BRADLEY ARTICLE ON EDC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R000400490002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 6, 1954
• Content Type: MF

5X1
25X1
25X1
ApprovedirRelease 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP8OR0431R000400 00012!-7-
/4/carch 1954
v
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Bradley/ rticle on EDC
1. Believe this is very good. Have read it very carefully and
see no reason why you shouldn't sponsor it.
2. Suggest following clearance procedure:
to get it cleared through State by
Merchant and Molting by Monday p.m.
to get Mr. Kyes to clear it through
Defense by Monday p.m.
to look at it to see if it needs AEC
clearance and if so get that by Monday p.m.
3. If any of above raise items they wish to discuss with
the authors, it be arranged for Tuesday a.m. with
and Colonel Clifton of National War College.
4. The Saturday Evening Post must have this by Wednesday,
10 March at noon.
Army review(s)
completed.
?ta
25X1
25X1
Lyman-15:-Kirkpatrick
Inspector General 25X1A
/
DOCTIEIV rn.
r.:::::::.. ..:.. ,
0
Approved* Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80RA1R000400490002-7
1
STANDARD FORM NO. 64 Approved Filielease 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP8OR017.0004004900 2e7
eSrif
J.-03ot_
Office Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
25X1A
TO
FROM :
25X1A
SUBJECT: l7 -Wry 25X
1. We have previous],y- been shootin ol n e Satevepost,
but in view of the strong effort now being made to secure French EDC ratification by
icl'?
16 April, the ,Bradley article must be out before this date if we are t?void the
risk of being too late. We believe the Post will be willing to publi?ltien in
the 7 April issue (which would give maximum impact), but only if the article is
fully cleared and given to them by the morning of 10 March.
0/NE
Bradley article on EDC
DATE: 5 Marek 1954
000111*EnT MC,
I3 CIM. o
0
2. Colonel Clifton, the author, believes that if this extremely short
deadline is to be mat, CIA must handle the clearance process.
3. We believe that clearance will be required from State, Defense, and AEC,
(on the atomic references).* If the deadline is to be met the fastest possible clearance
will be required, culminating if necessary in a meeting Tuesday at which we and the
above agencies could discuss any require changes.
Approved For Release 201-RDP8OR01731189Ap400
90002-7
Approved 1pRelease 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80ROIF1R0004004900
IS RUSSIA Iliia3C THF BA. R PS?
13y General of the Army.
Former Chairman of the Jo
Bradley
ate of Staff
Lnto one rater afternoon in Septksr at 1952, Gene
were standing beside a small, grey-stucco Q fermhou
River Rhine. Before us, the terrain sloped gently download to a large *tato .
patch with woods near/4y The roar of airplane engines and the itharpvttporta of
opening paraohutes filled the ekies. Vivid splashes of color spread across the
somber .landsoape as the red, white orange and blue chute, lowered their
burdens.?nearly one thousand crack French paratroopers their field pieces,
as'nition1 food, medical supplies, even trucks lashed to wooden platforms whit*
struck the muddy earth of the potato patch with an echoing thundera1ap4
The airborne Frenchmen quickly organised their equipment and took cover
in the woodland. The U. S. Air Force planes which had dropped them disappeared
in the distance. Soon the noise died down until ones agein the only sound we
could hear was the quiet dristle of the rain on the tile roof of the farmhouse.
Then a regiment of U ground forces charged'edto the scene. Small-arms
fire crackled, the field pieces roared, demolitionages geysered German
farmland into the air?while umpires rushed about to ?leads how the "battle" was
going. For this was an important exercise in the first la le military
maneuvers to be hold by the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
The problem in this particular action was to wipe out a Phine-crocsing bridge-
Duo ?- . ? --t8;32.;; .,r
heA before westbound 'Soviet" troops couldlenglOtuiA and 'this be set to ()complete
a theoretical cr.)nquest of G,rnnyi.wwith Fra
Ri
ust west
In a window of the farmhouso, an old %wow
a battired VlaCk
felt hat Fropped his elbows on the sill and stolidly surveyed the ruin of his
potatopar.rovRed Fs u on a de civet Ft stir his tret stubb4
pp ola gam 03,103,2p :,c1A-. DP80 017 004004 00 -7
Approved F elease 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01.1R000400490002-7
S.-Bradley
beard reflectively,
summed up
rehearsal for the *liberation" of farm.
