COMMENTS ON THE 6 OCTOBER 1969 PAPER ENTITLED 'THE PHOENIX PROGRAM'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R001100030003-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 22, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

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22 October 1969
SUBJECT: Comments on the 6 October 1969 Paper Entitled
"The Phoenix Program"
1. The goals, or target numbers, of Phoenix are no more arbitray
than those established for other programs in South Vietnam. As in the
case of most program goals throughout the world, they attempt to
combine known capabilities with an additional margin aimed at providing
incentives and indicating the degree of significance which the central
authorities attach to the program. If goals were based solely on present
capabilities, there would be little stimulus to progress. (If educational
goals were established on initial capabilities teen-agers might still be
playing with finger paints. )
2. Viewed in this perspective, the target figures for the Phoenix
program do not really seem detached from reality. In fact, based on the
results for the first eight months of 1969, they appear to have gauged
fairly accurately the role of momentum and incentive in picking up the
pace of VCI neutralization. As of the end of August 1969, the program goal
of 1, 800 VCI per month produced a goal total of 14, 400. The actual total
of VCI neutralizations was 12, 156, an overall track record of slightly over
84 percent of the program objective. This record, particularly considering
the more stringent criteria imposed on the definitions of VCI by USMACV-
GVN authorities in February 1969, after the goals had been established,
sheds a reasonably favorable light on gross Phoenix performance.
3. With regard to impatience as a casual factor in disappointment
with the program, whether or not it be general or widespread, such disappoint-
ment is probably not only a function of the deep entrenchment of the VCI
(an undisputed fact) but also of the attitudes derived from our western,
industrialized world in which, typically, resources are gathered and allocated
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to a program with the expectation that a solution will be rapidly forth-
coming. This problem of expectations, however, has characterized
virtually all of our efforts in South Vietnam, and is not unique to the
Phoenix program.
4. The problem of fungibility, or ease of substitution, arising
from the predominance of low-level VCI appears to be largely a problem
of our own conceptual creation. The current level of district and higher
level VCI netted in the Phoenix program (23%, up from 17% in February
1969) does not, on balance, seem to be disproportionate. The VCI
organization, as most political organizations, has pyramid-like characteristics.
This being the case, netting better than a one-in-five ratio of chiefs to
indians would suggest that in reality the Phoenix is weighted more heavily
on the side of high-level rather than low-level types. Certainly if the
Chieu Hoi or the DIA/CIA figures indicated that these operations were
netting one officer for every four to five enlisted men we would be
extremely surprised. Furthermore, at a certain point in the organizational
evolution of the VCI it is likely that it will become easier to replace chiefs
than indians. While it is not claimed that this point has yet been reached,
it is already the case that the recruiting of indians (previously uncommitted)
becomes more difficult as the probability of their being rolled up rises.
Furthermore, neutralization of higher level types can be effected either
directly through standard techniques or indirectly by denying these leaders
the manpower and physical resources they require to present a threat.
In this light, the fact that Phoenix operations have forced VCI to move
from native villages because capture was imminent is not necessarily
all bad. The VC cannot win this war by remote control any more than we can.
5. The Phoenix program has never claimed that all VCI neutralizations
were or would be the result of Phoenix-initiated operations. The prime
goal of the Phoenix program is organizational in nature rather than opera-
tional. In fact, the principal rationale for the establishment of the Phoenix
organization was the realization that Chieu Hoi, RD cadre, RF/PF, conven-
tional military and police operations were not independent and, at this
stage of the war, should not be allowed to conduct their activities in an
informational vacuum. As a result of this organizational outlook, the
Phoenix program is neither discredited nor puffed by the percentage of
neutralizations resulting from Chieu Hoi, or military operations, or police
captures, or, for that matter any functional distribution. The prime
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objective of the Phoenix program is to ensure that local operations are
exploited for their possible impact on the VCI, to provide information
to managers of Chieu Hoi and military roundup operations on known VCI
so that these can be exploited for their intelligence value, and to establish
and maintain a ledger balance so that we and our Vietnamese allies can
evaluate the VCI threat and how well we are doing against it.
