THE VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE: ITS STATUS AND EFFECTIVENESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R001100050006-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 58
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 4, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
4 Juno 1971
TGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Viet Cong Infrastructure:_
Its Status and Effectiveness
Suramary.
The most critical struggles in South Vietnam
during the past. two years have been those waged
daily at the grass roots levels. The Communists
have not been trying to drive the government's
military and security forces from the field, nor
have their tactics been aimed at altering the bal-
ance of forces in the countryside in the near term.
Instead, the enemy has been trying to hold on, to
stay in contact with the people, and to rebuild
local support structures and forces. The main
Conanunist objective has been to keep an apparatus
intact and ready to mount a mere serious challenge
to the GVN after the bulk of US forces has been
withdrawn.
The Communists have accomplished much less
with these tactics than they hoped. Until now
trends have continued to run against them in most
rountry and they still seem to be
losing more capable cadre than are being replaced.
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The process is too slow, however, to disable the
most vital parts of the Communist apparatus in the
next few years. Thus, for the forseeable future
there will be Communist cadre with dedication,
administrative know-how, and command experience
operating throughout South Vietnam.
What those hard-core cadre can do now is severe-
ly limited by the massive allied forces arrayed
against them. But allied abilities to contain enemy
activities and to maintain the security that has
been established depend heavily on continued aggres-
sive government operations. If these operations
falter, or if they are offset by rising enemy acti-
vity, the Communists will be able to rebuild faster.
The withdrawal of American forces and the like-
lihood that more North Vietnamese manpower will be
committed to the war suggest that the threat to the
GVN will grow during the next year or so. The with-
drawal of US forces from parts of MRs 1 and 2 has
already created hard-to-fill gaps in allied security
and allowed the Communists to operate more freely.
It is too early and the evidence is too sketchy to
conclude that the Communists are on the road to
recovery in these two regions. But if North Viet-
nam pumps in more manpower and military units 'during
the next year or so--as seems likely--Saigon will
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be hard pressed to maintain the degree of control
it now has over the people and the Communist appara-
tus is likely to enter a period of resurgence.
Government gains probably are more durable in
the Mekong Delta and in MR-3, but even in these re-
gions the Communists retain considerable strength
in some areas. If enemy main force units return
from Cambodia or if there is a marked decline in the
effectiveness and aggressiveness of government
forces--as has happened in some places--the Commu-
nists will become more active and security will
deteriorate. Moreover, if there should be a severe
loss of confidence in the government, perhaps
caused by fear of a precipitous
or by a falling out among South
end to US support
Vietnam's top mill-
,
tary commanders, there will be a Communist apparatus
available with the talent and organization to ex-
ploit both political and military opportunities.
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The Problem and this Memorandum's Approach
1. The erosion of Communist strength and the
decline in the effectiveness of the Viet Cong's
grass roots apparatus have been basic trends in
much of South Vietnam during the past three years.
Communist forces are simply not able to muster the
kind of manpower and material resources from the
countryside that they could in earlier years. Yet
a countrywide enemy apparatus is intact--if not
always in place--and with continued material and
manpower support from North Vietnam, the Communists
remain strong contenders for power. Indeed, over
the past six months or so, the evidence suggests
that the Communists are having some success in im-
proving the effectiveness of their apparatus. This
stems in part from the inability of the South Viet-
namese in some areas to maintain effective security
as US forces depart. Without US forces nearby,
the Communists are often able to take advantage of
persistent GVN weaknesses...
2. This memorandum attempts to assess recent
trends in the portion of the Communist apparatus in
South Vietnam known as the Viet Cong infrastructure
(VCI). The views expressed here are largely impres-
sionistic; they are derived primarily from immersion
in the reporting from South Vietnam and not from
any of the data series used to measure the progress
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of allied programs. Allied strength figures for
the VCI are so soft and the criteria for them so
fluid that any conclusions based mainly on numbers
are apt to be misleading. Thus, the memorandum
does not concentrate on the numerical strength of
the VCI, but on the current effectiveness of the
apparatus and its potential ability to influence
the situation.
The Conceptual- Framework: What is a VCI?
3, All methods for taking the measure of the
Vietnamese Communists are imperfect, and sizing up
the so-called Viet Cong infrastructure is especially
difficult. The term itself is a problem. The Com-
munists do not use it to describe any part of their
bureaucracy. Infrastructure is an American term for
the command and control organization that provides
guidance, sustenance, and certain specialized ser-
vices to the overall Communist effort in South Viet-
nam. Members of the apparatus often perform mili-
tary duties, and some of their main jobs--terrorism,
extortion, and armed propaganda--depend heavily on
the use or threat of violence.
- 4. But the primary mission of the VCI is not
combat or even direct combat support. Most people
we consider members of the VCI earn this distinction
because they engage in activities that constitute
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essential underpinning for all Communist operations
in South Vietnam. They provide political and mili-
tary direction, they administer, they recruit, they
conduct subversive and intelligence operations, and
they collect funds and supplies. They are the
Communist party members, political activists, agita-
tors, and organizers whose talents and motivation
have enabled. the Communists to persist for so many
years. When these people do their jobs well, the
Communists are able to fight more effectively in
South Vietnam. But when the support structure has
been weakened and the VCI is ineffective, as it
often has been in recent years, the enemy's capabil-
ities are much more dependent on men .and material
from North Vietnam.
5. Except in those few areas of South Vietnam.
where the Communists maintain physical control,
the apparatus generally operates clandestinely.
But it usually can be identified by function, if
not by personality, because of the highly structured
bureaucracy the Viet Cong have built and maintain.
6. Even a short time spent perusing enemy
documents can convey a strong notion of the perva-
siveness of the Communist organization. It extends
downward through sjx basic cchelonc:,--COSVN, region
province, district, village, and hamlet. At each
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level (at least in theory) there is a steering
committee and organizations responsible for such
varied tasks as finance, public health, propaganda,
security, and manpower recruitment. At the district
levels and above, committees and agencies are or-
ganized quite rigidly and they usually are manned
by full-time personnel. In the villages and ham-
lets, the organization is loose, more often staffed
by part-timers, and usually does not include all
components. In fact, local Communist functionaries
in today's South Vietnam often are unable to reside
in or even enter the areas of their nominal juris-
diction.
Why the Numbers Are Misleading
7. The allied Phoenix/Phung Hoang program
aimed at rooting out the VCI defines its target to
include all members or probationary members of the
Vietnamese Communist party and those nonparty
people who perform a "cadre function." The con-
cept focuses on leadership or key personnel, but
.in practice almost anyone who is identified working
regularly and voluntarily for the party or a front
group at any echelon can be picked up in statistics
used by the Phung Hoang organization.
8. The current Phung Hoang estimate of the
size of the Viet Cong infrastructure throughout
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South Vietnam is around 68,000. This is an unreal-
istic portrayal of the extent of the organized Com-
munist apparatus because it excludes so many low-
level and part-time people who work for the Commu-
nists. Moreover, it does not take account of
,enough clandestine Communist personnel assets, in-
cluding penetrations of South Vietnamese government,
military, and security agencies, or those who
have legal cover and can live safely and work co-
vertly under the eye of South Vietnamese security
authorities. Most persons in these categories are
not likely to be included in allied estimates of
the VCI.
