FY 72-73 AIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R001300030011-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 58
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2006
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: June 28, 1971
• Content Type: MF

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FORM No. 237 Use previous editions
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0R0013000 00111-9
OSD eView Completed.
Decl ssiied and Released as
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0013000
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e'sT ? 'roved For Release 2006/03/171
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tOR001300030011-9
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
2 8 JUN 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
ADMIRAL THOMAS H. MOORER
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE HONORABLE U. ALEXIS JOHNSON
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
THE HONORABLE RICHARD HELMS
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SUBJECT: FY 72-73 Air Operations in Southeast Asia (U)
Attached for Senior Review Group consideration is a paper which
assesses U.S./allied air operations in Southeast Asia. The paper examines
current air operations and considers four alternative U.S. sortie levels
and their associated effectiveness and costs for FY 72 FY 73.
Enclosure
OSD Review Completed. Declassified and Released as REDACTED
Copies
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AIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
This study examines U.S. air operations in Southeast Asia in order to
provide a basis for considering U.S. sortie levels for FY 72 and FY 73.
Specifically, the study looks at the effect the U.S./allied interdiction
effort has had on the North Vietnamese supply efforts, assesses current
and planned tactical air and B-52 operations in SEA, summarizes the fiscal
impact of alternative sortie levels, and considers four sortie level options
for FY 72 and FY 73. Section I summarizes the key points of the study and
presents the four sortie level options and their associated costs. Section
addresses the broad question of the effectiveness of our interdiction effort
and the extent to which these efforts have imposed a constraint on the North
Vietnamese. In Section III the use of tactical air is examined and two
methodologies which provide a basis for considering sortie level options
are developed. Section IV considers the use of B-52s, their effectiveness,
and possible sortie level options. The final section, Section V, examines
the fiscal impact of four alternative sortie level options.
I. Summary and Sortie Level Options
The U.S. has waged a large scale interdiction effort since 1965
with the principal objectives of destroying North Vietnamese supplies and
the means the enemy has been using to ship them to South Vietnam, and of
raising the cost to the enemy of continuing his war effort in Southeast Asia.
The extent to which this interdiction effort has seriously limited the
strategy the North Vietnamese have chosen is not clear.
In light of the evidence of previous campaigns and DIA/CIA intelli-
gence estimates, two points should be kept in mind in reviewing sortie rates
for FY 72 and FY 73. First, marginal changes in sortie levels probably can
be made without ?a significant impact on the outcome of the conflict in SEA.
Second, because of the uncertainty of North Vietnamese intentions and the.
assessment that maintaining current levels of interdiction effectiveness ;
may constrain the worst-case strategy the North Vietnamese might select, the
effectiveness of air interdiction efforts in FY 72 should probably be main-
tained at levels not significantly lower than the current level.
The study indicates that two key factors must be considered when
deciding upon sortie rates for FY 72 and FY 73: (1) it is the level of
U.S./allied air operations effectiveness, not numbers of U.S. sorties that is
most important; and (2) in view of the enemy's fluctuations in activity
rate4a variable sortie rate with a surge capability appears most appro-
priate.**
*The Joint Staff believes that despite historical seasonal fluctuations
,in enemy activity, because his logistical program is behind schedule due to
,the air interdiction program and LAM SON 719, he will exert an intensive
effort to continue movement of supplies during the southwest monsoon season
on a crash basis..
**The Joint Staff points out that an additional factor is the force
structure remaining at any point in time. See Tab 1 for a summary of FY 71,
72 and 73 programmed force structure..
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The four tactical air and B-52 sortie rate options (two tactical
air options have a variant) considered in the study and their associated
costs or savings are summarized in the table below.
SORTIE LEVEL OPTIoNS
_ . _ _ _ . _
Tactical Air Concept
Budget/Fiscal Guid. Ceiling
JCS Proposed Level Rate
Option 1 Variable Rate
W/Surge
Option lA b/ Same as Option
AC-130s.
Option 2 Variable Rate
W/ Surge
Option 2A b/ Same as Option
AC-130s.
B-52
Budget/Fiscal Cuid.
JCS Proposed
Option 1
Option 2
Ceiling
Level Rate
Variable Rate'
WI Surge
Variable Rate
W/Surge
No. Sorties Added Costs($M) a/
FY 72 FY 73 FY 72 FY 73
10,200 5,300
10,000 8,000
6-8,000 . 4-6,000
10,000 7,700
1 plus six more
4-6,000 3-4,000
7,700 5,000
2 plus six more
1,000
1,000
7-900
1,000
4-700
840
+$145
-$300
-$255
-$490
-$445
46o
20
+$30
180
-$170
650
1,000 +835 +$100
4-700 -$80 -$40
840
3-500 -$180 -$100
600
a/ Added cot over present Budget and Fiscal Guidance.
b/ Considers procurement costs and added sortie costs of gunships.
Each of the four options results in a different level of U.S./allied air
operations effectiveness, and compares differently to the current (1-Y 71)
level of effectiveness.
The decision as to what FY 72-73 sortie levels are appropriate
turns on the level of effectiveness desired in relation to its impact on
limited resources. Sortie levels above the Budgeted level will necessitate
the re-allocation of FY 72 and FY 73 funds and would require several sizeable
program cuts. Alternatively, levels below the Budgeted rates would provide
additional funds for either other high priority SEA programs or non-SEA
high priority programs.
Overview: NVN Supply Efforts and the Impact of U.S./Allied
Interdiction
The principal objectives of the U.S./allied interdiction campaign
have been to destroy supplies and the means the North Vietnamese have been
using to ship them to South Vietnam, and to raise the cost to the North
Vietnamese of continuing their war effort in Southeast Asia. In an effort
to achieve these objectives, the U.S. has waged a large scale interdiction
effort since early 1965. The effort as focused primarily on North Vietnam
. until 1968 when it was shifted to South Tiaos1._ Since the bombing began the
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75,000 B-52 strikes and dropped 6 million tons of bombs (compared to a total
of 2 million tons in World War II and 635,000 tons in the Korean War).
Despite this effort, the North Vietnamese have continued to move men and
supplies and have persisted in the war against South Vietnam, have exerted
considerable pressure on the RANK and essentially immobilized the Cambodian
Government and forces, have met a major ARVN effort in Laos, and have mounted
offensives in both North and South Laos.*
Partially in response to the U.S./allied bombing and partially in
an effort to increase their flexibility, the North Vietnamese have greatly
expanded their LOC network in South Laos. Currently sixteen logistical
commands (Binh Trams), employing 40,000 to 50,000 personnel and an inventory
of 2,500 to 3,000 trucks,xx direct the flow of supplies along the LOCs in Sou
Laos. The system moves supplies chiefly by truck, supplemented by two
petroleum pipelines, various waterways, oxcarts, bicycles, and thousands
of human porters. Its 1,900 miles of road extend from Mu Gia Pass 300
miles to the tri-border area. Besides the Mu Gia Pass there are two other
entry corridors from North Vietnam -- the Ban Karai and the Ban Raving
Passes -- through which supplies are funneled into South Laos.
3
Disagreement exists as to how effective the U.S./allied interdic-
tion campaigns have been. It is clear that the campaigns have destroyed
some supplies and have disrupted to some extent the flow of material along
the LOC. But has the level of destruction and disruption been sufficient
to seriously limit the North Vietnamese's chosen strategy? Some argue that
the interdiction campaigns have not been very effective because:
-- Within the level of pressure imposed by the bombing the enemy
has essentially not been resource-constrained nor severly limited by the
capacity of the Laotian road net; the enemy can continue to ship supplies
into South Vietnam and Cambodia at somewhat higher rates if he is willing to
pay a price.
-- The enemy has minimized short-term disruptive effects due to
bombing by maintaining sizeable stockpiles in South Laos.
-- The cost to the North Vietnamese has not been great as most of
the trucks and material that are destroyed are provided by China and the
Soviet Union, and they are fully capable (and apparently willing) to provide
whatever level of military aid is needed for North Vietnam to continue their
war effort.
-- Captured documents and ralliers make a convincing case that
manpower considerations (training capacities, casualties, and personnel
resources) act as more of a constraint on enemy operations than supply
movements or the effectiveness of the U.S./allied interdiction campaign.
The Joint Staff believes this interdiction effort has significantly
impeded enemy supply flow and has imposed serious constraints on enemy
military intentions, strategy, and options in Southeast Asia.
**DIA believes the system has about 2,200 to 2,800 vehicles, of which
about 1,600 to 1,800 are cargo trucks involved in the movement of supplies.
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Others argue, however, that the interdiction campaigns have been
effective in that:
-- The pressure imposed on the enemy by the bombing in South Laos
has been a key factor in the enemy's choice of military strategy and tactics
in South Vietnam. Enemy supply throughput, despite the most intensive effort
ever. attempted, was about one-third the amount of the previous dry season.
The reductions in enemy forces since peak 1968 levels, the absence of
country-wide offensives such as reportedly planned for TET in 1969 and 1970,
reduced number of battalion sized offensives, and continued pacification
progress all suggest the enemy's combat actions are significantly constrainec
by the interdiction campaign.
-- The determination of the enemy's efforts in South Laos to
counter the effects of the bombing (e.g., additional roads, antiaircraft,
guns, and manpower) as well as North Vietnamese pressure on the Royal Laotia]
government to end the U.S. bombing of the Trail all suggest that the inter-
diction effort is impacting on desired enemy strategy for operations in
South Vietnam.
-- The destruction of materiel moving down the LOC (less than 2,60(
truck loads entered South Vietnam and Cambodia during the last dry season)
and the diversion of manpower for security of the network does inflict a
significant cost on the North Vietnamese.
-- There is considerable evidence that air strikes and supply
shortages have resulted in enemy morale problems and defections.
One point is clear, however. With the loss of Sihanoukville, the
-destruction of secure base areas in Cambodia, the support of additional LOC
security forces in South Laos, and the disruptive effect of LAM SON 719,
the burden on the logistic system in South Laos has increased substantially.
