, faix~,y ~ra3ia'ola ~~T~,at Gflng svurcas r~p+artesi
si~ar{ng the J.ast weak o;:' January that CGSVN
haad~uartaxs rags ttelling its cadres ixt western
~`~ 3 that the ceasefire was temparary aztd wou3d
3.ast Por only bt! flays -- iied, until. 28 March
when aX l U,S . ~,,ou;d hate be~ext wi thdrazm.
ist. 5 February 1.973}
~ -~e'a";"~~'.T x-9'73 ~"ccoxding i~-
a~ G~.a Binh Pravznca of k~R ~~ a nelx CQ,Sfif dirVcive
caLl.ad far Viet Cong cadres to rebui~.$ their
zii.litar~ forces.. The dixe ~ivs also stated that
if the iratioz.~7., Council for ~iatzonal Peconci.liai zo~t
arld Concord was not establis'ned. ~?rit}~.n three ~anths
after the ceasefire ---- i. e ., _ bar 2~ 1Rpri1 -- the
V-i e t Cong ~rou? d 7 =~t~.cb. attacks t~ti ou~hout Souti~
Vietz~m. Tne intent of the at4acss wo~.d be to
t
f
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arce
he G
T~ to acca,~i, Co:~un_tst terms T^nr +~>a
est?b3.z.S.~Ant Of' thB Cau~C? 1 _
u1~ +..3 >:~~rcri 1y73)
19 .Febzuarf 1973
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whaas a1I. U.S. farces wi1,l have 'Haan watad_Ta~,,~,,.
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17 i u f7S'LI2~"TJ' 197,
ryrd ~. a~~areh 1973
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27 T~'arch 19~3
Con,
st4ted
a res1,~1~' r T '-~,:.~? activit o PraP'?`e for
y' b'T 2G :,~ri1.
d i sti . 2$ Febrtz~,T. 1973 )
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t in ~_ e zrovznca trere still ua'3ex~
sand ard,ers
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3.?a~~ os
r( tl ~ i~~'1n3 ~; OIl
L^-i.o Fe~aru?zy 1973
~tly ce.ptured by ~~,~
Late Februz~y 1973
~~ ~' ebI't23r~ l ~~~
?_~ ~ e'ox~r.~x ~ X973
dirt. 20 i?Iarch 1973)
tree . ze ed i.n laze e ,. ~ 'Q~- a super?.or
aficer oi~ xiarth ~Tietn^~es8 r,Icn.s z"'or a 'r?*tajor
a~'fe:~si~s,,r This ofz^enszvs xras to ba~~* shoz~tl~
after ~~ t?_'erch. tras the 25X1
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~~uaa,g Tin ~r oTt? nce s of :~ ~. 1. _ 2~X 1
descrz'aed in same detail. the targ,eLs Tahic'rz had
been assi~d 40 ~2`La dim-? s~ on. f .., ~ ^~ ~ phase
of the ne~x affensi~e, ~i5Xa
s zxea tare bazng cold as of -cn? s date t',eat
-she ?T'?8i, Cong would try to recs~ ~,.~e Sa ~u~ on
ti!a ca~tral coast of Sa w-~h Va.e ~r~ b~- 31 2~1z.,-~ch,
1' nis re port cont?ins na da~~a..d.1s, ~iowY~rer o
tie Cor-~zsts plc~z to do t~.s?
di St _ 1c, ~:f~rr'n l Q7~1
ne;~ ar~c7. untested diet Cong source ; n C~u~.ug j]`ga~? -
P.covi~.ca o~. ~?rR l reported teat Co;-rn,~,, st cacLras in
hi
.
r.u,tt .yew z~orth,,,~r
The soul ce felt that :phis ofz'ensive wauld probably
cans zn the peri cd fallarring she deparuu,,: a a= tie
14st U.?S, nilitary forces, -
1973) ~ ~ ~-~ dirt. l ~~iaz~ch
r~.
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~ a r:a,~ or-
z~.lit~ry offensive crrai
th~n the ~-
..~... uQUG U~,~c, ~za was conv_i.nct
the Caist, leadsrs'aio wi11
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r?~ in. uha :res-terms _
-t'?a ~?~~~/'TC t?rere p:T,a~..zng to rrok~ ~:nat'nar afensl~re
uz uer U, S. for ce s taawa w-? thd.Ta;rn, f row Sou~,h ~1'iet~+. ~~
o~! 2~ i~fJ. cho disc. l2 ~Ia_z~cn. 1973}25X1
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Surmnary o.~ ~enort
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 Approved For Relea~200
~7. I~,;rch 1973
r''= ~ y ~.M.2'G17. 1973 7
mid a~_`axch 1973 .
y~. .ti
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h?[J ~?31d 'LI21tG'Sac,eCi tTiet Cptl~ 5C1T?"r'G4~ ~ 12 the -
TrreS~`i,ex' ~del't? rCci022 Oi t?~ lp re~Orted t~.at 2S O?"
ttl,l.a CA3ve ;~ie'G ~'iOTl~ Ca4xcS '~ZZ .~1'?,S 8ie=`, t.r0x'e
bei~ bxze#ed on future Cb~,~-;u.~st r:Lil?-~ar-,~ ~1~.s.
~`cGCrdirrt; to the solrGe, no 1~r~,a seals ~,1;ti_.s~,l
of ex?tiors ~rould 'c~e 1eu:?,ch$d
until the erd of 'r:?z'ChS
bec:ausp the Co~,uua.sts do r_o~ ~r~n4 to H ? ,
t?r'_~ich =~i~ht sto tha U S. do arrft~~
~_,, o ~ mi1.~.',-,ary jr-i-~sdz-et?ral?
zt,.r th$ er~d ofL ~?Z"Gi~., the C o1-~.unist,~ tr? ?