III. Political Apathy
6. "Malaise" seems to us an inaccurate word for describing one
of the real and major problems associated with the Phoenix effort.
"Malaise" means a sickness or being ill at ease. The root problem here,
however, is that many local Vietnamese feel entirely too comfortable in
the presence of the VCI. Thus "political apathy" would seem to be a better
label for the problem here involved.
7. It would be flying in the face of the evidence to deny the existence
of a substantial political apathy -- particularly at local levels -- in South
Vietnam, but it would also be misleading to deny that this is both a cause
and an effect of the total political situation, including the stalled talks in
Paris. In terms of our perspective in program evaluation, however, it
should be pointed out that the lack of native enthusiasm for prosecuting the
war against the VC is, or would be, a problem affecting all of our programs
in South Vietnam, not merely Phoenix. To the degree that U. S. forces
and ARVN are fighting a foreign military force and ultimately rely on a
highly ritualized form of discipline, they are partially immune to the
initial effects of local apathy. It is not surprising, therefore, that local
operations -- including, but not limited to the Phoenix program -- would
be the first to encounter difficulties. This is truly a major problem that
we face in South Vietnam and, at least at the present time, there are no
simple solutions forthcoming. It would appear, however, that a continued
emphasis on pursuing the VCI by dedicated GVN forces (which are substantial)
and the continued demonstration of GVN resolve to neutralize the effectiveness
of the Viet Cong will achieve a greater change in the apathy quotient than
would agonizing over whether or not the VCI really wear black hats or
white. The GVN cannot tolerate local accommodation at this time any more
than it could previously; and the way to combat determination on the part
of the VC is to show an equal determination to eliminate them. Whether
this elimination is achieved through death, discredit, imprisonment or
merely public identification is a matter to be determined by the operational
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necessities of the war. It is clear, however, that given the present goals
and strength of the VC, the GVN cannot achieve its objectives by officially
or institutionally sharing with local rural officials any private apprehensions
of senior Saigon leaders regarding possible reprisals by the VC. If we
must introduce analogies to the U. S. crime problem, consider the
effectiveness of our police force if district attorneys felt as intimidated
as shopkeepers.
IV. Suggested Reappraisal
8. All programs in South Vietnam should be reappraised; not
periodically, but continuously. The Phoenix program is not and should
not be an exception.
9. Criteria for reappraisal, however, are not insignificant. There
are two distinct sets of criteria which can be applied to such a re-evaluation.
One relates to the degree to which a program is achieving its goals; the
other, to the degree to which the program goals are relevant or desirable.
10. On the basis of information available thus far, there does not
seem to be evidence that the Phoenix program is not meeting its goals --
given some current margin of shortfall which should be offset by an
acknowledgment of the impact of program momentum. Therefore it would
appear that the principal criteria on which we should base any reappraisal
of Phoenix should be the evaluation of that program's goals in the light of
the total current situation in South Vietnam.
11. There is certainly merit in examining the possiblity of gradually
emphasizing police and juridicial actions at the expense of those conducted
under the more summary forms of martial law. However, it is probably
a truism that such a substitution must be timed to meet the environmental
variables. To apply constitutional law at Khe Sanh or at Ben Het would
seem to be folly. The record of the U. S. Government during our own Civil
War or the British during World War II constitute but two examples of the
easily demonstrable fact that governments far more deeply rooted in
traditions of constitutional legality than South Vietnam accept almost
unquestioningly the need to bend, suspend or waive the rules when survival
is at stake. While the Vietnamese Assembly, the Saigon press, and some
sectors of international and U. S. opinion frequently choose to ignore it,
there is a war going on in South Vietnam. The ultimate decision of how to
balance the necessary degree of violent justice with constitutional justice
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must rest with the GVN. We can advise our Vietnamese allies, cajole
them, and assist them in this decision, but in the end it must be theirs.
Most importantly, given the political environment, the Paris talks, the
military situation, and the propensity for local accommodation, the delicate
balance between military, paramilitary, and civilian actions that the GVN
must choose will very likely be one of the most significant factors
influencing the future course of the war.
