REMARKS OF ALEKSANDR YURIEVICH KAZNACHEYEV BEFORE THE OVERSEAS PRESS CLUB, NEW YORK CITY DECEMBER 17 1959

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R000200140018-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 19, 2002
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: December 17, 1959
• Content Type: SPEECH

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Remarks Of
ALEKSANDR YURIEVICH KAZNACHEYEV
Before The
OVERSEAS PRESS CLUB, NEW YORK CITY
December 17, 1959
Thank you ladies and gentlemen. I am happy to have this opportunity to share
with you and with people everywhere what I know about some of the activities of
the Soviet Government in Southeast Asia. I hope my knowledge of these deeds can
act as my modest contribution to the struggle of people everywhere against
communism. I also wish to present ideas about political developments within the
Soviet Union.
I do not approve of-the Soviet communist. regime not what is called the Soviet
Government. I came to disapprove even before I went abroad to Burma, although my
experiences in Burma helped me to understand more fully the evil of communism. I
watched the Soviet regime in action and I studied its methods and doctrines quite
thoroughly at special institutes designed for persons (like me) to be sent abroad.
My classmates and I were considered by the regime to be its first-line ideological'
fighters. For more than two years, I was a member of the Soviet Embassy in Burma.
During this period, I worked for Soviet Intelligence.
In June 1958, I found it impossible to continue to work for the Soviet com-
munist regime with a clear conscience. I decided to make my decisive step because,
first of all, I wanted to help in the struggle for freedom and democracy of my
own Russian people, as well as all other peoples enslaved by the communists.
Secondly, I decided to do it in order to help other nations endangered by communism
to preserve their freedom and independence. This was especially true about Burma,
a country which I came to love, and to which I feel a definite moral obligation.
in the Fall of 1957, while on leave in Moscow, I was informed by high ranking
KGB officers that I had been selected to work for the political intelligence group
in Burma. The two men who directed me to join KGB were Valdimir Us and Boris
Galashin, whom I knew in Burma as high ranking Soviet Embassy officers. They
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told me that I had been selected for KGB since I knew Burma, and the Burmese
language. This was a decision that I could not accept or reject. They were only
telling me what KGB headquarters had decided.
They had me sign a paper which was an oath to do my best in performing tasks
assigned by intelligence superiors and to keep deadly silent about my work. The
last sentence of the oath stated that, if I willingly or unwillingly revealed
secrets, I should be ready to accept any punishment, including the death sentence.
Us and Galashin gave me the false name of Kazakov. After this, they told me
what my duties would be for Soviet intelligence in Burma.
I was to translate from Burmese to Russian, secret documents obtained by
the Rangoon element of the Political intelligence group. I was to develop con-
tacts in Burmese political circles, in order to gather information. This would
lead to my developing "cooperative" politicians, in order to turn them into
paid Soviet agents. I was to establish contacts with foreigners in Burma, in
order to gather information on the work of foreign embassies and to penetrate
them. Lastly, I was to observe the behavior of other Soviet citizens in Burma
and report on them.
I had instructions that my intelligence affiliation should be kept secret
from other members of the Soviet Embassy in Burma, including Ambassador Shiborin
himself. The KGB is supervised by the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union. This organization plants its residents abroad under cover
as diplomats, Embassy workers, representatives of the State Committee for Cultural
Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS), SOVEKSPORTFILM, SOVINFORMBUREAU, and with
interpreters or technicians working with Soviet aid projects.
In Burma, the KGB unit's chief was Ivan Vozniy, who had the rank of Colonel
of State Security. Boris Galashin, the man who "recruited" me for intelligence
work in Moscow, had the cover rank of "Attache." He was responsible for my
political reliability (I wonder where Boris is now?)
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The assistant to the chief of the group was Igor Trushkovskiy. He had
the cover job of representative of VOKS in Burma and the rank of "Second Sec-
retary" and "Cultural Attache" in the Soviet Embassy.
Two other members of the group were Mikhail Vologzanin, who had the cover
job of SOVEKSPORTFIIM representative, and Dimitry Dityatev, who had the rank
of Second Secretary and was Head of the Embassy Consular Office. There are
of course other people, including special technical personnel such as radio
operators and code maker, who work only for the intelligence group.
