MEMO TO THE NIO'S FROM GEORGE A. CARVER, JR.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000800140024-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: November 7, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

NATION/' INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS
App% Air' 2084 6M*T lIAiRV&WE j720R
To:The NIO's
FROM: GACarver, Jr.
SUBJECT:
Attached is a comment on the
"New Famil " Memorandum prepared
by as indicated
in his covering note. Bureau-
cratically, I have taken the
position that I will not either
associate myself with these comments
or dissent from them because I
do not want to express this office
views until I have had a chance to
consult with all of you and that
given the course of the past day's
events, we have not yet been able
to focus on this problem. I would
like to discuss it at our staff
meeting next Wednesday (14 November)
Georges carver, Jr.
D/DCI/NIO
6 ,C " C ~,Lhln,c~
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3JBJECT: CIA Comments on a Proposed Family of
National Intelligence Products
1. The production strategy outlined in this proposal
has one valuable central idea, one glaring centres.:, weakness,
and a number of subsidiary points of varying merit.
2. The valuable central idea is that the community
should be equipped to produce more of its intelligence in
a national form. The proposal occasionally pushes this idea
too far; given the uneven capabilities throughout the com-
munity on such topics as economics and non-military sci.:-._-,,:a,
coordination would be more trouble than it was worth.
-S::heless, it is a valid criticism to assert that the .,.
l.oceives too much uniiaue- overlapping ma.ter_i i.'
ularly in crisis situations.
3. The glaring central ?,r,.-akness is the proposal ?~-_
_o_lence on direction. Who initiates a National Watcf-
BBulletin? Who exercises quality control? Who is esr pow:. ?
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to reject proposals on trivial matters to keep from flooding
the system? The same questions apply with equal force tE;
the National Analysts Summary, the National Intelligence
Bulletin, and the National Intelligence Weekly.
4. If we discard the naive assumption that all these
systems will operate spontaneously, there seems only one
answer. In every case, control would have to be vested in
the representatives of the DCI, to whom the President has
made it plain that he looks for coordination production.
This is so self-evident that it seems a dubious tactic to
leave it out of the proposal in hopes that the other agencies
won't notice.
5. Moreover, while this proposal pays lip service
to the other publications of CIA and the community, the
spirit is clearly to sweep them from the board and start
virtually from the ground up. There may be virtues in this
kind of shock treatments if we consider, however, the ru m.ner
,af other changes being introduced into the community
would seem far better to use existing mechanics, moc=. ; ,?.~;c
them wherever possible rather than junking them. ThE,
that both a new family of products and the old family be simultaneously supported by our analytical assets
a kind of competition goes on is not workable, either
the producers' or the customers' viewpoint.
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Some Specific Issues
6. NOIWON and the NWOB. It would be a mistake to
include the White House Situation Room in NOIWON. The
White House is a consumer and should not be flooded with
raw intelligence in a crisis. What is needed are two
products, a. Draft National Watch Officers Bulletin and a
NWOB. The DNWOB could be initiated by any member of NOIWON
and would constitute a report plus a request for confirmation
or additional information. After responses have circulated
within the system, CIA--for an NIOC under the DCI--should
coordinate and send to the WHSR an NWOB, or reject the
DNWOB on grounds of error or triviality.
7. The suggestion (p. 14) that NIOWON/NOIAN would
provide for an input of operational information poses
serious problems. It is not reasonable to expect that the
results of high-level and necessarily delicate negotiations
would be fed into such a system, nor is it likely that JC:-
military operational plans could be revealed for
among intelligence analysts. Not only are there sea <
problems , but we would run the risk that our use of information would be perceived as a possible attempc
influence or formulate policy. This could be dangerot,
to the integrity of the community itself.