9. But while Phung Hoang estimates may be
too conservative in some respects, they also suf-
fer from double counting and unrealistic extrapola-
tions based on Communist organization charts.
Moreover, just as some South Vietnamese officials
minimize the strength of the 'VCI, others tend to
. exaggerate the number of hard-core cadre they face.
10. Showing numerical trends in VCI strength
from year to year is even more hazardous than pin-
ing down the size of the apparatus at any one time.
Estimates range upwards from 80,000 for the mid-
1960's through the first half of 1969; they were
over 70,000 in early 1970; and they were just under
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70,000 during the past year. Yet definitions and
accounting procedures have changed so frequently in
the past six years that these statistics are not
comparable and do not adequately reflect trends.
11. Similarly, Phung Hoang estimates of VCI
members killed, captured, or defected cannot be
directly related to the total VCI strength esti-
mates. Nearly 20,000 VCI were reported neutralized
in these ways in 1969, over 20,000 in 1970, and the
rate reported this year is even higher. These
figures include people improperly identified, de-
fectors who still work for the Communists, and
individuals who are subsequently released and re-
turn to enemy ranks. Furthermore, many key persons
in the Communist command set-up obviously die or
desert without over being included in the neutrali-
zation data.
12. Thus, while Phung Hoang statistics are a
necessary tool for those concerned with the allied
countersubversion effort in South Vietnam, they
are inadequate for analyzing trends in Viet Cong
capabilities. Individual provinces figures help
measure the extent of the enemy's cadre and support
structure, and the numbers often parallel conclu-
sions reached in more subjective ways. But sharp
fluctuations in some provinces from time to time
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indicate that: the margin for local error is quite
large--so large, in fact, as to undercut almost any
national projections.
Trends in VCI Performance and Policies
_ ..
13. Whatever its numerical strength, the Com-
munist apparatus clearly was hurt badly during the
three years following the 1968 offensives. Indeed,
its effectiveness probably has been curtailed in
some parts of South Vietnam even more than is sug-
gested by trends in Phung Hoang statistics. Com-
munist documents, prisoners, and defectors provide
persuasive evidence for this conclusion. These
sources show convincingly that in most parts of the
country the capabilities of the apparatus have been
eroded, even in areas that remain Communist strong-
holds and where the government's position is at
best precarious.
14. The loss of cadre has been heaviest at
the lower levels, of course, but district and even
province organizations have felt the pressures
caused by losing good chiefs and long-time fol-
lowers. Key people who know their jobs and know
the territory simply cannot be replaced as readily
as before. Heavy personnel losses and the increas-
ing difficulty of recruiting the best young men of
the villages make it harder to fill vacancies simply
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by promotions. Any good cadre who is promoted is
likely to leave another hard-to-fill vacancy and
- thus reduce the quality of the apparatus down the
line.
15. Many Communist political and administra-
tive leaders lost their lives during the 1968 of-
fensives, and many others have died in the day-to-
day combat since 1968. With large numbers of small
actions the order of the day on both sides, local-
level cadre often find themselves exposed to bat-
tle. Military action remains the biggest factor
in the erosion of the Viet Cong's apparatus. A
fair number of cadre at the village and hamlet lev-
els get killed or captured while on military opera-
tions, but very few provincial or even distrlict
officials regularly run the risks involved in mili-
tary assignments. These higher level people are
the prime targets of the Phung Hoang anti-infra-
structure effort; capturing or killing them gener-
ally requires better intelligence and police work
than is the rule in South Vietnam today.
16. Because the Communists put a premium on
preserving key personnel to carry on the struggle
many provincial and district committees set up
housekeeping in base areas or keep on the luove
from safehaven to safehaven. Provincial level
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cadre; in particuLar, generally staypermanently
beyond the reach of government forces targeted
against them. At district level and below, indivi-
duals and committees are more likely to move about
in order to facilitate contact with their various
subordinates and to avoid being detected. Where
government presence is massive and where local
government leadership is aggressive, the Communists
often are obliged to keep their committees moving
quite regularly. This makes communications between
individuals and agencies more difficult and reduces
operational effectiveness.
17. At the village level, the government's
manifold operations have inflicted real and serious
damage on the Communist structure in many areas by
separating it from the people. Cadre at this level
must be present to provide leadership and motiva-
tion, and to inspire fear or respect in order to
obtain local support. If they are not in place,
they must rely on less vulnerable--and probably
less effective--agents to do some of their jobs
for them. Cadre working in the village and hamlet
organizations must spot the government official
targeted for assassination, mark his movement, and
plan and supervise the murder. It is at the village
level and in the hamlets that taxes must actually
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be collected, 'Ghat people must be organized, propa-
gandized, and proselyted, and that new personnel
must be recruited. As long as the Communists try
to build up their support among the people and to
draw sustenance from them, they must operate among
the people. No matter how good their clandestine
techniques and their skills at subversion, their
type of war cannot be fought by correspondence.
18. The Viet Cong face a bleak situation in
some parts of South Vietnam today, but in most of
the country they retain at least a foothold amongst
the people and in some key areas their strength and
influence rivals or even outweighs the government's.
Soon after trends in the fighting and the govern-
ment's pacification effort began to move strongly
against them in late 1968 and early 1969, the Com-
munists took steps to stem the tide and to conserve
-their strength as much as possible for the long
road they saw ahead. Their, general counter-
strategy was aimed at preserving those parts of
their apparatus that would be hardest to replace--
including hard-core cadre of the VCI--maintaining
contact with the people as much as possible, and at
the same time nibbling away at the government's
pacification assets.
19. In mid-1969, after trying one more coor-
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dinated offensive involving many main force combat
units, the Communists began to scale down their
military efforts, to stress small-unit action and
the need for guerrilla forces, and to rely heavily
on hit-and-run attacks and terrorism. These mea-
sures were accompanied by a sharp cutback in the
southward flow of North Vietnamese manpower and the
breaking down of some regiments and battalions in
order to strengthen local forces. Many Communist
documents and press articles stressed the fundamen-
tals of a "people's war" in which secure base areas,
sound organization, and healthy working relation-
ships with the local populace are paramount.
20. For the Viet Cong apparatus in South
Vietnam, the watchwords became subversion, terror-
ism, self-sufficiency, and political agitation.
Many cadre formerly engaged in other tasks were
assigned to a special military proselyting campaign
aimed at subverting South Vietnamese forces and
infiltrating their ranks with the Communist agents.
Similarly, the Communists began to stress the need
to develop so-called legal cadre--party members
or party agents with the status and credentials to
survive and to operate clandestinely in the growing
areas under at ledst nominal GVN control.