*Ashrs he,exolaimed *It is a craw world,
tatherlsnd ameept her own mons.'
Unhappily, ths German farmar15 remark is just as
he made it more than eighteen months
is defending the
today as it was when
co. In, feet, three eod one half years have
elapsed since the defense ministers of NATO agreed it s Impossible to defend
western Europe against the Russians without an effective German military Gontribution
to the WeEtin rearmament program. The Germans ars ready and willing, and enough
U. S. equipment for the first six Osman divisions is'avallable right now. But
quibbling and deley.primarily of French origin-.have now brought this situation
to the point that the Soviet Union is dangerouSly close to winning a major
strategic victory without firing a shot
When I relinquished the ehairmanehip of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
last August, I did not anticipate that the program for the defense of western
Europe would be in a state of audh oriels in this spring of 1954 that the
United States would be tweeds simply as a matter of Militaryirealism, to think
of certain dreadful alternatives to the orderly buildup of western strength on
the European continent ae previously agreed upon in the deliberations of NATO.
I shall explore these alternatives later in this article. First, however, I
should like to make a report on the existing situation..a report I 1?,41
obligated to make at this time because the crisis is mite, because Dif past
experience with NATO is an intimate one which in some respects is unique, and
because pi" present military status permits as a degree of public candor not
always available to one labile still in high position.
Approved Foillielease 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP8OR017.000400490002-7
Approved eRelease 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R0e1R000400490002-7
Western Europa is not ju3ta pion of reals
for tins?not in any World Wer III. Its resources,
than Woes of the entire oommunist bloc, constitute
Soviet and the civilised worlds he potential Uneven.? balmy= freedom and
velment. For exempla the United States at present has nearly tele, the steel
production of all the Soviet nations. But the steal Mills of a oonquered
western Europe plus those the communists already haveeuld turn this great
advantage into a defleit amounting to more than one.feurth of existing American
steel production. Estimates by aor other yardstidbp.oram materials, population,
industrial production economic strengt4. come to the same ocnolumions That
western Europe, free, tips the scales in our favor; that western Europe, conquered,
weights the balanoe in fervor of ?Ammonia,. The defense of western Europe is
therefore of as much comes= to the United States as the defense of Now York,
Detroit, or the British Isles. If western Iturope Should, by its continuing
weakness, tempt the Venal* aggressors unendurably and fill into Soviet hands,
the future of the United States would not be pleasant to contemplate?not
to mention the even more immediate future of the western European populations.
Having served with now of the illustrious Freak generals, having held
the field leadership of the American armies in the liberation of France in World
War II, I have a deep and abiding respect for the French and for their leadership
in Europe. But having witnessed the devastating effects of the atomic bomb
and having seen the motion pictures of our hydrogen bomb tests, I feel that
another liberation offtrope in the atomic-hydrogen bomb era would be a
strategic impossibility
Tactical atomic: weapons--boMbs, missiles, eaneon..ould on the other
hand be of major importance in the defense s opposed to the liberation, of
Approved Follklease 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R0174b00400490002-7
Approved *Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R0O1R000400490002-7
4.-Bradley
western Europe Wes led the world in this field. It amid
an allies, Including France,
and I shall elaborate an this thought presently. But tactical atomic weapons
are of no reel value without sufficient ground strength to fore? an invading army
to as itself into a suitable target. The achievement of that sufficient ground
strength in western Europe will be realized only When the German contribution,
so long delareiby neinch int2ansigen4becones available.
Tho first objective of the United States in this age of stoats and hydrogen
bombs, is the prevention of war. We do not care whether the Soviets believe
this or not, but we do want our allies to knew it. Two principal deterrents to
war have been created sinae the prostration of Europe in the last leer: (1)
The North Atlantic alliance and (2) the U, S. Strategic Air Command with its
nuclear weapons and the ability to deliver them an mass.. One without the other
-
is not enough.
The Soviet Union might have neutralised our re. Air Command by
agreeing in the United Nations to complete at sic dinarmamentn the
Ruesians had few A-bombs and we had many. But the Soviet leaders ?mad not figure
their way around the respected ground and air capability of NATO. So they had
to stop the progress of the NATO build-up, started so faithfully among the western
allies in 1949, and now slowed to a pustled it in 1954 They struck, logically,
at the heart of the matter?the German contribution.
The Soviets have pressured the Germane. They have tested the French.
