D/NIO CHRONO - FEBRUARY 1976 (CON'T)

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9
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RIPPUB
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K
Document Page Count: 
93
Document Creation Date: 
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 19, 2008
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1
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Publication Date: 
February 1, 1976
Content Type: 
LIST
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9.pdf3.16 MB
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Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 D/NI0 Chrono - February 1976 (Con't) 34. 26 Feb 76 The National Intelli- Enno Knoche,AD/DCI/IC gence Production Problem D/OSR (Draft) for the DCI D/OCI 35. 26 Feb 76 Expanded outline of Sov- Dr. Edward Teller iet civil defense study cc: Wheaton Byers TREA has not reviewed. Processed IAW CIA TREA arrangement letter dtd 4/11/08. NRO review(s) completed. CRC, 2/14/2003 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 D/NIO CHRONO - FEBRUARY 1976 (Con't) 17. 10 Feb 76 18. 11 Feb 76 19. 11 Feb 76 20. 11 Feb 76 21. 12 Feb 76 22. 12 Feb 76 23. 17 Feb 76 25. 17 Feb 76 26. 17 Feb 76 27. 20 Feb 76 28. 20 Feb 76 29. 20 Feb 76 30. 20 Feb 76 31. 23 Feb 76 32. 23 Feb 76 Economic Estimates NIO/E, USSR, ME, JP, WE Structural Changes and Director Institutional Reforms Senate Select Committee Rea Director Regarding KIQ Strategy Reports and Narrative Performance Evals. The DCI's Immediate Office NIOs, PP, and RI Note to Intelligence Support for RAdmiral Holcomb General Haig Secretary Simon's 4 Feb Letter Support for General Haig Thank you for note on Soviet Foreign Policy FOIA ADDeal for Cuban Docu- ments Intelligence Support for General Haig D/OCI via DDI 25X1 25X1 NIO/LA RAdmiral Holcomb 25X1 Request Chairman, Review Staff Charts used by SecDef at Cabinet Mtg on 20 Feb NIO/SP Use of the Director of Lt.Gen Elmer T. Brooks Central Intelligence's "State O/SecDef of the World Check-list" Joint Cong. Committee on Atomic Energy Briefing given by DCI on 19 Feb. Hon. Donald Cotter Asst/SecDef/Atomic Ene: Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 1. 2 Feb 76 2. 2 Feb 76 3. 2 Feb 76 4. 2 Feb 76 5. 2 Feb 76 6. 2 Feb 76 7. 2 Feb 76 8. 4 Feb 76 9. 5 Feb 76 10. 5 Feb 76 11. 5 Feb 76 12. 5 Feb 76 13. 6 Feb 76 14. 7 Feb 76 D/NIO Chrono - February 1976 Rea for the date of the first "Wise Men" Mtg Thank you Two Special Projects of the Former Office of the DCI's Special Asst. for Vietn. Affairs Senator Pell's Request Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on Thailand General Tighe General Tighe, A/D/:25X1 DCI The 4 Feb Interagency Intelli- Parmenter, D/OCI gence Memorandum on Thailand Thanks for help on IIM-Thailand Hal Saunders, D/INR Intelligence Support for General Haig Electronic Warfare General Tighe's Request Director, DDCI, D,25X1 DDI DDO General Wickham General Tighe, AD/DIA Peter Rodman in ~25X1;rof1 office DCI, DDCI, EA/DCI, DDI, OSR, DDS&T, D/IC Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO1720R001000160001-9.7- 6 'lam DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGL r- National Intelligence Officers Dr. Edward Teller Lawrence Livermore Laboratory University of California Box 808 Livermore, California 94550 26 February 1976 Per our conversation in Washington, attached is an expanded outline of the Soviet civil defense study as the latter is presently conceived. This outline will indicate the problems we consider important and the way we plan to address them. It would be most helpful if you could take the time to read this prospectus with some care and then give us the benefit of your reactions to and comments on it. The subject is one of enormous importance, for several reasons, and we want to make this look at the problem as thorough and comprehensive as possible. With many thanks for your help and with warmest personal regards. Sincerely yours, Georg A. Carver, Jr.. Deputy for National Intelligence Officers Attachment GACarver, Jr.:kes Distribution: Original Addressee w/att (outline only--did not send memo fr 25X1 to IWG on Soviet Civil Defense) 1 NIO/SP w/o att D/NI0 Chrono w/att 1 - NIO/RI w/o att 4.,,h i,.~ YS L s Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE National Intelligence Officers SP - 29/76 25 February 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the Interagency Working Group on Soviet Civil Defense SUBJECT . Preparation of an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on Soviet Civil Defense REFERENCE : Memorandum (same subject), SP-16/76, dated 6 February 1976 '' (0 1. The referenced memorandum established a working group to prepare an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on Soviet Civil Defense. At the first meeting of the working group on 17 February 1976, an outline of the memorandum and agency responsibilities for preparing major parts of the paper were agreed upon. It was also agreed that the chairman of the work- ing group in collaboration with the NIO for Strategic Programs would pre- pare an expanded outline of the paper, indicating agency responsibilities (attachment 1) and a work schedule based on a completion date for the proj- ect of 1 June 1976 (attachment 2). 2. In preparing the expanded outline, it became obvious that back- ground papers would be required to assist the agencies responsible for draft- ing the several parts of the study. At least some of the background papers identified in attachment 3 should become annexes to the main report. 3. The significance of Soviet civil defense to high level US officials requires that participating agencies make a vigorous effort on this project. The extent of research by contributing agencies will be limited, however, by the need to meet the work schedule for completion of the paper. Even with our best efforts, the Interagency Intelligence Memorandum will be a status report of what we know and do not know about the subject; it will be a base- line for further intelligence collection and analysis. Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 SP - 29/76 SUBJECT: Preparation of an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on Soviet Civil Defense 4. The chairman of the working group for Preparation of the memoran- dum is At the second 25X1 meeting of the working group, the members should be prepared to commit their agencies to the proposed work program and schedule. The second meeting will he held at CIA Headquarters at 0930, 1 March 1976, Room 7-E-62. Please pass the names of participants to 25X1 Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs Attachments As Stated Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 SP -- 29/76 SUBJECT: Preparation of an Interagency Intelligence (Memorandum on Soviet Civil Defense Distribution: D/DCI/NI0 NIO/SP NI0/RI IC Staff D/NPIC NIO/SP: ~25Feb76) Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Iq Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 ATTACHMENT 2 Interagency Intelligence Memorandum Soviet Civil Defense WORK SCHEDULE 1 March Working group meeting to finalize work program. 7 April Distribution of background papers to the working group. 14 April Agency comments in writing to originators of background papers. 21 April Distribution of sections of the memorandum to the working group. 30 April Distribution of the chairman's first rough draft of the paper to members of the working group. 7 May Distribution of the first draft of the memorandum for agency comments. 14 May Working group meeting to review first draft. To speed the process of review, proposed substantive changes should be in written form for distribution at the meeting. 21 May Distribution of final (second) draft, with key judgments and summary for agency approval. 27 May Working group meeting for clean-up of final draft. 1 June DCI approval for publication. Graphics: Proposed graphics for the background paper (annexes) and the main body of the memorandum should be submitted to the chairman as soon as possible. Graphics may be rough layouts but they should have a title, an explanatory caption and should be properly classified. Photographs should be marked with appropriate annotations. Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Iq Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 ME HORAN[)UM FOR: Mr. Wheatnn Byers Executiv )fficer Presiden't's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Attached is a self-explanatory note to Dr. Teller. Would you please be good enough to see that it is sent to him via some appropriate channel sufficiently secure to accommodate this material. Many thanks. George Carver, Jr. D/DCI/NIO Date 27 February 1976 TRANSMITTAL SLIP D/DCI/NIO The attached memorandum lays out the Soviet Civil Defense paper in more detail than the original outline. This is an ambitious project with a tight schedule. Ray FROM: NIO/SP FORM No 1 FEB 55 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED... DATE 25 i-eb 76 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 National Intelligence Officers 26 February 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Enno II. Knoche Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community Mr. Richard Lehman Director of Strategic Research SUBJECT The National Intelligence Production Problem Attached is the draft of a memorandum which outlines and amplifies in writing some of the points I tried to convey orally at our 25 February session with the Director. I would welcome any comments or reactions either of you might care to offer. :[ know that each of you will not agree with several of my prescriptive recommendations (though I suspect that your respective objections will not be directed at the same recommendations or based on the same arguments). I am not soliciting agreement or consensus, but would appreciate it very much if you would flag any comments which either of you see as containing factual errors. Georg A. Carver, Jr. Deputy for National Intelligence Officers Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 .l Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE National Intelligence Officers 26 February 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William Parmenter Director of Current Intelligence SUBJECT The National Intelligence Production Problem Per our 25 February telephone conversation, attached is a draft of a memorandum outlining my thoughts on an approach to the problem of national production. I would welcome your comments and reactions and, particularly, your flagging any factual errors -- particularly in those portions of the memorandum which discuss matters for which you bear the primary responsibility. Georg. A. Carver, Jr. Deputy for National Intelligence Officers Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP8ORO172OR001000160001-9 . .