REVISION OF PSB D-23

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R000700450029-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: July 28, 1953
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2006/12/19: CIA-RDP..80R01731 R000700450029-9
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
COPY NO. E-
July 28, 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
SUBJECT: Revision of PSB D-23.
In reference to my memorandum of July 27, 1953, I am now
transmitting a copy of the revision of PSB D-23, July 24, 195113,
COPY NO. ~i, prepared in the Department of State, together
with a copy of Stategs summary. In addition, there are enclosed,
for reference:
1. Copy of my memorandum of July 27, COPY NU.
2. Copy of State Department memorandum in connection
with State Department proposed draft of PSB D-23 (undated);
3. Copy of memorandum to Mr. Bonsai, PSA, from
Ambassador Stanton, dated July 16, 1953.
George A, Morgan
Acting Director
MQRI/DF Pages 1-41 and 43
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRE`
1
of 1Paga
DOCUMENT NO, , q
NO CHANGE IN CLASS 8 Ca 9 (1 8
flE
it
I
mSSIFIED
Li
CLASS. CH ! (KI) TO
NEXT REVI,VI UATE
AUTHi HR ~i?
DATE 2 ~1~ RZVIEWERI 018373
Approved For Release 2006/12/19: CIA-RDP80R01731 R000700450029-9
 Approved For Release 2006/12/19: CI6-RDP80R01731 R000700450029-9
Copy. No 52
SECURITY flFOR`IATION
TOP SECRET
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHIl'1GT ON 25, D. C.
July. 27, 1953
14EHORANDTJM
TO: Psychological Strata Mr Board
SUBJECT: Revision of PSB D-23
A revision of PSB D-23, prepared in the Department of State as
noted at the last Board meeting, will be circulated as soon as it can
be mimeographed. At the request of the State Departrient a statenent
setting forth the considerations that led to the revision, together
with copies of a memorandwi by the United States Ambassador to Thailand,,
are circulated herewith. Since tSB D-23 is still before the 1SC, I hope
the Board will consider at least the central issues raised by the pro-
posed revision at its rlceting on July 29.
To help define those issues, I would like to corrient as follows:
1. N`1SC action No. 788 b directed ~'SB to prepare a plan for
"coordinated psychological operations based on Thailand." If Phase II
of P D- i e e e e b me zro 1;,. a
posed change with the NSC.
Thus one question is bow to handle the pro-
2. Phase II in PSB D-23 is not laid down as a final decision to act
but indicated as a direction for contingency planning and preparation
"for utilization of Thailand as a base - when and if conditions permit"
Para 3, p. 34). Several of the State coru:ients seem to ignore this dis-
tinction. Thus with regard to acceptability to the Thai Governrient and
effects on relations with other Asians and Allies, there is no question
of proposing Phase II to any of tho..zuntil conditions have evolved further
along lines indicated in PSB D-23. Also with regard to cormiitmcnt of
non-native forces, the State cornent tares no account of the possibility
that national policy with regard to VPC may be implemented by the time
Phase II is reached. Hence the issue that concerns PSB D-2~ is not
whether Phase II rial;es sense under resent cireurastanees but whether it
should be adoted as a basis for ettin ready -to rioet probable future
circums ances.
3. That Southeast Asia is not a political unity is obvious, but
this does not exclude important parts of it from becoming more unified
for certain purposes when and if the communist threat spreads and the
U,S. injects its partnership as a basis of fresh confidence. Here again,
the issue is not the present but the future. If we not onLad ?j- t
actual dividedness of the area but insist on thin7:inn in no other terms
'ox dater on we - ` n o an o - cor .lunist iv siye~~ra ~
It is not a question of a ` o II
g a 'ja uni ,~ I ase II. The i a,
would be to radiate moral as well as material strenth outward frpm the
Thai base as far and fast as it will go.
SECTMITT INFORt IATIQN Page #
TOP SECRET of 2 pages
89008
Approved For Release 2006/12/19: CIA-RDP80R01731 R000700450029-9
 Approved For -Release 2006/12/19: CIA-RDP80RO1731 R000700450029-9
Nap" W
SECURITY MITFORMIATION
TOP SECRET
I+. In respect to the Ambassador's torrent on economic aid it should
be noted (Para (5) p. 30) that the main recomncndation is for maintenance
of economic aid and technical assistance programs "at least at the
present scale", in order to avoid the obvious contradictions resulting
from any decrease in such programs. It is also intended (para (5) (c)
p. 30) specifically to aid in development of Northeastern Thailand, a
point mentioned as desirable in the Ambassador's r.lemoraridtui.'
5. PSB D--23 does not connit us to any fixed view of prospects in
Indochina (para 2, p. 25, pLza 6, p,26). If the main free--world effort
remains there, it is still impC'zttant to strengthen the Thai flan l-..