12. The problem of balance is not restricted to the GVN. It would
be a simple matter to obtain from some ARVN officer an opinion that the
VC are going to win; a simple matter to elicit from a village chief the
opinion that his district chief is corrupt. The question remains: is this
the dominant form of behavior and opinion in South Vietnam. If it truly is,
then we should not waste the time reappraising the Phoenix program but
should withdraw all of our forces and support immediately. If this is not
the dominant attitude, however, we can, and should, take steps to alter the
attitudes of those whose support we cannot count on. Wavering GVN officials
can be replaced; committed GVN officials can be encouraged and their
enthusiasm spread; and we can insure that at least in the areas of GVN
influence the nature of the enemy is known and discredited.
V. The VCI Turnaround
13. The question of GVN prisoner accounting, jail procedures, and
the ultimate return of "neutralized" to their scene of operations is a
serious one that is the subject of current discussions between the U. S. and
GVN authorities. Perhaps the principal cause of the problem has been the
lack of detention facilities -- a problem not unknown in the United States.
It is hoped that resources can be found to allocate to this problem, but
it must be kept in mind that with the U. S. withdrawal, major military
questions are being put to the GVN and spare resources -- both money and
human -- are not going to be easily found.
VI. The Anatomical Analogy
14. To go for the head instead of the body may not be either practical
or, necessarily, the most efficient way of attacking the VCI. Certainly,
the intelligence required to identify and neutralize the "heads" (since there
are obviously more than one) comes from the rather tedious roundup of
low-level types. Additionally, it may be that the analogy itself is misleading.
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In an organization as idologically dedicated as the PRP, it may well be
easier to find heads than bodies, particularly after a long period of attrition.
While unquestionably it is more disruptive to an organization to have high-
level cadre roped in or eliminated than to have a larger number of low-
level operatives neutralized, it is also true that in operations which are
police-like in nature, high-level intelligence depends on low-level
intelligence. Significantly, the ultimate disruption of a tightly-knit
organization is not to martyr the head but to dismember the body; that is,
to deny to the high-level leaders the capacity to use the manpower resources
of the country to further their ends.
VII. Phoenix as a Political Weapon
15. There is a very real danger that the intelligence (information)
coordinating capabilities of the Phoenix organization could be used in an
undesirable way as a means of political elimination. It should be noted,
however, that Phoenix did not create this potential, it merely enhanced it
as a by-product of increased efficiency. As was the case in the issue of
political apathy, however, this situation is not unique to Phoenix but is
common to all programs in South Vietnam. The type of safeguards that we
can provide are truly a function of the degree of influence which we hold
over the GVN, and while GVN decisions in this matter (among others) have
the potential for creating current or future embarrassment for the U.S.,
it is important to remember: (a) that we cannot live the Vietnamese lives
for them, and (b) the use of military and economic power for political ends
is not unique to the Phoenix organization. Only a continuing emphasis and
insistence on a balance of political stability and minority rights throughout
all of our programs in South Vietnam can ensure that U. S. assistance is not
used to create a new form of tyranny. On the other hand, an inefficient
GVN will stand little chance of staving off the tyranny the Vietnamese
Communist Party seeks to impose over all of Vietnam.
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QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS OF THE PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG PROGRAM
The overall war in South Vietnam, as well as the
Phoenix program, is a mixture of quantitative and qual-
itative aspects. This dichotomy is not unique; it is
characteristic of all social phenomena and, signifi-
cantly, of all attempts to measure change or progress
in these phenomena.
The more remote that the evaluation or measure-
ment process is from the actual events of change the
greater the requirements for comparability in informa-
tion and, in most cases, this requirement takes the
form of a demand for quantitative reporting. To a
certain degree, qualitative aspects of an event can
be translated into quantative terms--this, for example,
is the rationale of reporting high-level versus low-
level VCI neutralized--but as is the case in most
translations something is lost. The quantification
process does provide Washington analysts and decision
makers with a greater insight into overall program
performance, but it should be remembered that it is
at best an approximation that is of most value for re-
mote viewers of the situation. A district chief does
not need a historical data series to tell him how well
the Phoenix program is going in his area but the pro-
gram manager in Saigon needs such a data series in
order to make each district report comparable in form
to each other district report.
