LETTER TO VICE ADMIRAL VINCENT P. DE POIX, USN FROM GEORGE A. CARVER, JR.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000900080035-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: May 15, 1974
• Content Type: LETTER

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15 May 1974
TO: Vice Admiral Vincent P. de Poix, USN
Director
Defense Intelligence Agency
I hope the attached squares the circl
protecting your le
itimate e
iti
d
g
qu
es an
at the same time making our service
colleagues feel wanted to the point that
they will participate willingly. I would
appreciate your seeing that word gets to
the services through your good offices as
promptly as possible since 22 May is only
five working days away and those partici-
pating in the 22 May seance may want to
do some thinking and homework before
arriving at the meeting.
George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
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?.r V
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
15 May 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: Vice Admiral Vincent P. de Poix, USN
Director
Defense Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: Need for Service Participation in the
Development of a Proposed National
Intelligence Production Schedule on
Strategic Programs
1. As I mentioned in our 14 May conversation, on
10 May Mr. Howard Stoertz (the National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic Programs) distributed to various intelligence
research managers a memorandum, with attachments, outlining
a meeting Mr. Stoertz wants to convene on 22 May. The pur-
pose of this meeting is to review the bidding on projects
that ought to be considered for the-second half of this
calendar year. Since the group involved-is a working level
one analogous to a group of USIB representatives, Mr. Stoertz'
memorandum was sent to various officials in DIA, CIA, State,
NSA and AEC and was not sent to the USIB principals.
2. For reasons which we discussed, Mr. Stoertz believes
(and I agree) that the community's total address to the
range of problems involved would be greatly facilitated if
this meeting could also be attended by appropriate working
level managers in the three service intelligence components.
I have therefore appended three additional copies of
Mr. Stoertz' 10 May memorandum (plus an additional one for
your personal records) and request that you distribute them
to General Aaron, Admiral Rectanus and General Keegan. We
want to be punctilious about the channels through which
formal communications are sent to the service intelligence
components but at the same time, we all have a common interest
in getting done expeditiously that which needs to be done --
something which, of course, involves the direct participation
of all who will be doing the actual work.
Geo ge A. Carver, r.
25X1
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
Atts: A/S
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Office of the Director of Central Intelligence
SP - 55/74
10 May 1974
MEMORANDUM'FOR: Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
United States Air Force
SUBJECT: Interagency Meeting on Proposed National Intelligence
Production on Strategic Programs, July-December 1974
1. As you recall, you received through USIB channels in February
a memorandum concerning planned interagency intelligence production on
foreign strategic matters through July 1974. The participation of the
military services has contributed greatly to the preparation of several
of the studies called for in that production program.
2. Although a number of projects scheduled earlier in the year are
still underway, it is not too early to begin thinking about our national
intelligence production program for the second half of the year, espec-
ially inasmuch as individual agencies are already preparing their work
programs for the next fiscal year. Moreover, the question of the major
year-end estimates on strategic forces needs to be resolved.
3. I am requesting that senior research managers from Intelligence
community agencies meet to consider a production program for July-December
1974, and invite you to designate a representative to participate. An
agenda for the meeting is attached as well as two papers you may wish to
study prior to the meeting. Progress reports on various aspects of
NIO/SP activity will be handed out at the meeting.
4. I plan to hold this meeting on 22 May from 1000 to 1200 in
Room 7-E-62, CIA Headquarters.
owar o .
National Intelligence Office
for Strategic Programs
Attachments:
Three as stated
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SUBJECT: Interagency Meeting on Proposed National Intelligence
Production on Strategic Programs, July-December 1974
Distribution:
1 - Army Addressee
1 - Navy Addressee
1 - Air Force Addressee;
1 - D/DCI/NIO
1 - NIO/RI
1 - NIO/SP
NIO/SP:RGates:mat/0 (1OMay74)
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PROPOSED AGENDA FOR NIO/SP PLANNING MEETING
Report by NIO/SP on status of current work program and ad hoc
projects. (Hand out at meeting)
II. Report by NIO/SP on projections issue and solution.
(Hand out at meeting)
III. Discussion of proposal to prepare consolidated survey of Soviet
Strategic Forces in 1974. (Attachment)
IV. Discussion of proposed work program for period July-December 1974.
(Attachment)
V. Other Business
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 At' chment 2 to:
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES;
ON SOVIET STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE FORCE
A COMBINED APPROACH FOR 1974
1. In considering national intelligence production related to strategic
programs during 1974, the NIO has attempted to encourage improved responsive-
ness to the needs of the policraker and flexibility in various publications
to allow for changing circumstances. A combination of circumstances suggests
that the interests of Intelligence as well as those of the policypnaker would
be best served this year by combining the NIEs on Soviet strategic offensive
and defensive forces into one document comprising a survey of Soviet strategic
forces.
