CIRCULAR ON US AND RVN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, SECURITY SECTION, THU BIEN SUB-REGION, COSVN. (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R001100090010-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: June 3, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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CONFIDENTIAL
Committee, CO3VN))
Nguyen Van Tan
((Page 1 of Item 2 of O.T.))
C IRCULAR.
CDEC Doc Log No. 05-1033-72
------------------------------ FULL TRANSLATION --------------- --------------
((Item l of O.T.))
No. 33/CV TOP SECRET ((VC alas sificatioh))
Tot Various district and city security sections
To help you better understand the schemes, operating methods, and tricks
of the US and Puppet ((RVN)) security police and intelligence agencies
information on the organization and activities of US and Puppet ((RVN)~
intelligence forces from the national level to village level compiled during
the last year ((possibly 1970)) is attached. This will help you and concerned
units and branches study the specific local situation and provide proper
leadership for each area to counter enemy security, police, and espionage
activities.
It will also help you conduct political indoctrination courses for cadre
and combatants to heighten their revolutionary vigilance which will enable the.
to maintain internal security and counter psywar, Chi@u H6i ((Open,Arms)) and
counterpenetration activities.
Upon receipt of this document, you are requested to study and disseminate
it to, cadre operating in the local areas so as. to effectively detect-ond.countr
activities.
Successive reports should be forwarded to the Sub-Region Security Sea
for further instructions.
15 Oct 71
For the Security Sea, ((possibly
Thu Bih)) Sub-Region Party
((possibly a noies of Thu Bien'
C40 Sub-Region)) (in lieu of a report
Military Security ((Soo))
TX_((unidentified))/18 copies
File
All Cs ((possibly companies))
B2 and B3 ((unidentified))
ORGANIZATION
1. Police Forces
The enemy considers.. the security and police forces his key forces
for attacks against revolutionary installations to implement his pacification
program. Therefore, he strengthened their personnel strength and improved their
organizational methods.
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The areas of operations of the police force at all levels were also
widely developed.
The enemy has changed the "Directorate General of National Police"
into the.National Police H4, subordinate to the Presidency. District and
province police chiefs and higher have been replaced by reliable and capable
has been designated commander of the ((RVN))
n M6--,k Phon
(m-
g
.
lackeys.
National Police RQ to replace Trani Van Hai.) Police agencies at all echelons
were provided with higher ranking officers. Majors or lieutenant colonels
e designated
i
C
ns wer
apta
were designated as province police station chiefs.
olice
e
ill
p
ag
as district police station chiefs and second lieutenants as v
station chiefs. The CIA force also assigned additional US advisors to the
((RVN)) police force at district level. '('The number of CIA personnel
concurrently operating as US advisors in district police stations is 337?)
r attention to strengthening the village
ti
ul
d
c
a
par
The enemy pai
police stations because he considered them the key force among the people 'and
used them to attack our hamlet and village revolutionary installations.
olice B ((platoon)), and
e field
(
p
on
Each police station had 50 members
two' secret police cells to conduct surprise attacks against our installations).
nned to establish
l
a
There are altogether 2,517 villages in SVN.- The enemy p
d
.
2,130 village police Stations. Of them, 1,650 have been establishe
Strength: T ;Policesstrength has rapidly developed as follows$
1964:. 40,000 men
1965= 55,000,
1966: 65,000
1967: 73,700
19681 66,520
(Police strength decreased in 1968, because policemen were ax-LAw%&
during our ((1968)) General Offensive and Uprising phase .
1970: 108,000 men
In 1971 the enemy planned to increase the police force personnel
,
strength.to 244,000 men. On the average, one policeman will control five
families. (The enemy also planned to increase this force to 300,000 men to
e
satisfy the requirements of the pacification program and gradually assum
ional Force troops who will be upgraded to Regular
of Re
iti
ti
l
l
g
es
v
oca
ac
Forces .'(k C&ng and An Giang Provinces are used ae experimental sites for
this plan.)
rovince was ' to. have 5.00+1. policemen Y1~7;?ipr ~X~C~9~
? -_.~..
..1
each
ing to
ne
p
)
.
