NOTE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000900090037-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 2004
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: April 8, 1974
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2004/12/02 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000r0900090037-0
Office of the Director
of Central Intelligence
8 April 1974
STAT TO:
The attached falls in your department.
Please note the DCI's comments. It reads
rather strangly to me also, and I can under-
stand why he thought some of its statements
rather bizarre.
George A. Carver, Jr.
D/DCI/NIO
Approved For Release 2004/12/02 : CIA-RDP80RO172OR000900090037-0
 Apprgved For ReJ,se 2004/12/02: CIA-RDP80R01720RQ,p900090037-0
ACTION INFO.
DCI-
ppCi 12
3JDDS&T -~- 13
DDI 14
5 DDO 15
6 DDM&S 16
IG
ACTION
INFO.
SAVA
ASST/DCI
AO/DCI
EX/SEC
D/
9
10
GC
LC
--
19
20
SUSPENSE
Date
DCI/G
Vf (-, -
Approved For Release 2004/12/02 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000900090037-0
 Approve 1\ror ReI se 2004/12/02: CIA-RDP80R01720R( .900090037-0
'7
i~ / i nPvt-innrnPnt-, -And
The cruise missile force has provided the Soviet Navy with a formidable anti-
ship capability, but during the Sixties several factors arose which created new prob-
lems and challenges for it.
The Soviet Navy was assigned broadened missions, including distant
deployments where cruise missiles and their platforms-designed for
operations in waters near the USSR-were less effective.
Soviet planners began to give increased thought to the possibility
that a war with the West might be limited-at least temporarily-to
conventional weapons rather than escalating directly into a strategic
nuclear exchange.
Western naval powers placed added emphasis on the development of
cruise missiles and cruise missile defenses.
. The Soviets have responded to these problems by developing new missile sys-
tems in an attempt to maintain the tactical proficiency of the force. Most of these
missiles offer only marginal improvements over older missiles, but others display
new and unique capabilities. Although these new missiles provide the Soviet Navy
with better antiship capabilities, several inherent weaknesses in the employment of
the force remain. Among these are the limited ocean surveillance and targeting
capabilities of the Soviet Navy and poor logistic support.
..Soviet research and development efforts on new antiship missiles continue at a
strong pace. As with earlier efforts some of these ongoing development programs
appear to be only extensions of existing cruise missile technology. Many, however,
are innovative attempts to deal with some of the weaknesses still facing the Soviet
Navy. These programs include a tactical sea-launched ballistic missile apparently
designed for an antiship role and at least two missile systems that probably are for
use against submarines.
Despite expected Soviet advances in antiship missiles, over time the develop-
ment of better cruise rciissile defenses as well as the introduction of competitive
cruise missile systems by the West probably will reduce the relative effectiveness of
the Soviet cruise missile force. The-'Sovie't force, nevertheless, is expected to remain
a significant threat to Western naval forces into the Eighties...
SS-,? X-1' :.This antiship cruise missile system has been in
the test phase since at least June 197O/
U
COP,1lv1 ENT: The SS-N11X-12 appears to be a re-
placement for tine SS N-,tea submarine launcfle l cruise'missile.
The SS-NX- 12 flies fast?r and farther thar7 the SS-N-3a. It is
also expected to employ an improved gr.iid;ance and control
Ap ,e l iPor/R l er2D9b a3/ ~>-,A QRW AQPj00090037-0
v,iil be fitted or7i"-1l and possibly some J class submarines.
25X1