(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000900080030-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: May 20, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS
)FFICE'OF THY! FW &Ieap 1 1Aag CIA-RD
DATE: 20 May 1974
TO: Vice Admiral Vincent P. de Poix, USN
Director
FROM: Defense Intelligence Agency
Per our previous conversations,
attached is the text of the memorandum
that the DCI sent to the President on
18 May commenting on the PFIAB report on
the strategic threat. As you will see,
the Secretary of Defense has already
received a copy, but I thought you might
find it useful to have this personal
text for your own reference. Again, we
appreciate your help in this exercise.
Georg A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
DCI/NIO/GACarver:mee
Distribution:
Original - Addressee w/att, NIO 1052-
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1 - RI w/o att
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 25X1
' "%./JVHL IN I CLLI(j NCE OFFICERS
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENITRAL INTELLIGENCE
Approved For Release 2004/09/23: CIA-RD
DATE: 20 May 1974
TO: The Honorable Albert C. Hall
Assistant Secretary (Intelligence)
FROM: Department of Defense
Per our previous conversations,
attached is the text of the memorandum
that the DCI sent to the President on
18 May commenting onthe PFIAB report on
the strategic threat. As you will see, the
Secretary of Defense has already
received a copy, but I thought you might
find it useful to have this personal
text for your own reference. Again, we
appreciate your help in this exercise.
Georg Carver
Jr.
,
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
Attachment
DCI/NIO/GACarver:mee
Distribution:
Original - Addressee w/att, NIO 1052-74
1 - GAC Chrono w/cy att
1 - RI w/o att
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 SECRET
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D, C. 20505
18 MAY 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
The White House
.SUBJECT Report on the Strategic Threat by the
President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
1. Admiral Anderson has made available to me a.
copy of his letter to you dated April 30, 1974, containing
PFIAB's annual assessment of the strategic threat. It
would not be appropriate for me to comment on the Board's
recommendations about U.S. strategic policy and the public
presentation of it, or about the priority which should
be accorded to certain U.S..R&D programs. I would,
however, like to comment on three other aspects of the
Board's conclusions -- the prospects for Soviet strategic
superiority, intelligence requirements to support U.S.
strategic policy, and the uncertainties in intelligence
estimates.
2. In the estimate of "Soviet Forces for Inter-
continental Attack" (NIE 11-8-73) which I submitted with
the concurrence of the United States Intelligence Board
in January of this year, a distinction was drawn between
two different measures of strategic power. One involves
equality or superiority in quantitative terms. The
second considers deterrent and war-fighting capabilities.
The message of NIE 11-8-73 is that:
The U.S. faces very substantial improvements
in the USSR's strategic attack forces.
By the early 1980's these improvements are
likely to convey an image of superiority to
those who ascribe significance to quanti-
tative measures.
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r.,
-- While through these improvements the Soviets
will increase their counterforce capabilities -
notably against the U.S. Minuteman force --
they are not likely to be able to negate the
U.S. deterrent under any circumstances we
can foresee over the next ten years.
A corollary'of this forecast is that the Soviet Union could
be perceived as having superiority of forces and a
.political advantage in the calculations of other nations,
despite the continued ultimate effectiveness of the U.S.
deterrent.
3. The forecast in the NIE assumed the future devel-
opment of U.S. forces along the lines now programmed and
assumed no SALT constraints other than those of the
existing agreements. These agreements placed a ceiling
on certain largely quantitative aspects of the growth of
the strategic forces of the two sides. The qualitative
improvement of strategic forces, unconstrained by SALT
I, has proceeded unabated. This is an area in which the
U.S. retains a substantial lead. While some elements of
the Intelligence Community differ in certain respects,
I believe that Soviet actions since the signing of the
SALT agreements reflect, not only an attempt to keep up
with the competition -- out of concern for such U.S.