((sic)), and'each district was to have 300 men,(zbu Ca stbiots) ((sic)
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CONFIDENTIAL
CDEC Doe Log No. 05-1033-72
scientific and technical communication liaison facilities, weapons, and
all of them are tyrants, scoundrels, and antirevolutionaries who were selected
by the enemy to serve as key cadre in the national police force.
The CIA also provided the ((RYN)) National Police Force with sufficient
to the enemy's plans, all Puppet administrative personnel must each have from
three to five secret informants. The enemy will choose the most qualified of
them to train as new lackeys.
Of the ((RVN)) national, police, the most dangerous elements are the
special police (operating seoretly), the field police (suppressing and
terrorising the revolutionary movement), and the police interrogation teams
(torturing and exploiting captured revolutionary cadre and agents). Almost
However, primary efforts were focussed on the development of the field
police force (500 field policemen for each province and 120 for each district)
and the special police force. In addition, the enemy established a secret
((security)) network in hamlets and villages. Each village planned to have
from 20 to 30 secret informants, excluding the number of hamlet and village
Puppet administrative personnel who assumed police responsibilities. According
((Page 2 of Item 2 of O.T.))
financial aid as.followsl
to cover the requirements of the National Police.)
1963:
1964:
19651
1966:
1967:
19681
1969:
19701
$3249 million ((US))
$48
$68.2
$176.5
$273.4
$220.6
$168.6
$168.2
(The amount of money was decreased from 1968 to 1970 to lighten the
US expenditures. Therefore,. the Puppet government had to exploit ((the people).)
different areas, such as among the ethnic minorit people, religious followers,
such as recruitment of secret informants, planting personnel in ' our
internal organizations, kidnapping and assassination, etc... ((sic)). The
enemy placed much emphasis on the training of agents operating in the
training them in specialized skills and on the methods of secret operations,
reactionary ideology and transforming them into tyranical and capable
henchmen to work against the glorious Revolution. It was also aimed at
In training: Primary training courses were conducted for the -special
police force. The essence of the training was infusing the trainees with
and in R region ((possibly in the Khmer Republic)).
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CONFIDENTIAL
CDDC Doo Log No. 05-1033-72
The enemy successfully trained a number of key cadre in the
National Police Force as followes
females (.Khmers) in Tra Minh ((Province)) ) to send them to K ((Khmer))
Battlefield to operate. Policemen at village level, village and hamlet
Puppet administrative personnel, and assistant village security section
chiefs who already received training numbered 20,000 men (in 1970).
intelligence organizations. A training session was conducted to train 60
sent them to foreign countries (US, Malaysia, and the Phillipines) to study
41 cadre ranking from investigators up -
433 female action cadre (Thien Nga)
172 intermediate interrogators
He also selected a number of officers, captain and higher and
trained policemen by the end-of the first half of 1971.
The National Police Force in ((RVN)) MR 3, planned to have 28,000
The training requirements to be satisfied in 1971 were as follower
According to enemy plane, all policemen were to be well trained in.
1,200 intermediate level policemen
23,920 low level agents
120 commanders of river patrol boats
6,704 intelligence cadre (1,604 intermediate and 5,100 low-level
((page 3 of Item 2 of O.T.))
2. The Special Central Intelligence Office (subordinate to the Presideno
The total number of personnel is this office, according to our
cadre
000 of men. (They are all key intelligence cadre and
is
over 2
estimation
,
.
,
personnel'who have been carefully selected.) Its main activities were conducted;
be reported to the Special Central Intelligence Office in order to keep,
placed emphasis on fifth ooludnists. All fifth columnist activities were to
organizations, political factions, religions, and ethnic minority groups and
secretly (by its agents who operated under the name of social and speoia.ized
abreast of the situation and provide proper guidance.
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to use for their secret activities.)
All Special Central Intelligence Office cadre and personnel enjoy
many privileges. They have undercover operating funds and at higher salary
than members of the National Police Force and are authorized, to recruit
members of the National Police Force for the Special Central Intelligence
Office.
this network,;Y must recruit a number of leaders and members or different
networks, determine their areas of operation, and select some civilian houses
city wards and` the rural areas. It is to be completed by Jun 71. (To organize`
CDC Doe Log No. 05-1033-72
At present) Tran Kim TuyenI and Nguyen V n Y ai'e ((President))
Thieu's advisors.