~~ u V I IN I - National Intelligence Officers 24 February 1976 Honorable Donald R. Cotter Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy Room 3D1074 The Pentagon Dear Don: Per our conversation on Friday, 20 February, I am forwarding for your information a copy of the text of Mr. Bush's briefing to the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy on 19 February. Also attached is the longer version of the briefing, copies of which were provided to the Committee in advance of Mr. Bush's presentation. Georg A. Carver Jr. , Deputy for National Intelligence Officers' NIO/SP:kes Distribution Original -Addressee w/atts Imo' - D/NIO Chrono w/o atts .l - NIO/RI w/o atts Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP8ORO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 low Now /D/NIO Chrono w/o atts Only original w/atts (NIO/SP 23 February 1976 NOTE FOR: NIO/SP Attached is a set of charts used by the Secretary of Defense at a Cabinet meeting on Friday, 20 February. At the DCI's request, would you please arrange for the proper people to examine all of these figures and see if they are in general accord with the figures currently being used in national intelligence production. If any of them are not -- i.e., are at significant variance with comparable figures the Intelligence Community is using -- please identify these areas of disagreement. After these checks have been run, please prepare a short note to Bill Hyland for the DCI's signa- ture either asserting that the Secretary of Defense's figures are in substantial conformity with those of the Intelligence Community or explaining any areas of material difference. George A. Carver, Jr. D/DCI/NIO Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE National Intelligence Officers 23 February 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: Lieutenant Colonel Elmer T. Brooks, USAF Office of the Secretary of Defense SUBJECT Use of the Director of Central Intelligence's "State of the World Check-list" 1. In response to your query, I had each of the NIOs review those portions of the DCI's "State of the World Check- list" for which he (or she) was the principal drafter. As I suspected would prove to be the case, this review indicates that the Secretary can feel quite free to draw on this docu- ment in the preparation of his own speeches or statements, even unclassified ones. Much of the material and the judgements contained in the checklist was, of course, derived from classified data (some of it very highly classified), but the actual language of the document itself is sufficiently general so that drawing on it would not jeopardize intelligence sources 2. You will naturally appreciate that it would not be desirable to identify these judgments or the language in which they are couched as coming from a report prepared by the DCI for the President. It will also be self-evident that the footnotes giving specific references to classified studies should not be cited in any document put in the public domain. 3. Some of the statements, while they reveal no partic- ular sources or methods, are clearly politically sensitive and would have a certain political impact if used in public state- ments by cabinet-level U.S. officials. These are fairly obvious. One example is paragraph 12; for the Yugoslavs arc quite touchy about any discussion of Tito's possible death. Another, is the characterization of Tong IIsiao-ping in the first paragraph of UAL I Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 the China section (which happens to come right after the paragraph on Tito). 4. With the above exceptions, we see no difficulties with the Secretary's drawing on the checklist in any way he finds helpful and are pleased that he found the document of some interest and value. Georg A. Carver, Jr. Deputy for National Intelligence Officers GACarver, Jr./kes Distribution: Original - Addressee 1 - SA/DCI tY - D/NIO Chrono 1 - PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE 1 - NIO/RI Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 _,.,- 20 February 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Chairman, Review Staff SUBJECT Senate Select Committee Request 1. Attached for your information is a copy of Mr. Miller's 18 February letter to me, which I received during the afternoon of the 19th and discussed at the Executive Committee meeting on 20 February. Also attached is Bill Bader's letter of 12 January, which started this ball rolling, and 14 January 25X1 note to me commenting on Bader's 12 January letter. 2. Over the last month, we have had several discussions with Lynn Davis and Beth Blumfield on this matter. The SSC Staff is convinced it has a hard case of Helms trimming his substantive sails and suppressing analysts' truths which he felt would be unpalatable at the White House. I think this interpretation is nonsense. Helms made a judgment call which seemed right at the time and which I think it is pointless to peck over in hindsight. As I have tried to point out to the staff (with no great degree of apparent success), they are taking two documents out of the context of the totality of the Agency's production during the period. So far as I am concerned, the Agency's track record in delivering unpalatable truths about Vietnam to the White House more than speaks for itself and reflects considerable credit on both the Agency and the DCI. This, however, is not a line of reasoning the SSC Staff finds particularly congenial and they apparently prefer to be selective in their critical focus. Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 3. I: plan to take no action on responding to this letter pending the DCI's directions. IIe, in turn, will probably not want to make a decision until you have obtained some clarification of what is involved. Georg A. Carver, Jr. Deputy for National Intelligence Officers cc: Mr. 25X1 Mr. Ms. GACarver, Jr., D/I)CI/NIO:kes Distribution: Original - Addressee w/atts cys - as indicated above w/atts 1 - D/NIO Chrono w/atts- 1 - SSC File w/oatts 1 - NIO RI w/o atts 25X1 / Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Iq Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 MEMORANDUM FOR: George A. Carver, Jr., D/llC:C/NIO SUBJECT Continents on Attached Letter (Dated 12 January 1976) 1. in general, most of the points in the attached letter are accurate, but they tend to gloss over some of the important nuances in the situation. -- the spring,1970 memorandum was on "prospects",. not _ "political prospects" --,,a minor point. --- as memory serves (and I do not have a. copy of. the memorandum) , the point made in the memorandum on military intervention into Cambodia was not that it would not significantly affect the ability of the communists to expand their control in Cambodia. Instead, the point was that for such a military action to have great impact would probably require a large force to be committed and to be sustained for a considerable length of time. the memorandum never said that a US military incursion would fail. by the time the memorandum hit the DCI's'desk, it was practically the eve of the US military action; the publication of the memorandum would have inevitably appeared to have been "writing for the record" --- the decision had already been made. 2. The remarks in the letter concerning the draft estimate on the results of the US incursion into Cambodia are correct. Even so, it should be pointed out that between the time of the -draft and the decision not to proceed with it several factors were pertinent. Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 the conditions surrounding the incursion changed, i.e., the operation was terminated at the end of June. with the operation terminated, it did not make much sense to rush into print with what had to be incomplete data --- information on. the results and -- more important -- on their impact were still coming in. Moreover, the key question then became that of "impact", and it was too early to offer anything but very tentative judgments on this score. - A/NIO/SSEAAF Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO1720R001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE National Intelligence Officers 20 February 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: Rear Admiral M. Staser Holcomb, USN Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense SUBJECT Intelligence Support for General Haig Forwarded herewith for your er s and information is a further set of the cables sent in support of General Haig. Please return these and future messages to my office after they have served your purposes. Please note that there is no cable for Monday, 16 February, due to the holiday. George *A. Carver, Jr. Deputy for National Intelligence Officers Package transmitted under O/DCI/NIO Distribution Orig - Addressee w/atts 1 - D/NIO Chrono w/o atts.--'' 1 - HAIG SUPPORT FILE w/o atts 1 - NIO/RI w/o atts Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL lNTELLIGE,rE National Intelligence Officers 20 February 1976 Thanks for your note of February 6, forwarding 25X1 comments on Soviet foreign policy. As you are aware, is highly regarded for his experienced and shrewd perceptions of the Soviet scene. This piece strikes a particularly responsive chord here. We too see the long-term Soviet policy horizon -- the favorably changing correlation of forces -- somewhat blurred by such intractable difficulties as agricultural productivity, effective leadership of the disparate gaggle that passes these days to. the "World Communist Movement," and translating Western difficulties into specific Soviet policy gains. Sincerely yours, Deputy for National Intelligence Officers George A Carver, Jr. 