POLITICAL IMPROVEMENT IN CAMBODIA, OBSTACLES AND POSSIBILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000800100005-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 24, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

pproved For 100005-4
WASiiINGiON, D.C. 2505
24 July 1973
SUBJECT: Political Improvement in Cambodia,
Obstacles and Possibilities
1. Current Trends and the Present Situation. The
Phnom. Penh, government's fortunes and the overall non-
Communist position in Cambodia have deteriorated steadily
over the past several months. Indeed, this decline has been
continuous ever since the ill-fated Chenla II Campaign. in
the fall of 1971. Psychologically, the FANK has never
really recovered from the drubbing the North Vietnamese
Army gave its units in those 1971 battles along Route 6.
From that time forward, the initiative has passed in-
creasingly to the Communists, despite the fact that after
Chenla II, the North Vietnamese turned over a progressively
increasing share of combat responsibilities. to their clients
and, initially, pupils -- the Khmer Insurgents -- who now
do most of the fighting. Although heavily outnumbered by
the FANK, the Khmer Insurgents now clearly have the strategic
initiative. They harass all the major lines of internal
communication, and from time to time close each of them.
The Insurgents control much of the countryside, and are
mounting increasing pressure on Phnom Penh itself..
2. To date, the Phnom Penh Government (the GKR) has.
shown no sign of any ability to reverse this situation --
again, despite the fact that the combat force theoretically
at its disposal is at least twice and probably three times
larger than the Insurgents' combat strength. Even with the
massive U.S. air effort now in train, the GKR's prospects
f or survival are not bright. If that air effort terminates
on 15 August, further deterioration in the GKR's position
seems certain ~:-- and if even the current level of Insurgent
pressure continues, the spectre of unravelling collapse is
inescapably real.
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: IA-RDP80RO172OR000800100005-4
J~ti~xi;Jl
 Approved For Re4&gpe 2004/06J14: CIA-RP80R01720R00100005-4
3. Continuing or increased U.S. assistance to the GKR
might slow the rate of decay, but hardware and material aid
do not. of themselves affect and cannot offset the major
obstacle to improvement: the Phnom Per-h government's inability
to pull itself together and use the physical assets it already
possesses. This -- not-hardware or other forms of quantifiable
assistance -- is the central issue. Unless or until the GKR
can start functioning as a government, there is little hope
for any significant improvement in its position.-- no matter
what additional assistance the U.S. provides.
4..' On the basis of the record of the past twenty months,
it is as certain as anything in Indochina ever is or can be
that there. is no prospect of the GKR's beginning to function
in this fashion so long as Lon Neil remains physically present
in Cambodia. His whole behavior pattern, at least since his
stroke on 8 February 1971, has been one of unwillingness --
or inability -- to manage the affairs of state, coupled with
a concomitant unwillingness to let anyone else do so, or even
try. His periodic retreat into a private world of congenial
fantasy', his erratic meddling in the activities of his major
subordinates, and his consistent refusal to delegate meaning-
ful authority to others in the government have served to
negate much of the value of U.S. support. Lon Nol's behavior
patterns -- his arbitrary movement of units on personal whim
and order, without informing (let alone consulting) his field
commanders or general staff -- were major causal contributors
to the debacle of Chenla II. There is no practical likelihood
that Lon Nol will alter his pattern of behavior. This situa-
tion is not going to get better. If his brother Lon Non should
return to Cambodia -- and there are indications that Lon Nol is
considering this -- it will get worse.
5. Given the present parlous state of affairs in Cambodia,
the real 'problem -- if improvement.in the GKR's position and -
prospects is desired -- is not how much additional U.S. assist-
ance can be provided but how Lon Nol's departure -- i.e., .
physical absence from the country -- can be arranged without
destroying what little vitality remains within the government.
This is not a question of deposition or ouster (though it
could come to that), but a question of getting him to leave
the country physically, retaining his title of Chief of State --
and hence the form of the current GKR -- but giving de facto
"temporary" control to those who may be able to govern in a
way that he, demonstrably, cannot.