21. The loss of their supply channel through
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Sihanoukville, the political turnabout in Cambodia,
and subsequent allied cross-border operations
prompted the Communists in the southern half of
South Vietnam to redouble efforts to achieve the
greatest possible level of self-sufficiency. The
local apparatus was enjoined to grow food, to en--
gage in conm-teraial ventures, to conserve and to
capture weapons and ammunition, and to work out
ways to secure supplies from South Vietnamese
sources.
22. In recent months the Communists have
put more energy into developing assets in urban
areas in the hope of infiltrating and influencing
non-Communist opposition elements agitating against
the government. They certainly do not call all
the shots in these circles, and their attempts to
inspire more agitation frequently are feckless,
but they clearly see opportunities to fan fires
prompted by war weariness, economic grievances, and
anti-American sentiment. These efforts probably
will grow during the next few months, if only be-
cause the Communists wish. to avoid being left on
the sidelines during the political ferment of an
election year.
2:1. The tactics Hanoi adopted in 1969 were
not intended to produce trends favorable to the
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Communists immediately. They. were aimed at heading
off still heavier manpower losses, maintaining the
integrity of the countryside apparatus, and putting
the Communists in a strong position for the strug-
gle they expect to ensue following the departure
of US combat forces.
24. Two years of these tactics have had very
mixed results. Hanoi probably is chagrined at the
extent to which South Vietnamese forces have taken
over security duties, kept pressure on the Commu-
nists, and restricted their abilities to operate.
Similarly, the loss of supply and sanctuary arrange-
ments in Cambodia have undercut the enemy military
threat to much of South Vietnam and thus reduced
the effectLveness of the course Hanoi chose j,n
1969. Communist manpower losses have remained
fairly high, and a substantial flow of North Viet-
namese troops has not halted the decline in enemy
force levels nor made up for the loss of capable
southern cadre.
25. The results of Communist subversive
efforts are far more difficult to measure because
successful subversion usually goes undetected.
Enemy troop proselyters clearly have had some suc-
cess; roughly one third of SOKLe 70 South Vienami.o.
outposts overrun in the delta so far this year fell
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because of Communist agents in the rants of local
security forces. Many more enemy assets doubtless
are at work within the far-flung South Vietnamese
government and security apparatus. Because of the
time, energy, and talent going into the enemy sub-
versive effort, it is only prudent to assume some
measure of success. Yet it is equally clear that
in the kind of hostile environment they encounter
in much of South Vietnam today, Communist subver-
sive operations are often likely to fall flat.
26. The extent to which. the Communists have
successfully outfitted their apparatus with legal
cover is equally difficult to judge. The "legal
cadre" theme has been so prominent in enemy tacti-
cal directives that, given the quality of most
South Vietnamese countersubversive efforts, there
is every reason to believe that thousands of Com-
munists have successfully survived and now operate
under such cover. But there are problems inherent
in these so-called legal activities. Communist
sources acknowledge that keeping a tight party rein
on "legal" personnel assets frequently is difficult
and that a taste of a softer life and urban ameni-
ties dilutes the revolutionary zeal of even hard-
core party members. Moreover, it is one thing to
send a man from the jungles to take cover in a city
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and quite another to recruit new assets who already
have legal cover.
27. The evidence suggests the Viet Cong re-
cruiter has a much more difficult time making his
pitch effective today than he did a few years ago.
That he can usually make it and not get turned in
to government authorities may contribute to Commu-
nist confidence about the longer term prospects.
But while people's willingness to tolerate Commu-
nists in their midst-enables the Viet Cong appara-
tus to survive, the enemy needs cooperation and
active support to make many operations work.
28. Communist self-sufficiency programs have
had considerable success in South Vietnam because
they thrive on the apathy and venality of many
government officials. The reporting from South
Vietnam is rife with examples of successful self-
sufficiency operations. Through bribes, intimidation,
and the connivance of a few people in key spots,
the Communists often are able to tap legitimate
GVN sources to secure the goods and services they
need to survive. In most of the country theyare
a long way from achieving the kind of self-
sustaining insurency they enjoyed in earlier years,
but they do seem to have the moans to enable them
to keep waging an inconclusive but still viable
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struggle.
29. So far we have tried to generalize about
the state of the Viet Cong apparatus in South Viet-
nam. Our conclusions generally have shown the
Communists losing ground and the government grad-
ually making headway in the countryside. But there
'is no single "situation" in South Vietnam; the
state of the enemy apparatus is different in each
of the four military regions, and the variations
are even more pronounced as one looks at individual
provinces. The following sections examine the
current condition and activities of the VCI in
each of the four military regions. Unlike the
general comments, these sections focus on recent
trends and on problem areas where the Communists
remain strong and where enemy activities are likely
to be most troublesome in the future.
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Military Region 1: An Uncertain Future
30. Overall trends in local Communist activity
in Military Region I were clearly favorable to the
government until a few months ago. The main force
war subsided after mid-1969, and this allowed allied
forces to contain and in some places to root out an
entrenched and pervasive Viet Cong apparatus. South
Vietnamese forces and strong, active American. ground
units saturated the 20-mile wide coastal strip
straddling Route 1 where most of the people in the
region live. The Viet Cong were simply ground down
by allied operations, and they were held down by a
thick blanket of territorial security forces.
31. Under these conditions the Communist
apparatus concentrated on survival, on rebuilding
its strength, and on avoiding allied forces as best
it could. The VCI in much of the coastal strip
found the going too tough and took flight into the
hills. Allied gains were by no means uniform or
complete. They were greatest in the two northern
provinces where the enemy apparatus is less firmly
rooted and no longer very effective. The three
southern provinces still contain some of the most
formidable concentrations of Viet Cong strength in
the country, and progress there is more limited and
less durable.
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32, By late: 1970 government pacification forces
had reached out about as far as they could in some
places in MR-1; ahead lay the foothills and longtime
VC strongholds that contained few people but that
could be overcome only with great difficulty., In
other areas, allied gains rested largely on American
ground combat forces, and US troops were pulling out.
In still other places, Viet Cong resistance stiffened
and the GVN lost some of its former momentum.
33. The allies retain the upper hand in MR-1,
but the Viet Cong are a long way from being rendered
ineffective. Moreover, the departure of more US units
and the possibility of North Vietnam pumping in more
forces during the coming months make for a very un-
certain future. There already are signs that the
local Communist apparatus has more room to maneuver.
More important, the Viet Cong retain deep-seated support
that has enabled them to persist under the strongest
challenge the al:Lies could mount against them. In
all probability, the Communists anticipate the going
will be less difficult from now on because the US
combat role is ending.
34. Northernmost Quang Tri Province is, of couse,
constantly exposed to the threat of North Vietnamese
military power. In the past two years there has
been steady progress against the local Viet Cong
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apparatus, in part because enemy main forces have
been kept at bay,. Viet Cong activities were stifled
by saturation operations run against them in the
coastal areas. Late last year government officials
claimed with good reason. that the Viet Cong apparatus
no longer functioned effectively in Quang Tri. City
.and most of the coastal districts. Viet Cong hamlet
and village committees were said to have fled entirely
from three districts into the hills to the west.