'A/NIO/USSR:kes Distribution: Original - Addressee 1 - A/NIO/USSR 41-,- , n/NTO ('hrnnn 1 - 1 - NIO/RI Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 NOW TI iE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE National Intelligence Officers 17 February 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William Parmenter Director of Current Intelligence THROUGH Mr. Edward. W. Proctor Deputy Director for Intelligence SUBJECT Support for General Haig Attached for your information and retention is a Quarterly Report (September-December 1975) from This report, along with 25X1. earlier correspondence, confirms the value and efficacy of the effort. On several occasions, General Haig has personally indicated his appreciation for and the importance he attaches to the analyses that he receives from IIe clearly holds them in 25X1 high regard for the professional manner in which they have discharged their duties in support of him. Original - Addressee w/att 1 - DDI w/att 1 -- IHAIG SUPPORT w/att / 1 - D/NIO chrono w/o attt./ 1 - NIO/RI w/o att 1 - DOC Chrono w/o att Gcorge/A. Carver, Jr. Deputy for National. Intel.lizence Officers Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 17 February 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/SP NIO/CH NIO/SSEAF SUBJECT Formal Request on Attached is a note from I I which is 25X1 essentially the same as the intra-ICS memorandum for- warded to you on 11 Februrary. We will caucus on this subject after you have had a chance to sort out your thoughts on the problem. George4. Carver, Jr. D/DCI/NIO Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 1 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 CENTRAL IN! IGENCE -tional Intelligence' Officers :1.7 February 1976 DTE FOR: The Director JBJECT : Secretary Simon's 4 February Letter Attached for your signature is a proposed esponse to Secretary Simon's letter of February (which we received on 0 February). Also attached is a copy of hat letter, plus the 5 February note by hich Bill Morell forwarded it to you. Morell actually drafted Simon's letter Aid Morell's text, in turn, was based on _onversations with and who drafted your proposed -eply. In this exercise, therefore, there a certain amount of circularity, but this response will keep the record straight 6 and clear your books. George A Carver, Jr. D/D 'I/NIO Copy of whole package will be returned upon DCI's signature. GACarver, Jr. :kes j f - D/NIO Chrono cy NIO/E Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 TM) C;1 fPf?r 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 1NE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE National Intelligence Officers 17 February 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: Rear Admiral M. Staser Holcomb, USN Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense SUI3JICT Intelligence Support for General Haig Forwarded herewith for ysal and information is a further set of-the cables sent in support of General Ilaiff. Please return these and future messages to my office after they have served your purposes. George,,-s ,arver, Jr. Deputy for National Intelligence Officers O/D/DCI/NIO: Distribution Orig _ A s ee Watts 25X1 Chrorono w/o atts 1 - D/NIO Chrono w/o atts -- 1 - IIAIG SUPPORT file w/o atts I - NIO/RI w/o atts TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 February 12, 1976 Dear Barbara, Having been an admirer of yours for many years, I am delighted to have an opportunity to add this note to the compendium. Your contributions to the work of this Agency have been legion; and your assistance to a succession of its senior officers, indispensable. Your poise, efficiency, tact, loyalty and unfailing good judgment have been -- quite literally -- invaluable during the past series of hectic, stressful months. All of us are deeply in your debt, not only for helping make Bill's office run so smoothly during an impossible time, but also for being so helpful to the rest of us who needed to work directly with him during this era -- and for continuously giving us all a lift by your company, humor, charm and great contribution to the aesthetics of his office as well as its efficiency. I wish you well in your new duties, which I know you will discharge with stellar distinction, and look forward not only to seeing the range of your contributions steadily increase, but also to the pleasure of working with you as they do. With warmest regards, Sincerely yours, George A. Carver, Jr. Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 12 February 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: NIOs, PP and RI SUBJECT The DCI's Immediate Office Attached for your information is a note from Mr. Evans which briefly delineates the responsibilities of the DCI's two assistants -- and 25X1 UNCODED Please note the change in title for j and ensure that all correspondence to him carries the proper designator -- SA/DCI vice EA/DCI. George A. Carver, Jr. Deputy for National Intelligence Officers Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 e> 7 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution 'mw' ES 76-1 11 February 1976 Organization of the J}CIF s Immediate Office 1. The Director will be assisted by an Executive Assistant 25X1 and a Special Assistant Their 25X1 respective duties are generally as follows: (EAJDCI). The Director will look to her for the organization of his day, to include confirmation of requests for appointments, as well as being the officer who. will set into motion travel plans and monitor arrangements related to same. She will have particular responsibility for assistance to the Director with regard to Congressional, journalist, and social/personal contacts. She will also under- take special projects for the Director. 25X1 b. (SA/DCI). He will assist the Director with regard to substantive intelligence production and opera- tional matters. He will be responsible for checking the com- pleteness of materials assembled for various meetings the DCI is to attend such as the 40 Committee, SRG, PFIAB, etc. He will also have a particular responsibility for seeing that briefing materials are developed in support of DCI appointments. Addi- tionally, he will screen intelligence publications and operational cables. 20 The Director will be supported by two Secretary-Stenos 25X1 who will handle the telephones . for the Director as well, as for the k;PL/DCI and SA/DCI, It is contem- plated that in the future the latter will have his own Secretary--Steno. 3. The functions of the Executive Secretariat remain as described in 'l-IN 1-99. As most of you know, has joined us as my Deputy. U. Evan . Executive Secretary r tYr r- L'~~ C~TTY Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 ~ 7-, 11 February 1976 SUBJECT Senate Select Committee Request Regarding KIQ Strategy Reports and Narrative Performance Evaluations 1. I believe you have received at least some briefings on your predecessor's Key Intelligence Question mechanism, which was designed to focus the Community's efforts on issues of major importance to our policy-level consumers. This KIQ approach was tried on a pilot basis in FY 1974 and attempted for real in FY 1975. In brief, at the beginning of the fiscal year the NIOs prepare a list of Key Intelligence Questions (69 in the FY 1975 list), which are developed in concert with concerned elements of the Community, discussed by the USIB and then issued by the DCI. On each Question, the NIO within whose area of responsibility it falls then caucusses with the appropriate collection and production managers throughout the Community and develops something called a Strategy Report, designed as a vehicle for identifying who can and will do what in an effort to answer (or try to answer) that Question. After the end of the fiscal year, all the KIQs and the Community's performance on them are subjected to something called the KIQ Evaluation Process (KEP), the first part of which entails having the NIOs write a narrative assessment of the Community's overall performance with respect to each KIQ. 2. From virtually the moment of its inception, the Senate Select Committee and -- especially -- that Committee's staff have evinced a great and continuing interest in the KIQ/KEP Process. In August, the Staff Director (Bill Miller) asked that the Committee be provided Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 ,0001 v loan copies of the FY 1975 KIQs and the Strategy Reports for five of these KIQs: #7 Accuracy of new Soviet ICBMs #22 Warsaw Pact defense budgets #30 Prospects in Yugoslavia after Tito These requested items were forwarded to Mr. Miller and his staff associates via on 21 August. 25X1 3. On 12 January 1976, Mrs. Lynn Davis of the Senate Select Committee Staff asked to see the NIOs' narra- tive evaluation assessments of the Community's performance on the above five FY 1975 KIQs. Bill Colby refused to provide these documents on the grounds that they were internal working drafts and part of an internal evaluation process still in train. (Furthermore, at the time the request was first levied) Bill himself had not had a chance to read these evaluation reports and he was more than a trifle irritated at being asked to provide internal documents which he himself had not seen for SSC inspection.) 4. Last week, Bill Bader -- a senior member of the SSC Staff -- called to repeat the request for these five evaluation reports. Specifically, he wanted to know if you would be willing to reverse Colby's decision. 5. There are several sets of equities involved here, including your own determination of the general posture you want to take with the SSC and its staff. All other things being equal -- which, in this case, they may well not be -- I think you should let Bill's decision stand. These are candid internal documents and all of your deputies are more than a trifle gun-shy about passing such documents to the Senate or House Select Committees, since on many occasions over the past year our own prose has been used as ammunition in hostile fire publicly directed against us. Also, these reports were folded into an overall evaluation (with numbers purporting to show allocation of Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Community resources to various KIQs), which was a disaster and which Bill himself recalled. I would not want that document to get outside the Executive Branch and am concerned lest these five evaluation reports whet an appetite for the entire package of which they subsequently became a part. 6. Appended for your information is a copy of the complete list of FY 1975 KIQs, the Strategy Reports on the five KIQs in question (which were shown to the SSC Staff), and the five performance reports for which they are asking and which they have not yet been given. As you will see, the performance reports by themselves are not damaging; but the request for them relates to a larger set of issues and our posture on that particular request should be consistent with what you determine ought to be our general posture with respect to these larger issues. I would appre- ciate a decision as soon as it is convenient for you to make one, since Bader will certainly be querying me again soon and I would like to be able to give him a firm answer -- yes or no -- the next time we talk. Georg A. Carver, Jr. Deputy for National Intelligence Officers cc: DDCI w/o atts D/DCI/IC w/o atts Executive Registry w/o atts GACarver, Jr./kes Original - Addressee Watts cys - as indicated above w/o atts 1 - SSC File w/o atts 1 - D/NIO Chrono w/o attsL 1 - RI w/o atts 3 `sl Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 ..r a... BACKGROUND ON KIQ, KSR, KIQ NARRATIVE EVALUATIONS -- SENATE SELECTIVE COMMITTEE STAFF Between 15 July and 12 August 1975 Mr. Peter Zimmerman and Miss Beth Blumfield reviewed the "Key Intelligence Questions for Fiscal Year 1975" and the Key Intelligence Questions Strategy Reports for FY 75. 