Supplies must be moved along this route if the North Vietnamese are to
continue their current level of war effort in South Vietnam and Cambodia:
In looking ahead to possible North Vietnamese intentions and
capabilities in 1972 and into 1973, DIA and CIA have assessed the capability
of the South Laos logistic system to support alternative North Vietnamese
.military strategies in South Vietnam. Though the burden imposed on the
logistics system has become significantly greater over the past year, CIA
concludes that if the current levels of interdiction effectiveness are
maintained, the logistics system would not be a constraint on any strategy
the North Vietnamese might want to adopt other than a major, country-wide
offensive in South Vietnam or a simultaneous offensive in MR I and Cambodia,
assuming no LAM SON or similar type operation is conducted. DIA believes
that if a LAM SON-type operation is conducted the enemy's capability to
carry out a major offensive in Cambodia, or simultaneous offensives in MR I
and II would be marginal because of logistic constraints. Without a LAM SO1
however, DIA believes the constraint imposed by the enemy's logistics systen
on their options Would be less severe.
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III. Tactical Air Sorties
A. Background Data
5
Trends in Sorties. Significant changes in the numbers and
mix of sorties have occurred in the past six years and important changes
are planned for FY 72 and FY 73. Tactical air,sortie dataare summarized
in the following table:
TACTICAL AIR SORTIES IN SEA
(Monthly Averages-in Thousands)
Total Attack Sorties
FY 66
FY 67
U.S.
RLAF
VNAF
Totals
Sorties by Area of
16.7
2.5
24.5
2.7
19.2
27.2
12.0
14.6
South Vietnam
Cambodia
. -
-
North Laos
South Laos
SI
3.5
a/
...-6
North Vietnam
3.7
9.1
Totals
19.2
27.3
Gunship Sorties
.1
.2
RLAF
VEAF
Totals
.1
.2
/ Excludes gunship sorties.
12/ Budgeted tactical air sorties,
2/ Not designated either North or
4/ VNAF has been budgeted for 6.5
8.2 thousand in FY 73, but the
sorties.
FY 68 FY 69 FY 70 FY 71 FY 72 FY 73
28.0 29.2
.4 .8
2.2 2.1
30.6 32.1
17.9
-
1.1
17.4
-
2.1
3.7
8.4
7.9
4.2
30.6
32.1
.5
.4
.5
.4
20.6
12.3
10.2
5.3
1.5
2.5
3.0,/
3.0(
3.1
3.1
4.9-41
6.8-
25.2
17.9
18.1
15.1
11.9
5.4
1.0
2.3
4.9
3.6
N/A
N/A
7.4
6.6
-
-
25.2
17.9
.6
.6
.7
.14
.1
.2
.2
.2
.1
.8
.8
.8
.8
1.7
1.4
excluding gunships.
South Laos in these years.
thousand tactical air sorties in FY 72, and
VNAF have been flying about 17% non-operationa
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Among the significant facts shown by this table are:
6
- RLAF and VNAF sortie capability is increasing and should
continue to increase over the next two years.
- Despite the sharp drop in U.S. sorties, overall tactical
air sorties continue at about the same level;
- As currently budgeted, total tactical air sorties will?
be slightly higher than current levels in FY 72 because of the increases in
RLAF/VNAF capability, but will drop in FY 73 as U.S. sorties are reduced.
- Sortie levels in South Vietnam have decreased
_significantly.
- Sortie levels remain high in South Laos; however, they
were lower in 1970 and 1971 than in 1969.
- Gunships have been performing an increasingly greater
share of the tactical air sorties. The allied gunship capability will
expand over the next two years.
Mission Allocation. The following table illustrates the
type of missions U.S. aircraft have been flying.
ATTACK SORTiES BY TY TE MISSION
(Percentage of Strikes by Target)
Mission
2/_
1968
2/
19b9
1970
1971
AAA/Radar
Truck Parks/Other
Area Targets
6
57
L.
66
5
62
7
42
Roads/Bridges
15
12
8
26
Trucks
7
s
5
14
13
Troops
10
10
9
10
Other
5
3
2
2
Average Sor-0.es
24,300
22,300
17,500
12,900
Per Month/
a/ As reported in BOMBA data.
b/ Based only on Jan and Feb data.
.2/ As reported in SEDAB files. ?
1:11 BOMBA data show approximately 1.4 attacks per sortie.
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The following observations can be made:
- The percentage of effort expended against air defense
targets has remained about constant.
7
- Missions against area type targets, which had remained
nearly constant, decreased noticeably during 1971.
- The percentage of effort against roads and bridges has
increased three fold over 1970 levels, and has doubled from 1968-69 levels.
- The increased emphasis on attacking trucks is evident in
the doubling of the percentage of effort against these targets in 1970-71
over 1968-69 levels.
Effectiveness by Type of Aircraft. Truck killing missions
have proven to be a relatively high pay-off mission. The table below shows
reported truck kills by type of aircraft for the current dry season.
AIRCRAFT LEFECTIVENESS VS. TRUCKS - SOUTH LAOS
Trucks Des/Dar
Per Sortie
(Nov 70 - Apr 71)
Total
Type Acft Sorties Trucks Reported Des/Dam
AC 119
14-86
2,193
4.51
AC 130
1,286
12,268
9.54
Total Gunship
1,772
14;461
=6
Al
22
8
.36
-A4
1,036
290
.28
A6
660
324
.49
A7
1,606
511
.32
B57G
804.
1,821
2.26 ---
F100
128
41
.3a
F4 ,
4,345
1,293
.30
0ther2/
15
4
.27
Total Tac Air
8,616
4,292
.50
Total Sorties
10,388
18,753
1.81
a/ Includes F-8 and TA-4; A-37s and F-105s flew no sorties against
trucks.
=
The table shows that gunships have been much more effective at killing
trucks than the other attack aircraft -- demaging and destroying about
16 times as many trucks per sortie. Of the gunships, the AC-130s kill
about twice as many trucks per sortie as the AC-119s. The most effective
truck killing tactical aircraft has been the B-57G, averaging about 2.3
trucks per sortie. The Navy's A-6 has averaged about .5 kills per sortie
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ApprovriclifOrgl*Pgga2iChti'- of the tactical aircraft have been averaging between
.25 and .35 trucks per sortie.
8
While the number of A-1 sorties shown in the preceding table are
insufficient to providea valid indication of A-1 effectiveness against
trucks, data from previous years are more conclusive. For example, during
the 1969/70 dry season USAF A-is flew 2,332 sorties against trucks in Soutl
Laos, destroying or damaging 1,271. Their effectiveness, 0.55 trucks per
sortie, was higher than that of all tactical aircraft flown during the
1970-1971 dry season, except the B-57Gs. However, it should be noted that
the A-is do not have the survivability of faster aircraft in areas of high
anti-aircraft threat.
The wide difference in truck kills per sortie suggest that change
in the mix of aircraft could increase the number of truck kills with the san
sortie level, or achieve the same number of truck kills at reduced sortie
levels.* For example, if additional gunships are substituted for tactical
aircraft, additional truck kills would be possible at the same sortie levels
Shifts within types of tactical aircraft could also increase truck kills
as in the past the Aels and currently the A-6s are achieving 1.5 to 2 times
the number of kills per sortie as the other tactical aircraft (except for
B-570s).
Where Truck Kills Occur. Figures 1 and 2 on the following pages
show where truck kills by gunships and fast-moving aircraft took place during
April 1971. The target boxes lettered A through D are the areas which were
subjected to intense B-52 strikes from October 1970 to February 1971.** The
area of the LAM SON interdiction program is also outlined. The arcs represen-
the aikm threat envelope. During April 1971 the B-52 activity in the boxes wal
well below the levels of previous months.
The figures point up a number of interesting facts:
- The lettered boxes through which the majority of the truck
traffic passed and which were supposedly made less trafficable by the intense
bombing were not lucrative truck killing areas for fast-moving aircraf.xx*
The SAM/AAA threat can be presumed to be the reason for the lack of gunship
activity in those areas.
- The largest proportion of the fast mover truck kills occurred in
the northern area of the logistics system, whereas the gunship kills occurred
primarily in the central and southern areas.xx**
*The Joint Staff believes that all of the elements must be considered in
the truck killing mission.
The boxes described in this paper include not only the area of the
original COMMANDO HUNT V Interdiction boxes, but also the areas subjected to
intense bombing when the enemy began bypassing the original boxes. Each box
is approximately 20km x 20km.
xx*The Joint Staff says that numerous truck kills occur in the boxes (due
to B-52, TAC AIR radar strikes, and time delay ordnance) but are never
reported.
****The Joint Staff state that the reasons for the higher gunship truck
kills in these areas were that, (1) gunships, can always operate on southern
routes, but are frequently restricted from operatinzifern high threat
areas, and (2) gunships are .s-ebtlik1ROMOR017t2QPiPteus`t ruck traffic
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?
SOUTHERN
LAOS
LEGEND
* Location at which one or
more trucks damaged or
destroyed
SAM Threat Envelope -- Shown
as 20-mile arcs from estimated
locations during majority of
1971 dry season. Suspected
sites in S. Laos near end of
dry season shown as dotted
lines.
TRUCKS DAMAGED OR DESTROYED
IN SOUTHERN LAOS
April 1971
BY GUNSHIPS (AC-119, AC-130)
SOUTH
VIETNAM
? ?
:' ?
?
??-a.????
?
??
?..
?
? ??'?'
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LEGEND
4.
SOUTHERN
LAOS LAOS
Location at which one or
more trucks damaged or
destroyed
*NORTH
Box-
VIETNAM \
? ? . . ?
.4.-- ?
10
TRUCKS DAMAGED OR DESTROYED
IN SOUTHERN LAOS
April 1971
BY FAST-MOVING TACTICAL
AIRCRAFT
SOUTH
VIETNAM -
..1
?
? ?? ?
- -
"7 z.
SAM Threat Envelope -- shown
as 20-mile arcs from estimated
locations during majority of
1971 dry season. Suspected
sites in S. Laos near end of
dry season shown as dotted
lines.
?S ?