The province committee remained in the foothills
where it has been for years.
35. Trends during the first part of this year
have been less encouraging. Many ARVN units and
some US forces that provided security to Quang Tri
were committed to Operation LAM SON 719 from. late
January through late March. This caused redeployment
and thinning out of the blanket of territorial
...security forces at a time when Viet Cong activities
were on the rise. There was a?marked increase in
overt Viet Cong activities?terrorism, tax collection,
food gathering, and hamlet entries. American
officers say the Communists appeared populated areas
in greater numbers and with greater frequency than
in many months.
36,. The enemy upsurge in Quang Tri did not last ,
but it suggests that many localities still harbor
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Communist cadre and that the apparatus is capable of
rebounding if the South Vietnamese fail to keep the
pressure on. The province chief estimates that
around a third of the people would cast their lot
with the Viet Cong if given a free choice and that the
rest of the population now supports the GVN. This may
be only a rough guess, but so much residual support
for the Communists could be critical if security
deteriorates; the province chief expects it will
because US forces are withdrawing.
37. The VCI in Thua Thien Province has been
hurt badly since 1968. Aggressive allied operations
forced Communist military units back into the foothills,
dislodged parts of the local apparatus, and drove the
rest of it deeper underground. Bitterness over
Communist activities in the Hue area during the 1968
Tet offensive contributed substantially to the enemy's
decline.
38. Last year the Communists had trouble just,
surviving. in many areas along the coast. Some main
force units apparently were split up to help local
Viet Cong forces rebuild their apparatus. The VCI
was so depleted in three districts that the Communists
tic
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had to borrow people from neighboring districts to
launch a terrorist campaign in the lowlands. Contact
between the Viet Cong along the coast and Communist
forces in central and western Thua Thien was sorely
disrupted. Communist cadre who stayed in government
controlled territory had to hide or attempt to go
"legal." South Vietnamese officials say they were
unable to develop solid information on the VCI
during the last quarter of 1970; their security
services had no information on the VC province
committee and knew little about recent activities
of district committees. With the exception of
periodic sabotage against the Hue-Da Nang railroad--
an easy and inviting target--the Viet Cong in Thua
Thien seemed to do little more than protect and
consolidate what assets they retained.
39. ARVN and US redeployments connected with
LAM SON719 weakened security markedly in Thua
Thien and the Communists reacted accordingly. When
Regional Force units were moved west to the security
screen in the piedmont, territorial forces back
in the lowlands faced 'a sharp increase in Viet Cong
activity. Enemy-initiated incidents in the lowlands
were up 70 percent in March over February; terrorism
was at its highest level in two years. Abductions,
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propaganda and food collection efforts went up too,
especially after local enemy forces were told they
could expect little outside help because of the need
to counter the South Vietnamese drive into Laos.
40. The upsurge in Viet Cong activity has not
lasted and did not in itself threaten. Thua Thien's
standing among the most secure provinces in South
Vietnam. As in Quang Tri, the future in Thua Thien
will turn on how well the South Vietnamese can
adjust to US troop withdrawals and keep the pressure
on the Communists. Saigon's forces are likely to
have their hands full if the North Vietnamese decide
to bring more military units back to Thua Thien in
the next year or so.
41. US ground combat forces have bee/1 essential
to keeping the Communists in check in Quang Nam
province. Since they arrived there in 1965, .American
units--helped out to some extent by ARVN and South
Korean regulars--gradually beat down the Viet Cong
apparatus along the coast and generally kept the lid
on enemy main forces. The VCI failed to hold its
own in some places, but a basic organization remained
intact, if not always in place.
42. GVN territorial forces and the civilian
apparatus tarcleted against the VCI have been and
still are overmatched. This judgment is based on
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American officials in Quang Nam, and to a lesser extent
on what has happend in sectors ?recently vacated by
American units. The Communists have reasserted
themselves quickly and convincingly. One is reminded
of a large ship parting the sea as it passes through
and the water closing rapidly when the ship is gone.
43. The catalog of problems facing the ?Viet
Cong while the American presence was overwhelming is
a familiar one: shortages of seasoned cadres
shortages of foodstuffs and materials, difficulties
maintaining contact, and just plain too little elbow
room to operate. Several sources say Communist
influence at the hamlet level waned and that village
committees were not much better off. These grassroots
echelons were said to be floundering because of lack
of direction and supplies from above, because of
.population movement out of areas formerly controlled
by the Viet Cong, and because of constant disruptive
allied military operations.
44. Nonetheless', the Communists have retained
some basic strengths in Quang Nam that enable them
to hang on. The higher echelon-VCI apparatus has
hardly been touched. The VC province committee is
still situated in the hills southwest of Da Nang;
the district cominittees, while not always in their
districts and active, are still intact. One gets
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an impression that a sizeable. VCI organization remains
in and around Da Nang, and that the enemy has had a
fair amount of success in developing "legal" cover
in this area. In the latter half of 1970, several
important VCI in Da Nang were neutralized, including
a good portion of a district-level committee. Accord-
ing to VCI captives, the Communists immediately set
out to reorganize that committee, even though they
had to borrow cadres from other districts.
45. The Communists continue to hold sway over
a significant proportion of Quang Nam's people. The
GVN's province council estimated last October that
little more than half the population could be
counted on to support the GVN in a showdown- In
mid-November, a former mayor of Da Nang estimated
that a third of Quang Nam's militia force would fight
the Communists willingly, another third would avoid
commitment, and the final third would sympathize
with the Communists.
46. Against this kind of challenge, the GVN
does not appear to be blessed with a strong
anti-VCI apparatus. American and Vietnamese
officials alike bemoan the lack of training,
experience, and motivation of the government's
sc.curity force, Me Special Police arc said to
be relatively ineffective below the district level;
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the anti-infrastructure program does not get adequate
support from senior provincial officers and is
hamstrung by politics. ARVN is said to meddle in
civilian affairs in Quang Nam, and local political
considerations (including bitter fights between
various local Dai Viet, VNQDD, and other factions)
are said to affect the deployment of territorial
forces and selection of unit leaders.
47. The departure of US Marine units from
some of the more exposed sectors of Quang Nam has
led to a decline in territorial force effectiveness.
Several provincial officials report that these forces
are less aggressive, that they have adopted a
defensive attitude, and that their fighting power
has diminished in areas where they once fought
'side-by-side with Americans. Security in the
countryside has deteriorated markedly during the
first part of 1971, even where province officials
earlier insisted the Viet Cong could do little more
than harass. The Communists are flexing their
military muscles in districts west of Route 1 and
south of Hoi An, the province capital. Just as
territorial forces have cut back on patrols, some
local civilian officials and security troops are
leaving their posts and sleeping at night in. Hoi An
and Da Nang. This deterioration has been caused more
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by raw Communist military power than by the latent
strength of the VCI. But military attacks give the
local apparatus more room and a better environment in
which to operate, and there is good reason to believe
that Communist fortunes are improving in Quang Nam.