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SEC RE, I
8. NOIAN and the NAS. This is the least clear
part of the proposal, as exemplified in the mystifying
statement on page 18 that "other events" would have
generated 39 Summaries in March 1973. What does seem
clear, however, is that the consumers, in crisis periods,
need more frequent and timely coordinated summaries and
analysis than those provided by a scheduled daily. This
would seem to call for coordinated sitreps, which in theory
could be produced in the proposed National Intelligence
Operations Center. In practice, however, we have found
that coordinating sitreps under pressure is not possible,
even within our own house, if it involves getting the
"chop" from the various chiefs. It is possible in practice
to solicit and accept contributions from outside the immediate
group producing the sitrep, and making use of "all the talents"
in this way is not only feasible but highly desirable. But
the community cannot afford to subordinate the timely pros u?.-
tion of information and spot analysis on "how the cr-_s-.;
going" to coordination considerations.
9. The Relationship between NWOB and NAS. The
proposal is too schematic in the sharp distinction drav,,n
between factual reporting and analysis in time of
and in its aversion to any scheduled production. Our
experience in a host of crises, including the 1973 Middle
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Eastern war, is that consumers do not want a stream of
separate items throughout the day and night. They find
the Situation Report format highly convenient as a means
of pulling together developments and adding analysis. This
should not--indeed, does not--prohibit the immediate reporting,
out of schedule, of truly key new items. But three or four
Sitreps a day, as opposed to an irregular stream of small
items--some factual, some analytic--fits their consumption
Habits much better.
10. The National Intelligence Daily. This is a good
idea, and we propose its immediate adoption, independently
of the other proposals. We are prepared to drop or modify
the Central Intelligence Bulletin, to accept drafts originated
by other agencies, to encourage more active participation in
coordination, and to welcome statements of dissent. We would
expect the principles or CIA Chairmanship (paragraph r. and 3
to apply.
11. The National _in-telLigence Weekly. Here is-,
good idea. In defining it more specifically, we
that it focus on matters of clear significance to U:
which may require policy actions within several weeks
than on the more eclectic approach of the Current
Weekly Review. It can oe thougnt of as an expansioi, os_'
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Watch Report that woulc: l.oox a bit further forward and
cover political and economic as well as military problems
which, if they occur, could be expected to require
response at a high level.. It could readii_,T be produceu
using a modified Watch Committee/NIC strucr.ur_e.
12. The NIEs, SNIEs, and NI4Ms. The proposal doe:
not seem to call for any change in those products, althour.1
the NIAM examples in paragraph 33 (page 26) raise questions
about the authors' eoncepti r. of how these products diffe:t
13. The Role of the NIGs. This matter is present1l
under debate, experimentation, and evolution, and the proposai
acknowledges that its concepts on this matter may be premature-..
All that need be said at this point is that many of the ref-
erences to the NIO's directing, initiating, and drafting role
seem at variance with the DCI's emphasis on the staff -0-nature
their function.
odds and Ends
14. In the list o: ._at: oval consumers, a dist
needs to be made between: those consumers who requirs
continuing flow of natiox.u.. intelligence on the whcr..
cif na.tiona1 secu:zitVj those with narrr),vv.:
con.ti.nuous , but nonc_ c iE (cq:1... i. iy real a r10 i iiiJ:;E"?:C
requirements. The economic policy people normally S.
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this latter group. They will need special service,
and special provision needs to be made for them.
15. It seems odd to assert that there are no established
mechanisms or SOPs for producing national intelligence in
times of crisis. How is it then that SNIEs get written?
The mechanism is that the DCI initiates them, on his own
motion or at the request of a consumer or USIB member. (and
presumably, in the future, at the suggestion of the NIO).
The mechanism has worked poorly, but it does exist.
Conclusion
16. The proposal's concern to improve national into---
ligence is valid. Central direction is essential in this
process and should be explicitly vested in the DCI and hi;-
representatives. Each of the national intelligence products
proposed should be reconsidered in this light.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: C/NIO
Herewith a draft comment on the
IC Staff recommendations for a "new
family" of national intelligence prod-
ucts. This draft rests on your comments
to DDI and DD/OCI. May I have any
specific suggestions on it ASAP, the
response is due to the DDI COB Thursday,
8 November.
DD/OCI
Nov 73
(DATE)
FORM
AUGN54 IQI WHICH RELACES FORM
USED.
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