~' ~1 14:.uaGh .
laroar-scale attac'~s, t,~rhich i:~i.1.1 con~ti~e u~xtil.
tha ~~iI ;?q 265 t0' ~GC$?7'`i, 'JZ'0~03c~.7 S W'-^.i Ch th$
~Ii?t Cow Y?rill~ z~xase~+-~:, ?zt z"ut1.~z'e nun ~-'
~otia,,zons,
~ d'-st. 12 2~:GrG'~. 1g7~1 ?. 25X1`
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1~. I':orch 173
does xiot coo - - _~ T1T
to te=ns on a political s$tt3eTM~zrt
by 2$ ~~il, or n?.r~ty days aftax the eeasefi re,
-the ji ie t Corg trill no 1on,~ex abide by the
P~^ri s 2greenent aid th$ ne?~r offe~.siva :gill be~i~.
t di st . 23 Mar Gh 1973 }
r?~`i.lit'~' r~orGes ara planazi.rg a re ~4o#fens ~e 4
which T.~? I.1. begin, in lave atxil Tf -t~+a ~T
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~~ ~ r~r;:~rx~I an
~-9-21. ~`=~=c~ x-973 ~~ra 1oW-?eval V-?et Cor_g sacscUs o~. t'~esa dates
descri~ied Co~.miri.st plans to attac~: sr civic
~rilla~es aad areas ? n. ~iz~'n ~uosa and FIaL ~/dr_ia
pI'C]'ViI2Cc^3 Ol r'R ~. T~(leSS at~,3Cs5 are "t0 ta'~
-';.acs '~saor. so~,et~e afGSr ~ ~:pril ~973.rr
dzsuw ?..1i- r~`axr.'n 1973)
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~~'1cT~AJ~1~S~ ;~~~A~~S STA~~
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
To: The Director
FRO~~,i: GACarver,Jr.
SUBJECT:
o,aTe: 27 March 1973
1. Attached is a package I have sent to
Brent Scowcroft. Prior to its dispatch
I convened my colleagues in OCI, ONE,
OER and DDO/FE . Nane of them voiced
any abjection to it.
2. As indicated in my cover note, work
on the two other studies is in train and
they should be ready far transmission
by Friday.
/s/
George A . Carver, Jx .
Spacial Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
Attachment
cc: DDCI
DDO
DDI
OCI
ONE .
OER
V NO
C7/3~CI/SAVrl: GACarver/mee
Os?i~ - Genaral Scowcroft
1 - tiI x? . Kennedy
Capi~:s as indicated an buckslip
1 - Vr1S/RAG
1 - G_~C Chrono
1 - 13 i 11 C
1 - White House Special Projects
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MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Communist Intentions in Vietnam
REFERENCE:w SAVA Memorandum, "A Warning Flag on Possible Vietnamese
Communist Military Plans", 27 March 1973
1. In view of the evidence, it is appropriate to raise a
"warning flag" with respect to the possibility of an imminent and. sharp
rise in the level and extent. of Communist military activity in South
Vietnam. It would be unfortunate, however,. if concern over this possi-
bility served to detract attention from a more- likely and no lea s
serious Communist strategy, What is now going on -- and what will
continue to go on -- is a major effort to absorb part of South Vietnam
into the DRV`s civil and military administration. TJhether or-not the
Communists resort at some. future date to large-scale offensive action
to complete the process of absorbing South Vietnam .will depend on Hanoi`s
assessment of the risks. But such action is almost certainly not likely
for another year at least due to fear of heavy bombing of Hanoi and uncert-
Dainties with. respect to assistance from ~~[oscow and Peking, ~"
2, The strategy of absorption does require some military action.
GVN pockets and salients within Communist-controlled territory must be
S E C R E T
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 6. This presence will appear increasingly to the South Vietnamese
as solid, permanent, and above all, threatening.. It wi11 grow in
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S E C R E T
Hanoi beca~sse the Communist apparatus and.. military force would tend to
It is said that such a "deferral" spells acceptance of "defeatrr by
5. It has been. argued that the. lack of Communist political appeal
in the South gives the GVN the edge in any situation in which Hanoi
"defers" large-scale military action for an extended period. of time.-
Communists are bent on creating a presence. in South Vietnam not envisaged
The argument here is that these assumptions are not correct, that the.
lose its strength and commitment while confined in th.e boondocks.
by the allied side under the Paris Agreements..:
visibility and its identity as an exte i
ns on
will gradually emerge for all to see.
of the northern administration .
Meanwhile, if things evolve. as
Hanoi expects, the US presence will fade, ,the `South Vietnamese will feel
unprotecte ~ and in due course Hanoi will decide'the psychological situation:
is ripe for an intensification of terrorism, political seduction, and
incremental military pressures.
How the GVN respcinds to Hanoi?~
strategy and pressure'depends~:n .-
part on US"attitudes and commitments. But once Thieu is convincen that the
Communists intend to establish a permanent and .working administrative-and
military presence in the South, his reactions ,are predictable.. He-will
S E C R E T
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seek full U5 backing for a renewed military effort to drive the Communists
aut, making the case that Hanoi was violating understandings clearly
expressed in the Paris Agreements. Failing that, Thieu would at least
ask the US for sufficient aid to allow-the ARVN to apply heavy pressure
on its own against Cammun3_st forces and supply routes within-South Vietnam.
8. While the strategy outlined above- does not pose an imminent .?,~-~~~~ ~,
to the survival of the GVN -- as wauld a large--scale Communist offensive --
it is not too early to consider what should be done to make it fail.
The problem here is that most measures which come immediately to mind,
involve some form of ARVN and/or US military action which could well
appear unprovoked or indirect political. pressures likely to have little
effect on Hanoi.
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