George A. Horgan
Acting Director
SECURITY =01O U IATION Page 2
TOP SECRET of 2 pages
89908
Approved For Release 2006/12/19: CIA-RDP80R01731 R000700450029-9
 Approved For Release 2006/12/19: CIA-RDP80RO1731 R000700450029-9
ti
TOR ST CRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
DEPARTMENT W0POSED DRAFT OF FSB D-23
The State Department proposed draft of PSB D-23 is based on the
Department's objections to Phase II of PSB D-23 and upon a memorandum
from Ambassador Edwin F. Stanton, copy attached, which strongly
supported the Department's object:tons and provided additional informa-
tion and reason.
TOP SECS' ,T__::_SECURITY INFORMATION
''908
~J V
Approved For Release 2006/12/19: CIA-RDP80R01731R000700450029-9
 Approved For Relea r - '' ' .ut : h P M700450029-9
July 16, 1953
PSA - Mr. Bonsai
PSA - Edwin F. Stanton
PS1 D-23. "U.S. Psychological Strategy with Respect
to the Thai Peoples of Southeast Asia.fi
Having perused the above mentioned paper, I would endorse
"Phase I", which proposes in coordination with U.S. military programs,
to consolidate Thailand as a secure base, by increasing its strength
and making its frontiers more defensible. This, in essence, is
what the U.S. Government has been doing in Thailand during the past
two and one-half years throi)LYh the extension of military and economic
assistance to Thailand] 5x1
With respect to a military assistance program, I believe that the
Thai economy and finances will not support any great increase in the
military aid which has been planned and which is now in process of
being implemented. Every effort should be made, however, to expedite
shipment of military equipment which has been programmed, par-
ticularly artillery, and to assign without delay the additional
personnel requested by MAAG, Thailand, in order to expedite the
training of the Thai Armed Forces. The assistance being extended by
our Government to the Thai Police should not be overlooked. To meet
the threat to Thailand's frontiers occasioned by the Communist
invasion of Laos, the strength of the Thai Police is being increased
by some 5,000 men 2X1
r i '~ X1
Cith ro pect to our economic aid, I feel, on the basis of con-
versations with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and other
members of the Cabinet, that the Thai Government does not desire
any great increase over and above the level of aid which has been
extended during the past two years. In fact, the Thai Government
finds the setting aside of counterpart funds a very considerable
burden and is an obligation which it would like our Government to
waive. I believe, therefore, that it would not be advisable to
increase economic aid except for such emergency projects in north-
eastern Thailand as may be agreed upon. It should be borne in
mind that the economic assistance which we have extended to Thailand
is not of such a nature as materially to lessen the financial burdens
incurred by the Thai Government in connection with expenditures
for military purposes. The only exception to the foregoing is the
assistance which M.A can give viith respect to highways.
aggression or Communist blandishments has been stimulated.
home to the Thai people and their will to resist either Communist
The psychological objectives listed under "Phase I" have also
received a .groat deal of attention and through information programs,
the dangers of Communism have been brought 25x1
accomplished by the extension of informational activities to the
provinces, However, this can only be achieved through an increase
of personnel, preferably personnel having at least a basic
knowledge of the Thai language, and through increased appropriations.
With rogard,9908
TOPSECU_ T - CUR ITY INFORMATION
Approved For Release 2006/12/19: CIA-R?P80R01731R000700450029-9
 Approved For R6M@g=/1.2 Z T QI R000700450029-9
89908
Approved For R
- ~FCTiT?TT.Y TNF'I~TiM4TTnf~
 Approved For Release 2006/12/19: CIA-RDP80R01731 RoOf-O 1Q -9tate
Draf t
July 21?, 1953
T CUP Ty Ii 07 ' 7 TION
TOP SFC .T
SUi.F `PRY OF' idsT'TT ENT 0' TATS P.1,VTSIOT~' OF PS " ,
. T 7 CT TO TIC
U. yCIIOLOGICL TIL . CY j'TTFI I
TIM '0 I,; S OF SOUT i~ T A It~
I. P Iision
To determine the psychological implications and consequences of
cowunist strategy in Southeast Lsia, ,:~nd to establish a sound U. S.
psychological strategy in the area with respect to the Thai peoples of
Southeast Asia,
II. Conclusions
1. That communist expansionist activity in Southeast Asia is growing
in strength and potency. Developments in comnuni.st str a.te;ry in the Thai
ethnic area pose an imminent threat to Thailand, which rust be met rapidly
with an effective political-psychological military counter e;f:i ort, or
Southeast tsia could fall to the communists without overt intervention
by the Chi;ese Communist awned forces.
