MEMORANDUM TO WHEATON BYERS FROM EDWARD TELLER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000900090022-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 30, 2009
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: March 29, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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PFIAB/NSC review completed.
MEMORANDUM
To: Wheaton Byers
From: Edward Teller
This document consists of 0 pages.
No.of V copies, Series
DOE review completed.
March 29, 1974
The purpose of this memorandum is to bring to the attention
of the PFIAB some information of which I have become aware
recently. The occasion was a review that I attended of a
briefing that was prepared at LLL for presentation at a symposium
sponsored by the Atomic Energy Commission in Germantown. The
purpose of the symposium was to discuss the overall possibility
and subsequent consequences of a return to atmospheric nuclear
testing by the Soviet Union.
The question of the Russians returning to testing in the
atmosphere has always been regarded by me to be one of great
importance. As you may recall, during the latter part of 1961
the Russians ended a three year testing moratorium with only two
River Test Site of the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Weapons Proving
Ground.
intensive series of
Any return to atmospheric testing in the future by the Soviets
would, I expect, be the culmination of very extensive and time
consuming preparations.
A possible example of such preparations was the driving
motivation for the AEC symposium. Perhaps you have been informed
about construction of six ICBM silos at Location 23 of the Shagan
days of warning--then they conducted
testing over the next fourteen month
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My colleagues at LLL are resentl addressin the roblem
presented by Location 23.
LLL's presentation at the symposium was in two parts. One
consisted of a description of our calculational efforts which I
have just mentioned. The other was entitled "Location 23 in
Context" and is the main purpose for my writing this letter.
As the title might imply, this presentation did not empha-
size the test preparations at Location 23 but did use them as a
point of departure for considering a number of other activities
that have been observed in the Soviet Union and which can be
related directly or indirectly to Location 23. It is not my
intention to repeat this presentation herein but to give you a
general view of the vast amount of information that is available
which can be related to the question of what the requirements and
capabilities of the Soviet Union are with regard to a possible
resumption of atmospheric testing.
The information that we think relates to this question of a
return to atmospheric testing falls into several major cate-
gories, the first being Location 23 itself.
Other major categories from which information can 25X1
be extracted and used in the analysis o Location 23 are the ICBM
systems that are associated with these silos and the activities
that are presently going on in the Soviet nuclear testing program
and at their nuclear test facilities.
The most relevant part of the presentation is addressed to
the general topic of atmospheric testing. In this instance a
review has been made of what indicators were available to the
U. S. prior to the Soviet return to testing back in 1961.
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With hindsight, of course, we can recognize that we did observe,
by virtue of U-2 photography, the construction of hardened
buildings at the Semipalatinsk NWPG wh
h were to be sub'ected to
a nuclear blast some two years later.
To evaluate the probability of an atmospheric test
resumption by the Russians, we have borrowed heavily on the past
to establish those test centers that have played a significant
role in past nuclear testing by the Soviets. We are also
evaluating the possible requirements that the various forces of
the Soviet Union might have that require nuclear testing in
environments forbidden under the present treaty. This kind of an
approach does two things. First, it places a potential limit on
the capabilities that the Soviet Union may have for this type of
testing and, second, it allows us to keep score on how much
evidence we have compared to what we might have in regard to how
their capabilities are being developed.
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To evaluate the modifications of their force structure like
the introduction of the MIRVs and the associated on-board
computers. This could render Soviet missiles vulnerable to
"pindown," a circumstance which would not exist in the
earlier and cruder Russian rockets.
To demonstrate Russian capabilities to the world and thereby
to gain leverage in subsequent diplomatic moves. This
possibility includes the beginning of sustained pressure on
the United States and the free world, or it may be related
to some special important demand in international relations.
To test the results of ABM research which, we believe, has
proceeded without abatement since the Moscow Treaty
(actually, the Moscow Treaty did not rule out research but
only deployment). A successful test may then be followed by
abrogation of the Moscow Treaty and rapid deployment of
tested ABM equipment.
To widen the margin of Russian superiority in a decisive
fashion. The test series itself may then be followed by an
offer of a comprehensive test ban which would rule out an
American test series whose effects could balance, in the
long run, the results of knowledge pained by the Russians.
In my opinion, it is impossible to say, on the basis of
evidence available at present, whether and when the Russians are
planning to break the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The fractional
evidence available now makes it, however, imperative to keep an
eye on this possibility, particularly because test resumption by
the Russians may have serious consequences, as indicated above.
The prevailing opinion of the CIA (as indicated at the
conference held in Germantown) is that the Russians do not intend
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to abrogate the test ban. This opinion may have justification,
but the danger exists that due to this opinion we shall exercise
less than sufficient diligence in looking for evidence on the
possibility of abrogation. In this respect, there is a danger
that events of 1961 may be repeated.
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