The activities of the Soviet intelligence in Burma are to subvert the
nationalist political forces and politicians, gather secret information about
the Burmese Government and to carry out special psychological warfare. The
group also had the responsibility to observe and report on all Soviet citizens
in Burma, to discover the unreliable elements and those that had been influenced
by "capitalist" propaganda and surroundings. The group also carries out es-
pionage work towards the penetration of foreign embassies in Burma, especially
the American.
In their work, the KGB in Burma is responsible only to its headquarters
in Moscow. The Ambassador himself is kept under constant physical and technical
watch, and reports on his activities are regularly sent to Moscow by the group.
This intelligence group works with its agents in the political parties, such
as the pro-communist National United Front. The largest part of my work was the
translations of reports and documents of these agents who penetrated the political
parties, in addition to governmental departments and the Burmese Army.
The main bases from which the secret intelligence activity was carried
out are the offices in the Embassy, of VOKS, SOVEXPORTFIIM, and SOVINFORMBUREAU.
The group uses three separate units of special radio equipment for their work
in Burma.
The KGB element has a special assignment from the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to maintain contact with the legal communist
parties aboveground and the insurgent communists underground. These contacts are
maintained by exchanges of letters and messages and by secret personal meetings.
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Personal contacts can be carried out at very high level, such as that between
Bobodshan Gafurov, a member of Central Committee of CPSU who visited Burma, and
U Ba Nyein, a leader of the Communist National United Front. In Burma, I worked
as an interpreter at secret meetings between these two men.
One of the most important activities of the group in which I personally
participated was special psychological warfare that embraced the entire Southeast
Asian region. The Rangoon group of the KGB was regularly planting in the Burmese
press articles prepared in Moscow KGB headquarters.
These articles were forgeries about political parties and political leaders
of other countries of Southeast Asia, accusing them of being tools of imperialism,
dishonest and corrupt. They were aimed at isolating and liquidating anti and
non-communist parties and leaders who were working against communism. They were
also aimed at spoiling relations between the people of these countries and the
anti-communist world. There were forgeries about the American support of the
Indonesian rebels, American brigery of the Indian Finance Minister, frequent
violations of Cambodia's sovereignty and the "subversive" activity of Japan in
Southeast Asia. There were many, many more.
The complex planting of the articles in the Burmese press worked as follows:
1. Articles in the Russian language were received in Rangoon
from Moscow on microfilm, through intelligence channels, and reproduced
as photocopies at the Embassy.
2. I then translated the articles into English and Burmese. (I
replaced a KGB man named Ivan Rogachev in this job.)
3. The Moscow articles were then planted in Burmese newspapers,
through trusted Burmese agents.
I+. It was then my duty to check the articles after they had been
published in newspapers (both Burmese and English language) against the
original Russian text.
5. My notes on the accuracy of the translation and reproductions of
any variations from the Russian original, were sent back to Moscow, this
time through TASS channels.
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6. The Soviet Information Service (SOVINFORMBUREAU), TASS, Radio
Moscow, official Soviet diplomatic representatives abroad, and other
newspapers were then obliged to publish and redistribute these materials
all over the world as true stories.
The main Burmese newspapers used by the group for this work were the
Communist controlled "Mirror" and "Botataung," ahthough the "Peoples Journal,"
"The New Light of Burma," the "Path," the "Mandalay Ludu," and the English
language "Burman" were also used. The De,gon Publishing House was also exploited
by Soviet Intelligence in Burma.
One of the best examples of such fabrications was a pair of articles planted
in the "Mirror" by the Vozniy group, during the Spring of 1958, at the very peak
of Indonesian insurgent activity. One of the articles reproduced a letter, pur-
portedly from an Indonesian rebel leader named Sjamsuddin to American Ambassador
MacArthur in Tokyo. The other was purported to be from "Admiral Frost," of the
United States Navy, to another Indonesian rebel leader. At Ivan Vozniy's direc-
tion, I translated both of these "letters" from the Russian language photocopies
into English, and later checked the articles published in the Burmese language
"Mirror" against the original Russian photocopies. The Sjamsuddin "letter" was
dated March 15, 1958, but was published in the "Mirror" in May. In it, Sjamsuddin
asked Mac Arthur for help and talked of SEATO aiding the rebellion. The Frost
"letter," which was published in the "Mirror" in early June, advised the rebels
not to surrender and stated that the United States would continue to help them.