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- The suspected SAM sites in Laos appeared not to deter
either fast-mover or gunship strike activity as numerous truck kills took
place within these SAM-threat envelopes.
- The success of the gunships in interdicting trucks on the
egress routes late in the dry season is evidenced by the number of kills
in the southern portion of the Laotian panhandle.
B. Requirements for U.S. Tactical Air in FY 72-73
Because of the basic disagreements concerning the overall effec-
tiveness of the interdiction effort and the dearth of "hard" data upon
which to base an analysis, it is most difficult to estimate "requirements"
for tactical aircraft. However, the impact of marginal sortie rate changes
on interdiction effectiveness can be estimated. In light of this, two
approaches are used to provide a framework within which to examine tactical
air sortie levels for FY 72 and FY 73. The first approach begins with the
current soqie rate (the-U.S. has been flying an average of 12,000 fixed
wing attack sorties monthly) and considers the impact on effectiveness
resulting from planned changes in air operations in SEA. The second approach
by determining the number of sorties required for the most essential tactical
air missions, establishes a benchmark of the number of aircraft needed to
perform the most critical missions as well as provides a lower bound which
should not be breached if lower sortie options are considered.
While agreeing with the principle that maintaining the level
pf total U.S./allied air operations effectiveness is more important than
maintaining the numbers of U.S. sorties, the Joint Staff does not subscribe
to the implications which this study draws from the combination of the above
statement of principle, and the following discussion of the impact of
VNAF/RLAF increases, impact of increased effectiveness and additional gunships
and impact of reductions in least effective sorties.
*An attack sortie is an aircraft sortie whose primary mission is to
deliver destructive air-to-ground ordnance on the enemy. This includes
strike, flak suppression, armed reconnaissance, interdiction, and close air
support. Combat air patrol (MIG defense) sorties are generally not classi-
fied as attack sorties but are included in this discussion since the same
aircraft are being used interchangeably for attack and CAP in SEA.
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'Variations from Current U S. Sortie Levels
Three factors should be kept in mind when examining the Lmpact,
variations in current U.S. sortie levels will have an overall interdiction
effectiveness. The first is that there are planned increases in the VNAF/
RLAF tactical air capability. The second is that a significant increase
in effeCtiveness per U.S, sOrtie should occur -- resulting from continued
improvements in sensors and weapons systems and changes in the mix of sorties
And the third is that changes in effectiveness can be achieved by varying the
number of those sorties which seem to be least effective.
The Impact of VNAF/RLAF Increases. The VNAF and RLAF have been
averaging about 3,200 and 2,200 monthly attack sorties in FY 71, respectively.
Under current planning the VNAF is expected to increase to 4,900 monthly attac:
sorties in FY 72 and 6,800 in FY 73. The RLAF should 'increase to about 3,000
attack sorties monthly in FY 72 and FY 73.. To assess the effect of these
increases a basis for comparing a VNAF/RLAF sortie with a U.S. sortie is
needed. Because of the differences in such factors as range/payload, loiter
time, and mission flexibility which tend to favor the U.S. aircraft there
is some question as to what basis is most appropriate. One approach is to
trade off the VNAF A-1 and A-37 sorties and the RLAF T-28 sorties on a one-
for-one basis with U.S. aircraft, arguing that this is not unreasonable as
an F-4 sortie is now carrying only about 21 tons of ordnance -- less than
the ordnance capacity of an A-1 and A-37 (which represents 85 to 90 percent
of increase in VNAF/RLAF sortie capability), although still greater than that
of a T-28. A second approach -- resulting in a more conservative estimate
is to base the trade off on tonnage of munitions per sortie. Present
munitions loading factors provide for about 2.75 tons per U.S. sortie
and about 1.4 tons per VNAF/RLAF sortie, resulting in a trade off factor
of about 1.9 VNAF/RLAF sorties for each U.S. sortie. This results in an
anticipated monthly VNAF/RLAF sortie increase which equates to an added .
capability of about 1,300 U.S. sorties in FY 72 and 2,300 in FY 73.
The table below summarizes three ways this added capability might
be viewed in relation to changes in U.S. sortie rates.* Using the FY 71
sortie rate as a base, Case 1 shows that by holding U.S. sortie rates
constant in FY 72 and FY 73 the added capability would result in,a net
increate in effeCtivenett (measured in terms Of FY 71 sOrtie equivaleftts),
Case 2, using the FY 71 U.S. sortie rate as the Adjusted Capability Level,
illustrates that U.S. sorties could be reduced to 10,700 and 9,700 in FY 72
and FY 73 without reducing effectiveness from current levels. Case 3, with
the currently budgeted U.S. sortie rate as a base, shows the resulting levels
of effectiveness when this added capability is considered.
*The criteria for the-..three cases used in the table and in the tables
on the following pages are:
Case 1 - The FY 71 sortie rate is used as the base for both
FY 72 and FY 73. Adjustments are added to this base.
Case 2 - The FY 71 sortie rate is used as the
in both FY 72 and FY 73. The "Base Sortie Rate" is the U.S
must be flown for effectiveness .to remain at FY 71 levels.
Case 3 - The "Base Sortie Rates" for FY 72 and
currently budgeted. Adjustments are added to this base.
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IMPACT OF VNAF/RLAF INCREASES ON SORTIE CAPABILITY
(Average Monthly Sorties)
13
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 .
FY 72
FY 73
.FY 72
FY 73
Babe Sortie Rate
12,000
12,000
10,700
9,700
VNAF/RLAF Increases
1,300
2,300
1,300
2,300
Adjusted Capability
13,300
14,300
12,000
12,000
FY 72 FY 73
10,200
5,300
1,300
_2)22
11,500
7,600
a/ The Joint Staff says that as a larger share of the total air effort
it Shifted to the allie8 we mut recognize the faCt that their
operations are not wholly under our control and some loss of
effectiveness will be realized beyond that which is a function
of performance and load carrying capacity of their aircraft.
Impact of Increased Effectiveness and Additional Gunship.s. As our
ability to develop more precise target data continues to improve through the
use of advanced sensors and better intelligence data, a more effective screen-
ing of proposed targets and thus an increase in effectiveness per sortie flow'
should be possible. Similarly, through the use of advanced weapons such as
laser and electro-optically guided bombs and advanced CBU munitions, greater
effectiveness per sortie should be realized.
- -
Under current plans allied gunship capability in FY 72 will increase
by six AC-130s. One approach to quantifying the possible trade off of these
six additional gunships for tactical air sorties is to consider them in terms
of truck killing capability. In the current dry season campaign it took
about 16 tactical air sorties to kill the same number of trucks as was killed
with one gunship sortie. Thus, these six gunships in terms of truck killing
might be traded off with about 2,300 tactical air sorties per month I During
the peak months of the current dry season we were flying about 2,000 tactical
air sorties monthly against moving trucks. About 300 of
needed to keep trucks off the road during daylight hours
not operate. Because of this constraint, the additional
be traded off with only about 1,700 tactical air sorties
and FY 73 when assessing the possibility of reducing U.S
holding effectiveness constant (unless a shift away from
aircraft on other target-types is also undertaken).
these sorties are
when gunships do-;
six AC-130s can
per month in FY 72
. sorties while
targeting tactical
It is difficult to estimate with confidence the precise increase
in capability that might be achieved with the improvements in target selec-
tion, munitions, and weapon systems and the addition of the gunships.
However, using the 2,300 or the 1,700 monthly sorties (depending on the case
beiniconsidered) as an estimate of the added Capability due to the additiona
gunships and adding a 10% increase in capability due to improvement's in tar-
geting selection and weapon systems appears to provide a reasonable estimate.'
*Gunship/tactical air sortie trade offs consider that three tactical
air sorties are required as escorts for each gunship sortie.
xxThe Joint Staff cannot subscribe to a linear trade off of gunship
for tactical air sorties as prescribed in this rationale. As previously
noted, gunship effectiveness is a direct result of tip combined effects
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a Lime.
Below is summarized the impact of this added capability depending
upon the manner in which it is viewed in relation to the current U.S. sortie
level. Case 1 again shows the net increase in effectiveness if the current
sortie rate is held constant in FY 72 and FY 73. Case 2 illustrates the
levels to which U.S. sortie rates could be reduced without degrading effec-
tiveness. And Case 3 shows the resulting levels of effectiveness when these
improvements are considered.
IMPACT OF INCREASE IN PER SORTIE EFFECTIVENESS
(Average Monthly Sorties)
Case 1
Case 2 Case 3
FY 72 FY 73 FY 72 FY 73 FY 72 FY 73
Base Sortie Rate 12,000 12,000 8,000 7,300 10,200 5,300
VNAF/RLAF Increases a/ 1,300 2,300 1,300 2,300 1,300 2,300
Improved Effectiveness +3 500 :113_15oo +2,700 +2,400 +3,300 +2 800
Adjusted Capability T800 17,800 12,000 12,000 14,800 10,400
The difference in the number of sorties added due to improved sortie
effectiveness results from (1) differences in the number of tactical
sorties that can be traded off for the added gunships (because of
the constraint of flying a minimum number of tactical air sorties
against trucks to keep them off the roads in the daytime), and (2)
differences in the base number that the 10% factor is applied to.
Impact of Reductions in Least Effective Sorties.* In examining the
impact in variations from the current sortie level, it is useful to assess
the relative effectiveness of sorties directed at various target categories
and consider the impact on effectiveness of variations in the numbers of
sorties direeted against target categories which appear to be least effective
,
One target category that might be considered is Traffic Control
Points (TCPs). From October 70 through March 71 there has been an average
of 3,000 sorties monthly targeted against TCPs. The concept of a TOP is
essentially one of area denial -- to impede the flow of supplies. Although
occasionally these sorties have been successful at closing sections of road
for short periods of time (less than a day and usually for only a few hours)
and thereby temporarily impeding the movement of supplies, it is likely this
level of effort could be varied somewhat without having a major impact on
overall effectiveness.