8 August 1975 Mr. William Miller requested that the Committee be provided loan copies of the' Key Intelligence Questions - FY 75`and the KIQ Strategy Reports for the following KIQs: #7 Accuracy of new Soviet ICBMs #22 Warsaw Pact defense budgets #30 Prospects in Yttangl a,r; n -P+-- rP4 ~. These items were provided on 21 August 25X1 for forwarding to Mr. Miller. On 12 January 1976 Miss Davis requested access to the NIO narrative evaluation reports for the above five FY 75 KIQs. Mr. Colby said no since these are internal working drafts -- part of the process but not the full evaluation. Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/SP .NIO/CII NIO/SSEAF 11 February 1976 SUBJECT Review of Need for Attached is a self-explanatory intra-IC Staff 25X1 note onl After you have had an opportunity to digest its contents, I would like to discuss it with you particularly in light of the study that 25X6 I and their priorities. Georg / A. Carver, Jr. D/DCI/NIO Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 25X1 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 11 February 1976 SUBJECT Structural Changes and Institutional Reforms 1. Over the past several months, many have engaged in discussion and thought (often more of the former than the latter) about structural or organizational changes in the intelligence community. The basic decisions may have already been made, hence several of the suggestions outlined below may have been overtaken by events; but I thought you might find these observations of some interest and use. 2. Structure should be keyed to function. The DCI has three major sets of continuing responsibilities -- clearly interrelated, but nonetheless both distinguishable and distinct: a. Being the Government's senior substantive intelligence officer and advisor. b. Being the Government's principal advisor on intelligence resources. c. Managing the CIA. 3. Each of these three sets of responsibilities has its own complexities. a. Being the fount of national intelligence is clearly the DCI's primary responsibility, since establishing such a fount was clearly the 80th Congress' primary objective in passing Section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947.* *What Congress wanted was a mechanism through which all of the information available to the US Government bearing on national security problems (with a foreign dimension) could be collated and evaluated by one central entity, not under the control of any cabinet department or military service. Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 low -- The primacy of this set of responsi- bilities is further underlined by the fact that the DCI's other major responsibilities (advising on resource allocation and managing the CIA) really have to do with the mechanisms which enable him to discharge this function of being the Government's principal substantive intelligence officer and fount of national intelligence. -- The DCI's broader substantive responsi- bilities logically evolved from this statutory base, including his present responsibilities for providing a broad range of current intelli- gence reports and assessments and for providing national estimates. -- The key aspect of this set of responsibilities is the latter's national scope. As applied to intelligence, "natia l" has come to mean intelli- gence which draws on all information available to all components of the Government, is assessed by the best analytic talent available throughout the Government, and is presented to the President and his senior advisors with a reflection of significant dissenting judgments where the latter exist and are of material consequence. -- Over the last year or so there has been a rising amount of debate over the extent of the DCI's responsibility for providing substantive intelligence support to the Congress. This added complexity, however, does not alter his clear obligation to provide support to the President and the NSC, or his primacy as the Government's principal foreign intelligence officer. b. The resource "advisory" role was only implicitly adumbrated in the 1947 Act. It has evolved by pragmatic precedent and was explicitly stated in President Nixon's November 1971 letter. The precise dimensions of that role, however, and the DCI's degree of authority in resource matters are still vague, and disputed (especially in the Department of Defense). 2 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 c. The CIA is an instrument set up to help the DCI discharge the responsibilities with which he was vested by statute. -- Over time, it was given -- under the DCI's management -- certain other institu- tional responsibilities, notably the covert collection (espionage) function (a "service of common concern"), the covert action function (one of those "other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security" directed by the NSC), and certain responsibilities for the development and management of technical collection programs (ditto). -- Despite the language of the 1947 and 1949 Acts and the pragmatic precedents of almost three decades, there is still some debate within the Executive Branch -- and within the Intelligence Community -- over what CIA is, and what it is not. In part, this debate is rooted in what may sound to to a layman like a philosophical connundrum: whether there is (or is not) a valid dis- tinction between "national intelligence" and "non-departmental intelligence". CIA's production -- i.e., the published output of the DDI and parts of the DDSIT -- is clearly "non-departmental", since CIA is not under the control of any cabinet department. Many CIA analysts -- and managers -- would and do argue that, ergo, what CIA produces is national intelligence. This contention, however, is by no means universally accepted throughout the rest of the Intelligence Community or the Executive Branch, where it is argued (often stridently) that reports/ assessments/appreciations/estimates are not national intelligence unless and until they reflect (and, in some cases, clearly identify) the views of all concerned components of the Intelligence Community, not just those of CIA. Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 -- This debate, in turn, is at the root of what some, indeed many (outside CIA), perceive as an inherent conflict of interest in the dual roles of the DCI (as his office is now structured) as the Government's senior substantive intelligence officer (the fount of national intelligence) and -- simultaneously -- the head of one of the Intelligence Community's analytic and production com- ponents, i.e., the CIA. 4. In addition to the three sets of continuing responsibilities outlined above, the DCI also has a fourth set of responsibilities which are latent or intermittent: providing intelligence support to national decision-making in times of crisis. These are clearly related to his con- tinuing responsibilities, but have several special features. -- They bring into sharp focus the ambiguities in the relationship between and responsibilities of (on the one hand) the DCI and (on the other) the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. -- They also bring the complex "national/ tactical" question into sharp focus. -- They give added intensity to the debate over the role and functions of the CIA. 5. The Present Structure. At present, the DCI is supported by a command structure which was developed during the tenure of your two immediate predecessors. It includes: a. A Deputy DCI -- appointed by the President with the Senate's advice and consent -- who serves as Acting DCI in your absences, is the CIA member of the USIB, performs a variety of special missions and functions, but who (under present arrangements) is not really in the line of command. b. Two staff Deputies to the DCI who assist him in the discharge of his two -- and it is important to remember that there are two -- sets of community Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 responsibilities: substance (the D/DCI/NIO) and resources (the D/DCI/IC). c. Four line Deputies -- DDSF,T, DDI, DDO and DDA -- through whom the DCI runs the CIA. 6. The present system runs with the grain of the DCI's major responsibilities. It is not bad. Actually, it is fairly good. It does not -- nor can it -- alleviate the problems engendered by the DCI's limited and ambiguous authority (especially in the resource field); but apart from that, it has only one serious flaw: within it there is no overall, day-to-day manager of the CIA, other than the DCI himself. This, in turn, -- Sets up a great drain on the DCI's time. -- Compounds the perception of ".conflict of interest" between the DCI's Community and Agency roles, noted above. -- Creates an anomalous and often awkward situation: when the DCI is wearing his "Community" hat adjudicating Community disputes, the CIA has no single advocate to explain and defend its legitimate institutional equities. 7. The flaws in the present structure, however, could be quite easily remedied by either of two approaches: a. Changing the present concept of the role of the DDCI, charging him with being the day-to-day manager of CIA (and letting him be it), or b. Re-constituting and perhaps enhancing the now abolished position of Executive Director. 5 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 U.