These articles were signed by the "Mirror's" "Special Correspondent in Djakarta."
These Rangoon "Mirror" articles were then distributed among Indonesian
political circles, played up in the world communist press and even re-published
in an Indonesian language newspaper the "Bintang Timur," which was also controlled
by Soviet intelligence.
This activity of the Rangoon intelligence group is only part of the large
Soviet press network throughout the whole region of Southeast Asia, including
India, Indonesia and Thailand. In Indonesia Soviet intelligence uses such news-
papers as the "Bintang Timur" and in India, "Blitz," the "Delhi Times." In Thailand
"La Patrie" was used in the same way.
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In Burma, there is now the celebrated Kovtunenko case, which has been going
on for many months. Kovtunenko is the TASS representative in Burma who, in the
Spring of 1959, published an article in the TASS bulletin which said three Burmese
newspapers (the "Nation," "Guardian," and "Reporter") were used by the American
Embassy to undermine Burma's policy of neutrality. This article was written in
Moscow originally, planted in the "Delhi Times," and signed by their non-existent
Rangoon Correspondent. The article was then sent to Rangoon, for distribution
through TASS channels. In this case, the Soviet propaganda machine did not work
well and a definite mistake was made in the last link of the chain. The channel
of distribution of this material was not properly selected and the editor of
"Nation" sued Kovtunenko for defamation of character. Kovtunenko hid out in
the Soviet Embassy, to escape trial. As far as I know, he is still afraid to
come out.
The intelligence group I have described is not alone in the Embassy, there
are other groups with intelligence duties. The GRU group or Military Intelligence
is operated by the Military Attache group. The former chief of this group was
Colonel Stryguine whose unsuccessful attempt to defect to the Burmese Government
is well known. Colonel Stryguine's replacement was to be Colonel Anatoliy Popov,
a highly experienced intelligence officer.
Another group is the Referentura, which is responsible to the Number Ten
Department of the Foreign Office in Moscow. In this group are intelligence
officers, such as First Secretary Maksin, and Ambassador's Secretary Aleksandr
Razvin, and another section of code makers and radio operators. The Referentura
is responsible for keeping files of all secret documents and communications
with Moscow. They also had the responsibility of reporting on the behavior
of Soviet citizens in Burma and for technical work.
An Economic intelligence service works through its economic advisor Vasiliy
Panov, who is the representative of the State Committee for Foreign Economic
Relations (GKES) in Burma. This group has definite intelligence duties.
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There is no doubt that the real intention of the Moscow and Peking regimes
is to achieve a Communist Burma. The original Stalinist plan for achieving a
Communist Burma through the armed efforts of the communist insurgents has de-
finitely failed. The insurrection was started on orders of Moscow in 1948, but
the Chinese Peoples Republic soon appeared and direct control over the Burmese
insurgents was passed to Peking. The failure of the insurgency was recognized
by Moscow in 1952, and all stress was shifted to bringing the communists to
power by subversion and other "legal" means.
The aboveground communist parties of the National United Front were as-
signed the main role in this new approach, while the insurgents had the support
task. Both were directed and supported by the Soviet and Chinese Embassies.
A determined, and to some extent successful, attempt was made to achieve power
by parliamentary means in the 1956 general elections, when with the financial
aid of the Soviet and Chinese Governments and coercion of the voters by the
communist insurgents, the National United Front won about forty seats in the
Burmese Parliament.
Conditions became quite favorable for the communists after the 1956 elec-
tions, especially after the split of the Anti Fascist Peoples Freedom League
in early 1958. The split occurred with the aid of Soviet intelligence. This
progress for the communists was interrupted in October 1958 when Prime Minister
U Nu transferred Premiership to General Ne Win. Several hundred of the subverters
and agents of Peking and Moscow were arrested and the Ne Win Government began to
achieve great successes in the liquidation of the communist insurgents.