They have propagandized the Italians. At the recent foreign ministers'
conference in Berlin, they held out the hope of settliag the Indo-China war at
the Geneva conference scheduled to begin April 26--once the Korean question
clue re_ The.
was out of the way?Land achieved theiilobvious objective of giving the Preach
ckee-Ceelet,,,
a reason for furthery on agreeing to German t. 'LA 64"
Approved For lease 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP8OR0173 00400490002-7
do more in this respect toward etrengthening
Approved Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R0O1R000400490002-7
4a--Bradley
The simple xuilitary fact of the znatt
rurepe needs both 2ranoe and Germany* The
Is a Franoo-G mon rapprochement in their mu
Aftnr an, because or an accident of geollephy, ?ranee
strong, ressibia Witte=
at of the United States
OIX
unt on German forces
to defend Franee while defending herself. I find it hard to see mbo would benefit
more from a reasonable degree of German defensive strength than Franee iteato
Approved For lease 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP8OR01731111100400490002-7
Approved Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP8OROO1R000400490002-7
5.-Bradie7
R. 4Jj
The ortnriter is one of emotion rather
t hel427 ?rename poem to fear the Germans more
To state
fear the
Russians: 1 wesell vividly -ow a netting of IMO defense minister., held
in Wathingtae-in.Ne4gf 1950, was thrown into an uproar verging on the
hysterical when we got, down to the hard questi(An of how we were to achieve an
admittedly essential contribution of twelve Gormah divisions to Europe's defense*.
The United States propose that a rearmed Weat Germany be admitted to full
partnership in NkTO Jules Moch, then the French minister of defense, exploded
in protest. Phs. Keith present as his adviser,supported him vehemently. The
suggestion was utterly unthinkable. K. and Ntie. Nedia French patriots of the
highest order, had both been in German coaeentration camps during World War II.
They lost their only eon in that var. They knew of Nasi. radial persecutions at
first hand. Their own bitter memories of Germans in uniform are shared, in varying
degrees,by millions of their countrymen in a naaian thrioe invaded by Germane
within a period of seventy years.
Can an American understand the depth of such emetic
/ can, for
I recall how I owe leorned that the War between the Ste erican civil
weraawne not really over, Upon first being ordered to Fort Berming, Georgia,
in 19*, I found that the one email army mardhing through Georgia under
Sherman in 1864 had left a deep and lasting hurt, still felt so nany decades
afterward. When I contrast this with three German conquests and occupations
of Frame, I believe I can readily appreciate French
But understandable as it was, the effect at 111. Wats emotional upheaval
was suoh that additional meetings had to be held in London smd Brussels the
followine month to risk up the pieces of the shattered eenferenee. It was
at the Brusnals session that the atmosphere on the German question changed
Approved For ease 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP8OR0173000400490002-7
Approved IRelease 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01.1R000400490002-7
one of despair to one of hope. For tbrsnoh etdancod the eameept of a
Suropean Defense Community?an organisation, ItOkIn NATO OOxxposed Often**, Germany,
Belgium, The Netherlands* Luxembourg and Italy* which would raise an international.
army made up of troops from these six Or nations which* logioaLly, muA rarnish
the bulk of the manpower for dofering western Europe in any event. Control
of this international army and the licensing of its arms produedAnwoold not
rest in any in1e. nation t in an international commissariat or defense
department Which in tura would fit in its defense rIqns with those of Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe* the top continental oommand post of
NATO. The EDC would also *vs its own tactioal air force and, after a period of
transition* a tom= defense budget to whioh the elm nations would contribute.
Let me emehasite the point. that the European Defense Community, or EDC, is
not an American idea; it is a French proposal* designed primarily to make German
resruanent acceptable because it would be eintrolled. Let me also note that the
need for a German oontrlikUtiou to 7uropean defense is not just an American
notion, but the result of a NATO?wide agreement It sight be added as an ironical
footnote that the eounmniste are partially responsible for the EDC they are now
trying to kill* for they started the Korean war* which in turn oaused a sense of
danger and urgency in Europe aontributine to the decision that Germany must be
rearmed.