48. Officials in Quang Tin say the VCT has
_
either been uprooted or suffocated from six to nine
miles inland the length of the province, and that
the number of old Viet Minh families has been re-
duced- Last September, however, the province chief
said village committees remained in one third of
Quang Tin's villages, the district committees still
effectively controlled some of the village-level
agencies, and the province committee was intact in
the hills west of Tam Ky, the province capitaA.
Early this year he said the effectiveness of district
committees had been reduced further, and that less
than 10 percent of the villages still had some form
of a Communist organization present. Numbers aside,
the GVN in Quang Tin has indeed set its sights
westward into the piedmont where the VC have been
strong for years, suggesting that the government is
reasonably confident of its gains along the coast.
49. The territorial forces, under the leader.-
ship of an aggressive, imaginative and highly regarded
province chief, have done their job well in Quang Tin.
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The Regional Forces have become the province mobile
units and are mainly deployed in the foothills. The
Popular Forces have become district mobile units
leaving hamlet security solely to militia in much of
the coastal region.
50. There has been a surge of Communist military.
activity by some of Quang Tin's native Viet Cong
battalions in recent months. US Fire Support Base
Mary Ann was devastated in March in an area that
still seems out of reach of durable GVN control.
During the same period, two companies from an enemy
local provincial battalion crossed east of Route 1
for the first time in a year, but were turned back
by GVN territorial defenders. The VC also were active
in some of the GVN's priority pacification areas, but
tfiey did not prevent families from moving back and
re-claiming some land.
51. Quang Tin has yet to be affected signifi-
cantly by US troop withdrawals, although elements of
the Americal Division based at Chu Lai have left the
province from time-to-time for specific tasks. Like
GVN officials in many areas, the province chief said
flatly a few weeks ago that he will not be able to
replace US assistance, particularly in the areas of
helicopters, armor, engineers, artillery and medical
support.
-o
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52. Quang Ngai Province remains an enemy strong-
hold. Government gains are neither as extensive nor
as durable as elsewhere in northern South Vietnam.
The Viet Cong have been on the run in many places and
even run out of some, but Communist influence among
the people of Quang Ngai remains a very real problem.
Security is fragile and does not extend very far
west of Route I nor more than a few miles from dis-
trict towns in the foothills. This is not to say
that'GVN gains are modest; on the contrary, they are
substantial and hard won in a province where 50 to
80 percent of the families are said to have direct
ties to the Viet Cong.
53. Communist sources reflect the kinds of
problems the enemy has encountered in areas thick
with allied troops and civilian infrastructure; VCI
cadres were constantly on the move to avoid detection
and capture; there were chronic food shortages;
personnel replacements were hard to come by, even
from sources that had. served the VC well for many
years; government land clearing operations erased
base areas and places of concealment; some hamlet
committees had no guerrillas; and a large population
flight from VC-controlled areas removed a prime
source of support.
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54. Through it all, the enemy apparatus had had
to function as best it could. The province committee
is in a long-time VC base area and all of the district
committees remain intact, although they are on the
move a good deal of the time. Traffic in foodstuffs
from the coast to main force units in the highlands,
and in munitions from base areas in the hills to
local force and guerrilla units in the lowlands has
been maintained. An effort was undertaken to lace
Quang Ngai city with "legal" cadre for procurement
and as in-place assets for the long haul. The Viet
Cong have also tried hard to subvert South Vietnamese
forces and the government's administrative network.
They clearly have enjoyed some successes in these
endeavors, and their gains may be greater than
allyone can determine at present.
55. The government's anti-VCI effort has been
hampered by political squabbles, by ineptitude, and
by fence-sitting and fear that has persisted after
years of strong Communist influence in Quang Ngai
The province chief is uncertain of the allegiance
of his territorial forces. The top military officer
in Quang Ngai is concerned with VCI operations at
the village level because he thinks some elected
officials are aiding the Conawnists. The province
chief has had trouble getting Saigon's clearance
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for district chiefs he considers incompetent. Village
chiefs are reluctant to identify suspected Communists
for the police because of enemy reprisals.
56. Most observers and statistical indicators
agree that CVN progress slowed appreciably in Quang
Ngai during the latter half of 1970, and that the
security situation has grown worse this year. VC
military activity has been on the rise and has ex-
posed serious weaknesses in the fighting abilities
of the territorial forces. American observers
concluded recently that the success of this year's
westward pacification push depends on whether the
Communists choose to challenge it or not.
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Military Region Chronic Troublespots
57. The strong position the Communists maintain
in Military Region 2 rests on an entrenched apparatus,
and on North Vietnamese military power that is brought
to bear from time to time where the GVN is vulnerable.
The region is very large, ethnically and geographically
diverse, and not very susceptible to generalized con-
clusions. There are two distinct areas in MR-2: the
sparsely populated western highlands inhabited largely
by non-Vietnamese where main force warfare still plays
a significant role in enemy tactics; and the heavily
populated coastal areas where the Communists now rely
mainly on guerrilla action, terror, subversion, and
political action.
58. Although their apparatus has taken a beating
in recent years, the Communists have had considerable
success in holding their own in MR-2. Most of the
population now lives in areas occupied by government
troops and administered by Saigon-appointed officials,
but fairly firm government control extends to barely
half the rural population--less than in any other
region. The Communists thrive on the ineptitude of
many of the government forces arrayed against them.
The territorial forces in MR-2, handicapped by
built in ethnic and geographic problems, are con-
sidered the worst in the country. This is one of
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the prime reasons why the Communists still are able
to operate fairly well in much of MR-2--they simply
are not under as much pressure as they often are
elsewhere.
59. The Viet Cong apparatus clearly has been
separated from the people in many areas, but the
government's hold is often tenuous, the veneer of
popular support for the GVN is thin, and there are
many spots where the Communists still enjoy a good
deal of active support from the people, or where they
can at least keep people on the fence. Sharply in-
creased terrorism and several strong Communist
military drives have dealt setbacks to the GVN in
MR-2 so far this year. So many hamlet and village
officials are being singled out by Viet Cong,
assassins tht it is now difficult in parts of
heavily populated Binh Dinh and Phu Yen provinces
to find people willing to accept government appoint-
ments.
60. The Communists have tried to keep the
western highlands of MR72 under a strong main force
threat in order to use the areas as a staging base
for attacks against the populated territory along
the coast as well as to keep allied forces tied
down. Thj.s spring North Vietnamese regulars struck
harder in Kontum and Pleiku provinces than they
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have for several years and the consequences of their
campaign have been felt throughout MR-2. The South
Vietnamese have been largely on their own in the
highlands since US ground forces pulled out last
year. This spring they had to commit half the
region's ARVN battalions to Kontum Province alone
'Both sides took heavy casualties and pacification in
Kontum came to an abrupt halt. The diversion of
ARVN units to Kontum also enabled local Communist
operatives in other MR-2 provinces to roam more
freely and to reassert themselves in areas formerly
under nominal GVN control.