programs as B-i, Trident and Minuteman improvement -- but
also an opportunistic desire to press ahead and achieve
a margin of superiority if they can. In my view, the
Soviets perceive themselves as essentially equal in over-
all strategic power today. However, I do not believe (as
does the PFIAB) that the Soviets perceive t emselves as
approaching the threshold of overall superiority in
strategic power. How far they will press any attempt to
achieve superiority will depend to a considerable degree
on U.S. negotiating and defense policies, in particular
on our ability to persuade the Soviets that:
--they cannot continue indefinitely to have
both substantially improving strategic
capabilities and the benefits of detente;
non-restraint on their part will produce
offsetting U.S. reactions;
restraint on their part will be reciprocated.
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4. I have re-examined the possible impact of Soviet
strategic developments on the credibility of the U.S.
deterrent. I continue to believe, as indicated in NIE
11-8-73, that under no foreseeable circumstances in the
next ten years are the Soviets likely to develop and deploy
forces of the magnitude and quality necessary to reduce
damage to themselves to acceptable levels by a first
strike against U.S. strategic forces. I believe the
.Soviets would have to Calculate that the U.S. would be
able to make a devastating reply to any Soviet surprise
attack. In reaching these conclusions in the NIE and in
my re-examination of them, I have considered possible
damage levels on the two sides as revealed by engagement
analyses between U.S. and Soviet strategic forces, inclu-
ding all three elements of the U.S. strategic triad and
their programmed improvements. There are obvious uncer-
tainties in such analyses, but in reaching my judgment
I have taken account of:
-- the low levels to which Soviet ABM defenses
are limited by Treaty;
-- the great difficulties the Soviets face in
the development of effective ASW capabilities
against missile submarines in the open oceans;
-- and to a lesser extent, the unlikelihood that
Soviet air defenses, despite their massive-
ness, can overcome the limitations in their
ability to prevent penetration by bombers.
5. I agree fully with PFIAB's concern over the need
to improve the substantive intelligence required to
support U.S. policy objectives, especially in areas of
significant Soviet R&D effort or potential. In the three
critical areas the. Board mentioned -- accuracies of Soviet
missiles, prospects for detection of U.S. missile sub-
marines and the strategic implications of Soviet laser
developments -- we currently have intensive interagency
study efforts underway in order to provide policy officials
with as definitive an understanding as possible of Soviet
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programs and capabilities. These three subjects are
listed among the Key Intelligence Questions toward which
I have directed the entire Intelligence Community to
focus its attention.
6. I appreciate and will pursue the Board's suggestion
that CIA participate in the preparation of the "RISOP"
(Red Integrated Strategic Operations Plan.) used in warn
gaming the SIOP. DIA participates now and uses Intelli-
gence Community estimates, but as the gaming becomes
more complex with more STOP options, CIA may be able to
contribute more than hitherto to development of the RISOP.
I will undertake to explore with the Secretary of Defense
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff how CIA can best contribute
to this aspect of operational planning for our strategic
forces.
7.. Finally, I agree with the PFIAB findings that
intelligence estimates require the keenest possible tech-
nical evaluations. To that end we are experimenting on
ways to communicate more precisely the degree of confidence
we have in our judgments, particularly on technical data.
One of our interagency studies is addressing the prospects
for determining the accuracies of Soviet ICBMs in the
period about five years from now, in an effort to narrow
the uncertainties as well as to alert users of intelligence
to them. The strategic relationship over the next decade
is likely to be increasingly sensitive to uncertainties
in such qualitative factors as missile accuracies, which
are unquestionably more difficult to measure than quanti-
tative elements such as the numbers of launchers or
weapons.
/s/ ]IV. E.. Golf
W. E. Colby
cc: Admiral Anderson, Chairman, PFIAB
The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
The Honorable Janes R. Schlesinger, The., Secretary
of Defense
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SECRET
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000900080030-8
SUBJECT: Report on the Strategic Threat by the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
O/D/DCI/NIO/SP:HStoertz/mee:18Mayl974
Distribution
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