DOWNEY AND FECTEAU

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R000700500022-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: February 15, 1957
• Content Type: MFR

Approved For Release 2004/1 0/2 0R01731 R000700500022-0 ' 0 2
15 February 1957
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COdUMZNT NO.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
^ DEG.ASSMEB
DATE! 25 !1911 REVIEWERIJ
627
SUBJECT: Downey and Fecteau NEXT RvkkW OATze TS S
1. The following persons were present at a meeting in the Depart-
ment of Defense on 14 February 1957:
Col. Bradish J. Smith, OSO/OSD
James Kelliher, OSO/OSD
Orvil S litt Off ce of Public Affairs, OSD
Chief, FE
2. Col. Smith had requested a meeting, stating that the Defense
Department was concerned about the text of the proposed press release
for use in the event Downey and Fecteau came out of China. As the meet-
ing developed it became obvious that the Defense Department's concern
hinged on what they felt to be an extremely hostile press attitude
that had been engendered by the Department of State's refusal to permit
correspondents to visit Communist China. They were fearful that if
Downey and Fecteau were released in the near future the press, because
of this hostility, would refuse to be satisfied with the present
non-committal statement, but would use the statement and the whole
Downey and Fecteau affair to embarrass the Secretary of State in
retaliation for his attitude on the entrance of newsmen into China.
3. In the course of the discussion the OSD representatives agreed
that there was little that could be done to change the present agreed-upon
press release and concurred with the CIA representatives' position that
expanding on it in any way could only result in the most embarrassing
complications. It was their feeling, however, that, based on the
sentiments expressed in Paragraph 1 above, CIA in the person of the
Director, should make representations to the Secretary of State to
insure a friendlier press. The CIA representatives present expressed
themselves as not being alarmed over the situation, but agreed that
it might be useful to express the Paragraph 1 problem to the Department
of State as a factor in their consideration of the newsmen-in-China
problem. Accordingly, it was agreed that Col. Smith and the CIA repre-
sentatives would meet with Mr. Walter McConnaughy of the Department of
State [it]ri no' +I%-
am roe, Chief, FE
State, OSD reviews completed
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Chief , FE
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P80RO1731 R000700500022-0
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"X5 February 1957
DOCUMENT NO.
MMIMIU DUM FOR THE RECORD NO CHANCE IN CLASS, p
p DECLASSIFIED
CLz? . LN'.IEcE TO, TS S
SUBJECT: Downey and Fecteau Ni XT Rk.V L W t ," 14. - -
AUTH: HR 75.2
DATE: t Q_..REYJEWEflt.
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1. The following persons were present at a meeting in the Depart-
ment of Defense on. 1k February 1957:
Col. Bradish J. Smith, 060/OSD
James Kelliher, 060/OSD
Orville face of Public Affairs, OSD
Chef,
roe, Chief., FB
2. Col. Smith bad requested a meeting, stating that the Defense
Department was concerned about the text of the proposed press release
for use in the event Downey and Fecteau came out of China. As the
meeting developed it became obvious that the Defense Department's con-
cern hinged on what they felt to be an extremely hostile press attitude
that had been engendered by the Department of State's refusal to permit
correspondents to visit Communist China. They were fearful that if
Downey and Fecteau were released in the near future the press, because
of this hostility, would refuse to be satisfied with the present non-
cowmital statement, but would use the statement and the whole Downey
and Fecteau affair to embarrass the Secretary of State in retaliation
for his attitude on the entrance of newsmen into China.
3. In the course of the discussion the OSD representatives agreed
that there was little that could be done to change the present agreed-
upon press release and concurred with the CIA representatives' position
that expanding on it in any way could only result in the most embarrassing
complications. It was their feeling, however, that, based on the senti-
ments expressed in Paragraph 1 above, CIA in the person of the Director,
should make representations to the Secretary of State to insure a
friendlier press. The CIA representatives present said they were not
alarmed over the situation and, they saw no reason for any demarche by
the DCI. They did say that, in their opinion, the point raised by the
Defense representatives was, however, one which Defense might wish to
mace to the Department of State as a factor in the Department's con-
sideration of the newsmen-in-China problem. The CIA representatives
refused Col. Smith's request that CIA carry the problem to the
Department, but they did agree to set up a meeting with Mr. Walter
McConnaughy of the Department of State for two purposes:
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a. To enable the Defense representatives to present their
point to W. McConnaughy.
b. To enable Mr. McConnaughy to explain to the Defense
representatives the Department's policy on the newsmen,
thus avoiding the necessity of CIA acting as a middleman
between the two departments.
4. It was made clear to the Department of Defense representatives
in the course of discussion that we were not alarmed over the point
raised, although we felt that it might be worthy of mention. The CIA
representatives also made it clear that it was not our purpose in any
meeting with Mr. McConnaugby to be critical of the matter in which the
Department of State was handling the newsmen-in-China problem and that
the main point of the meeting was to have Defense put its views to the
Department of State since, if these views had any merit, it might be
useful for the Department to consider them in the context of the overall
problem. The CIA representatives suggested the meeting with Mr.
McConnaughy in an attempt to alleviate the considerable amount of concern
which was being generated in the Office of Special Operations of the
Department of Defense which had reached the point where it could have
jeopardized our current arrangements with OSD in the handling of the
Downey-Fecteau case had some sort of cooperation frcm our side not been
forthcoming.
5? A meeting was subsequently arranged with McConnaughy for
25 February 1957. However, on 23 February our liaison with
OSO, advised that the furor had died down, an he felt that OSO
would not be inclined to press this matter much further. Col. Smith
agreed in a telephone conversation on the morning of 25 February that
he felt less concerned about the matter and at the suggestion of the
undersigned agreed that the meeting with Mr. McConnaughy should be'
cancelled. The undersigned called W. McConnaughy and cancelled the
meeting and advised him in general terms of the Defense Department's
concern. W. McConnaughy said they would be happy to meet with Defense
representatives at a later date should they wish to do so.
Chief, FE
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