A second target category that might be considered is labeled
Miscellaneous. From October 70 to March 71 there has been a monthly average
of about 1,500 Miscellaneous sorties in South Laos. Some of these sorties
have struck tanks and bulldozers, but some of them have also been expended
on targets of doubtful value such as ox-carts, pack animals, and caves.
It is likely that some variations could be made in this category without
significantly impacting on tactical air effectiveness.
The Joint Staff betieves that the following discussion is of
little validity maintaining that if were feasible to identify in
advance those sorties which turn out in retrospect to have produced
App44461feoPReWaseefi066/01?tailK6P86111647nikilii1W66e611121en scheduled
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If one-LalfibfoituksiispFdALRDPSORCeR2OROMA?11.49P1IP-third of
tlikplINYieict)FARAteTgsPisce laneous targets are re-allocated against more
lucrative targets (e.g., trucks or truck parks and storage areas -- when
based on good intelligence), a net increase in effectiveness could probably
be realized. Assuming one-half of these re-allocated sorties represent a
net increase in capability, the table below shows the impact of this re-
allocation in relation to the sortie rates for the three cases.
15
IMPACT OF SORTIE RE-AULCATION ON CAPABTT,ITY21
(Average Monthly Sorties)
Case 1
Case 2
Case 3
FY 72
FY 73
FY 72
FY 73
FY 72
FY 73
Base Sortie Rate
12,000
12,000
7,650
6,800
10,200
5300
VNAF/REAF Increases
+1,300
+2,300
+1,300
+2,300
+1)300'
+2,300
Improved Effectiveness
+3,500
+3,500
+2,450
+2,400
+3,300
+2,800
Sortie Re-Allocations
[phone]
+600
+500
+850
ill-oo
Adjusted Capability
17;800
-18,800
12,000
12,000
15,650
10,800
a/ The Joint Staff states that the responsible field commanders no
are in close contact with the daily tactical situation constantly
strive for the most effective application of available resources
within the constraints of air operating authorities and enemy
intelligence. The Joint Staff also says that there is no identi-
fied breakthrough in force management or targeting techniques
which will permit maintenance of the same effectiveness with a
significant reduction in the weight of effort applied. As new
tactics, techniques, and equipment are introduced, the enemy also
strives to improve his posture by the employment of heavier defenses,
surprise tactics, continued expansion and improvement of the LOC
network, and innovations in his methods of moving supplies through
? the system. These actions and counteractions tend to offset each
other to the end that total impact on the enemy remains a direct
function of weight of air effort applied.
Minimum Essential Sortie Levels*
The Second approach is to establish a minimum essential sortie
level by estimating the number of sorties needed for the four most important
tactical air missions: close air support, gunship escort, combat air patrol,
and interdiction. This estimate has two purposes: (1) it represents an
estimate of tactical air requirements for the most critical missions, and
(2) it establiSheS a floor which should not be breached if reductions in current
sortie levels are considered. Estimating sortie requirements by mission area
is used only to provide a basis for determining the magnitude of the total
requirement; it does not imply that sorties should actually be managed or
controlled in this manner. The field commander should retain the flexibility
to manage the sorties as necessary.
Close Air Support. Close air support for U.S. combat troops is
the most essential tactical air mission; the amount of close air support per
maneuver battalion should not be reduced. From October 70 to June 71 an
average of 35 close air support sorties per month were provided each U.S.
*The Joint Staff believes the discussion in this section, continuing
to paragraph C on page 17, seriously understates the minimum sortie levels
required and should be balanced by the views of the responsible field
commander. COMUSMACV' s comments onfti-t. _i9436kF02EoRtickwacia3Latbacis are at
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Approved For Release 2006/017 1720RD01300030011-9 16
maneuver battaliOn in Vietnam. Under current redeployment planning there
would be an average of 20 maneuver battalions in SVN during FY 72 and four
in FY 73. To maintain the same amount of close air support per maneuver
battalion would require 700 tactical air sorties monthly in FY 72 and 140
monthly in FY 73.
However, as U.S. forces redeploy, the enemy may be capable of
applying greater military pressure on the remaining U.S. maneuver battalions.
In light of this it may be prudent to increase the number of close air support
sorties to 40 per maneuver battalion in FY 72 and FY 73. This level of effort
would require 800 sorties monthly in FY 72 and about 150 monthly in FY 73.
Because the RVNAF Improvement and' Modernization Program has not
provided a build-up in 1/NAP capability as rapidly as the ARVN has expanded,
?there will be a decline in the number of close air support sorties per ARVN
maneuver battalion unless U.S. sorties are provided in the interim. If the
entire VNAF capability is used for close air support in FY 72, an average of
27 sorties per maneuver battalion would be available. Increasing this level
of effort to 30 sorties per battalion per month in FY 72 would require an
average of almost 600 U.S. sorties per month.
Data on the level of close air support the U.S. has; oeen
providing the Cambodians are limited as these sorties have been aggregated
in other categories. Because the 1/NAP have been providing their own close
air support in engagements in Cambodia, the level of U.S. effort is not
believed to be great (on an average monthly basis). A level of 200 per
month in FY 72 and 100 per month in FY 73 is believed to be adequate.
Close air support in North Laos has been averaging about 30
sorties per month'. Assuming this level of effort is held constant, a minimum
of about 1,600 monthly U.S. close air support sorties are considered essential
in FY 72 and about 300 in FY 73.
Gunship Escort. Because gunships are the most effective weapon
against trucks, and because they are vulnerable to AAA fire, it is essential
that tactical aircraft escort the gunships. Presently, three F-4 escorts are
provided for each gunship sortie. Current planning provides for a monthly
average of 700 and 350 gunship.sorties in FY 72 and FY 73. If each of these
is accompanied by three tactical air escorts, gunship escort would require
2,100 and 1,050 sorties monthly in FY 72 and FY 73. These escort sortie levels
would enable all gunships to operate in relatively high threat areas.
Combat Air Patrol. Assuming B-52 strikes are continued, tactical
aircraft will be needed for combat air patrol against the .MIG threat. Each .
cell of three B.-52s is protected by two F-1-1-s. During the last two years,
no B-52s have been challenged by a MIG, however, the F-4s are undoubtedly
an important deterrent. Current plans call for an average of 1,000 B-52
strikes monthly in FY 72 and 650 monthly in FY 73, therefore about 700
monthly tactical' air GAP sorties are needed in FY 72 and about 450 in FY 73.
Gunships do not require GAP sorties as the F-4 escorts flying flak suppression
are also capable of providing a defense against MIGs.
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Interdiction. The missions included in this grouping are those
with the objective of reducing enemy capability by disrupting his logistics
system by destroying his supplies as they are moved toward his area of
operations and by forcing him to divert additional men and effort to his
logistic effort. In South Laos, armed reconnaissance against trucks during
daylight is an important mission. Tactical aircraft are used to force trucks
to move only at night when gunships can be used most effectively. From
October 70 through March 71 there has been an average of about 300 sorties
monthly flying armed daylight reconnaissance against trucks. This sortie
level should be maintained in FY 72 and FY 73. ,In addition, about 200 sorties
monthly are probably essential in South Laos to hinder enemy road repair
crews, to strike the waterway logistics system, and to strike truck parks and
storage areas. Though difficult to estimate, a total of about 200 inter-
diction-type sorties 'are also probably eSsential in South Vietnam and North
Laos and about 200 additional in Cambodia in order to adequately disrupt
the enemy's logistics system. Thus a total of about 900 monthly interdiction
sorties are considered essential in FY 72. Because of the anticipated
improvement in RVNAF and Cambodian forces in FY 73, it is estimated that
essential U.S. interdiction sorties can be reduced to about 500 per month in
17 73.
The table below summarizes the minimum essential tactical air
sorties for FY 72 and FY 73. If U.S. gunship sorties are maintained at the
FY 72 level in FY 73, an additional 1,050 tactical air sorties (for gunship
escort) should be added to the FY 73 total.
MINIMUM ESSENTIAL SORTIES
(Monthly Averages)
FY 72 FY 73
Close Air Support 1,600 300
Gunship Escort 2,00 1,100
Combat Air Patrol 700 450
Interdiction 900 _500
Total 5,300 2,350
.a.2 The Joint Staff points out that these figures bear no resemblance
to the views of the field commander. (See footnote on page 15
and Tab 2.)
C. Variable Sortie Demands and Rates
It is important to recognize that wide variations in sortie needs
result from weather and enemy activity patterns, changes in combat activity,
and other factors. ,This is evident, for example, in the variations in sensor-
detected truck movements in South Laos (a large proportion of U.S. sorties are
allocated to countering this truck mo,rement).
MP mut
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SENSOR DETECTED TRUCK MOVEMENTS -- SOUTH LAOS
(Fiscal 1971)
July
3,219
November
7,662
March
43,326
August
1,637
December
20,612
April
31,620
September
470
January
32,324
May
19,971
October
939
February
38,915
a/ Shown are both north and south bound movements.
1.8
,
These fluctuations in the need for sorties indicate that a procedure should
be developed to encourage lower sortie levels during periods when needs are
low. There are infrequent but intense periods when demands for sorties
reach peaks beyond that normally experienced even during the dry season
the recent LAM SON operation is one such instance.
The table below illustrates the variations in sorties flown to
date in FY 71; the monthly variation in sorties resulting from wet and dry
season truck movements is evident as well as the peak demand for sorties
in March during LAM SON 719. Fluctuations are greatest for F-4, A-7,
,and gunships, which are the aircraft most used for attacking trucks during
the dry season. The increase in B-57 sorties are resulting from their intro-
duction into the theater.
U.S. ATTACK SORT.I.LS - SEA
By Aircraft Type
Type
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
Mo.
