GENERAL DAVIDSON'S 18 JULY REQUEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000800100009-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: July 23, 1973
• Content Type: MF

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23 July 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William E. Colby
SUBJECT General Davidson's 18 July Request
1. Attached for your consideration and -- if you like it --
signature is an interim response to Phil Davidson's letter.
2. The project in question could be of great value indeed,
but I am afraid it will not be, and the sample appended to Phil's
letter (alas) reinforces that skepticism. What our military
brethren ought to be pondering (but will probably avoid) are
Vietnam lessons such as:
b . The need to develop, and face, facts
regardless of what they implicitly say
about past or ongoing U.S. . programs
(e.g. , the size of the enemy's force
and whether it is increasing, the
volume of supplies moving through
Laos in the face of interdiction, etc.).
c. The essentiality of seeing the enemy --
and his tactics, goals, etc. -- in his
terms, not forcing data on these
topics into a procustean matrix based
on our approach and organization.
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3. If the committee would face up to matters such as the
above, this exercise would be of tremendous value. The chances
of its doing so, unfortunately, are minimal.
(Geerge A. C-;Trr, Jr,
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
Orig - Mr. Colby
1 - GAC Chrono
1 - VAS Chrono
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
Lieutenant General Phillip B. Davidson, Jr., USA
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301
I have your. letter of 18 July sketching the committee
established to compile the intelligence lessons learned at the
major force levels during the Vietnamese war and inviting me
to submit my views of the principal intelligence lessons learned
in my tenure as Dep CORDS. The committee's task is a
fascinating one and, of course, one in which I have a great
interest, both personal and professional. I will try to dictate
some thoughts and conclusions during the course of the coming
week and will send them along to you.
Please keep me posted on your project as it evolves.
It is an important undertaking and I would be very interested
in seeing the final results.
With best regards.
Sincerely yours,
W. E. Colby
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,OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Honorable William E. Colby
Director,: Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 2050
Dear Bill:.
I Executive Regi t y
I S JUL 1973
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) has directed
that a committee composed of Major General Potts, ACSI, USA;
Major General Keegan, ACSI, USAF; Rear Admiral Rectanus, DNI,
USN, and myself, be established to compile the intelligence lessons
learned at the major force level (MACV, NavForV, USARV, 7th AF,
Pac Fleet, PacAF, Field Force, 3d MAF, etc.) during the Vietnamese
War.
It is not the intent of the committee to compile a history of
intelligence organizations and operations, but rather to produce a study
dealing with lessons which are timeless in nature. Lessons learned
should be those which can be applied to future conflicts regardless of
size, location, or the nature of the enemy. The study should make a
positive contribution to the development of doctrines, research and
development projects, Service school curricula, and to follow-on studies.
We would like to have your vantage-point views of the principal
intelligence lessons you learned in the Southeast Asian War as Dep CORDS.
We want your own words in this effort, and therefore we do not want to
inhibit you in any way b)I prescribing a format. We would appreciate as
much detail as possible, however, as pertains to special circumstances
surrounding your lessons learned, as well as any rationale as to why a
particular lesson is highlighted.
The material of the lessons may be of any classification, however,
they must be administratively handled in accordance with appropriate
security regulations.
WASHINGTON, 0. C. 20301
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To give you a clearer idea of what is wanted, we have attached
an example of lessons learned as seen at this initial stage by the
committee.
Since, as usual, we are fighting a tight deadline, we would
appreciate your reply by 24 September 1973. Please address your
response directly to me using the enclosed self-addressed DoD label.
Sincerely,
2 Enclosures Phillip B. Davidson, Jr.
as stated Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Intelligence)
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USE OF INTELLIGENCE
One of the most profitable intelligence practices used in the
Vietnamese War was the. weekly dissemination of intelligence to
COMUSMACV, his major Army, Navy, and Air Force commanders,
and the MACV senior staff officers.
The device for doing this was the Weekly Intelligence Estimate
Update (the WIEU). The WIEU was held every Saturday morning at
the MACV all-source conference room. Regular attendees included
COMUSMACV; CG, 7th Air Force; CG, USARV; COMNAVFORV; the
civilian Deputy for CORDS; the civilian. Scientific Advisor; the NL/.CV
J-2, J-3, J-4; several MACV Special Staff officers; and the A-2, 7th
Air Force. On special occasions, Field Force commanders or Embassy
officials were invited. The meeting invariably started with a 30-minute
to one-hour presentation by the MACV J-2 Area Specialists on the enemy
situation as developed over the last week ending with an intelligence
estimate bearing on future enemy operations.
The J-2 presentation was subjected to stringent question and
challenge by all members of the group. At the conclusion of the presenta-
tion, major commanders or CMM-TUSMACV discussed the enemy and
friendly situation, and frequently decisions and general plans were
(tcv iope(l during this phase o (.h t, ru f L:111: ,
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The WIEU had several advantages: First, the enemy situation
was thoroughly presented to and discussed by the conferees; second,
alternate explanations of enemy actions were developed; third, the
major commanders and senior staff officers became intensely conscious
of the enemy situation and its impact of their decisions, plans, and
operations; fourth, all in this key group knew the background and rationale
of the major decisions made by COMTJSMACV; above all, there was close
communication between the J-2 and the commander -- the commander
knew all the J-2 knew about the enemy, and the J-2 knew precisely the
intelligence needs of the commander.
2
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