6. 1963 and 1973 -- the Non-Parallel. One ghost that
bedevils discussion of the above approach is the events of
1963 in South Vietnam. Whether the U.S. instigated and/or
caused Diem's overthrow in 1963 or whether some Vietnamese
(non-Communist) group would have inevitably overthrown him
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: C -.RDP80R01720R000800100005-4
~w LA
25X1
 5C-
Approved For Rel a 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80RO172OR0 00100005-4
no matter what the U.S. did is something that will long be
legitimately -- and passionately -- debated. Whatever the
merits of these arguments about South Vietnam in 1963, they
have no relevance to Cambodia in 1973. The two situations
are not analogues and the course of action here envisaged
with respect to Lon Nol is in no material respect parallel
to the course of events that ended Diem's regime and life.
Thus, the post November 1963 pattern of events in South
Vietnam. does not provide relevant arguments for or against
encouraging Lon Nol's physical absence from. the Cambodian
scene
25X1
7. Necessary Versus Sufficient Conditions for Improvement.
Lan Nol's physical. absence would not Be any panacea or guarantee
of improvement. There is no assurance that the three remaining
High Council Members would be galvanized into facing Cambodia's
many problems cooperatively or effectively. Though they seem
more realistically aware than Lon Nol.of Cambodia's perilous
situation, and though the GKR was better run. while Lon Nol was
in Tripler. Hospital recovering from his stroke than it ever has
been while he was in Cambodia, Sirik Matak, In Tam, and Cheng
Hang have not demonstrated any great ability to work together
for common national goals. They have all engaged in carping
about Lon Nol's shortcomings and in maneuvering against him
and each other. If Lon Nol were to depart, they might not
rise above their petty rivalries and backbiting. Furthermore,
with Lon Nol gone, there would be an increased risk of a coup
attempt against the remaining leadership, possibly with one or
more members of the High Council cooperating or participating.
8. In short, Lon Nol's departure -- by itself -- is
clearly not a sufficient. condition for improvement in the GKR's
position and prospects. From the pattern of the past two years,
however, it can be persuasively argued that. it is a necessary
condition. If Lon Nol remains, the realistic prospects for
improvement are virtually nil and further U.S.. aid would
probably be wasted. If he leaves --'physically, not titularly ---~
there is some chance of improvement, some room for maneuver and
some likelihood that the right mix of U.S. aid and counsel could
make a difference.
9. The Time Factor. With 15 August fast approaching, the
hour is clearly late and the time short for improvement of much
real consequence in a negotiating arena. It could be -- and
is -- argued that given the time element, the risks involved
in pressuring Lon Nol to leave are not worth the unprovable
possibility of improvement if he goes. This is a legitimate
argument not easy to counter. What the U.S. is faced with is
the virtual certainty of a progressive deterioration in the
Phnom Penh government's position and capabilities if Lon Nol
Approved For Release 2004/06/14 CIA-RDP80RO172OR000800100005-4
25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80RO172OR000800100005-4
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80RO172OR000800100005-4
 VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS STAFF
ApproveWP&P tEe'N W4'%8/Q": lkbOWW ftMqW8001
DATE: 25 July 1973
, Jr .
GACarver.
Attached is the "Lon Nol" memorandum
in its final form. At Mr. Colby's
direction it was distributed at the
24 July WSAG. Mr. Colby and
General Walters already have copies.
L6eorge A. Garver, Jr,
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
Copies to:
Mr. Shackley
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80RO172OR000800100005-4
 25X1
VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS STAFF NC
OFFICE OF THE Approved For ReIse I200~I.,i~ 4/~&/1 ! CIA-RD
DATE: 25 Jul '73
TO: The Honorable James R. Schlesinger
The Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT: Cambodian Analysis
Attached is a paper Bill Colby
and I circulated at the 24 July WSAG
which you may find of some interest.
Mr. Clements and Admiral Moorer
already have copies.
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80RO172OR000800100005-4
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80RO172OR000800100005-4