LETTER TO ALLEN DULLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R000400470002-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 17, 1959
• Content Type: LETTER

State fept. review completed
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"Amn
~DOCIfl11ENT C19.
THE FOREIGN SERVICE -0~
OF THE
American Embassy,
SECRET
London.
16
DATE.
Dear Allen:
November 17, 1959.
I am enclosing a letter which I have just written
Elim O'Shaughnessy, our Charge d'Affaires in Belgrade,
describing a visit which I had with Tito in Brioni on
November 10.
As you will see nothing of any particular importance
came out of it. However, I feel that I was able to improve
his perspective somewhat in regard to our approach to some
of the issues which confront us.
There is no doubt that he has been hurt badly about
his inability to come to the States. Although I under-
stand the political difficulties which are involved, parti-
cularly in an election year, I feel that we should do every-
thing possible to work out some exchange of visits over the
next 12 or 18 months. There is no doubt that the President
would receive a whole-heartedly enthusiastic welcome in
Belgrade and that the Yugoslavs would be very flattered by
his visit there. This it seems to me would have important
implications in all Eastern European countries and, indeed,
in Russia itself.
Would it not be possible r him to stop at Belgrade
either on his way to or from oscow next spring? Then, he
could logically postpone Xitv return visit to the
US until after the election in November.
Although this trip has been a hectic one, I am glad
that I made it as it has given me a better understanding --
particularly of all the cross currents in Germany. I will
be home just before Thanksgiving and in Washington t`e
offing we~c:_ -
Allen Dulles,
Director (Cent
App %.s~iQj fJO:
"FwT 1~c t ~fF'
The Honorable (L
o~. ~a7er1
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Dear E.l im :
En route Brioni to Munich
November 10, 1959
My visit with Tito was well worthwhile although nothing
particularly moment came out of it. would have learned enough from it to JustI i vfy Your that
you
long trip from Belgrade and return. 'er eieve he
Ti
may have talked a bit more freely withome?th e m' I biir believe
hav aveo
don# if a State ,Depar'tment representative had d been present.
present.
Because the visibility at Belgrade airport delayed our
takeoff, we arrived at Brioni two hours late. This ea
the length of our actual conversation to reduced
As you know, Tito can speak simple E lish lndle over an
hoyr.
understands English well. He spoke and at apparently
when we discussed complicated topics. Serbo-Croatian, however,
handled by Mates, his Secretary Then the translation was
at Pula and stayed with us throughout ' who met us at the dock
Tito appeared well and strong,
stated at the beginning and was most cordial. I
ta dal cthe t that I had come to see him in a non-o from our official American position, Points that my views might differ
frankly, and that I hoped he would do likewI would
ise. I speakadded that
I had no intention of Aublioizirg our discussion in any way.
I opened the conversation by ay.
that
tI had had with him in reminding him ,of a talk
ate hdlhai March, 1957, on my way back to the
t he hat s had Cheri noted a visit the to the Soviet Union.
S
hsn~;es that were taking placedwith-
in the Soviet Union, and that although events in Budapest
/might
The Honorable
Elie O'Shaughnessy,
Charge d'Affaires,
American Embassy,
Belgrade .
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might slow down further changes, tSlowdown would be only
temporary. I also reminded him that during this visit he
had agreed that China might represent a bigger question mark
for the long haul than the USSR itself.
Tito replied that changes had taken place within Russia
as he had assumed they would, and that even greater and more
fundamental changes might lie ahead He then asked what I
felt Khrushchev's reaction might be to his recent trip to
the United States.
I said that one thin; at least must h,.ve been clear to
Khrushchev and that was our inherent good will towards all
people and our strong hope for a more durable peace.
Tito Immediately added that he was Clad that President
Eisenhower was going to India', because it was important to
assure India that she has good friends. However, he hoped that
this did not indicate a long postponement of the summit meeting.
replied that although some of our allies were rather
cool to a summit meeting, I assumed that one would be held,
perhaps in the early spring. Tito said that he hoped this
was the case, as it was vitally important not to allow the
world situation to deteriorate again..
I mentioned in passing that many people I had talked to
in his country and ours hoped that sooner or later -- possibly
on his way to Moscow in the spring --President Eisenhower would
visit Yugoslavia, and that after the 1960 election furor died
down, Tito himself might come to the United States. He of-
fered no comment.
