COMMENTS ON THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT'S POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PERFORMANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R001100050024-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: January 11, 1971
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2004/09/23 :, CIA-RDP80Ry17WR0011
11 January 1971
SUBJECT: Comments on the South Vietnamese Government's
Political and Administrative Performance
1. An underlying assumption of the paper -- and of much of
US policy today toward South Vietnam -- seems to be that the purely
military threat to the GVN will continue to diminish and that the
problems in South Vietnam will increasingly be primarily of a
political nature. Whether or not these assumptions prove correct
will depend, in part at least, on the continued energy and
effectiveness of the ARVN and the RF/PF in inflicting losses
on Communist military forces, keeping main force units holed up
in the hills or bogged down in Cambodia and Laos, and suppressing,
dispersing, and wearing down local Communist units. ARVN and
RF/PF performance will depend in turn on a number of factors
including the amount of logistic and combat support they receive
from US units as US ground forces withdraw from a direct combat
role. One very real danger is that our disengagement will snow-
ball and that the US will fail to provide the helicopters,
artillery, and many other items of equipment which the ARVN and
RF/PF need or expect in the process of assuming full responsibilities.
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2. There is not much point of worrying about improved
administration unless we first give the ARVN and RF/PF what they
need to hold the still potent communist military threat at bay.
I have already seen how the US -- and the US military services --
react when we are phasing out after a war. After World War II we
bugged out of Europe and Korea, taking most of our equipment home
and leaving behind friendly forces with little capacity for self-
defense. We did it again in Korea after the Korean War. We
are already beginning to do the same thing in South Vietnam.
3. All the above does not mean that some demobilization
will not be possible in SVN over the next few years or that the
ARVN could not supply some trained personnel to the National
Police or that programs to improve administration at local and
national level should not be pushed; but lets not kid ourselves
into the belief that the military threat is dying and that the
ARVN and RF/PF will continue effective without a ready supply
of costly equipment, sophisticated logistic support, and some US
combat support.
Para. 6 -- Political Parties -- wouldn't spend to much time
on this -- it is a long term effort.
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1C. Turnover province and district chief positions to
civilians? Why -- what practical (not theoretical) end is
served?
Phung Hoang -- Effective containment of military threat
is a pre-condition to progress against VCI. Territorial security
is still important; one should not say that Phung Hoang is
Number ONe -- it deserves high priority and needs to be pushed,
but not at expense of Territorial Security -- these are inter-
dependent.
25X1
ILLEGIB
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-R OR01720R001100050024-5
 Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP80:IR01720R001100050024-5
11 January 1971
OER Comments on "The South Vietnamese
Governments Political and Administrative Performance"
1. Without specifying the position they should occupy
in the paper there are two action areas in which positive
and constructive activity by the GVN would go fZr in
attracting the allegiance of the average citizen and the
support of elite organizations. These are as follows:
a) The GVN has for some months been considering
revisions of the countrys investment laws. Little
progress has been noted. But now as the war winds
down a number of foreign firms have been making
inquiries about investing in South Vietnam. A
revamping of the investment laws would go far in
creating the type of climate for foreign investments
which South Vietnam so badly needs.
b) As US forces continue to withdraw a serious
unemployment Situation -- already noticed in Danang --
will develop. The GVN could show greater recognition
of the unemployment problem -- and manifest government
concern for its people -- by establishing a government
placement agency to match skills and jobs available
on a country-wide basis.
2. Given the many uncertainties about the size of
the VCI why not delete the 63,000 figure on Section IV,
page 2. It is not necessary to the argument.
3. Many of the recommendations to improve Phung
Hoang are good. They do seem, however, to be creating
one more bureaucracy. The recommendations might consider
capitalizing -- VC style -- on in-place local organizations
and special interest groups such as farmers, students,
Buddhists. It should also be remembered that neutralizing
the military forces -- local forces and guerrillas -- will
go further than psyops or due process of law in cutting
down the infrastructure.
OD/OER
Approved For Release 2004/09/23 : CIA-RDP80R01720R001100050024-5