61. In Pleiku Province the Communists
carried out a devastating attack on a district
headquarters and some nearby resettlement villages
this spring.
received a severe blow and that the memory of the
massive destruction and the freedom with which the
Communists moved about would endure in the minds
of the people. The province chief in Pleiku
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clearly was unnerved by the enemy attacks. He
charged that ARVN troops have not been able to fill
the gap left by American forces, that security
has been eroded steadily in the past year, and that
Communist cadre now are able to enter all hamlets not
along main roads.
62. In the thinly populated plateau provinces
of southern MR-2, the government's position is at
least superficially better, mainly because Communist
forces are not very large and not very active. A
desultory guerrilla war goes on and Viet Cong cadre
are at work behind the scenes even where there are
numerous signs of progress and well being. Most of
these provinces fail in the middle of countrywide
security ratings. None of them are trend-setters,
however, and the way they evolve in the future
probably will be determined more by events elsewhere -
:than by the native strengths and weaknesses of either
side.
63. The main pri2e for both the Communists and
the government in MR-2 is control of the people
concentrated along the coast. The northernmost
province, Binh Dinh, has a population of about one
million, the second highest in the country. Another
million. or so live in the four coastal provinces
to the south. The local Communist apparatus generally
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r T.
remarked on the ease with which the Communists are
able to enter some hamlets and intimidate government
sympathizers, and the fact that Viet Cong cadre were
being turned up in very sensitive spots. One Viet
Cong cadre targeted and killed in a police operation
was identified by local people as their former
village chief who had lived under "legal" cover and
exercised authority on behalf of the GVN.
of Viet Cong cadre in this manner are all too rare in
Binh Dinh
Eliminations
66. The Communist apparatus in Phu Yen Province
is less formidable than that in Binh Dinh, but it too
supports a bloody campaign of terrorism and guerrilla
warfare.
The Viet Cong in Phu Yen have achieved notoriety
during the past year or so because of their peculiar
brand of "people-to-people" activities based on
wholesale abductions of civilians. Last year the
Co=unists formed regular troops into five-man
squads that worked.closely with political cadre
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in this effort. The squads enter a hamlet or village,
round up people, and take them to a remote place for
a period of days or weeks of indoctrination.
67. The impact of this kind of action is hard
to measure, but there are clear signs that it has
made people in some places reluctant to side with the
GVN. It serves as a reminder that the Communists
can still reach them and that taking government
positions or even cooperating with the government
can be dangerous. Another vivid example of the
Viet Cong wielding covert, but effective control
over some people in Phu Yen came to light during
recent local elections. Half the population of one
village turned in blank ballots, reportedly in
response to Viet Cong instructions.
68. There is less overt Communist activity
in the southern coastal provinces of MR-2, but the
Viet Cong still enter hamlets regularly in some
areas and the enemy is not kept constantly on the
run by government secUrity forces.
in large part to EL first-rate province chief who
has made his leadership felt at all levels during
the past year, the Communists are being denied
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access to more and more human resources and the gov-
ernment is becoming more effective and responsive.
The local effort against the Viet Cong infrastructure
is no brighter than elsewhere, but the hope in Binh
Thuan is to remedy some of the shortcomings on which
the Communists thrive.
cpmmittee of citizens recently set
up to investigate corruption in Binh Thuan may be
able to "neutralize" more Viet Cong this year than
the entire anti-infrastructure program.
69. Ninh Thuan is considered one of the most
pacified provinces in MR-2. The healthy security
situation has produced more confidence in the
government, less support for the Viet Cong, and
the gradual development of responsive political
institutions. But Ninh Thuan still has its share
of the enemy; the province chief estimated late
last year that nearly half of his hamlets still had
some form of party organization in place.
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Military _gion3. Significant Pockets of Residual
Strength
70. MR-3 has been considered a showcase of
pacification, even though the Communists retain a
good deal more residual strength than most of the
statistics suggest. The government has relatjveJy
firm control over about two-thirds of the population.
No hamlets are considered to be under the physical
control of the Viet Cong. The ratio of allied to
enemy forces in MR-3 is the highest in the country.
There are still around 90,000 US military personnel
in the region, including artillery, helicopter,
and other combat and combat support elements, but:
most American ground forces have now left. Govern-
ment territorial forces have taken over much of
the security burden, especially since abouChalf
of the South Vietnamese regulars normally operating
in MR-3 have been in Cambodia.
71. Although there are still areas of signi-
ficant Communist strength, the Viet Cong apparatus
in much of MR-3 has been weakened. The improved
government position is attributable in large part
to the absence of most of the Communist main force
units that once made this area the scene of per-
sistent heavy fighting. The four Communist divi-
S?0
tho.t lormerly fou9-ht in. MR-3 have not been
deep into the region since the spring of 1969.
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Some of their regiments deployed to the delta in
the second half of 1969, while the rest stayed in
sanctuary in Cambodia until Sihanouk was upset.
Since then, these units have fought mainly in Cam-
bodia. With them gone, allied forces have kept a
fairly tight lid on Communist military activity in
'MR-3 and the Viet Cong apparatus has had to fend
for itself.
72. In large parts of MR-3 Communist commit-
tees are kept on the run and well away from the
populace. Yet in some of the most important and
heavily populated provinces, including those
closest to Saigon, the enemy organization not only
survives, but still seems to draw substantial
local support and to present a significant threat
to local authorities. Moreover, the Communists are,
putting a great deal of energy into attempts to
"legalize" their apparatus in order to operate in
territory under government control; neither the
magnitude nor the success of these efforts is
measurable.
73. Thus, while the Viet Cong are in no po-
sition to upset the balance in MR-3 on their own,
and the statistical trends are likely to continue
showing them losing ground, they are by no means
out of the picture. If the Communists were able
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gets weaker and less effective as one moves south,
but pockets of hard-core Viet Cong strength can be
found all along the coast.
64. Because of its central location, its large
population, and its agricultural resources?and
because Communist roots run very deep in this
former Viet Minh stronghold--Binh Dinh has been one
of the most bitterly contested provinces in South
Vietnam- In the past two years the Communists have
had to cut back the size and scope of their military
activities in Binh Dinh, but they have sustained a
damaging campaign of subversion,- terror, and
guerrilla attacks. The government has made inroads
into the countryside and more villages than ever
before have a government presence of some kind. But
in the spring of 1970 and again this year the enemy
carried out a seasonal campaign that caused setbacks
and often made the Communists appear to have more
vigor and resiliency than the larger government
forces in the province.
the Communists had a
solid hold in one northern district, that they
operated with impunity in a central district, and
that both side:.3?were fighting hard for another
district not far from the province capital. He
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to bring back some of their military units now tied
up in Cambodia in order to resume a heavier level
of fighting, their local apparatus in MR-3 might
be able to rebound and it probably could do at
least some of the support tasks it is meant to do.