Ave
-
A-1
624
551
529
498
432
305
224
144
216
198
372
A-4
1,890
1,633
1,462
859
1,043
932
1,887
1,959
2,114-
2,067
1,585
A-6
-902
626
470
407
527
820
648
690
836
611
654
A-7
918
945
742
773
1?,123
1,463
1,289
1,644
1,893
1,655
1,245
A-37
1,264
1,270
1,097
470
704
1,088
1,021
876
992
939
972
B-57
-
-
-
6
52
160
239
212
283
249
120
F-4
5,017
4,346
3,506
3,677
4,521
5,520
5,924
5,656
7,286
5,363
5,082
F-100
2,482
2,906
1,840
1,209
1,523
2,121
2,331
1,794
2,273
1,801
2,028
Gunships
315
347
327
304
390
64o
738
733
839
801
543
Other
1,023
823
505
6o
1
14
19
37
102
56
264
Total
14,435
13,447
10,478
8,263
10,316
13,063.114,320
13,745
16,834
13,740
12,864
a/ The Joint Staff points out that, in addition to variations induced.
by weather factors a major factor in the August to November 1970
AwfWgcliEqr Ifteat,Sie 26giltO3i1le:ctEei-ERDPaokfritkobDfr3toi6AiAy6iz at ions
(NSDM-77) and subsequent qui/lance and interpretation to -En field.
Troll errAnyr
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D. Sortie Level Options For FY 72-73
The two previous sections (B and C) suggest it would be
appropriate to consider establishing sortie rates for FY 72 and FY 73
with the following three characteristics:
19
1. A variable sortie rate for use during periods of normal
operations -- this would take into account the fluctuation in sortie
demands during the wet and dry seasons and reasonable variations in enemy
activity. The exact number of sorties flown would be at the discretion
of COMUSMACV.
2. Provide a 30 day surge capability above the ceiling of the ,
variable rate -- this would provide a capability to meet peak needs (e.g.,
a LAM SON-type operation).
3. Budget munitions for the midpoint of the variable range and
establish the fore structure to support high end of range. COMUSMACV
would be permitted to "bank" any munitions not used below the budgeted
average for use later in the year.
A sortie rate with these characteristics would have the flexibility
_
to meet the normal fluctuations and the high points in enemy activity rates,
yet would allow the realization of the significant savings associated with
reduced average sortie levels.
The table below outlines the currently Budgeted, the JCS proposed,
and two lower level sortie options (each with one variant) which incorporate
the three characteristics noted above.
Budget/Fiscal Guidance
JCS Proposed
Option 1
Option LA
Option 2
Option 2A
La/
TACTICAL AIR SORTIE OPTIONS
(Monthly Sorties)
Concept
No. Sorties
FY 72 FY 73
Ceiling 10,200 5,300
Level Rate 10,000 8,000
Variable Rate 6-8,000 4-6,000
W/Surge 10,000 7,700
Same as Option 1 except 6 additional AC-130
gunships are added to the force.
-Variable Rate 4-6,000 3-4,000
W/Surge 7,700 5,000
Same as Option 2 except 6 additional AC-I30
gunships are added to the force.
The Joint Staff point8 out that the sortie rates proposed in
Option 1, 6-8,000 for FY 72 and 4-6,000 for FY 73; and Option 2,
4-6,000 for FY 72, approximate the reductions of 25% and 50% which
COMUSMACV describes at Tab 2. Option ? 2, with 3-4,000 sorties
proposed for FY DAIiiant; 426Mb04306030041aently
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Budgeted/Fiscal Guidance Option. This sortie option would provide
a significantly greater total allied capability (level of effectiveness) in
FY 72 than the current level as the increases in VNAF/RLAF capability, per
sortie effectiveness, and a limited re-allocation of missions more than.
offset the reduction in numbers of U.S. sorties (as noted in Case 3 on
page 15, there would be an additional capability of about 3,500 monthly
sn'tiet). I Y t theMoAge'te-d opUon woula I5rovIde slightly less capability
than the current sortie level.
JCS Proposed Option. The JCS proposed option would also provide
a significantly greater total allied capability in FY 72 than is provided
by the current sortie level (an additional capability of about 3,500 monthly
sorties). This option would also provide a greater level of effectiveness
in FY 73 than the current level (as noted in Case 3 on page 15, there would
be an additional 1,000 to 2,000 monthly sortie capability). For both years
the increases in VNAF/RLAF capability, per sortie effectiveness, and a
limited re-allocation of missions more than compensate for the reduction
in numbers of U.S. sorties.*
Option 1. This option calls for a variable monthly sortie rate
of 6,000 to 8,000 in FY 72 and 4,000 to 6,000 in FY 73 and the capability
to surge to peak levels (10,000 sorties per month in FY 72) for up to 30
days if the military situation dictated such a rate. Under this option,
and assuming an average of 7,000 monthly sorties are flown, total allied
capability in FY 72 would remain slightly below the current level as the
increases in VNAF/RLAF capability, per sortie effectiveness, and a limited
re-allocation of missions will just about offset the reduction in numbers
of U.S. sorties (note Case 2 on page 15). In FY 73, total allied effective-
ness would be Y'educed to somewhat below current levels, assuming an average
of 5,000 monthly sorties was flown. If the high end of the range was flown,
total allied capability would be only slightly below the current level.
Effectiveness considerations aside, the average of this variable rate is con-
siderably above the number of estimated essential sorties for both fiscal:years.
Option 2..A. This option is the same as Option 1 except that six
additional AC-130 gunships (above the six already planned) are added to
the force. The six gunships would cost S30 to S40 million for modification
and probably would not be available until mid-FY 72, thus they would increase
total allied interdiction capability under Option 1 by a monthly average of
about 1,000 sorties in FY 72 and about 2,000 in FY 73. This would raise
total allied capability to about the current levels for both FY 72 and FY 73.
*The Joint Staff does not believe that this option would provide a
significantly greater total allied capability in FY 72-73 as they believe
this conclusion is based on undue optimism about VNAF increases and the
possibility of improved effectiveness.
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Option 2. This option provides for monthly rates of 4?00o to
6,000 in FY 72 and 3,000 to 14,000 in FY 73 with a surge capability of
7,700 sorties for up to 30 days in FY 72. Assuming an average of 5,000
sorties per month are flown, total allied capability would be
below current levels (about 2,000 to 3,000 sorties below the current level
.as is evident in Case 2, page is). In FY 73, total allied capability would
be significantly below the current level (about 3,000 to 4,000 below), as
the increases and improvements would not fully compensate for the reductions
in numbers of sorties. In FY 72 the average of this variable rate is
slightly below the number of estimated essential sorties; in FY 73, it is
about 1,000 sorties above.
Option 2A. This option is the same as Option 2 except that six
additional AC-130 gunships (above the six already planned) are added to
the force. The six gunships would cost 330 to S40 million for modification
and probably would not be available until mid-Fl 72, thus they would increase
total allied capability under Option 2 by a monthly average of about 1,000
sorties in FY 72 and about 2,000 in FY 73. Total allied capability would
be about 1,500 sorties less in FY 72 and_1,000 sorties less in FY 73.
E. Alternative Methods for Performing Interdiction Missions
Increased Gunships for U.S. and Allies. As previously noted the
truck-killing capability of gunships has proved far superior to that of
fast moving tactical aircraft. An increase in the number of gunships,
beyond that already planned, and a corresponding reduction in tactical
air sorties could be made without any decrease in the effectiveness of the
air interdiction program. However, such trade offs are not without limita-
tions, as gunship operations are limited to night operations and to areas
where they can survive the antiaircraft threat. Hence, a limited number of
fast moving tactical aircraft will be needed for daylight operations and for
sorties in high threat areas., By making minor shifts in the mission allocat-
ion, it is 'still possible to substitute additional gunships for fast moving
tactical aircraft.within those constraints.
At A gurithip tortie COttt AbOut timet at MUdh at a fighter
aircraft sortie (352,000 -- which includes three escorts -- versus about
8,500) and during the current dry season has been killing about sixteen times
as many trucks per sortie, this trade off appears Very favorable.*
*The Joint Staff believes this cost comparison is not valid because the
gunship is only able to work in a semi-permissive environment under conditions
of marginal moon illumination, and relies solely on fighter type aircraft for
the maintenance of a workable environment.
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Slower Moving Aircraft. Many of the sorties presently flown by fast-
moving U.S. aircraft (e.g., F-4s) could probably be replaced by A-1 or A-37
sorties flown by VNAF and RLAF pilots at no reduction in truck killing
effectiveness, and at significant savings. Allied A-1 and A-37 sorties are
estimated to cost about S3,200 compared to about S9,000 to S11,000 for a
U.S. F-4 sortie. While no data are available for A-37 effectiveness against
trucks, the A-1 tiasS 'achieved a higher-kin ratio 'against trucks -611b.a that?
of the F-4 .(:'55 versus 30):*
Simple Aircraft for Allies. Consideration is being given to more
simple, lower cost aircraft for our SEA allies. The Air Force is currently
conducting tests of an armed, STOL aircraft as part of a broader Air Force
program designed to evaluate counter-insurgenCy aircraft for our SEA allies.
During the coming dry season, the Air Force program is expected to include
tests along the RAIN border of both the concept and the use of these aircraft
for the interdiction role.
IV. B-52 Operations
A. Background Data
As shown in the table below, the use of B-52s in Southeast Asia
increased in parallel with the buildup of U.S. forces to a peak of 1,770
monthly sorties in FY 69.
Area of Operations
South Vietnam
Cambodia
North Laos
South Laos
Total Sorties
B-52 SORTIES
(Monthly Averages)
FY 66 FY 67 FY 68 FY 69 FY 70 FY 71
280 520 920 1,340 870 190
6o 90
_
4o loo 190 43o 530 84o
320 620 1,110 1,770 1,460 1,120
-"As is evident these sorties were flown primarily in South Vietnam
until FY 71 when the emphasis was shifted to South Laos. This shift is a
reflection of the improved pacification situation in South Vietnam and the
reduction in large unit engagements and also a reflection of the increased
use of B-52s against the enemy's infiltration and supply routes in South
Laos.
Significant trends have also occurred in the types of targets
B-52s have been attacking.