Y is now trying to establish a secret security network throughout
Regional, Popular, and People's Self-Defense Forced (in villages and hamlets).
attacking our bases and border areas.
In provinces, the enemy organized military intelligence networks
throughout sectors. sub-sectors (at district level), and posts manned by the
recruit fifth columnists, and operate in main objectives to establish footholds for
All MI Services of the Joint General Staff, various military regions,
and regular force units planted their agents in important strategic areas of
operation to establish secret intelligence networks (frith intelligence network
3. M litary Intelligence Agency
The MI Agency was established by the Joint General Staff at village
and hamlet levels.
Fromerly, a sector military intelligence service was placed under
of the following six sections : , . ,, f
the command of a captain, but now it is commanded by a major. It is- composed:
1. Information Collection Sec
2.-_ Section in charge of recruiting secret intelligence agents
3. Military Operations-and rlauning Sec
4:, . Special Force Sec
5. Interrogation Sec
6. Rear- Service Sec.
78 Special Force troops.)
A military-intelligence-service?sub--sector was formerly under.the
Command of a first lieutenant but ..is slow commanded by a captain. It .has
Each military 'intelligence -service?sector was composed of from 80 to 130
agents. '(For instance: The Hhu Nghia Sector had 52 intelligence agents and
from 30 to 40 agents.
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Deputy commanders of Regional Force Inter-Units and posts manned
by the Regional and Popular Forces were in charge of the intelligence task.
They also recruited secret informants, collected intelligence information,
detected revolutionary forces in their infrastructures, and coordinated with
public security and national police members to attack and destroy our forces.
In `People's Self-Defense Force units, the enemy recruited informants
to conduct secret activities. (They were usually selected from the People7p
Self Defense Force personnel.)
((Page 4 of Item 2 of O.T.))
In 1970, the enemy held six intelligence training courses for 491
intelligence agents. In addition, each village selected a number of People's
Self-Defense Force personnel and sent them to intelligence training courses.
Wilita secur5t1_personnel: (RVN) military security personnel operand
to protect (RVN) internal ranks and counter our (lvC)) activities within the
Puppet Army. All units-_,of- company size and higher had military security
officers.
At the end of 1970, the enemy established 'village military security
sub-stations (consisting of three to five persons each). They were commanded
by military security agents coming from higher levels to act as key personnel
r
and popular Force units and People's Self-Defense Force personnel). They
considered these activities the most effective meseures to protect their
The." Phi ng Hoang Committee was organized in late 1968. In late
5. Phi8ng ,Huang Committees s.
(A combined intelligence organization commanded by CIA
ne l
1970, its agencies were widely established from the national level to region,
province, diatricti, and village levels. In addition, Phuong Hoang mobile
((intelligence)) cells were organized by each level to operate and to motivate
lower' levels.
E *Ch Phuong Hoang Committee has a central office. The composition
of Phuong Hoanp Committees at' all levels consists ' of public security,
police; intelligence, military security pacification, civil affairs,,psywar,
policemen, and intelligence agents, played the key role in their activities.)
At province and village levels, the province and village chiefs
usually served as chairmen of the Phu2dng Hoang Committees and the vice-
commanded all public security agents, policemen, and military
chairmen
intelligence agents.
Each PhAng Hoang center from district level and higher was directly
guided by a US advisor (CIA personnel) with a number of cadre, public security
agents, policemen,'and_intelligence personnel serving as'coordinators.
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 organizations in SVN, there are also US Intelligence or
CONFIDENTIAL
the (CIA) and (DIAL ((Defense Intelli
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her esn_ionage
ance. _1d
na)) 4q well s e
~4, ru ted b y ((Prim Mini a er)) erg Hal in K
CAKhmgr, Lerubli
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CDEC Doc Log No. 05-1033-72
g
x
handed over tqq the Puppet Army. We do not known e c
(GVN) Bie t Kicch Force but we know that it consists' of two kinds of forces.
I
The BidtKich Force in charge of attacking NVN.
c
Bit J l$ pe
previously placed under the direct control of US commanders. Now it,has been
th of the
a t stren
th
a e
personnel in~,Saigon. It was reported that e n y
the Civil Affairs Organization and merge it into the National Police forces.