~ "',Y .iI -_ A 1%W 8. The "Two Deputies" Approach. Another, super- ficially appealing way to go at the structural problem is to follow the "two deputies" approach: i.e., give the DCI one Deputy DCI to manage the CIA and another to handle the Community. I understand that this is the approach now being favored downtown; but before any final decisions are taken (if they have not already been made), careful consideration ought to be given to the fact that this approach would be likely to create more problems than it solves. -- This is because the DCI does not have just one set of Community responisibilities, he has two: substance and resources. -- In solving the "CIA problem" it would compound the "Community problem." -- If the Community deputy were a civilian (especially a non-Defense Department civilian) there would be great -- and under- standable -- concern within the DOD, the JCS and the military services that Defense's resource equities and requirements would not be properly understood or adequately protected. -- Conversely, if the Community deputy were a serving military officer (or a civilian with a Defense Department background) there. would be serious, again understandable, concern -- within other componenents of the Executive Branch, in the Congress, in the Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 public (and, for that matter, within CIA) about the objectivity of national intelligence production. -- If the two Community responsibilities -- substance and resources -- are combined under a single deputy, one of them would be bound to suffer. Given the American fascination for the concrete and quantitative -- especially in light of the amounts of money involved -- said single Community deputy would almost inevitably be inclined to focus primarily on resources, which would probably soon come to drive substance. Hence, substance -- i.e., the responsibilities the DCI was primarily set up by statute to discharge -- would almost inevitably suffer. - The chances of serious friction between the two deputies would be great. Even in the unlikely event that both were always saints, there would be an inescapable pecking order problem: one would have to be Acting DCI in your absence, and he would be seen throughout the Government, Congress and public as being your principal Deputy. Giving primacy to the CIA Deputy would generate one set of unavoidable problems; giving primacy to the Community Deputy (especially if -- under this arrange- ment -- he was a military officer) would generate another. 8. Conclusion. In sum, I believe strongly that the two- deputy approach is a loser, almost guaranteed to crate more problems than it solves. Others (including Bill Colby) may and do disagree, but I am convinced that the present, rather easily modified framework offers a much more promising line of approach within which you can fairly easily solve the "CIA problem" without compounding and complicating the Community one. Georg A. Carver, Jr. Deputy for National Intelligence Officers 7 Lj eL, Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 ~~r.1figS?~m4"r. hq Approved For Release 2008/06/19 CIA-RDP80RO1720R001000160001-9 10 February 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/Economics INFORMATION NIO/USSR NIO/Middle East NIO/Japan NIO/Western Europe SUBJECT : Economic Estimates Attached is the memorandum from Secretary Simon via Mr. Morell that Mr. Bush mentioned at yesterday's meeting. After you have had an opportunity to peruse its contents, I would like to caucus with you to discuss what response should be provided the DCI for forwarding to Secretary Simon. George A. Carver, Jr. D%DCI/NIO / /NIO Chrono ns ! C ra_.111-1 ; . Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 J-0 UNCLASSIFIED I CONFIDENTIAL I I SECRET L .1 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 EXECUTIVE SEETARIAT Routing Slip ID/DCI/NI 131 Compt , 19 EA/DCI 20 25X1 Remarks: To 9: Please develop reply and advise about how long it will take. 25X1. ecutive ecretar 9 February 1976 Date Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 r;.Kucuttve ft;ayictry OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220 February 5, 1976 Dear Mr. Bush: I am enclosing a letter from Bill Simon on a subject that has interested him for some time. The letter, incidentally, covers one of the general topics he discussed with the President during the recent Saturday afternoon session with Cabinet offi- cials on the organization and management of the intelligence community. I am delighted that your confirmation worked out as well as it did. I'm looking forward to working with you in your efforts to put all of the pieces back together again--albeit in a somewhat different form. I do not underestimate the immensity of your task but I am confident that for the Agency and the in- telligence community 1976 will end better than it began. If you wish I would be happy to work with your staff in arranging a time for you and Bill to get together. All the best for the future. Sincerely, William N. Morell, Jr. Treasury Representative on the United States Intelligence Board The Honorable George Bush Director Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C. 20505 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 `y THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY' WASHINGTON 20220 CONFIDENTIAL February 4, 1976 Dear George: I have felt for some time that U.S. intelligence could take a more active role in preparing estimates of future developments important to our foreign eco- nomic policy. While I have found many national esti- mates helpful in providing background material relevant to our interests--particularly in the scientific, po- litical and military fields--I have observed that these estimates rarely focus on important international eco- nomic issues. Although the various policy offices of the EPB departments and agencies will continue to do the lion's share of this work--with the help of contri- butions from your Office of Economic Research--I would hope that we could work together to strengthen the national estimates process in economic areas. The trend of Soviet economic relations with Eastern Europe is an example of the type of estimate we might consider in view of the possibilities these trends may offer to the United States and the West for involving Eastern Europe more with the non-Communist world. While we obviously must be cautious and realistic in our ex- pectations regarding these possibilities, they do seem worth exploring. We have seen a number of recent developments in the pattern of Soviet economic ties with Eastern Europe which suggest that in coming years several Eastern European countries will have less assurance that they can depend on the Soviet Union as a major source of foodstuffs, energy and raw materials. For example, as a consequence of recent Soviet crop disasters Moscow CONFIDENTIAL ?'r.W.._-_N.. Morel1, Jr. Der"---31,__198 _ Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 NOW CONFIDENTIAL - 2 - has told the Eastern European countries not to depend on the USSR for grain import needs during the 1975-76 period, stating flatly that they must fend for them- selves. As you know, the Soviets also recently raised the price of oil and other raw materials to Eastern Europe, although not yet to the level of world prices. Thus, as these countries look to the future, they probably conclude that the Soviets will have continuing difficulty in meeting East Europe's future import needs. On the export side East European industries have emphasized sales to the USSR. As they shift their purchases to other areas, the Eastern Europeans must find ways to earn the necessary foreign exchange to pay for these imports by selling in hard currency markets, a difficult task since most of their current exports are not now attractive to Western buyers. Their trade must expand if these regimes in Eastern Europe are to achieve their modernization plans and meet the rising expectations of their citizenry. All of this presents a very real political and economic dilemma. I believe it is important that we improve our perception of future prospects in this area and that we have a better understanding of the practical alterna- tives open to the countries of Eastern Europe. If the dilemmas described above develop, as we think they might, what trade and financing opportunities would the Eastern Europeans offer to the United States, other Western countries, Japan, and certain countries in the Middle East? What might the political and economic consequences be for our own interests if we were to more actively seek a strengthening of East Europe's economic relations with non-Communist countries? How might this best be done? Many other issues should be considered which have a bearing on our policy deliber- ations--issues which we would be happy to discuss with representatives of the intelligence community. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 CONFIDENTIAL - 3 - If you agree that there is some merit in giving further consideration to the possibility of an esti- mate on this subject, please let me know. I hope, incidentally, that we can get together before long and discuss some of the more important aspects of intelligence support for foreign economic policy and negotiations. Sincerely, The Honorable George Bush Director Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C. 20505 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 10 February 197 MEMORANDUM FOR: T'he Director SUBJECT General Tighe's Request 1. On 9 February, the Acting Executive Secretary of the USIB sent you a note informing you that at the 10 February USIB meeting, General Tighe wants to bring up two additional items in ? - i_v session.. With reference to one of these, reported that: [General Tighe] is going to request that DIA be given the lead on the study, "Vulnerability of Soviet Space Systems", because of the interaction with U. S. tactical reconnsissance. He indicated that the Chairman, JCS sees this as primarily a Defense problem. 2. The above statement almost certainly reflects some garble, either in Tighe's own mind or in the relay of his request. There is no study in train, or contemplated, on the "Vulnerability of Soviet Space Systems", although an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum entitled "Soviet Dependence on Space Systems" was issued in November. 1.975. Tighe must have in mind the work being done on a related but significantly different subject, namely the interagency memorandum on "The Likelihood of Soviet Interference with U. S. Space Systems in Crises and Con f-licts." 3. This study, which is in train, had its genesis last fall in a request from the Off:ice of Management and Budget. The OMB noted that National Reconnaissance Program satellites and supporting systems were being justified in part on the basis of their potential utility in tactical conflicts. The 0MB concluded that the vulnerability of our satellites was therefore pertinent to budget decisions about funding of NRP programs as well as tactical reconnaissance systems. OMB representatives expected that the findings of the study would justify either budget reductions in satellite systems if they were likely to be :interfered with, or budget reductions in tactical reconnaissance systems if the satellites were judged reasonably secure. The study results may not meet these 0MB expectations. Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 w 4. Despite the flaws in OMB's reasoning, the subject is indeed of intrinsic importance and we did agree to take it on. During December and January a work plan was evolved under which the study would be produced on an interagency basis -- under the overall'supervisi.on of your NIO for Strategic Programs --- by an interagency task force chaired by of CIA's Office of Strategic Research. Notice to that effect was circulated throughout the Community by two memoranda I signed on 16 January. 