The program goals of Phoenix are stated in
quantitative terms primarily for purposes of informa-
tion compatability. In this respect they are hi hl ,
but not totally arbitrary; there is no certainty that
the achievement of these goals will bring about a
termination of the war on a specific date. Based on
a conservative extrapolation of the 1968-1969 data on
total VCI neutralized, however, it appears that the
results for 1969 will lie between 95% and 105% of the
program goals of 1800 VCI per month. This range would
strongly suggest that the quantitative goals fairly ac-
curately reflected capability projections and were
not merely conjured up by Saigon public relations
types. The fact that projected year-end results of
the Phoenix program will be close to the quantitative
program goals is not sufficient information on which
to base a program evaluation. Noting that more
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stringent criteria were imposed on the definition of
VCI after the establishment of
suggests that the program is actually grfor, ngwsom -
what more effectively than the y uantming some-
data would indicate. gross quantitative
From a qualitative standpoint
of the data becomes more difficult, ptaeticuerrrytanion
its highly aggregated form available ianWashington1
However, the increasing percentage of district and
higher VCI being netted by the
table) would indicate that from paoqualitativetstand-
point the Phoenix program is being increasingly
effective against higher-level VCI. Perhaps more
importantly, the overall ratio of approximately 1:4
for high to low level VCI being neutralized would
not seem to be particularly good prima facie evidence
that only low-level types are being most certainly not clear that attemptsttokpush thiss
ratio further in "avor of high-level types would
be in the best interests of our attack on the in-
frastructure. Firstly, there is the
which level of cadre are at this timeeasierntofre-
g
place by the VC; the ultimate impact on VC recruitin
may be felt more strongly by Phoenix's rounding up g
of low-level types. Secondly, of higher-level cadre that are netted is simultaneousl
a cause and an effect of their morale, it would ae
very likely y
that continued attacks on their resourcesr
is a necessary adjunct to reducing their morale.
One measure of the morale aspects involves the
relationship between the Phoenix program and the
Chieu Hoi program; one that must in a
at least be expressed quantitativel Th e ggT e te to terms
by which this relationshi r chnique
of the h this p is measured is a by-product
of the accounting, techniques established at the onset of
the Phoenix program itself. Just as the increasing
complexity of commercial transactions
and
sity of establishing income for a particular the
timces-
period produced the double-entrybookeeing sste
the need for a measure of progress bookeeping acm,
against the VCI produced theaccounting hsystem cur-
rently used by USMACV.
is dependent on many The fact that this attack
programs in South Vietnamrislnotddenied b by y and
dcivil
managers. On the contrary, the very e ependex
of these programs and their relationship to the VCle
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was the rationale for the development of Phoenix in
the first place. In the attached tables may be found
a functional breakout of the VCI that have been
neutralized during 1968 and 1969. Included in these
tables is a historical perspective of the percentage
of VCI neutralized that originate in the Chieu Hoi
program. The fact that this percentage is rising,
however, suggests that the Phoenix program, along with
others, is operating with more rather than less ef-
fectiveness. The prospect of entering the Chieu Hoi
program is a far more appealing alternative than being
rounded up in a military or police net. The evidence
that an increasing percentage of VCI are choosing this
alternative would appear to be a credit to the Phoenix
organization rather than a criticism.
The Phoenix program is organizational rather than
operational in nature and related rather than supplan-
tive to other programs in South Vietnam. As such,
while the numbers and quality of VCI neutralized are
relevant to Phoenix program effectiveness, the means
or program by which the neutralization takes place
is not. Thus, the percentage of VCI neutralized by
dint of Phoenix-initiated actions is relevant to local
management but not particularly relevant to Washington-
level analysis. From a quantitative data standpoint,
the prime production responsibility of Phoenix is
to establish a data base which indicates the extent
of the infrastructure and to identify and quantify
on a periodic basis changes in this data base. The
phenomenon that. changes to this liability account occur
through the results of Chieu Hoi, police operations,
or, for that matter, natural death is not a directly
relevant statistic in evaluating Phoenix program
effectiveness.