*The Joint Staff believes this discussion is incomplete because it
does not address the low survivability of the A-1 nor the lack of range of
the A-37. In addition, the Joint Staff says the truck kills achieved with
these slow moving aircraft were achieved with U.S. pilots and the VNAF pilots
will probably not be able to achieve the same ratios because the VNAF pilots
do not generally have a proven night flying combat capability nor the facility
to. ?PeiWiihictlF092G6Vidietir?tS iiiliN461W-6.664$*
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B-52 MISSIONS
(Monthly Average)
23
FY 71 Breakout by Period
a/ Wet Season Dry Season LAM SON
FY 69 FY 70 FY 71? (July-Oct) (Nov-Jan,Apr) (Feb,Mar)
SVN
897
83
355
745
110
11
166
40
7
272
62
13
78
20
1
26
11
0
Area Targets
Enemy Troops
Not reported/other
S. Laos
1,335
866
213
347
99'
' 3r-t
Interdiction Boxes
-
244
-
647
16.9?/
Area Targets
218
516
461
634
230
403gi,
Enemy Troops
9
9
80
11
25
3991
Other
200
2
'2
5/1
10
8
Subtotal
427
527
817
699
912
979
Cambodia
Area Targets
53
84
119
40
67
Enemy Troops
5
10
14
6
6
Other
1
0
1
0
0
Subtotal
59
94
134
46
73
Total SEA
1,762
1,452
1,124
1,180
1,057
1,089
% Area Targets
% Area Targets
Interdictio
Boxes
63%
63%
91%
91%
63%
85%
- 87%
87%
33%
94%
46%
61%
a/ Totals by area do not agree precisely with the numbers in the previous
table as this data is from another source.
b/ During the peak of the LAM SON operations (March 1971), B-52s flew 592
sorties against troops and 306 against area targets in the 20-by-30
mile LAM SON area itself.
- B-52s have been used primarily against area targets (storage
areas, depots, truck parks, and building complexes) throughout Southeast Asia.
In FY 70, 91% of the B-52 sorties were reportedly flown against area targets,
and in FY 71 the figure has been about 63%. In FY 71, two new types of targets
were developed:
- Interdiction boxes placed at the entry points of the Ho Chi
Minh trail into Southern Laos from North Vietnam (the Mu Gia, Ban Karai, and
Ban Raving Passes and the DMZ By-Pass). These special area targets accounted
for over 60% of the B-52 effort in the dry season period November - January
and April. The B-52s which were attacking area targets in South Vietnam
and South Laos in the wet season were shifted to the interdiction boxes in
the dry season.
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- Close air support against massed enemy troop targets. In
the month of March 1971 during the LAM SON 719 operation, almost Loo sorties
against enemy troops were flown in the 20-by-30-mile LAM SON 719 area.
. B-52 Sortie Needs In FY 72-73
Because of the large amount of ordnance they can deliver,
B-52s provide a unique capability against area targets such as truck parks,
supply storage areas, building complexes, and troop concentrations. B-52s
have also been useful in critical tactical situations -such as Kie Sanh and
LAM SON 719 when heavy and concentrated firepower was needed. Further, all-
source intelligence and ralliers indicate that B-52s have a significant
psychological or "terror impact" on the enemy because of the lack of warning
associated with their high altitude operation. However, the complexity of
the factors affecting the employment of U.S. airpower in Southeast Asia,
many of which cannot be quantified, and the limited available data on our
B-52 operations make it difficult to estimate the overall effectiveness of
B-52 sorties and to determine precisely the level of sorties we should plan
to fly in SEA..
Several important factors should be kept in mind when considering
B-52 sortie levels.
- The fact that at this time a significant reduction in enemy
overall capabilities and determination during FY 72-73 cannot be anticipated.
With the continued redeployment of U.S. ground forces, it would therefore
seem prudent to assume that the tactical situation in Southeast Asia will
require an effectiveness in air operations not substantially lower than in
FY 71.
- With the constrained DOD budget, the high cost of a B-52 sortie
(about 40,000 -- includes 57,000 for aircraft providing anti-aircraft and SAM
suppression and ECM support) represents a significant drain on resources.
- Recent improvements in technology, such as the use of
advanced sensors and improved tactical air munitions (such as fuel air
explosives), could allow the use of tactical aircraft against some targets
that formerly only B-52s could strike effectively.
- B-52s should be used against only those targets which
justify large concentrations of firepower on an area basis. As our ability
to find and validate these targets continue to improve, the use of B-52s
should become more selective, thereby necessitating fewer sorties to maintain
the same level of effectiveness, and increasing effectiveness for a given
sortie level.
In considering sortie levels for FY 72 and FY 73, this study
examines the available B-52 data to determine the relative effectiveness
of B-52s in different missions. This should permit better estimates of
the impact of various FY 72 and FY 73 sortie rates,
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As pointed out in section A, the four major roles in which
B-52s were used in FY 71 and the percentage of effort devoted to them are:
- Attacking selected area targets (63%)
- Dropping ordnance in interdiction boxes (22%)
- Attacking troop concentrations/enemy base areas
- Providing close air support (5%)
(5%)
Attacking Selected Area Targets
The effectiveness of B-52s against enemy supply depots is the
most difficult to assess quantitatively because little information is avail-
able on strike effectiveness. There are a number of reasons for this:
- Due to the high altitude of B-52 operations (36,000-40,000
feet), flight crews are generally unable to observe bomb damage and rarely
is there a ground observer on the scene.
All soUrde intelligence Can frequently be Correlated with
B-52 strike areas and times, providing evidence of specific strike results.
These samples, however, are not sufficiently large for statistical inference.
- Although secondary fires and explosions are means of gauging
lucrative target areas, estimates of destruction are very speculative.
As our intelligence indicates that most enemy supply depots are
small and widely dispersed, it is reasonable to conclude that the amount of
supplies destroyed per sortie is probably very small. Forcing the NVN to
disperse their storage areas, however, does introduce inefficiencies and
therefore increaes to some extent the cost of moving the supplies.
Dropping Ordnance in Interdiction Boxes
As was evident in section Al B-52 strikes were concentrated
on four interdiction boxes in South Laos during the 1970/71 dry season. -
During the LAM SON operation, however, most of the interdiction-box sorties
were shifted temporarily to the 20-by-30 mile Route 9-Tchepone area.
The concept of the interdiction box is one of area denial; to
impede the input of supplies into the logistics system rather than to attempt
to destroy supplies. Because of the terrain and existing road network, most
of the supplies destined for SVN and Cambodia must pass through one of these
four boxes. By bombing on a daily basis it is hoped that sufficient obstacles
(e.g., craters, landslides, and fallen trees) can be created to impede the
inflow of supplies. As the North Vietnamese cleared these obstacles additional
strikes would create new obstacles.
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The objective was to damage the routes sufficiently to either
reduce the input of supplies or to force the enemy to surge truck movements
(thereby making the trucks more vulnerable to tactical aircraft and gunships).
B-52s are essential to the concept of interdiction boxes because they are
the only aircraft that can efficiently deliver the large amount of ordnance
required for area bombing.
Three methods can be used to provide a rough assessment of
the effectiveness of the interdiction-box*Pocept during the past dry
season.
Reduce Input of Supplies. Sensor data show that the B-52
interdiction box campaign did not reduce the overall flow of truck traffic
through the four areas. About 48,000 tons moved through the four boxes
from November 1 through March 30 in the current dry season, compared to
about 38,000 tons during the same period last year when the interdiction
box concept was not used. While this might be explained by differences
in the enemy's intentions, it at least indicates that B-52s cannot stop
the inflow if the enemy wants to input higher levels. The enemy's dry
season campaign started a few weeks later this year than last, but there
is little data to show whether the B-52 bombing in the target boxes was
responsible.
Delays in Truck Movements. If the B-52 strikes were having
a significant impact, days of high intensity bombing should be associated
with law truck traffic and vice versa. Graphs showing the day-by-day relation-
ship between daily supply throughput and bombing intensity in the four inter-
diction boxes are at Tabs 1 through 4. Tab 2 illustrates the sensor detections
of southbound truck movements through the box and the number of tons of ordnance
dropped by B-52s and tactical aircraft in the interdiction box near the MU Gia
Pass during the months of October through January. Graphs for Ban Karaiy Ban
Raving and the DMZ By-Pass are at Tabs 3-6.
???
While there were some time periods when the interdiction boxes
seemed to be effective, they were often followed by periods when the bombing
seemed to have no strong effect on truck throughputs. The bombing in all
the boxes seemed to be somewhat effective for at least parts of each month
examined (October 1970-January 1971), but there were many periods when truck
throughput did not seem to be related to bombing intensity. For instance,
for the box at Mu Gia (Tab 2), bombing intensity and truck throughput are
positively correlated (i.e., intense bombing and high truck throughput) in
late December and early January. By the end of January, enough bypasses
existed for most of the boxes to make the interdiction box concept lose
most of its effectiveness.
*The four boxes analyzed in this section are the expanded boxes described in
the footnote on page 8.
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Truck movements on days of high, medium, and low bombing
intensity are also examined in the table below.
IMPACT OF BOMBING IN INTERDICTION BOXES ON TRUCK MOVEMENTS
27
Box A Nu Gia Pass)
Number of Southbound Truckloads
Moving Through Per Day
Oct
Nov
Dec
5.4
10.1
8.1
Jan
Average
o
0
0
11.4 .
5.8
38.0
15.4
12.8
15.5
8.9
6.8
11.5
On Days of High Bombing
Medium
Low
Box B (Ban Karai Pass)
On Days of High Bombing
.7
7.9
15.6
13.3
10.1
Medium
2.6
6.7
12.0
31.0
14.4
Low
2.0
23.0
20.0
33.0
23.6
Box C (Ban Raving Pass)
On Days of High Bombing
.3
5.2
5.4
8.1
5.4
Medium
.8
4.1
6.2
13.4
5.7
Low
.8
13.6
10.3
14.6
11.0
Box D (DMZ by Pass)
On Days of High Bombing
.1
0
5.0
7.7
4.0
Medium
.2
.2
10.1
6.1
4.5
Low,
0
1.0
5.0
4.8
3.1
Except in Box DI the data indicate that there is some correlation between
days of highest bombing intensity and lower truck throughput and days of-i'
lowest bombing and higher truck throughput. There is no correlation on,
days of intermediate bombing as sometimes traffic is higher than when
bombs are less intense, and sometimes traffic is lower than when bombs
are more intense. These data suggest. that sizeable variations in B-52
strikes affect truck movements through the boxes.