5. What Tighe is actually requesting is a switch in procedures through which DIA would be given the lead in directing the actual work in lieu of CIA (OSR). 6. I think this would be a mistake primarily for two reasons: a. The issues involved go far beyond military questions, no matter how broadly defined. They include considerations of Soviet attitudes, political perceptions, and political intentions and strategy. They do of course have military dimensions, but under the interagency plan already developed, military equities would be amply protected and the military establishment's professional expertise fully engaged by the degree of participation already requested of DIA, the service intelligence agencies and other Defense Department components. b. Involved here is a very knotty problem which goes to the heart of your responsibilities and your retention of control over the mechanisms indispensable to their discharge. What we are talking about is national collection systems which are unquestionably national, even though they also (unquestionably) can and do provide information of an inordinate value to tactical commanders. The needs of the latter must clearly be served, but the allocation of priorities has to he left to the DCI to determine if his position as the government's principle intelligence officer is to retain substance and meaning. The difficulty is that in this instance (as in others), the old, tidy dis- tinction between "national" and "tactical" intelligence/ assets/systems has been overtaken by technolgoy and is no longer as neat, or clear, as may have been the case a decade ago. 2 r~tv A`, Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 qw -am `7 . The arrangement:s we have set up to do this study w:i.l.l. }keep it in proper foots and protect everyone's 1eg1.t.i.m,tt:(eciu:i.t:ies, including both yours and those of our colleagues in the Pentagon. I thin;: they should be Continued. At a minimum, however, .T strongly recoiimiend that you not acquiesce in General `l:ighe's proposal at the meet.:i.ng and that, :i.f you do not fecl you want to turn. hint off there wi th a -Flat negative, you simply say you will. :Took into the situation in response to his expression of concern, but do so in a manner that does not commit you to any final outcome or d.ecis:i.on. 8. Appended for your information and background are copies of my two memoranda of 16 January mentioned above), plus an informal note by which 25X1 develops the cogent reasons why supervision of this project belongs here and not in DIA. George A. Carver, Jr. Deputy for National Intelligence Officers cc: DDCI DDI D/OSR DDSF;T D/DCI/IC Executive Registry Copy No. 1 - DCI Copy No. la - EA/DCI .Copy No. 2 - DDCI Copy No. 3 - DDI Copy No. 4 - D/OSR Copy No. 5 - DDSIT Copy No. 6 - D/DCI/IC Copy No. 7 - Executive Registry Copy No. 8 - NIO/SP Copy No. 9 - D/NIO Chrono Copy No. 10 - NIO/RI Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Notionol lntellijence Officers SP - 4/76 16 January 1976 Copy /' MEMORZANDUNN FOR: Mr. Edward W. Proctor Deputy Director for Intelligence Mr. Carl E. Duckett Deputy Director for Science and Technology Mr. Harold H. Saunders Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State LTG Eugene R. Tighe, Jr., USAF Acting Director, Defense Intelligence Agency LTG Lew Allen, Jr., USAF Director, National Security Agency - Major General Harold R. Aaron Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Army Rear Admiral B. R. Inman Director of Naval Intelligence, Navy Major General C. J. Keegan, Jr. Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence, Air Force SUBJECT Preparation of an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on Likelihood of Soviet Interference with US Space Systems in Crises and Conflicts 1.. In response to a request of the Office of Management and Budget (ONB) , the DCI has approved the preparation of an interag ency intelligence memorandum on the likelihood of Soviet interference. with US military- support satellite systems. The purpose of the study is to assess whether, when, and how the USSR might use antisatellite systems or other means to interfere with the functioning of US satellite systems -- especially those reconnaissance systems associated with providing support to US military commanders in the field -- in crises or conflict situations. The time period to be addressed is about the next five years, and the US systems to be addressed are those presently operating and now programmed. The study will be prepared under aegis of the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs. t i.tGt iAt- S;', iCE Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 2.. Attached are draft terms of reference for the memorandum, as agreed between representatives of the OMB and NI0 for Strategic Programs, in consultation with representatives of certain USIB agencies. The OM3 has requested that a draft of an initial memorandum be available by 1. June 1976. 3. In the preparation of the memorandum, inputs will be needed on such subjects as US space systems (capabilities and vulnerabilities) and their tactical applications, Soviet antisatellite capabilities, Soviet space systems and Soviet dependency on them, Soviet conflict doctrine, and NATO-Warsaw Pact theater conflict scenarios. For some of these in- puts, participation of the NRO will be required. 4. You are requested to designate a representative to serve on the ad hoc interagency aroun which will be responsible for preparing the memorandum The group w Research C. of the Office of Strategic with the name of your representative by COB Thursday, 22 January 1976. The first meeting of the ad hoc group will be held at CIA Headquarters, Room 5G00, 1000 hours on Friday, 23 January 1.976. George A. arver, r. Deputy for National Intelligence Officers cc: Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) Director, Office of Management and Budget Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community TOP SE C.RET 25X1 ill be chaired b IA. Please provide Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Iq Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 National Intelligence Officers Sr - 8/76 16 January 1976 Copy ___2L_ 11Et ORANDUN FOR: Director, National Reconnaissance Office SUBJECT Request for NRO Participation in the Preparation of an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum :L. The Director of Central Intelligence requests the participation of the National Reconnaissance Office -in the preparation of an interagency intelligence memorandum on the likelihood of Soviet interference with US space systems in crises and conflicts (see attachment). The memorandum is to be produced in response to a request of the Office of Management and Budget. 2. Among the inputs needed for this project (see paragraph 3 of the attachment) are the capabilities and vulnerab:L:Lities of US space systems. In this connection- the assets of the NRO clearly are the most appr.opriate25X1 to draw upon. of your office recently participated in an interagency meeting Oi{B request and the outline for the memorandum. 3. You are requested to designate your point of contact for the ad hoc interagency group which will be responsible for preparing the memo- randum. The group will be chaired by of the Office of 25X1 Strategic Research, CIA. Gc rge A. Carver, Jr. Deputy for. National Intelligence Officers .Y.~ t:..lf._' ".W1. L. i Z. Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 N1EMORAUDUN FOR: Deputy Director : or Intc'iligcence SUBJECT OSH/SEC Reaction _c) Recommendation on Leadership of Interagency Project "Prospects for Soviet Interference with US Space Reconnaissance Systems" 1. The impending proposal that DIA. take the lead in this project leaves us with mixed feelings, on balance negative. The project is responsive both to requests from OMB and to the DCIts KIQ No. 8. OSR/SEC was assigned working-level leadership of this project as early as September 1975 because it, alone among many organizations in discussion with the NIO/SP and OMB, expressed both a willingness to commit resources to the effort and a belief that new work had to be done. Several months of initial data col- lection and problem formulation have been undertaken by OSR/SEC to date. 2. The prospect of shifting the assuredly heavy management and administrative (including security) burdens of this complex project to another agency is not unattractive to us. However, the. putative reason. to shift the leadership of the project to DIA ---- because it concerns the interface of intelligence with tactical operations --- is not in itself persuasive. 3. The project certainly involves tactical intelligence functions of real-time systems. But it also involves problems of real-t:i.me_ political and strategic warning during the build-up of crises, a major CIA concern. 4.. Tactical intelligence functions, by the very nature of evolving collection technologies and the great importance of the information they collect, are Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 bE'CO111:i1Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 fu Lional intelligence mac L:i.c>ns . 1~ p ecedenL would be set: If CI'A were accorded a reduced 1:ol.e in this arena because it c:ar:cie : Lyre L-c(,rr:; tac:ti.cal. S. CSR/SEC has as ser. ted -Chat the problem requires some Unique conceptual and organizational approaches, combining space system expertise, apprecia L Lon of the battlefield, and knowledge, of Soviet strategy and operations.. During discussions of the problem, DIA was not notably vocal in c .press:i ng such recognition. 6. To date, DIA has not been visibly c ger- to put resources into this pro ject, much less lead it. In response to our request for resource commitments to the project, DID. offered up one major as a contract officer,. and two lesser officers, as project participants. 