Soviet and Chinese Governments plans were frustrated. The Soviet Embassy
in reports to Moscow labeled the Ne Win Government "pro-imperialist," "fascist"
and accused it of "liquidating the peoples freedoms and rights." The Soviet Em-
bassy was especially angered by the Ne Win Government's correct attitude of true
neutrality.
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As a result of the changed situation in Burma, a new plan has been developed
for the communist achievement of power. Two months prior to my departure from
the Soviet Embassy, the Embassy received a document from Moscow that gave the
official line of Soviet Government's actions in Burma.
According to the decision reached in Moscow and relayed to the Soviet Embassy
as guidance, the following efforts should be made in Burma:
1. To increase the support by all possible means to the Communist
National United Front.
2. Split the leadership of the Burmese Army by all possible means.
3. Split and weaken the influence of the Stable AFPFL.
The final goals of Peking and Moscow in Burma are the same, although there
are some differences in their tactics. Burma and C'mbodia along with Indonesia
are recognized to be in the sphere of influence of China while the recognized Soviet
sphere of influence includes, in this area, India, Ceylon and Afghanistan. The
immediate interest of Moscow is to have Burma as a weak but friendly neutral, with
the Communists working slowly towards achieving a communist government by parlia-
mentary methods. The insurgency is considered to be a lost cause by the Soviet
Government and even harmful to Soviet interests. The Chinese generally don't
believe in the usefulness of neutrality and has therefore maintained support of
the communist insurgents and kept the Burma border problem unsettled.
While the Soviet Government hopes to seize Burma's hand in order to more
easily seize her throat, the Chinese Communists endeavor to seize Burma's
throat directly. The result is the same.
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Now I would like to talk a little about my own country. I have read a good
bit of criticism of the USSR--some intelligent and some not. I want to give
some of my opinions about the country in which I was born, raised, and educated.
The Communist regime in the Soviet Union faces a general crisis. The
driving force of this general crisis is the immense contradiction between the
real interests of the people and the country on the one hand and the selfish
interests of the regime on the other. This general crisis reveals itself in
the way that today people cannot live in the manner and conditions which they
had yesterday; and the ruling class cannot rule the country in the way and with
the methods it used yesterday.
Every activity and policy, both foreign and domestic, of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government does not serve the interests
of the country, but of the regime. By the word regime, I mean the upper strata
of the ruling class as represented by the top party leaders and the Soviet
government.
All of the economic achievements of the Soviet Union have been made not
because of the Communist regime, but rather in spite of it. Today the regime
prevents the economy of the country from reaching a quicker, easier, healthier,
more efficient, all-sided development, in the interest of the people, rather
than the interests of the ruling class.
The Communist dictatorial regime deprives the people of practically all
of their personal and political freedoms and rights. Because of this, the life
of the majority of the people in the Soviet Union is basically abnormal and
unhappy. There are very few traces of democracy in the Soviet Union, as you
know democracy in the Free World.
Soviet foreign policy is criminal. Since the end of the Second World War,
it has been aimed at increasing international tensions, and preserving the cold
war and armaments race. It has endangered world civilization and therefore the
very lives of the people of the Soviet Union as well as elsewhere. The regime
seeks to expand its influence and control over other areas, and through this to
strengthen its position in the Soviet Union. The overall purpose of Soviet
foreign policy is to preserve and strengthen its power and control inside the
Soviet Union.
There is no single vital problem or question in the Soviet Union which
the Communist Party can claim it alone can solve. The Communist Party is not
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and artifical. It maintains itself in power only by force, suppression, terror,
slanderous propaganda, and tremendous falsification. It maintains its power with
the help of the iron curtain, the isolation of the Soviet people from other
people, the cold war, and the arms race.
This regime faces a general crisis, as it has ever since it took power in
1917. This general crisis is a contradiction between the interests of the
people and the interests of the ruling class. This general crisis reached
maturity on the eve of the Second World War, but the most dangerous point was
reached in the period surrounding Stalin's death. In 1953, the country was on
the verge of an explosion, which if it had happened, would have buried the
Communist regime. Stalin died just in time. It was urgently necessary for
the ruling class to take drastic measures to prevent this explosion. We can
only speculate about the form this explosion might have taken. The fact is that
the whole atmosphere in the Soviet Union had reached the utmost tension at
that time.