Impact on Tactical Air Effectiveness. If the target box
concept only causes minor fluctuations in truck movements (i.e., it does
not reduce total supply input), its principal value must lie in increasing
the ability of tactical aircraft to kill trucks in and around the target
boxes by forcing the enemy to surge truck movements and use more vulnerable
routes. By examining the number of trucks destroyed and damaged in the._
areas within one shuttle run of the target boxes_ (the enemy drives his trucks
about 10 to 20 miles between shuttle points) an assessment of the B-52s
impact can be made. these data are shown in the table on the following page.
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TRUCK SORTIF EFFECTIVENESS
(January-April 1971)
Within 5-10_4i1es of_Interdiction Boxes Other .Total
Box A Box B Box C Box D Total S. Laos S. Laos
No. Truck Sorties
1,288
717
480
4o6
2,891
6,000
8,891
Trucks D/D
432
342
154
141
1,069
2,042
3,111
Trucks per Sortie
.34
.48
.32
.35
.37
.34
.35
Gunships
No. Truck Sorties
1
4
27
16
48
1,514
1,562
Trucks D/D
5
8
116
133
262
13,601
13,863
Trucks per Sortie
5.00
2.00
4.30
- 8.31
5.46
8.98
8.88
B-57
No. Truck Sorties
76
0
1
1
78
613
691
Trucks D/D
131
0
1
2
134
1,509
1,643
Trucks per Sortie
1.72
1.00
2.00
1.72
2.46
2.38
2/ Includes A-1, A-4, A-6, A-7, F-4, and F-100 sorties.
b/ Includes AC-119 and AC-130 sorties.
The data show that in two boxes (Boxes B and D) the fast moving tactical
aircraft are more effective than elsewhere in South Laos; in one box (Box C)
they are less effective; and in one box (Box A) equally effective. For the
four boxes in total, the fast movers are slightly more effective, but not
significantly so. Both the gunships and the B-57s are less effective in al
box areas than elsewhere in South Laos. Overall, the use of B-52s in the
interdiction boxes have not resulted in any increase in the effectiveness of
tactical air and gunship sorties against trucks.
In summary, the data indicate that the use of B-.52s in inter-
diction boxes has not had a great deal of effect on supply movement. This
conclusion is supported to some extent by pilot sightings and all source
intelligence which indicate that the enemy has been able to maintain a
fairly high level of traffic through these four entry routes during the
entire dry season. Few landslides have been caused and the terrain has
become so pulverized that little is left to create an obstacle. The B-52s
have averaged at best only a few hours of bombing per day in each box and
the enemy has apparently been able to drive around and through the craters
once the bombs have stopped falling. His principal impediment has been the
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use or 'time aelayea oranance. However, in many piaces tne soil nas become
so soft through constant bombing that the delayed ordnance is buried well
underground and creates little damage when it later explodes.*
Attacking Enemy Troops In Base Areas
Little quantitative evidence exists to measure the effectiveness
of B-52s in bombing enemy troops in base areas. Prisoner interrogations
and ralliers indicate that B-52s have a significant psychological or "terror"
impact on the enemy because of the lack of warning associated with their
high attitude operation. However, the two primary factors which lead to
the reduction of these sorties in FY 71 likely will lead to further reduc-
tions in FY 72 and FY 73:**
-- As the main force situation in South Vietnam continued to
improve, fewer enemy base areas existed to provide good targets for B-52s.
Enemy troops were not often massed in sufficient quantities to merit the
use of B-52s.
-- Targets became mOre difficult to identify at fixed locations
for a sufficient period of time to enable B-52s to strike as the enemy
adopted more mobile, hit-and-run tactics.
Provide Close Air Support
In certain situations B-52s can be used for close air support.
B-52 strikes were used extensively in LAM SON 719 and in the defense of Khe
Sanh during the Spring of 1968 to help break up the massing of enemy troops
and to discourage enemy attacks.
There is little quantitative data available to assess the effec-
tiveness of B-52s in this role. It is clear that B-52s are not as capable
as tactical aircraft in delivering ordnance close to friendly positions.
B-52s are normally targeted against suspected enemy troop concentrations in
base areas. Reports of the effectiveness of these strikes are mixed.
There are some circumstances where the B-52 plays an effective
close support role. These are circumstances where large enemy forces concen-
trate for major attacks and our intelligence can locate them with some pre-
cision. There have been several ARVN reports on the LAM SON operation
indicating that the B-52s had been extremely effective in causing casualties
in such a situation. Similar evidence is available from the Khe Sanh battle
in 1968. On balance, however, it seems reasonable to conclude that the use
of B-52s in the close air support role is relatively inefficient unless the
the enemy is massed.
*The 7 AF COMMANDO HUNT V report concluded and the Joint Staff agrees
that the interdiction box strategy provided major benefits by delaying the
enemy's timetable for the 70-71 dry season, provided time to build up the
truck killing force of B-570s and AC-130 gunships, and required the enemy
to expend extra effort constructing bypass routes.
xxThe Joint Staff finds no evidence which would lead one to the conclu-
sion that the relatively few FY 1971 attacks against troops in base areas
will be further reduced in FY 1972 and 73. On the contrary, there is reason
to believe that, as the U.S. continues accelerated redeployments, the enemy
will revert to larger scale operations, which would require massing of troops
in base areas.
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The available quantitative data indicates that there is a wide
variation in the effectiveness of B-52s against differing targets. Strikes
against massed enemy troops (e.g., LAM SON or Khe Sahn) are quite effective.
Strikes against the interdiction boxes and enemy troops in base areas are
far less effective. The fact that some sorties appear to be only marginally
effective, in conjunction with recent improvements in tactical air munitions
and the continuing trend toward smaller unit actions, indicates that it may
be possible to consider reduced B-52 sortie levels in FY 72 and FY 73.
C. Sortie Level Options for FY 72-73
The previous section indicates that a variable sortie rate
with a Surge capability would also be appropriate for B-52s. Such a rate
would have the flexibility to meet the normal fluctuations and the high
points in enemy activity rates (e.g., a LAM SON situation), and at the same
time would allow for the savings associated with reduced average sortie
rates.
Under this variable rate munitions should be budgeted for the
mid-range and the force structure sized to support the high end of the range.
The table below outlines the currently Budgeted, the JCS
proposed, and two lower level sortie options based on a variable rate.
B-52 Sortie Level Options
----(Monthly Sorties)
NumberSorties
FY-72
FY-73
Budget/Fiscal Guidance
Ceiling
1,000
650 -
JCS Proposed
Level Rate
1,000
1,000
Option 1
Variable Rate
700-900
400-700
W/Surge
1,000
84o
Option 2
Variable Rate
400-700
300-500
W/Surge
84o
600
Budgeted/Fiscal Guidance Option. This option would provide at
least the same level of capability as the current level in BY 72. Capability
in BY 72 could probably be increased above the current level if: (1) full
advantage is taken of the improvements in advanced sensors (thereby eliminat-
ing unproductive sorties due to poor intelligence) and tactical air munitions
(substituting tactical air sorties where appropriate), and/or (2) emphasizing
those missions in which 13-52s seem to be most effective. In BY 73, capability
would likely be reduced somewhat -- depending on which type of missions the
sortie reduction affects -- although the need for B-52 sorties probably will
also be reduced as there should be fewer large unit actions.
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JCS Proposed Option. This option would result in the same as
the current level of capability in both FY 72 and FY 73. As noted in the
Budgeted option, it would probably result in an increased level of capability
if advantage is taken of the improvements in advanced sensors and tactical air
munitions.
Option 1. This option introduces variable monthly sortie rates
of 700 to 900 in FY 72 and 40o to 700 in FY 73, with average rates below the
FGM levels in both years. In addition there would be a 30 day surge capability
of 1,000 and 84o sorties in FY 72 and FY 73. A 700 to 900 rate in FY 72 would
provide a rate close to the rate recommended by JCS and contained in the
Budgeted option; however, by emphasizing the need to keep the sortie level
as near 700 as militarily prudent MACV should be encouraged to attack only
the more lucrative targets. If the improvements noted above are utilized,
overall capability should remain at close to current levels. The variable
rate for FY 73 will not provide the maximum capability recommended by JCS;
however, it would provide a capability to fly the same level of effort
against close air support and enemy troop targets as was flown in support
of LAM SON.
Option 2. This option provides for significantly lower average
rates than the Budgeted and JCS Options; monthly rates of 40o to 700 in FY 72
and 300 to 500 in FY 73. This option is based on the belief that B-52 sorties
can be reduced substantially without increasing the risk of carrying out our
military operations in SEA to unacceptable levels; that with the improvements
noted above and reductions in the least effective B-52 sorties (e.g., inter-
diction box sorties) overall effectiveness will not be reduced too far. This
option would provide in FY 72 a capability to fly the same level of effort
against close air support and enemy troop targets as was flown in support of
LAM SON. In FY 73, this option would provide a capability to fly about 70
percent of the level of support flown in LAM SON.
V. Fiscal Irgact of Alternative Sortie Levels
The table below summarizes the Budgeted/Fiscal Guidance tactical
air and B-52 sortie levels, the JCS proposed levels, and the two lower level
options developed in the sections III and IV with their associated costs and
savings for FY 72-73.
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Tactical Air
Budget/Fiscal Cuid.
JCS Proposed
Option 1
Option lA b/
Option 2
Option 2A b/
B-52
Budget/Fiscal Guid.
JCS Proposed
Option 1
Option 2
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SORTIE LEVEL OPTIONS
Concept
Ceiling
Level Rate
Variable Rate
W/Surge
Same as Option
AC-130s.
Variable Rate
W/Surge
Same as Option
AC-130s.