I then charged the subject to China. What did he think
of developments there?
Speaking with considerable vigor.. Tito said that he was
very concerned about China and felt that the situation there
was politically very dangerous. He thought that the Soviet
Union was also concerned and that it would exert increasing
influence on China through economic pressures to patch up the
conflict with India. It was difficult for him to understand
why the Chinese could be so foolish as to destroy the goodwill
that they had worked so hard to create in India.
'I suggested
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I suggested that a'vert' profound difference existed
between the Russian and Chinese situations. Russia is a
relatively satisfied nation ,economically, with a few serious,
internal, non-political preseur$eto expand. By contrast,
China with 650 million dynamic people will be faced with a
basic inadequacy of resources over the years and with tempting
economic, political and military vacuums in Southeast Asia
containing the very resources of land and minerals which
China herself lacked. I said that many of us found an'alarm-
ing similarity here with the situations which set Nazi Germany
and imperialistic Japan on the road to open aggression. Tito
nodded his head and interjected: "Of course, 'Lebensraum'".
I added that many of us felt that this situation called
for a dual policy on the part of the United States and other
like-minded nations: first to.make it clear to the Chinese
that we would vigorously oppose any attempted military aggres-
sion with whatever forces were required; second, to consider
as conditions ebabie us to do so, what measures we might take
to make it easier for China to live within her present boundaries.
I suggested that.possibly we had as much to fear from the
failure of China's present economic efforts as from their
success, and asked whether he thought it might be possible
gradually to develop some degree of mutual Soviet-American under-
standing and even coordination in dealing with the problem.
Tito commented that this was an interesting analysis which
might under certain circumstances prove to be valid. At the
moment he did not feel that within China the economic pressure
for expansion could be as great as I suggested. Russia no
doubt was worried, but it was unlikely that the Chinese at
this stage would totally ignore Soviet desires for stability
in Asia, although they seems at the moment to be making a show
of independence, and even Intransigence.
What concerned him more'waa another long-range problem.
China was seeking to maintain her ties with the overseas
Chinese and assert their status as Chinese citizens. Was this
not an effort to recapture the vision of an all-powerful,
imperialistic China?
Tito went on to say that our China policy had contributed
to the present danger by isolating China and creating an oppor-
tunity for Mao to establish America as the enemy. This was
dangerous
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dangerous for everyone and could lead to war. The answer
for us was to accept China as a fact and
better relationships. That was why Yugoslavia hay alwayst
a
recommended recognition of Peking and her admission to the
United Nations.
When I asked if he thought the Kremlin was any more
anxious than our own government was to see China in the UN,
he laughed. Until recently he suspected the answer was "no",
and the proof was that the USSR always brought up the question
when it was least likely to be soberly discussed. However, he
now felt that the Kremlin=sincerely wanted the Peking Govern-
ment admitted to membership in the UN because it would have a
sobering effect on Chinese policy.
I pointed out that the China issue in America was a
highly emotional one for very understandable reasons. We
have had a long record of friendship of China -- our missionary
efforts, the Open Door Policy, Wilson's rejection of Japan's
demands, and indeed the Pearl Harbor attack itself which to a
degree was Japan's reaction to our refusal to accept Tokyo's
domination of the China mainland.
I added that we had done everything in our
suade the Generalissimo to introduce reforms within e Chinapwhile
he still had time, but that he had
military ~apacit greatly underestimated Mao's
well. Had their foresight indeed
been better, Stalin
thand we e Kremlin might
have
preferred a divided China just as the now v have
Germany. they prefer a divided
Whatever the possibilities might have been for establish-
ing relations with the new Chinese regime, they were destroyed
by China's entry into the Korean War in 1950.
Nor was the situation any easier now. Even if we agreed
to exchange ambassadors and to withdraw our c.
Peking government's entrance into the UN, Chinaowouldninsiste
on her sovereignty over Taiwan and block Taiwan's emergence as
a separate nation. Thus, I emphasized, recognition was an
academic issue and was likely to remain so.