Drastic measures were taken by the Communist rulers. It had to abandon
Stalin's methods, which had been a complete fiasco. It had to introduce some
liberalization, relax political tensions, reorganize industry and agriculture,
and modify its foreign policy. The regime had to make definite concessions to
the Soviet people. All this process of liberalization and democratization was
nothing but a retreating by the regime. It was a step back from absolute and
unchallenged control over the country, and a step forward in an evolutionary
process. The culminating point of this first step was the 20th Congress of the
Communist Party, with its denunciation of Stalin.
The 20th Party Congress, and all of the changes leading up to it and
subsequent to it, seemed to be an indication of the strength of the regime. In
reality they were nothing but an indication of its true weakness. The events
which closely followed the 20th Congress leave no doubt about this. These events
were the uprising in Tbilisi, revolts and strikes in the concentration camps
throughout the Soviet Union, the Polish and Hungarian revolutions, and what is
especially significant, student demonstration and workers' strikes in the
Soviet Union.
Liberalization, democratization and changes temporarily lessened the gap
between the regime and the people, but at the same time undermined the very
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In general, economic and political conditions in the country improved,
but these improvements did not strengthen the position of the regime. The
liberalization, democratization and changes introduced produced an acute
necessity for further liberalization, democratization, and new changes.
For the first time in their lives, the Soviet people have enjoyed some
personal freedoms and rights. They breathe more freely, because they know
there can be no return to the overwhelming terror of the bloody Stalin period.
They are still deprived of practically all political freedoms and rights,
and many personal freedoms and rights. The first taste of freedom made them
feel and understand this more acutely. It made them desire and demand complete
political and personal freedom and rights.
The economic reorganization and changes introduced by Khrushchev were
only half-measures. They will not accomplish their aims unless further efforts
are made in the same direction.
The economy continues to be one-sided and unhealthy. The disproportional
development of the economy has reached such a state that its liquidation cannot
be delayed any longer. The highly developed heavy industry does not have the
necessary base of a proportionally developed agricultural and consumer goods
production. But this situation in the economy cannot be changed without a
cessation of the cold war and the arms race. People are living better
economically, and they are enthusiastic to get what they have a right to have
according to their labor.
The people in the Soviet Union now more and more clearly understand that
it is no one but the Soviet Government which is interested in the continuation
of the cold war and arms race.
So today the regime is again confronted with an extremely difficult situation.
The general crisis and the evolutionary process are now entering a new stage.
This present stage of the general crisis has its own characteristic features.
I think there are two of them.
The first feature is the fact that organized opposition to the Communist
regime is coming to life in the Soviet Union. Nowadays there is a necessity,
and what is especially important, the possibility, for organized opposition.
When speaking of organized opposition I do not mean the possibility for a
big opposition political party, but rather the possibility for people to discuss
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more or less freely vital questions of their lives, including political questions,
to exchange their thoughts, and through this to arrive at common understanding
and common decisions. Nowadays there are even possibilities for starting small
opposition groups, which work under various camouflages, and even underground
anti-Communist groups. Such things were completely unthinkable during Stalin't
time. Now they are possible.
The student demonstrations and workers' strikes in late 1956 and early
1957 were the first open indications of the existence of organized opposition.
Soon after the Hungarian Revolution, the students of Moscow University adopted
a resolution at a Komsomol meeting, which they sent to the Central Committee
of the Party. In this resolution, they demanded that foreign broadcast jaming
be stopped, that the foreign press be allowed free distribution and, most
significantly, that a two-party system be introduced in the Soviet Union. The
last was practically a demand for the liquidation of the Communist regime.
There are indications that the leading role of this opposition will be
played mainly by the technical intelligentsia and the so-called technocrats.
The existence of such an organized position is especially dangerous for the
regime and fills with new substance the whole evolutionary process.