Ceiling
Level Rate
Variable Rate
W7Surgen
Variable Rate
W/Surge
32
No Sorties_ Added Costs OW
FY 72 FY 73 FY 7-2 FY 73
10,200 5,300
10,000. 8,000
6-8,000- 4-6,000
10,000
7700
1 plus six more
4-6,000 3-4,000
7,700 5,000
2 plus six more
1,000
1,000
7-900
1,000' '
4-700
840
650
1,000
4-700
840
3-500
600
4145
-$300
-$255
446o
420
+$30
- 490
18o
-$445
-S170
435
+100
-$80
-$40
-$180
-$100
a/ Added cost over present Budget and Fiscal Guidance.
b/ Considers procurement costs and added sortie costs of gunships.
The table shows that maintaining the tactical air and 13-52 sorties
at the levels proposed by the JCS would cost about S180 million in FY 72 aid
$560 million in FY 73 above currently budgeted levels. The added FY 72 -
cost is due to maintaining a constant capability throughout the year rather
than phasing down near year-end. Reducing both tactical air and 13-52 rates
below the budgeted levels results in sizeable savings as under Option 1 above
$.380 million and $20 million would be realized in FY 72 and FY 73, and under
Option 2 about $670 million and $280 million would be realized in FY 72,
and FY 73. The additional gunships of Option lA and 2A would reduce the
savings by about $45 million in FY 72 and $10 million in FY 73.
Because it is not likely that additional DOD funds will be made
available to support sortie levels above currently budgeted levels, higher
rates would necessitate the reallocation of FY 72 and FY 73 funds and would
require several sizeable program cuts. On the other hand, the savings
realized with sortie levels below the budgeted levels would provide for high
priority programs for SEA such as the development of a STOL-type aircraft
interdiction capability for the VNAF, additional counter-insurgency aircraft
for our Asian allies, and/or other concepts now under study which should help
provide the South Vietnamese with an adequate capability to provide for their
own defense. Alternatively, the funds could be used for non-SEA priority
programs such as modernization programs for all Services.
Approved For Release 2006/0Ter3
MTN 720R001300030011-9
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01720R001300030011-9
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01720R001300030011-9
Approved For Release 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP80R01720R001300030011-9
. TOP SECRET
.SUMMARY OF U.S. AND ALLIED AIR FORCE STRUCTURE
In addition to sortie levels and their effectiveness,
discussed in the body of the study, a third factor bearing
on the adequacy of SEA air support is the available force
structure existing at any point in time. It is the deployed
force structure in combination with the associated mater-
ial support which finally determines our ability to counter
enemy activity with air power. The following table compares
the currently programmed force structure for FY 72 and 73
with that of 71. For purposes of comparison an "as of"
date of 31 January was selected as it corresponds to the
usual period of peak logistic activity.
COMPARISON OF AIR FORCE STRUCTURE IN SEA
(as of 31 January)
(aircraft
FY 71 possessed) FY 72 (UE) FY 73 (UE)
USAF B-52 (43) (43) (33)
B-57 1 Sqn 1 Det 1 Det
(9) (10) (10)
F-4 13 Sqn 13 Sqn 7 Sqn
(202) (23)1) (126)
F-100 4 Sqn
(73) -- --
F-105 1 Sqn 1 Sqn 1 Sqn
(16) (12) (12)
A-1 1 Sqn 1 Sqn
(28) (25)
A-37 1 Sqn 1 Sqn
(28) (25) --
AC-119., ,2 Sqn 1 Sqn 1 Sqn
( 31). (16) (16)
AC-130 1 Sqn 1. Sqn 1 Sqn
.
/(11) (18) (18)
USN 3 CVA 3 CVA 2 CVA
(1.6 on line) (1.6 on line) (1.1 on line)
USMC A-4 1 Sqn
(25)
A-6 1 Sqn
(13)
F-4 1 Sqn
(14)
ONO Om.
-
-
Top sE)Mprripved For Release 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP80R01720R001300030011-9
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01720R001300030011-9
TOP SECRET
(aircraft
FY 71 possessed) FY 72 (UE) FY 73 (UE)
VNAF F-5 1 Sqn 1 Sqn
(19) (18)
_
A-37 5 Sqn 5 Sqn
(98) (90)
A-1 3 Sqn 3 Sqn
(58) (6o)
AC-147 1 Sqn 1 Sqn
(15) (18)
AC-119 --- 1 Sqn ?
-(18)
RLAF T-28
Ac-47
1 Sqn
(18)
6 Sqn
(1144)
4 Sqn
(96)
1 Sqn
? (18)
1 Sqn
(18)
(63) (86) (86)
(10) (8) (8)
TOP SECRET 2
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Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01720R001300030011-9
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01720R001300030011-9
I Ur btiviit. I
APPMVERVIRTGRIANUTP2006/03/17TE3A;RDR8 ORMININiff )500030011-9
The Joint Staff says that COMUSMACV's concept for the employment of
air assets in Southeast Asia during FY 1972 envisions sustained interdic-
tion in Southern Laos at or near current levels of effort to disrupt enemy
_logistical activity on a continuing basis. Planned U.S. monthly tactidal sortie
allocations for FY 1972 in Northern Laos, Cambodia, and the Republic of Vietnam
are 1,000 in each area with the remainder being applied in Southern Laos.
As stated by the Joint Staff, it is COMUSMACV's judgment that the planned
U.S. levels in each of the three areas. outside Southern Laos are the minimum
requirement and that any reduction in his overall authorization would have
to be absorbed in the Laotian interdiction program. COMUSMACV has provided
his estimate of the logistical consequences of both a 25 and 50 percent
decrease in sorties. It is his estimate that a 25 percent decrease in.
sorties would permit an additional 13,550 short tons of throughput, almost
tripling the amount of supplies available to the enemy. He further estimates
that a 50 percent reduction in air sorties would permit the enemy to increase
his throughput by 27,100 short tons.* COMUSMACV sees additional ramifications
resulting from a reduction in air interdiction in that large numbers of rear
service and security personnel would be freed from duties in the logistical
system and would be available for reassignment to combat units. AAA units
could be more effectively concentrated against the residual air interdic-
tion effort in Laos or relocated to support forces operating in RVN. As
to how the enemy would employ additional supplies available as a result
of a reduction in air sorties, COMUSMACV has submitted the following
comments. "The enemy presently requires more material in all locations,
however, his three areas of greatest concern will probably continue to
be RVN MR-1, COSVN (MR-3, MR-)-- and Eastern Cambodia), and the B-3 front.
Accordingly, exaMples of the impact that additional logistical throughput
would have on each of these areas have been developed.
a. The enemy could assign first priority to RVN MR-1. Approximately
one-third of the enemy units oriented against RVN are currently in or
adjacent to MR-1. Short supply routes would permit a rapid improve-
ment in the logistical posture of this sizeable force and a concurrent':
increase in the level of tactical activity. It is currently estimated
that the enemy has allocated to MR-1 3,400 short tons of the material
throughput this past dry season. If, for example, the 13,550 short
tons of throughput which would accrue from a 25 percent reduction in
air sorties were added to the supplies already being directed to MR-1,
he would be capable of eventually quadrupling the current rate of 137
attacks by fire per month while maintaining the same level of intensity.
At the same time the enemy could build reserve stocks in northern MR-1
base areas in preparation for efforts to isolate population centers,.
interdict friendly LOCs and overrun fire support bases. If stockpiled,
the additional materiel would support the 6.1 division equivalents targeted
e,gainst MR-1 for 133 days of sustained full scale combat operations.
*OSD(SA) believes that tactical air performance in Southern Laos during
FY 71 contradicts COMUSMACVs concern for the consequences of reduced numbers
of sorties when the effectiveness per sortie is increased. During each month
of the first three quarters of FY 71, there were about 1,400 less tactical
air and gunship sorties than in the same period of FY 70. However, in FY 71
truck kills have been about; double the FY 70 level and throughput into South
Vietnam aftd Cambodia ha, beer). about one-half that of FY 704
Approved For Release 2006/03/17.cm111172ORD01300030011-9
TOP S
Approved For Release 2r0p3/S7ECRETP8OR01720R001300030011-9
b. As a second illustration the enemy could send the additional
supplies to COSVN's area of operation, principally the areas of
MRs 3 and 4 and Eastern Cambodia. The most vital areas of RVN lie
within these boundaries, and it is here that the enemy must ultimately
prevail, if he is to win the war. Longer supply lines to COSVN would
not, however, permit the enemy to achieve results as rapidly as in MR-1.
The area would probably be of secondary priority initially but, as the
enemy's supply position improved in MR-1, the emphasis of the logistics
effort would probably shift to COSVN. It is estimated that the area
under consideration in this example has received 2,000 short tons
of supplies during the past dry season. In the event of a 25 percent
reduction in air sorties, the enemy could initially direct the addi-
tional 13,550 short tons of supplies as they became available to
forces in Cambodia east of the Mekong. There are presently 5.2 divi-
sional equivalents operating in this area and the additional materiel
would logistically support them for 154 days of sustained, full scale
combat operations.
.c. As a final example, the enemy could direct the increased logis-
tical throughput to the 3-3 front. The enemy has long regarded this
region as the stepping-stone to the populous coastal provinces. While
relatively short supply lines would permit quick improvement of the
communist logistical position, an increase in tactical activity would
not have the immediate impact of operations in MR-1, or be as critical
to enemy goals as activity in COSVN. The 3-3 front is estimated to
have received 920 short tons of materiel during the past dry season.
If the communists were to direct all additional supplies to this area,
a 25 percent diminution in air sorties would provide sufficient
materiel to logistically support a force twice as large as the 2.3
division equivalents currently in the 3-3 front for 173 days of
sustained, full scale combat.
d. In conclusion, a reduction in the air interdiction effort would
permit the enemy to significantly increase the capability of his forces.
Further, the amount of improvement in capabilities is directly related
to the degree by which the air sortie rate is reduced. If the current
balance of the Indochina War is not to be altered in favor of the enemy,
any reduction in air sorties must be avoided."
Approved For Release 2498/ISECZECT'80R01720R001300030011-9
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01720R001300030011-9
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01720R001300030011-9
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01720R001300030011-9
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