Americans disagree, I said, about our position on
Quemoy Matsu, but there was no disagreement on our all-outcommi -
'ment to defend
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meet to defend Taiwan. Moreover the 9 million
Taiwan, regardless of Chiang, have a right to theirlownf
future. They are highly literate, relatively with widespread land ownership, and strongly anti-Communist.
If allowed to vote in a plebiscite, they would undoubtedly
choose independence as their first choice with some association
with Japan possible as a second choice. With the advent of new
weapons and missile systems, Taiwan's military significance
for us will decrease, I added, but the people of Taiwan, like
the people of Burma or Cambodia, would remain as important to
us as the people of Berlin.
Tito listened to all this intently and asked many
questions about the future of Taiwan and the characteristics
of the Taiwanese. He said that my view was new to him and
very interesting. He remarked, however, that American policies
customarily lagged behind events.
for instance, it took the United States muuchalongerrthantit did
the British to recognize?the potential role of the Partisans.
The same lag in American policies appeared in Iraq, Algeria,
and elsewhere. Cuba too was an example, although it was easy
for the Yugoslavs to identify themselves emotionally with
Castro's guerrilla struggles because of their own experience.
Now, he agreed, it is necessary for Castro to show that he can
govern.
I agreed that there was something to this criticism and
that indeed most Americans would accept it in greater or
lesser degree... However, among other things he had overlooked
the extraordinary record on land reform, cooperatives and labor
organizations which MacArthur had achieved in Japan; the many
improvements which we had encouraged on Taiwan; our strong
backing of Nehru's economic efforts in India; and indeed the
aid which we had given "socialist" Yugoslavia,
I added that there was a growing understanding in America
of the importance of genuine social, economic and political
reforms in world affairs, that this was in line with our own
revolutionary heritage, and that as a Democrat I could say
that this understanding included all the likely candidates
for the Republican as well as the Democratic Presidential nomi-
nations. I said that the American people had
tense period extending from the stockmarket crashe ofh 9 9h a
through the Great Depression, World War II and the huge demands
on us following the war, and that a desire to catch our
breath and recharge our batteries was Inevitable. Now, I felt,
/we were
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we were emerg j,ng from this period of slowdown, and that the
next few years, regardless Of
tho, of 16
elections,would see a resurgence -' `uAmerica'stcreative en-
ergies both at home and ab
Vito said he hoped that this was the case, and the
friendship and understanding between Yugoslavia and America
would deepen?
I concluded by asking him for his views on Germany and
his expectations concerning the future of Berlin.
Tito replied that everyone, including the West and East
Germans, eras becoming adjusted to a divided Germany, that
there was no other likely outcome, that this was probably a
zood thing from t standpoint of everyone's
interests and
that the need therefore was to develop acceptable relations
between the two Germanys.
I asked how in this case could we settle the Berlin
question since Berlin's only logical role was the capital city
oafia United Germany. He agreed that this was difficult but
rushchev s suggestion that Berlin might become
a free city could serve as a basis for negotiation if not
now, sometime in the future.
I asked him if he thought Khrushchev understood that
under no circumstances would we relinquish our position in
Berlin until an overall settlement could be reached that was
acceptable to all concerned. He said he was certain that the
Kremlin understood this and that there would be no reversion
to threats. I would have liked to explore his views on
Germany and Europe more fully, but at this point we ran out
of time.
I brought the discussion to a close by saying that I
hoped to be in Berlin itself by midnight and to spend a few
days there and in Bonn. He said that he understood the re-
building of West Berlin had been extraordinary and that he
would like to see it.
On the way to the door I told him that our economic
experts had high praise for the competence of his economic
/planners
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planners and administrate.,, He said that he was glad of
this, but that much remained' to be done.
This is the story. Not '_ ding unusual or unexpected was
revealed, but I felt that 16;as able to improve his under-
standing of us and to broaden hia,.perspective on several
questions.
I hope that ways will be found for more Americans to see
Yugoslavia and Tito on both an official ? d unofficial basis.
You know better than I how this can be encouraged, but I am
convinced that it is important. If the President had chose
to visit Belgrade he would have received an enthusiastic
welcome which might have had important implications further
East.
Thank you attain for all that you did to make my time in
Yugoslavia both pleasant and informative.
With my warmest regards,
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