2. There are several factors which commend this approach this year in
particular:
--both NIE 11-3 and NIE 11-8 must be done this year; the last
NIE 11-3 was done in 1972, and a Memorandum to Holders was
prepared in 1973;
--in recent months, policymakers have.emphasized the need for
brevity in strategic estimates; integration would help to meet
that need;
--recently, PFIAB was critical of certain key judgments in NIE 11-8;
their criticism would have been mitigated and perhaps avoided
had strategic offensive and defensive aspects of the threat been
integrated into. one estimate and that integration reflected in
the key judgments.
3. Other factors not peculiar to this year also support an integrated
approach:
--treatment of offensive and defensive forces in the same document
would assure that new developments and forecasts in either field
would be taken into account in analyzing the other and could
produce improvements in analyses of current strategic forces as
well as future force structures and threats;
--a single document surveying Soviet strategic forces could enhance
the value of the estimate to the policymaker, who would then have
readily available a concise but comprehensive assessment of Soviet
strategic capabilities and intentions;
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--integration could provide some economies in time, paperwork,
personnel and length of document at least sufficient to
..diminish somewhat the "annual agony."
4. Such a survey of Soviet strategic capabilities needs to take into
account policy relevant topics and expressions of particular interest made
known in recent'months, and to focus especially on areas of uncertainty in
earlier versions of NIE 11-8 and NIE 11-3. In addition, the changing US
nuclear strategy as expressed in NSDM 242 has given new significance to some
aspects of the threat, for example, Soviet nuclear war fighting capabilities--
both what that means and Soviet doctrine pertinent to it--as well as Soviet
attack assessment capabilities and capabilities for strategic warning. On
the other hand, the survey should not broadly expand the scope of either
NIE 11-8-73 or NIE 11-3-72, for example, to include Soviet capabilities
for peripheral attack.
5. As noted above, policymakers have stated quite firmly their preference
for brief, policy relevant estimates on strategic forces. Therefore, a
strategic survey or estimate this year should be held to 20-30 pages if possible.
For example, particular emphasis can be placed on brevity in the description.
of what is already.known about Soviet strategic forces. Supporting analysis
should be published separately as annexes to the Estimate. The supporting
analysis in 1974 should take into account the findings of current interagency
research on the following specific topics of previous uncertainty and/or
disagreement:
-ICBM and SLBM accuracies;
--capabilities. and employment of Backfire; .
--Soviet laser research, particularly as it relates to strategic
defense applications;
--Soviet capabilities for detection and localization of. submarines
in open ocean areas.
6. As with any new approach to a problem, organizational difficulties
can be expected. Nevertheless, the objective would be to keep the entire
process as simple and straightforward as possible. Descriptive sections on
offensive and defensive forces can be treated separately in the survey and
can be prepared as in the past. The principal work of integration should
be in the Key Judgments section and the Force Implications section, both
based upon the other sections of the paper.
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PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ON FOREIGN STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, JULY-DECEMBER 1974
1. In considering a work program for the period July-December 1974,
we have taken into account our experience during the past several months.
The initial NIO/SP production program of self-initiated projects proved
somewhat ambitious in that it failed to anticipate the large number of
unscheduled requests for studies by various policymakers. Further, the.
projects are taking somewhat longer than we had anticipated in the initial
schedule. Thus, the number of projects we suggest for the second half of
this year is limited. In the same'manner that we jointly prepared the
work program last winter, we welcome your suggestions for the project list.
We again plan to touch base with various policymakers to keep ourselves
aware of their current or anticipated needs and to elicit their suggestions
on the proposed program..
2. We propose the following projects:
a. President's QuarterlRRe ort on Developments in Soviet
Strategic Forces
Type: Interagency Intelligence Report
Target Dates: 1 October and 1 January
Primary Responsibility: CIA/OSR
Principal Collaborating Agencies: DIA, NSA, State
b. SALT Monitoring Report
Type: USIB SALT Steering Group Report
Target Date: September (?)
Primary Responsibility: CIA/OSR
Principal Collaborating Agencies: DIA, State
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c. Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict
see. accompanying memorandum
Type: National Intelligence Estimate
Target Date: November 1974
Primary Responsibility: CIA/OSR
Principal Collaborating Agencies: CIA, DIA, State, NSA, Army,
Navy, Air Force, AEC
d. Soviet Development and Deployment of Land-used Mobile
Strate icMissiles
Type: Interagency Intelligence Report
Target Date: September 1974
Primary Responsibility: DIA/DE
Principal Collaborating Agencies: CIA, State, NSA, Army, Air Force
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