Francois NATO allies.gla
of 1950. Germany* too was har
original idea of a full NATO ma
latter might have been interpre
accepted the French EDC proposal in December
to go along with MC as an alternative to the
erahip for the Bonn govornmentocinatamah as the
ci at that time as an imrlied recognition by the
free world of a permanent division of GermanyJ But it was not until ilay of 1952
that the
'C treaty wee s rmed subject to ratification 4 the 1.arliamente of the
Approved FolPelease 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP8OR0173 000400490002-7
Approved Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP8OR0101R000400490002-7
OMB. NOV, two re years later, onir
weitino for
Foot of tho one may be found in the protractod debate between Dceber
of 3.950 and %,7:7 of 1952 over the form in which German troops woild be organised
and Wet German
reaty, the POlgians have partiallyodoee so, but
have rot. Lommotoono!fiptaly appear 114 be
nee not acted?
under EDC. Foonce t irst propose thot tho Gormon units be made mielarger
than battalions. This von rejoetecl as militarily unworkable. Thal at a meeting
of NATO military authorities Oa Collude in SepteMber of 1951, dame a French proposal
that EDO divlsione be made up of three regimental combat teaws-..for example
One French, one German and one Bo tan.
Doring a recess of the melting at which this propo1 was nade, 1 rxrked,
*Gentlemen, now that we are off the record, I have a
-Each of you
?amended a division or more in the last war. So would each of you who would be
willing to lead a divieion in battle with regiments of three different national-
ities kindly raise his hand??
No one including the Freneh general pr
disposed of the proposal, for it illustrated, dre.ittoa3iy, what all of us knew
in our hearts; as men of military experienoo-othat an international arir, if it
is to be efficient, must be broken by nationalities into unite no smaller than a
division. Differences of language, temperament, prooedure, habit and training
would otherwise produce only wild disorder. [Tie fact that the French had to be
worked up orodually, starting with battalions, until they were willing to face
the prospect of German divisions, is a reflection of the Fre-WI national fears
which are no less time-consuming for the tact that their root muses are easily
identified.
Approved For*lease 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP8OR0173.000400490002-7
This ineident
Approved
8--Bradley
Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R0.R000400490002-7
It is nopolitical loader* *Comm 0 and
de ermleation. For example, at the NATO meeting in Lisbon, in February of 1952,
prospects for an !DO treaty seemed dismal. The lamie was whether Frame eoUld
commit herself to raising twelve and ono-third glen* so her force s in EDO
would, among other oonsiderations? be slight4 larger than the proposed mew German
army. The problem was financial. Robert A. Lovett, than the U. 8, Secretary of
Defense, expelined that he had already squeezed out the last teller ofAmlrioan
funds available for military aid to Frame. To meet the goal France would
have to increase her military budget-end, it appeared, it would be political
suicide to increase the French military budget by one more trend.
There the matter rested when I was summoned rather mysteriously to a dinner
that evening which aide, his French opposite nuther and an American radio
correspondent had arranged, explaining only that they wanted me to canoe' any
other engagement I might have. I discovered that the other guest was none other
than the Premier of France, then 7dger Faure. I think he was as surprised as I.
It was a pleasant social occasion, and it was aZtec the first opportunity H. Faure
had bad to sit down with a military man, in an atmosphere of private conversatim
rather than the tension of a formal international ocaferenoe to discuss the
military necessities of the situation.
As the evening concluded, M. Faure sighed and shall
divisions
I must toll
announce tomorrow morning that we shall raise the twelve
and that we shall increase our military budget to meet
you that my government will fall within thirty days.
next morning, the Premier was eigood as his word, and as a result the
signing of the EDC treaty took place in Paris three months later. By then,
Approved For lease 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP8OR0173000400490002-7
Approvede Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80RI31R000400490002-7
9.Bradicy
as M. Faure had predicted, his government bad
instead of thirty. The interestingpoint
t lasted thirty.two days
t while M. Frure made the griWi
personal sacrifice of taking a step he knot/IOWA turn him out of office, the
French honored the commitment he made and continue to honor it today, even while
delayine treaty ratification. This incident illustrates ,the olitiol realities
which any French government faces in dealing with the vexed question of German
rearmament. I might add that the fact I have dwelt at moms length upon a
personal experience with M. Fauro oes not by any means indicate that I an
insensible of the high courage and fortitude of Premier Laniel and Foreign
Mtnister Georges !Adult in the difficult roles they must presently play with
respect to !DC.
Yet I am onvinced from my numerous aasocattcne with prominent Frenchmen
and American observers that a large majority of Frenchmen are not opposed to
German rearmament ler RR. Perhaps seventy percent of the Fran& people would almost
certainly accept some form of it, and I know that the high etilitary authorities
of France are convinced of the need for a German contribution. What then, are
the inhibitions on Frandh-ratifioation of the no treaty.?