2, That Thai1 .nd is politicallly and f~eogra'Dhicr:lly the most suitable
Thai ethnic base in which to initiate and develop a -ubstantial counter
effort.
That Thailand's economy, basically a,ricultural, is t present
strained Iy measures necessary for the national security. This situation,
occurring at a time ',rYien i.nere-sad communist pressure is imrc.nent, calls
for economic id nrogra.ms at the levels of the severa,l years past at lei st,
SEC,iUR.T.TY I'i' Or:':LTION 1
TQ' 'Ci ET of 4 pages
Approved For Release 2006/12/19: CIA-RDP80R01731 8000700450029-9
 Approved For Release 2006/12/19: CIA-RDP80R01731 R000700450029-9
v
Summary Draft
SECURITY ?tATION July 24, 1953
TOP SECRET
to support beneficial long-range projects, and to reduce the danger of
dissidence in the Northeast.
4. That the ethnic bo rds of the Thai peoples scattered through
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Southern China can ccn:tribuite.to the
psychological and military effort to prevent communist expansion.
5. That U. S. support end activation of a Thailand-based counter
effort must utilize and exploit fully the normal channels of contact with
native elements by placing highly qualified individuals in important posts
in Thailand and utilizing every phase and form of psychological warfare to
prepare the minds and emotions of -the people to collaborate in the effort;
that this sup-ort ~-iust relate to sync'ironize efforts
including extensive para,a ili_tary operations.
6. That a coordinated politico.l effort to bring French policy towards
Indochina more in accord with the realities of the situation '~ust be con-
sidered a major f.,ctor in the overall effectiveness of the resistance
effort based in Thailand while expanded 17. S. progr~is for strengthening
Thailand could assist in Making this effort more effective.
7. That the prom,osed expansion of U. S, activities based on Thailand
is feasible in the light of that country's capabilities, providing emphasis
is placed initially or reducing Thailand's vulnerabilities.
Consequently, progrr. ms sh'.uld be aimed at strengthening Thailand ' s
ability to resist communist aggression or subversion, with only such
necessary supporting programs in the inform~:mation field in adjacent areas
as are consistent with the existing patterns of inter-Allied relationships.
SECUE.- TY INI OR'', TION 2
.TOP SE,EI T of 4 pages
83008
Approved For Release 2006/12/19: CIA-RDP80R01731 R000700450029-9
 Approved For Release 2006/12/19: CIA-RDP80ROl731 R000700450029-9
Summary Draft
SECURITY IT'S Om 1TION July 24, 1953
TOP SECRET
III. Proosed chologica.l Strategy Plan
1. In coordination with U. S. military programs, consolid,.te Thailand
as a secure base, by increasing its strength C-,nd ni king its frontiers more
defensible.
a. Pa;rchal. 291-2 I- Ob ootives
(1) Stimulate, crystallize, maintain, and coordinate the
active resistance in Thailcnd to coi?nunist aggression, subversion,
and oppression,
(2) ' Thr"7ur hout ll of Southeast Asia maximize the favorable
aspects, and minimize any unfavorable aspect, of U.S. support to
Thailand.
(3) Encouraf;e and strengthen all feasii?le cooperation among
the countries of Southeast ..sia -ith each other and with the British
and French, and of both the farmer and the latter with the U.S.
b. Basic Tasks
(1) lTherever possible in cooperation with the Thai Government
and raking use chiefly of indigenous outlets, develop or expand U.S.
overt information programs directed to Southeast Asia, with initial
emphasis on those aimed at Thailand and other Thai ethnic groups.
(2) Stimulate and sup-)ort effective overt and covert informa-
tion activities of tho Thai Government in stir; -art of objectives
25X1
compatible with National Policy.
(3) Develop, expand, or intensify U.S.
activities in support of all of the objectives in National Policy.
SECLWT^'y. IYFOI E~_ TION 3
srcr "T of 4 pages
B9908
Approved For Release 2006/12/19: CIA-RDP80R01731R000700450029-9
 Approved For Release 2006/12/19: CIA-RDP80R017N311 R000700450029-9
`,
SSE ITY ITTFOI?,'TIOIT Summary Draft
TOP SECRET July 24, 1953
(4)
Develop, expand, and accelerate to the greatest extent
sound progrars for the creation and employment of :indigenous
guerrilla and Para-military forces capable of effecti'.-e active defense
against communist inva ion and infiltration of Thailand.'
(5) 'V1intain at least at the present scale, and possibly
increase beyond the FY '52 and FY 153 level, the economic aid and
technical assistance program.
(6) ?trengthen and make obligatory educational courses for
all official U.S. personnel, designed to give them a background of
the history, culture and languages within which they will work in
Southeast Asia, particularly Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia.
(7) Strengthen orientation projr--ms for indigenous military
personnel, and suitable information programs for the general public,
taking; into account local cultural attitudes.