However, we later reported that it was reorganized by ((President)) Thi6
with a number of pacification personnel for reinfordeanents.
i 1 Forces). The Bit Kith Inter-Group 81 was
({GVN S
organization, there are also some other organizations such as=
Civil affairs: There were - more than 1,QOO civil affairs
m intended to deactivate
th
is the chief of the village police sub-station. In a city, the ch e o
phu3ng Hoang Committee in a ward is the chief of a ward police sub-station.
6 In addition to the above public security, police, and intelligence
In- a village, the standby cadre of the Phubng'Hoang Village (Committee
((Page 5 of item 2 of 0. T.) )
SVN. (In 1968 there were
((Province)). Now there are only seven companies desiginated as unit B16)
The Bi;t Kich Force operating in auntainous and border areas in
18 (GVN) BiAt wiIh re ((companies)) in j4 'Minh
The Biet.KichForce consisted of many ruffians, scoundrels,
orphans, ethnic minority- people, and refugees coming from NVN.
At present, three Bit Kich platoons and three BiAt Kich groups
are operating in the. mountainous areas, areas bordering T5 and T10 (VC MR 5.'
and 10)), Tay Ninh ((Province)),and in the northeastern part of K ((Khmer
Republic)). The enemy has recently selected 1,100 Biet Kich men and sent
them to a. special training course. They will be sent to operate in the
mountainous and border areas and in the Khmer Republic upon completion of
their training course.
Pacification Grp: it previously had approximately 60,000
pacification personnel. However, at the beginning of 1971, it was as reorganized
by the enemy with a total strength of 25,000 men. The remaining pe
were assigned to the Police Farce.
In} addition, there were _semispeoialized organizations operat-
ing as political parties; religious and national reactionary political
organizations and ethnic minority people.
Besides the Puppet public security, police and intelligence a
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CDEC Doc Log No. 05-1033-72
and city areas. For example,. he closely coordinated operations of?the,public security.,
istrative machinery, This-has created many difficulties for us. Each (RVN)
village administrative section consists of from five to seven personnel and
each hamlet administrative section of from three to seven persons. Among the
the hamlet and village ((RVN)) administrative personnel there are experienced;
personnel, tyrants, and stubborn and dangerous individuals who have attacked
and destroyed revolutionary organizations. They inflicted losses on friendly
forces and impeded the revolutionary movement. However, some of the new
administrative personnel were forced to work for the enemy.
II. ((INTELLIGENCE)) ACTIVITIES:
The enemy used all types of forces to attack us in mountainous,'lowland.
personnel, and recruiting secret agents. The enemy prescribed that each (WVN)
administrative agent must recruit at least three ((secret)) agents.
At present, in enemy ((GVN)) controlled areas and in disputed areas, the
enemy has effectively established and consolidated the hamlet and villa a admin?
Thidu assigned Bul Van Nhu, Deputy Chief of the National Police Force, to
act'as vice-chairman of this "international security" organization.
((One line missing)) to oppress the people, and carry out espionage
activities to attack revolutionary installations in villages and hamlets.
Most of them have attended intelligence training courses. Above all, they
have been trained on assessing the situation, discovering revolutionary-
security" organization consisting of intelligence agencies of?satellite
countries in Asia for coordination in intelligence activities ((President))
In Apr 71, we learned that the CIA also established pn "international'
police intelligence, Biat Kieh, reconnaissance, pacification, ppywar, and
Chi&i Hal (.(open-arm)) forces with his military forces (such as Regular,_ _
Regional or Popular Forces) and in-place forcesy to include hamlet and,
village administrative personnel and reactionary ((political)) parties,
religious sects, and ethnic minority people.
He closely coordinated operations of (RVN espionage)' agents with those'.of,the
He closely coordinated operations of his personnelifrom all eehelon# with his irt
place forces in our infrastructure.
forces and operations, of his
He closely coordinated operations of his overt and covert ' forces.. with.. his armed
((Page 6 of Item 2 of O.T.))
He also used economic, cultural and social forces to support his espionage
specialized and semispecialized forces with his intelligence organizations.
effective.
His operating procedures and schemes were varied, cruel, flagrant, and
He concentrated his forces to attack Our important areas - under
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different forms and flexibly operated according to the specific situation