Nagy Prenehmen oppose EDO beoaus they fear it would mean sUho
Frame within a larger European community in which France's historic
on of
tity
would be lost, This is the principal nationalistic argument against EDO.
can readily understand the fears of my French military eolleagues that FDO
might mean the progressive disappearance of the French army, the French navy,
the French air foroe s these entities have existed in the peat. But all
nations must accept some limitations an their sovereignty in meetings common
need ex-rticularly when tlu-t need *ould be a matter of national life or death.
Approved For ease 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP8OR0173000400490002-7
Approved *Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80,011R000400490002-7
lO.-43radley
The United States, for e pie, is no longeD & frP agent; it aat keep its
polinies in accord with those of thirteen SATO Ilies, and its military strategy,
insofar as &mope is ooncerned is snb4ect noto the direction of the V. B.
Joint Chiefs of Staffs bet to the NATO Standing Group, ands under it, SHAPE.
I feel that the United States shoold and will go even farther in this direction
by, among other things, adopting the Belgian infantry rifle which has been
accepted as standerd by our westorn European alltoa.
Another French fear of EDC is bat it might become a vehicle for German
domination of western Europe, ineleding France. This contention is difficult
to understand, for it is precisely what the EDC beyond all other suggested
methods of German rearmament, is designed to avoid. The plain !net is that
German rearmament is comings one way or another, and it would seem to ne to be
far safer, from the French viewpoints to have thot rearmament under control of
7D0 decisions on whieh the French would have a veto. A etrong and reviving Germany
will inevitably play an influential role in European affairs. Indeed, it is
French recognition of this fact which creates French fears. But this develop-
ment cannot be met by avoiding the issue of rearmament or raising thebspurioui
croCas one French statesman did recentlei that 7D0 is *a French march to
American music,"
Night not a rearmed Germany drag France into a new war by attacking the
Soviet Union? This is a risk under any form of German rearmament. The
greater risk Is a Soviet attack on a disarmed Germany. The point is that the
security of free Europe is indivisible and the beet way to ly the ghost of
German aggression is to deprive Germany of an independent military establisnment
throu,1 DC* in ley opinion.
The recent Berlin confeoence should have -ado it painfully clear, to any
who maY hnplariedi9ObillireahMONMI : 61AW)PtiehelcknO0U01100490002-7 t Voluntarily
Approveer Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP801031R000400490002-7
ll-Bradley
give up control!at Germany under any circumstances. Mr. Z'blotov hag
answered, far better than I could, the theory also heard in Frans, that
ratification of EDC might prevent a German settlement. For he has 1.4s it
perfectly evident that the Soviets will retreat from G maw may when they
are convinced they must, and I cannot see hove. strong Turopeen.Defense Oodemenitn
would do aeythinn but advance the date of that happy events distant as it may now
France has other important conoerna in this uttr, including a desire
amounting almoet to a passion to obtain a favorable settlement of her dispute
with Cerny over the Saar Basin as a pro-condition to ratification of the
EDC treaty. Uppermost at the moment, however, is the issue of whether
ratificatien would impair the possibility of securing a settlement of the
conflict in Indo-China.
Here we see the blaokmailing nature of mmiet pocor politios at its
most naked. Pao no mistake about it?the Soviet tninvmderstands the
importance of the European Defense Community, and the best evidence is her
efforts to defeat it. Russia has made a show of easing east-west tensions,
offered trade to our NATO allies dangled a non-aggressioni and nutual assistance?
pact with the USTR before the French, all with the purpose of undermining rm.
And finally, we have the clear implication from the omennists that if the
French want to end the war in Inno-Cbina, they had better let !DC die on the vine.
No Annrican could fail to sympathise with the French desire to relieve herself
of e burden of the eight-year-old Indo-China war, least of all an Anorican
military man who for the last three years of his active duty lived daily with
the casualty lists from Korea. The United States, too, has a substantial atake
in the Indo-Chinese conflict. But the whole history of international ennerience
Approved For likase 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP8OR017310)0400490002-7
Approved ',Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R0401R000400490002-7
2*-13ra
with the ommuniat bloc has proven tine and t1 and tine again, that only thoSe
negotiations undertaken from a poeiticn of ves
success for the vest. As always, the coxmiunist
allied disunity and here again, it mime to me
a strength of a nature the oommunists understan
strength have any prospult of
Geneva will be playing, upon
functioning EDC represents
nd respect, while a still-
pending or threetened EDO represents a Soviet weapon.