7. It must be recognized that the purpose of the project is not to investigate the tactical role of real-time space reconnaissance assets per se, but rather to assess the incentives the Soviet-s will face to interfere in that role and ho.?i they might act on those inventi_ves. It is not obvious that DIA is uniquely strong in this kind of analysis, S. DIA' s sudden interest in playing a leading role in this study is commendable in itself. But it probably derives from belated recognition that the results of the study could shape the views of national policymakers toward systems and programs in which the DOD has major interests. Insofar as the programs of central concern are in the NIP, CIA can be said to. have :Less direct budgetary interest. But it is not clear -Chat direct budgetary interests, of er the best credentials for ieaderhs ip of an intelligence study affecting those interest s. 9 , If successful in illurninat:ing a complex and vital problem, the proposed study will have a direct effect on the resources and systems with Which the DCI meets his future responsibilities in peace, crisis, and conflict. The principal question, then, is what combination of leadership and analytic resources gives the DCI the greatest confidence that the problem will he illuminated. Chief Strategic Evaluation Center. _ _ Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 9 February 1976 (1130 Hours) NOTE FOR DCI SUBJECT: USIB Executive Session General Tighe just called to inform us that he intends to bring up two additional items in the USIB Executive Session tomorrow: a. He is going to request that DIA be given the lead on the study, "Vulnerability of Soviet Space Systems , because of the interaction with U. S. tactical reconnaissance. He indicated that the Chairman, JCS sees this as primarily a Defense problem. b. At the request of ASD(I), General Tighe is' going to call for the importance of more collec- tion against the Soviet navy. He said that this relates to the recent information on the Soviet navy mutiny. He indicated that Bill Nelson was aware of this problem. Acting Executive Secretary, USIB cc: D/DCI/IC D/DCI/NIO DDI DDO Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 nC Ulm[:% 'I' VI CENTRAL IN rrLIGENCE .tional intelligence Officers 9 February 1976 r. Peter Rodman ffice of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs ne White House Per our telephone conversation, attached 25X1 s the picture. is the fellow tanding at the left side of the picture with pointer on his shoulder. He has done -eoman work for (now) four DCIs and we will iss him when-he retires in March. If enry could spare fifteen seconds to ___ ] it would be FtI 25X1 nscribe this picture toF -neatly appreciated. Many thanks for your help. George A. Carver, Jr. Deputy for National Intelligence Officers, Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 71Z6 rrrr THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE National Intelligence Officers 7 February 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. General Eugene R. Tighe, Jr., USAF Acting Director. Defense Intelligence Agency SUBJECT Electronic Warfare 1. Recently the Director of Central Intelligence requested that a National Intelligence Officer investigate the need for an Electronic Warfare study at the national level. In pursuit of this, the National Intelligence Officer for Conventional Forces has consulted with various organizational groups in the Defense Intelligence Agency and Central Intelli- gence Agency. As a result, it has become apparent that a study "ECM Capabilities - ECC" which has been produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency for some years is now under extensive revision. It is a Secret-level study with considerable detail and of significant utility to operational forces. 2. Because of its limited level of security, however, it can merely reflect, but cannot include, some of the more highly classified and high informative material now available. As a consequence, the study does not adequately fill the needs of policy level personnel in Washington. It is clear that an addi- tional study better serving the immediate needs of Washington level consumers is needed. In order to accomplish this, it has been decided that the Defense Intelligence Study should con- tinue on its schedule with no interference in its production. An additional interagency study should be produced which would reflect significant features of the DIA study plus "all source" material which can best illuminate Soviet electronic warfare doctrine, practice, and policy. 3. We have learned that the DIA Directorate of Science and Technolo has recently created a section under the leader- ship of to thoroughly handle SECT Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 law NNW electronic warfare aspects of the Soviet threat. Because of this, it is requested that be designated to manage the national level study under the aegis of the National Intelligence Officer for Conventional Forces. It is further requested that the Colonel develop an outline of what would be needed for such a study and that this be sub- mitted to the National Intelligence Officer for Conventional Forces as soon as possible. Subsequent to this, the opinions of USIB representatives will be solicited, their suggestions considered, a production schedule set up and contributions requested. George /A. Carver, Jr. Deputy for National Intelligence Officers GACarver, Jr., kj Distribution: Original - Addressee 1 - NIO/CF 1 - D/NIO Chronol/ 1 - DIA SUBJ file 1 - RI Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 v m nr! nr7 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE National Intelligence Officers 6 February 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General John A. Wickham, Jr., USA Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense SUBJECT . Intelligence Support for General Haig Forwarded herewith for your perusal and information is a further set of the cables sent in support of General Haig. Please return these and future messages to my office after they have served your purposes. ueorge arver, Jr. Deput i for National Intelligence Officers Carver, Jr. ":..kbs Distribution Copy.No. 1 - Gen. Wickham w/atts Copy No. 2 - Chrono w/o atts Copy No. 3 - D/NIO Chrono w/o attsV Copy No. 4 - HAIG SUPPORT file w/o atts Copy No. 5 - NIO/RI w/o atts Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Iq Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 s.-' - T'fE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGCE WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505 National Intelligence Officers 5 February 1976 The Honorable Harold H. Saunders Director Bureau of Intelligence and Research Department of State Washington, D.C. 20520 Dear Hal, I wanted to send a word of thanks for INR's institu- tional and your personal contributions to the Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on Thailand issued on 4 February by the DCI. You-taking the time to annotate the draft and sharpen up its implications section was particularly helpful and very much appreciated. Sincerely yours, .:D/NIO Chrono RIO/RI .CONFJDENTIAL Carver, Jr. Deputy for National Intelligence Officers George A O/D/DCI/NIO:GACarver/mee Prig.- Addressee. 1-~.- NIO/SSEAAF Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 UU11F1Ili 3-i I i t Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 .*iE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIG- CE National Intelligence Officers 5 February 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William Parmenter Director Office of Current Intelligence SUBJECT The 4 February Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on Thailand east Asian Branch. UNCODED deserves a special word of . 1. As you know, on 4 February an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on Thailand -- prepared under the aegis of the NIO/SSEAAF -- was issued in the DCI's name. It was, I think, a very good paper. 2. As you doubtless also know, your colleagues did most of the work on this paper, including the bulk of the basic drafting. Would You lease relay down your command chain my thanks and UNCODED for this typically 25X1 first-class job done by the East Asia-Pacific Division and, particularly, those s lended analysts in its South- 25X1 thanks for his work, though saying that is not to slight the contributions of UNCODED 25X1 and all the other cooks who contributed seasoning to t is broth. Georg6 A. Carver, Jr. Deputy for National Intelligence Officers O/D/DCI/NIO:GACarver/mee Orig Addressee 1 - NIO/SSEAAF I - D/NIO Chrono 1 - NIO/RI . CON MENTIAL Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 5 February 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director SUBJECT . Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on Thailand 1. Attached is an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum entitled "The Thai Election and. Its Implications for the US", which was issued on 4 February. 2. Thai politics are now in a somewhat volatile and potentially turbulent period, with- assorted coup rumors beginning to circulate. Though the latter, to date, appear somewhat ephemeral, none of us want to get caught short by any sudden change in the Thai scene, particularly during your first few weeks in office. Consequently; I wanted to get this memorandum out as quickly as possible and, hence, took the liberty of signing it for you so that it could be issued as soon as it was completed instead of holding it for a day until your return from New York. Georg A. Carver, Jr. Deputy for National Intelligence Officers Attachment cc:- DDCI w/att Executive Registry w/att GACarver, Jr./kes Distribution: Orig - Addressee w/att cys - as indicated 1 - NIO/SSEA w/o att 1 - D/NIO Chrono w/ntlh/ Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 SECRET V4W THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505 4 February 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Brent Scowcroft Assistant to the President (National Security Affairs) SUBJECT The Thai Election and Its Implications for the US 1. The attached Interagency Intelligence Memorandum contains the intelligence community's assessment of how the present election campaign in Thailand will affect Thai-US relations and prospects for retention of a residual US military presence in Thailand. 2. As the memorandum indicates, there is a strong possibility that the Thai military may assume control of the government at some point before elections are held, or soon thereafter. Within the Thai military establishment, there is considerable nervousness, plus a growing disen- chantment with Thailand's experiment with parliamentary government. Moreover, there are rivalries and crosscurrents within the military establishment which could result in one or another clique's attempting a preemptive coup against the presumed plans of some other group. In short, the situation in Thailand is fluid and subject to quick and dramatic change. 