7_4. Strong government security forces and
effective police work have taken a heavy toll of
Viet Cong agents in and around Saigon itself. Co-
vert networks are still being rolled up from time
to :time and the enemy's party apparatus has been
crippled or destroyed in around two-thirds of the
capital. But the Communists are still trying to
rebuild, to infiltrate urban based groups, and to
keep open liaison channels into the city. Their
capabilities for terrorism and sabotage clearly
have been reduced in the capital area, but we
are much less confident that real inroads have
been made into their political and subversive net-
works.
75. There is so little Viet Cong activity
reported from some provinces in MR-3 that it is
almost impossible to g6t an impression of the state
of the local Communist apparatus. GVN officials
in these areas are almost uniformly confident and
cite the lack of overt activity as evidence of a
sharp decline in enemy capabilities.
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76. Dinh Long and Phuoc Long provinces on the
Cambodian border of northern MR-3 fall into this
category. Neither province is heavily populated
and because enemy military units that once kept
these provinces under pressure are now in Cambodia,
local Communists operatives have an unhealthy en-
vironment: in which to work. Roads are open, lum-
bering and other economic activities are on the up-
swing, and most people live under the government
security blanket or they are leaving territory
formerly controlled by the Viet Cong. In both
Binh Long and Phuoc Long, Communist village commit-
tees are forced to live in the jungles. Communist
tax collectors make their rounds but the lack of
strong grass roots support for the Viet Cong sug-
gests they are not very effective. Captured
enemy documents confirm that the Communists have
lost touch with many of the people in these two
provinces.
77. In neighboring Tay_Ninh province, the
government mood is decidely upbeat since the turn-
about in Cambodia last year and the easing of the
threat long posed by strong Communist main forces
on the border. The local Viet Cong apparatus
sLill enjoys a good deal of local supoort, hut now
the great bulk of the population is under some
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form of government control and government security
forces are keeping the Viet Cong on the run. Many
observers point cut, however, that Tay Ni nb is
one of the areas where local accommodations and
live-and-let. live attitudes toward the Communists
are widespread. The return of Communist military
units from Cambodia probably would enable the Viet
Cong apparatus in Tay Ninh to become much more
effective than it appears to be today.
78. Over on the coast
Tuy provinces, the roots of
also run deep, and the Viet
is quite strong. Communist
in Binh Tuy and Phuoc
Communist influence
Cong apparatus still
village committees are
not in place and overt Communist activity generally
remains quite low, but there were 97 abductions in
Binh Tuy in March and a sharp increase in Communists
attacks in one district. The province chief in
Binh Tuy acknowledges that as many as half the
families in the northern part of the province have
relatives in the Viet Cong.; the chief in Phuoc Tuy
estimates that a fifth of the population still
suppOktthp Communists,
79.. Long Khanh province falls in the middle
rankings in terms of security in South Vietnam.
The Viet Cong are not credited with "controlling"
any area, but they remain strong and fairly effac-
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tive. The province chief estimates that some 900
families provide support to the Viet Cong; all
three districts have active committees and enemy
personnel are in most villages collecting taxes
and conducting subversive operations. Enemy doc-
uments from one district claim considerable success
in recruiting South Vietnamese soldiers and get-
ting them to desert. A recent press item claimed
this same district is one of the few in MR-3 where
Americans and Vietnamese agree that security has
deteriorated since US forces pulled out in April.
Communist attacks and terrorism are up sharply
since then, suggesting that the Viet Cong have
more freedom to operate.
80. Some of the toughest and most resilient
Communist organizations in. MR-3 still work in the
three provinces that ring Saigon on the north,
west, and south (Binh Duong, Hau Nghia, and Long
An). Binh Duonq has come a long way in reducing
the effectiveness of the VCI, but the Communists
still have regular access to about a third of the
people in the province; In the northern districts
some Communist village committees remain in place
and both documents and police testimony indicate
th2 Communists run a fairly successful subversive
effort. Terrorism and abductions are quite common
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In recent months the GVN has uncovered more than
30 penetrations of its own organizations, including
two hamlet chiefs and three village chiefs.
81. Hau Nghia province is a long-time enemy
stronghold and has the toughest entrenched Commu-
.nist apparatus in MR-3. It also has the poorest
security in the region and one of the worst secu-
rity ratings in the country. Local government
forces are woefully inadequate and have not been
able to takeup the slack since US forces withdrew
last year. GVN officials estimate that about
half the people have relatives working for the
Communists, and the Viet Cong have access to over
half the population.
they tax, propagandize, and proselyte regularly.
Terrorism in Hau Nghia is usually much higher than
elsewhere in the country. There were 29 assassina-
tions in January; in February the victims included
three hamlet chiefs.
82. Hau Nghia provides a good example of the
inadequacy of VCI statistics. VCI strength is
reported at less than 1,000 --almost certainly an
understatement in view of the levels of enemy
activity and the pervasiveness of Communist acti-
vity. The Copiltah;ss probably have been clujte
successful in establishing themselves in "legal"
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positions Some sources say that village councils
are loaded with Communists and their agents; at
least two penetrations were discovered in the pro-
vincial administration last year.
83. Long An province also is a traditional
center of Communist strength. The enemy apparatus
in Long An has suffered setbacks repeatedly, but
it still shows the kind of resiliency that has
enabled the Communists to flourish there for years
Overt Communist activity in the form of military
attacks and terrorism is not very high, but the
Communists have ready access to the people in the
two most populous districts and they can collect
taxes, recruit, and conduct subversive operations.
Long An now ranks in the top half of the cowatry-
ide security ratings and VCI strength is said to
be below 1,000. But as in Hau Nghia, most observ-
ers believe the VCI remains stronger and more
effective than suggested by pacification statistics.
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Military ]tecTion 4: VC Still Under Heavy Pressure
84. The Communists are maintaining their
apparatus in MR-4, but its effectiveness has been
reduced by the myriads of government forces running
operations against them. The maSsive structure
built by the allies, including three regular army
divisions, territorial forces totaling some 200,000
men, plus numerous village militia, police, and
other security forces, has simply stifled many
kinds of enemy activities.
85. The enemy apparatus in the delta suffered
a shock when Sihanouk was overthrown and South
Vietnamese units subsequently drove into Communist
base areas along the Cambodian border. Some
government forces took heart from this development
and began to fight like they meant it; a few more
enemy personnel, most of them admittedly marginal,
got fed up and defected. The impact of Cambodian
developments on the enemy force structure and
supply situation in the delta is still substantial.
Some main force units are now fighting in Cambodia,
many cadre have been sent there, and reflections
of weapons and ammunition shortages are quite com-
mon.
86. D.cring the past year ARVN divisiuqs have
moved into the major remaining VC strongholds
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simultaneously. They built operations bases in
the northern districts of Kien Hoa Province, and
the government now has at least some kind of pres-
ence in what had been strictly Communist territory.
An ARVN Division has built fire-support bases in
the U Minh Forest for the first time and brought
the ground war to the former enemy sanctuary there.
ARVN units also have occupied some of the slopes of
the enemy's Seven Mountains base area, and driven
into another long-time base area in the heart of
the delta.
87. The Communists readily acknowledge in
their own councils that the massive government
. presence is restricting their access to the people.