The second feature of the present stage of the general crisis faced by
the regime is the drastic necessity to liquidate the unbalanced nature of the
economy. In order to do this, they must relax international tensions and slow
down the cold war and arms race. These are the main desires and demands of the
peoples in the Soviet Union today. The liquidation of the cold war, international
tensions, and the arms race are the key problems of the present stage of the
general crisis. The liquidation of the explosive atmosphere of terror and
suppression and internal political tension produced by them during Stalin's
period were the key problems of the previous stage of this general crisis.
Besides these two features, there is also the question of who will be
choosen by the ruling class to attempt solutions to the problems confronting
the regime. Among Soviet intelligentsia there is today definite speculation
that Khrushchev's group has used up its willingness and ability to undertake
further liberalization, democratization, and changes, and thus to preserve the
control of the regime over the country. There is speculation whether it will
be Khrushchev's or some other group from the ruling class which will be less
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be more willing and able to take the second step in the necessary retreat of
the regime. I say necessary because it is the only way for it to retain itself
in power.
Khrushchev's visit to the United States had definite aims. First of all,
he tried to present this visit as a recognition by the West and its leader the
United States, of the strength, successfulness, and thus the rightness of the
existence of the Communist regime. When speaking of the relaxation of inter-
national tensions, stopping the cold war and of disarmament, he has been
trying to deceive people again about the peaceful intentions of the regime.
At the same time, he definitely intended to give the impression that his group
is willing to take a step toward meeting the interests of the country and the
demands of the people. In his statements made in the Soviet Union after the
visit, he renewed his promises to lessen international tensions and stop the
cold war. He also promised to place more stress on consumer goods production
and to raise the standard of living of the Soviet people, which can be under-
stood as some sort of concession of the regime to the people.
By big promises and small concessions, Bhrushchev intends to weaken
popular opposition to the Communist regime in general, and opposition to his
own group from other groups in the ruling class, in particular.
His visit to the United States, and his statements, are indications of
his intention to keep the reins of power and not to surrender them to some
one else. He speaks about relaxation of international tensions not because
he is such a liberal man, but because the Communist regime which he represents
is forced to maneuver in the face of the new stage of the general crisis in the
Soviet Union.
All this can be understood as a sign of the beginning of the second step in
the retreat of the regime. Khrushchev's actions should not therefore be taken
as an indication of the strength of the regime, but quite on the contrary, as
an indication of its weakness. Like the maneuvers during the previous step,
they again can only temporarily reduce the general crisis, but at the same time
they will inevitably again further undermine the very foundation of the regime.
There is a definite evolutionary process going on in the Soviet Union.
Each step in the regime's retreat in the face of this general crisis is a step
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forward to the eventual burial of the Communist regime. It cannot be stopped.
It goes on because of internal forces. The policies of the Free World cannot
force the immediate fulfillment of this process, nor can they bring it to a halt.
But the policies of the Free World governments can hasten or slow this evolution
as they see fit.
The process will inevitably lead to the creation of a democratic system
in the Soviet Union, with a government in power which will serve the real
interests of the country and the people.
I want to touch on one more point of misconception and misunderstanding
on the part of some people in the Free World about the real nature of the
relations between the Russian nationals and the Communist regime of the Soviet
Union. There are people in the West who propagate the idea that this regime
represents and is supported by a majority of Russian nationals. This miscon-
ception shows itself in small points. People and the press frequently call
the Soviet Embassy the Russian Embassy, the Soviet intelligence service the
Russian intelligence service, Russian foreign policy instead of Soviet foreign
policy, and even instead of Soviet imperialism, Russian imperialism. This
misconception can go even so far and take such a harmful and dangerous form as
in the statement by the United States Senate concerning Captive Nations Week
last July. A definite idea can be seen in this statement that nations were
captives not of Soviet imperialism but of Russian imperialism.
The fact is completely ignored that the Russian nation is the first among
captive nations. The Russian nation has suffered perhaps more than any other
nation from Communism. It is the first victim of Communism and hence the first
enemy of it.
What we have now is a life and death struggle between Communism and the
Free World. There should be no relaxation in the face of the natural evolutionary
process now going on in the Soviet Union. The weaker the Communist regime is in
the Soviet Union, the more adventuristic will be its foreign policy and endeavors
abroad. The weaker it is, the greater will be its necessity to balance internal
failures by external successes.
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