(8) Tactfully, and on a realistic basis, induce the Thai
Government to carry out measuros intended to reduce Thai vulnerabilities
to communist subversion.
4
SECURITY Il` ORI"TION of 4 pages
..TOP ECPET
89008
Approved For Release 2006/12/19: CIA-RDP80R01731 8000700450029-9
 Approved For Release 2006/12/19: CIA-RDP80R01731 R000700450029-9
U iLt`~ I:,
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET July 24, 1953
PROPOSED REVISION BY DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PSB D-23
U. SPSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY WITH RESPECT TO THE
THAI PEOPLES OF SOUTFIEAST ASIA
I. MISSION
To determine the psychological implications and consequences of
communist strategy-in Southeast Asia, and to establish a sound U.S.
psychological strategy in the area with respect to the Thai peoples of
Southeast Asia.
II, ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM
1. Analysis of C mmunist Strate
at Evolution of communist strategy in Southeast Asia since
the beginning of 1953 has introduced e. new and dangerous element into
the chronic problems of this unsettled area. From a long-term viewpoint
a particularly significant development has been the setting up in
January 1953 of a "Thai Autonomous Area" in a portion of Yunnan Province,
roughly half the population of which is Thai This move almost certainly
indicates on the part of communist strategists an intent to manipulate
and subvert -- and perhaps a hope ultimately to dominate -- all of the
Thai peoples. There are approximately 35,000,000 human beings of Thai
or closely related ethnic origin -- including nearly 20,000,000 in Thai-
land itself -- scattered throughout Southeast Asia, with strategically
significant concentrations of them in Indochina, Burma, and China, as
well as Thailand. The pattern of ethnic distribution is such that if
the communist Pan-Thai strategy were successful the communist forces
could easily turn the French position in Vietnam, and from Thailand as
central base, attack either Bruma or Vietnam from the rear, while
SECURITY INFORMATION 1
TOP CRET of 33 pages
52
83308
Approved For Release 2006/12/19: CIA-RDP80RO1731 R000700450029-9
 ,Approved For Release 2006/12/19: CIA-RDP80R01731 R000700450029-9
SECURITY_ INFORMATION
TAP SSECRET
serwously threatening the British position in Malaya. Apart from the
possibilities of large-scale military action, the new communist strategy
could achieve success more gradually by a steady infiltration and subver-
sion of all the Thai territories, accompanied by guerrilla raids and
political pressures aimed at undermining the free governments in Thailand..
Laos and Cambodia. This is probably the most dangerous aspect of the
strategy.
b. The Vietminh invasion of Laos graphically illustrates the
threat in Southeast Asia. Regardless of the immediate military outcome in
Laos, the communist forces there have achieved some important results. The
most significant one Is to have established in Laos e. base for further
rn&litaryy para.-military, and subversive attacks. Another valuable
result, from the communist point of view, is to have demonstrated, both
to the native populations and to the French, an inherent weakness of the
French defensive position in Indochina, namely that while the French
can successfully defend any chosen position, they have difficulty in
depriving their adversaries of the initiativeo Even if the Vietminh
forces withdraw completely from Laos, they have demonstrated how
easily they cap enter it at will, and in setting up a "Free Laos" govern-
ment they have signified an intention to expand or resume the invasion
later.
as The immediacy of the threat to Thailand depends in part on
the degree of military and political success achieved by the Vietminh in
Laos, but even if the border areas of the neighboring state are effectively
cleared of communist influence, it remains serious. For the time being
it is largely psycho-political, and still in the probing stage. It will
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
2
of 33 pages
88308
Approved For Release 2006/12/19: CIA-RDP80R01731 R000700450029-9
 Approved For Release 2006/12/19: CIA-RDP80RO1731 R000700450029-9
SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
recede only slightly as communist power withdraws from its border, and
increase very sharply as it returns again. The threat will grow in pro-
portion to inability of French Union forces to cope with it successfully,
and if the Vietminh in any future military action is able to create a
sufficiently strong impression of irresistible surge, of "invincibility",
many influential Thai will be tempted to seek some accommodation with the
enemy. The danger that the communists may subvert non-communist opposition
elements and ambitious careerists in Thailand is particularly grave if --
as some reports suggest -, the exiled leader of the opposition, Fridi
Phanomyong, is now living in Communist China and collaborating with the
"Free Thai" leaders. The internal situation in Thailand is further
aggravated by the presence of a strong communist movement in Thailand's
large Chinese community,
d. In summary, it seems evident that the flexible, many-sided
but coherent communist strategy represents a very serious threat to the
tribes and nations of the Thai ethnic group, including Laos and Cambodia,
which occupy the heartland of Southeast Asia. This threat would be re