The terms Phoenix and Phung Hoang are not totally
synonymous. It. is part of the Vietnamization process
that Phung Hoang--the Vietnamese input--will ultimately
replace Phoenix, the US input. To the degree that
this process of Vietnamization can be measured by
official decrees and enthusiasm, it would appear that'
it is progressing fairly satisfactorily. The noise
level that the program produces in the Vietnamese
legislative branch and the apathy that the program
faces at local levels, however, are indeed hurdles
which must be faced. To a major extent, however,
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these problems are highly qualitative and subjective
in nature and are not reflected in any quantative data
available currently. While it is conceivable that the
slow growth of the Phoenix program in 1969 could be
traced to qualitative variables such as these, the
volatile nature of the data series cannot. Signifi-
cantly, the increasing rate of VCI neutralizations
suggests that while these problems may well exist they
do not exist in sufficient magnitude to determine the
course of the attack against the VCI itself.
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VCI INPUT TO THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM
AND CHIEU HOI INPUT TO THE PHOENIX PROGRAM
Percent of Total 1./
VCI Neutralized Percent of Chieu Hoi
1968 by Rallying That Were VCI
JAN 26.6 38.5
FEB 9.4 38.0
MAR 5.5 81.3
APR 8.8 22.4
MAY 7.6 36.3
JUN 10.4 43.8
JUL 13.3 25.8
AUG 16.5 33.9
SEP 17.1 39.9
OCT 17.0 39.0
NOV 15.6 50.3
DEC 19.8 51.0
JAN 15.3 35.6
FEB 18.7 29.9
MAR N.A. N.A.
APR 20.4 22.8
MAY 22.2 24.1
JUN 22.5 27.5
JUL 23.5 16.9
AUG 25.0 24.6
1./ Does not include military (Hoi Chanh) ralZiers.
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VCI NEUTRALIZATION BY CATEGORY - 1968-69
Killed
Captured
Rallied
Total
JAN
48
310
130
488
FEB
91
398
51
540
MAR
150
1099
74
1323
APR
183
997
115
1295
MAY
146
1028
97
1271
JUN
93
947
121
1161
*JUL
149
970
172
1291
AUG
152
780
185
1117
SEP
123
806
192
1121
OCT
270
940
249
1459
NOV
409
1563
366
2338
DEC
441
1452
470
2372
TOTAL 1968
2,255
11,290
2,231
15,776
JAN
542
1483
368
2393
**FEB
376
624
230
1230
MAR
1481
APR
557
871
367
1795
MAY
462
674
326
1462
JUN
475
565
303
1343
JUL
666
703
421
1790
AUG
598
783
458
1839
*'GVN PHOENIX Directive Signed 1 JuZy 1968
**More stringent, US-GVN approved identification criteria
were applied for the first time to February 1969 neutrali-
zation reports.
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 VCI NETTTRALIZATION BY CATEGORY 1968-69
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VCI NEUTRALIZATION BY LEVEL - 1968-69
Hamlet and District and % of District
Tillage- Province and Province
JAN
404
84
17
2
FEB
463
77
.
14.2
MAR
1232
91
6.9
APR
1139
156
12
0
MAY
1070
201
.
15.'8
JUN
904
257
22.1
JUL
1132
156
12.1
AUG
984
133
11.9
SEP
773
384
33.1
OCT
1131
328
22.5
NOV
1843
233
11.2
DEC
1884
228
10.8
TOTAL 1968
12,959
2,328
JAN
1855
532
22
0
FEB
1040
190
.
15
4
MAR
1200
281
.
19
0
APR
1491
304
.
16.9
MAY
1185
277
18.9
JUN
1043
300
22
3
JUL
1394
396
.
22.1
AUG
1408
431
23.4
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H D D
J F M A M, .,.., ~.w A .. ... .. -T-M--A- -~M ., ~.:' .
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1968
1969
VCI NEUTRALIZATION BY LEVEL - 1968-69