They do not so readily acknowledge that they, have
alienated many of the people whose support they
need. This happened on a massive scale during the
---Tet Offensive of 1968, when many homes were
destroyed and people killed in areas previously
relatively untouched by the war. Since then, the
Communists have lost much of their appeal, and they
do not command the fear, respect, and support they
once had. In many provinces the atmosphere has
changed, with people appearing more relaxed and
enjoying some prosperity. as government security
controls have improved. There is a clear, if un-
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spoken, assumption in many places that it is safer
and better to live where the government is relative-
ly strong and the Viet Cong is relatively weak.
88. Yet in some areas the people are still
sympathetic to the Communists and do their bidding.
Moreover, the Communist apparatus in the delta still
functions even though district and village commit-
tees are often kept on the run and have more diffi-
culties staying in touch with the people in the ham-
lets The toll of enemy personnel at the grass
roots level has been very heavy, but the Communists
retain a great deal of resiliency and show time
after time that they can come back if the govern-
ment fails to keep the pressure on.
89. In five provinces in the northern part of
MR-4, An Giang, Sa Dec, Kien Phong, Kien Tuong, and
Go Cong, the Communists are now relatively weak.
-These provinces regularly are rated among the most
secure in the country, and none of them has a -very
large Viet Cong cadre structure. In some cases
good security can be attributed to aggressive
government forces running a fair percentage of their
operations at night?always a good sign--while in
others local VC forces are simply weak and lethar-
ic. In many place Cormaunist village comraitt
have been forced to take refuge.
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90. The greatest concentration of grass-roots
Communist strength in the delta lies in four pro-
vinces along the main channels of the Mekong River
that flow down. to Viet Cong territory in the forests
on the coast. Both sides are strong and vigorous
in Dinh Thong province, the northernmost of these
Provinces. The Communist apparatus is large, Viet
Cong main and local forces are aggressively led,
and they periodically mount strong attacks: But
the government side clearly is stronger. Elements
from two ARVN divisions and relatively vigorous
territorial forces are gradually wearing many of
the VC down, including parts of the hard-core party
apparatus. Many village committees are trying to
operate in absentia, and recruiting in Dinh Thong
is not good enough to provide all the needed re-
placements.
91. In neighboring Kien Hoa province, the
Viet Cong probably are still stronger than anywhere
else in the delta. The VC apparatus there numbers
more than 4,500 and the province consistently ranks
among the worst in all Of South Vietnam. The Com-
munists still enjoy considerable support from the
people and are well organized in the villages along
tho ri_vers a in tretches of mangrove fo:
along the coast.
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92. The government sent two regiments into
Kien boa late last summer and kept the pressure on
until the 1Lo,t, few months. The Communists lost a
. district sat they had controlled unchallenged for
the last eight yea.rs. Many Communist sympathizers
felt the heat and came over to the government, at:
least for appearances sake. These defections have
dropped off recently, however, as the government
has relaxed its pressure and the Communists have
waged an offensive of their own. They overran 11
outposts during the first four months of the year.
The government regiments are gone, but. the terri-
torial security, forces are still building outposts,
and the general trend is likely to continue to
against the VC--but very slowly.
93. In Vinh Binh province the VC apparatus is
believed to be only about one-third the size of
Kien boa's but the Communists enjoy widespread
go
support from the population, and they are fighting
government forces which are better at promises and
plans than performance. The weaknesses of the pro-
vince security forces have made Vinh Binh among the
six or seven worst security risks in the country.
This may, in fact, understate the seriousness of
the situatio,1 'chore. Considering L1,,2 sill of Ll'e
VC in Vinh Binh, the poor security forces defending
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it, and the sympathy the VC still apparently enjoy
among the people there, Vinh Binh province may well
be the wor:-4t soft spot in the whole delta.
94? The Communists are said to have a large
support apparatus up river in Vinh Long Province
(nearly 3,000) , but they are up against tough
government forces. Even though security in Vinh
Long is still rated very low, Communist forces are
more likely than before to hide in their base areas
most of the time and they do not have the close con-
tacts they once had with the populace.
95. The three provinces situated around the
periphery of the enemy base area in the U Minh
Forest (Chong Thien, Kien Clang, and An Xuyen) have
some of the worst security rating in the cOuntry.
Communist operations mounted directly out of the
forest and along communications and supply routes
account for some of the problems. But enemy
strength is more durable because of the lackluster
performance of the government's territorial security
forces in these three provinces. In familiar cycli-
cal fashion, enemy strength in the U Minh helps
keep local government forces discouraged and on the
defensive; this makes it difficult for the govern-
ment side to recruit or otherwise enlist the aid
of the local population; and this in turn preserves
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a favorable environment for enemy operations.
96. Chuong Thien province is rated the leaSt
_
secure province in the delta and the second worst
in the country. The VC apparatus is numbered at
only around 1,500 but it has support from many of
the local villages. Seven CVN outposts were over-
run during the first four months of 1971 in the
eastern part of the province. Recently, territorial
forces have put some additional pressures on the
Viet Cong and ARVIN operations in the U Minh are
helping improve security. Chong Thien probably
would still go Communist, however, if given the
choice. The roads remain insecure and it is diffi-
cult for government forces to get around. Local
government security forces are an indifferent lot,
and the VC village committees still carry a lot of
weight.
97. In An Xuyen Province, the local Viet Cong
__?
still seem to have an advantage over the government
security system. Two Communist regiments that
sometimes sally out of the U Minh into the populated
areas is one reason for this. More important, how-
ever, are the large number of villages where sym-
pathy for the Communists has been strong for two
decades. These still supply the manpower needed by
the enemy's local support and administrative struc-
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98. Forces are fairly strong on both sides
in Kien Clang Province. The Communists maintain a
base area in the north and they control long
stretches of the canal passing down through the
province toward the U Minh Forest. The government
has been putting on pressure, however, and provin-
cial security forces are building outposts along
the canal Some of the villagers have begun to
respond, markets are springing up near these out-
posts, and the Communists are reportedly having
trouble collecting taxes. These improvements are
still very tenuous. A recent campaign involving
simultaneous operations by all government security
forces in the province came off very poorly. More-
over, desertions from government ranks remain par-
ticularly high in Kien Giang.
99. Elsewhere in the delta there are pockets
of Communist strength, but the 'provinces mentioned
above are the main problem areas. Most of Chau Doc
province in the western delta, for example, is quite
secure now but the Communists have a base area in
the Seven Mountains that enables them to keep a
substantial military threat nearby. Communist vil-
lage comittcer are still in place close to the
Seven Mountains, thanks in part to the backstopping
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provided by North Vietnamese regulars who come out
of the mountains from time to time. Since late last
summer ARVN units have been trying to dig the Com-
munists out of their bunkers and caves, and enemy
troops have been too busy to intimidate the province
security forces as before. A number of nearby ham-
lets that had been abandoned to the Communists have
been reoccupied, and more confident government se-
curity units seem to be getting a clear upper hand
in most of the province.
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