What nore can the United States do to aid the cause of to prevent the
cheap but gravely sienificant victory that international oommunismvould vin hy
default ehould MC fail? This nation has poured six billions of dollars in
Marshall Plan and military aid into France, has pumped hundreds of millions more
in military aid for the war in Indo-China through the economy of continental
France, has supported five divIaiens of her own in Europe for years, built up
air strength on the continent--I hardly need labor the point. With specific
reference to EDC, we have accepted virtually every Freeleh demand for
modifications, stipulations, protocol, and alreements designed to counter Froncih
fears that a reanwed Germany night prove to be a Praekenstoints monster whiCh
would turn on its creators,
Perhaps thero is still more that we can do. One possibility is that the
United States will urge an eetension to fifty years of the present twenty-year
TO pact, which commits 'as to mutual defense aesistanee with thirteen other
rations, Recently there have been inatoetions from London of a British intent
to make additional concessions as further incentive to France?perhaps including
commitment of Britteh troops to the European army-
The success of EDO is a matt-7r of such overriding importance that whatever
is needed to insure that SUOCOW must be done. I have long advocate(' thEt our
Approved For Ripase 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731.400490002-7
Approved 'release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R0O1R000400490002-7
13-- Bradley
Atomic !nergy Act be liberalised so we oan o further in sharing knoWledge of
nuclear weapons with our allies, and President Eiemzhowerrecently urged
Congress to take this step. Information on what the boMb is, haw to use it,
how to get the best results tram it, is necessary so our allies ean incorporate
the boob in their militnry plans. Once our allics have the benefit of all the
atomic inform! tion their ground commander' and their air commanders need, the
next logieal step would be to make tactical atomic weapons available to our allies
or at least to pledge their instant availability in the event of war. ?ranee
for exanple, has a superb new jot fighter-bomber known as the E'stere which is
already equipped for handling tactical A.boabs.
But how can we expect the Congress to take even the first step, of making
more atomic information available, so long as France continues to react,
Cillogioally a lust her own brain-child, the EDO? The Congressional attitude
on EDC was made evident in adoption of the Richards amendment to the AUtual
Security Act of 1953 This amendments now American law, provided that fifty
percent of U 8 military aid authorised for NATO should be withheld until EDC
is in effect. The practieal effect of the amendment is that all American military
aid to the sir EDO nations will stop next January unless (a) Congress repeals the
amendment (which is most unlikely) or (h) MDO is ratified The deadline would be
even earlier if it were not for the fact that we still have a backlog of military
assistance funds appropriated before the Richards amendment became effective.
Thus the eventual availability of tactical atomic weapons for use by our
allies and the continued flow of U. S. military assistance both hinge on the
ratification of !DC. France need have no fear that the United States or the
Approved For Rase 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP8OR01731A10400490002-7
Approved *Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R001R000400490002-7
of holdinr,
arise only
thdraw their forces fromEurope so
tinent. The real threat of a U. Swije
as there is hOpe
withdrawal woad
a conviction that the continent could at be defended. Thus it
seems to me, in the light of my experience with NATO which began from the
moment of NATO's birth, that French ratificattln of the EDO treaty and a start
on German rearmament are preoiselo the steps nost needed at this moment to revive
NATO confidence and to convince the Dated States and Great Britain that NATO
can achieve an adequate defense. If the French are worried about an American
"retreat to isolationism," they have the opportunity to administer the best
pssible antidote.
lila eadier,
would/open to the United Sta
We could
be made a member
step.
d fail.
the h
this pro
do it
Germany
veto thie
earn Western Gerny by ourselves,th
t Britain if L to go along with
but with or w:thout British help, we could
le "agonising respprai our
could only, in ell military logic,
of U. S. troops from the European continent
the Azores, Spain, Northern Africa, Greece
r words shift to a poliey of psripheral
One hs only to look squsrely t these alternatives and their potential
80 gtrongly the failur, of IBC would hand
the Soviet Union a major strategic victory in Europe vitlxnzt pulling a single
trigger. Tt if an adequate western European defense cannot be achieved, for
lack of German troops, what co.n we do except to consider the alternatives?
repercussion? to understand why I
Approved For Apse 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R017314400490002-7