3. We gave serious consideration to issuing the attached study as an "Alert Memorandum." Our decision not to use that particular art form should not be misconstrued as a sign of complacency about the state of affairs in Thailand. We will, of course, keep a close eye on this situation and alert you promptly to any new developments giving further grounds for concern. -m'I George Bush cc: The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 ww `X1 Secret Intelligence The Thai Election and Its Implications for the US Secret NIO IIM 76-008 February 1976 Copy Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 SECRET February 4, 1976 INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM* SUBJECT: The Thai Election and Its Implications for the US KEY POINTS With elections scheduled for April, Thailand is experiencing a growing sense of malaise concerning the country's experiment with parliamentary democracy. -- This sentiment is expressed by King Phumiphon, the military, and many prominent civilian figures. In these circumstances, there is a strong possibility that the military might decide to assume control. For the moment, the King appears to be against such a course, and many military leaders would be loathe to act against the King's wishes. The situation is fragile, however, and subject to quick change. -- Some younger officers are maneuvering to force their superiors to take a stand on the question of a mil- itary takeover. Given the rivalries within the military, it is also possible that one or another military leader might attempt a preemptive coup. Other developments which would increase the likelihood of a coup are: -- a sharp deterioration of the security situation. -- a breakdown in public order caused by widespread strikes or anti-government disorders. -- the prospect of a left-of-center coalition coming to power which would threaten the vested interests of the military and conservative elements in Thailand. This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the Central Intel- Zigence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State. SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 SECRET Short of a coup, there is also a possibility that the elections may be postponed, leaving Khukrit, the present caretaker prime minister to rule through emergency decree. -- Khukrit, the military, and the King may well come to prefer this alternative over going through with the elections. Implications for the US during the election campaign -- By the 20 March deadline on removal ale of US combat forces, the US will probably be the negotiations now in train with the Khukrit government regarding the residual US military presence. -- But there is no assurance that an agreement signed by Khukrit will be honored by a new government. -- The election campaign probably will complicate Thai-US relations. The US presence is likely to become an issue in the campaign, and campaign pressures may force some candidates to insist on a total US military withdrawal. Implications for the US after an election - If an election is held, it would be likely to bring another centrist-conservative government into power. - Such a government would probably be as fragmented and contentious as the present government, but it would keep Thai policy toward the US more or less along present lines. A less likely possibility is either a coalition based exclusively on rightist elements, or one which included the Socialists. - A rightist government would be cooperative with US interests, but would still be restrained by politi- cal considerations on how far it could go, or ap- pear to go, in accommodating the US. - ii - SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 SECRET - A government in which the Socialists had a strong voice would make it difficult, if not impossible, for the US to maintain any military presence in Thailand. Such a government, however, could prompt the military either to force the government to resign or to overthrow it. In the event of a military takeover, the resultant government would be sympathetic to US interests. -- It would be unlikely, however, to reverse the long term trend toward a more non-aligned Thai foreign policy. Nevertheless, a military government might call for a substantial increase in US assistance if faced with a greatly expanded. insurgency or a break- down of civil order in the country. - iii - SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Iq Next 8 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 t Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 I .-.".- _.. - . W1 CENTRAL INMt1IGENCE National Intelligence Officers 4 February 1976 NOTE FOR: The Director SUBJECT : Senator Pell's Request 1. Per our 3 February session, attached is a memorandum outlining a set of talking points you may want to use in a private session with Senator Pell in response to the queries contained in his 23 January letter (a copy of which is also attached). 2. The attached memorandum is classified because the subject with which it deals is still considered classified. If you so desire, a) it could be recast into a letter for the Senator, or b) we could draft a formal reply to Senator Pell giving technically accurate answers to the two questions he actually asked (i. e. , "no" and "no"), said reply. to be amplified and explained by you in oral conversation, or c) drawing on the attached, you can give him a candid oral reply in lieu of any formal written response to his 23 January letter. (OVER) OLC Executive Registry GACarver, Jr., D/DCI/NIO:kes Orig - Addressee w/atts cys as indicated w/atts e- D/NIO Chrono Watts 1 - RI w/atts Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 3. Please let us know your preference on this matter. George Al Carver, Jr. D/DCI/NIO Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Iq Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 UNCLASSIFIED _ CONFIDENTIAL SERET EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT Routing Slip ACTION INFO DATE INITIAL 1 DCI 2 DDCI 3 S/MC 4 DDS&T 5 DDI 6 DDA 7 DDO 8 D/DCI/iC 9 D/DCI/NI 10 1~ GC LC 12 IG 13 Compt 14 D/ Pers 15 D/S 16 DTR 17 Asst/ DCI 18 AO/DCI 19 20 21 22 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Iq Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied STAT Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 rational Intelligence Officers 3 February 1976 OTE FOR: The Director UBJECT : Two Special Projects of the Former Office of the DCI's Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs Per our conversation on 3 February, _ttached are resumes of the two special rojects we discussed. Both of these esumes were prepared in 1973. George A. Carver, Jr. D/DCI/NIO Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 National Intelligence Officers 2 February 1976 Lieutenant General Eugene R. Tighe, Jr., USAF Acting Director Defense Intelligence Agency Department of Defense Washington, D.C. 20301 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 %h '7!'(t- DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIG-CE WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505 Thank you very much for making available to assist us in the development of NIE 13--3--76. He is clearly a member of the community best qualified to take on this task and we appreciate your?letting him do it. Sincerely yours, George A. Carver, Jr. Deputy for National Intelligence Officers GACarver, Jr./kes Distribution: Original - Addressee 1 - NI0/China w/att 1'- D/NIO Chrono w/attf 1 - RI 'w/o att Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301 S-6011/DE-3 Mr. George A. Carver, Jr. Deputy for National Intelligence Officers Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20505 Dear Mr. Carver: (S) I am pleased to accept your recommendation that of my Directorate for Estimates assist you in the development of NIE 13-3-76: "PRC Military Policy and General Purpose Forces" by serving as principal text manager and drafter. Despite other critical demands on our professional talent, for what you refer to as our "near term needs," DIA attaches a first priority to support of the national intelligence production effort. We welcome any opportunity to play a leading role in that effort, particularly in military or military-related subject areas. Sincerely, F. F. T!!:HE, JR, --. I ktatenant General, USA -y -_ _ :; I. y reetor Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 FORM NO. REPLACES FORM 95.1 - - '' O 238 DOCUMENT CONTROL 03-4Oi DATE OF DOC 13 Feb 76 TO FROM SUBJ. SEC. CL. S ORIGIN IC Staff DATE REC'D 13 Feb 76 Need for DATE SENT Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Next 3 3 Page(s) In Doc ument Denied Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 _WP11 1"W February 2, 1976 The Honorable Richard M. Helms American Ambassador American Embassy APO New York 09205 Dear Dick, I apologize for the delay in answering your note of 15 December. Unfortunately, our records came up blank. I found myself stymied but (as always) reluctant to confess failure. The other day, I had the happy thought of calling Walt Rostow, who did not know the answer but said. he would get it for me. Less than an hour later, I was called, by the head of the LBJ Library, who informed me that the first "Wise Men" caucus on Vietnam was held on 2 November 1967. If he is accurate (and he insists that he was), your memory was exactly 26 days off, which is not bad considering all that has happened since then. Actually, I have been meaning to write you a note for some time. Few things in the period of lunacy which seems to have afflicted this nation have irritated me more than the spiteful assaults on you, your achievements and your integrity. I find this utterly bewildering (as must you). Your record speaks for itself. Virtually your whole adult life has been devoted to the service of our country, with no other aim in mind save that. You have served it well and faithfully, with much skill and commendable success. The current claque of carping pygmies ignore the fact that in the real world -- as opposed to the dream world some of your critics find more congenial -- one must act without the benefit of clairvoyance or the knowledge conferred by hindsight.. They turn a blind eye to the pressures you were under. I do not know all that passed between you and President Johnson and President Nixon. (It was not my busi- ness then, nor is it now.) If you made tactical adjustments on lesser issues to preserve larger equities, I can only hope that if I am ever in a similar position, I will have the wisdom and courage to do the same. Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 I -hope the tide of lunacy is-now ebbing. Should, unhappily, it prove not yet to be at flood, I want you to know that there are few I have ever met whom I respect as much as you and none that I respect more. I was proud to serve with and under you, am proud to count you as a friend -- and have said so, and will say so to anyone who asks, under any circumstances. Ruth joins me in warmest regards to you both. As ever, GACarver,.Jr./kes Original - Addressee Y- D/TRIO Chrono 1 - GAC Personal File 1 - RI 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80R01720R001000160001-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9 Iq Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2008/06/19: CIA-RDP80RO172OR001000160001-9