NSC STATUS REPORT ON THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R000800070010-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 22, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: July 28, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION
CIA 36312-a
IAC-D-55/4
(Revised)
28 July 1953
Copy No.
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
NSC STATUS REPORT ON THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
1. Representatives of the IAC have prepared the attached
revision of IAC-D-55/4 (26 June 1953). They recommend:
a) That the IAC concur in this report.
b) That the DCI, in transmitting this report to the
President and the NSC, indicate that the effects of recent budget
cuts on intelligence activities cannot be assessed at this time
and therefore are not reflected in this Report.
c) That inasmuch as intelligence programs by their
very nature are not subject to rapid change, the DCI propose to
the NSC that hereafter a complete revision of this Status Report
be prepared only on an annual basis (as of 30 June, or such other
date as the NSC may desire), and that semi-annually there be
submitted a brief supplementary statement of the most significant
changes which have occurred since the annual report.
2. The NSC requires that this paper be submitted by
1 August 1953. It would therefore be appreciated if each agency
would telephone its concurrence or proposed changes to the
Secretary of the IAC by noon, Friday, July 31.
Secretary
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SECURITY INFORMATION CIA 36312
IAC-D-55/4
(Revised)
28 July 1953
Copy No. _5,1?
No. 7 - THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and concurred
in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee)
Page
I. Objective . . . 1
I I. Coordination . . . . . 2
III. National Estimates . . . . . . . . . . 3
IV. Political, Social and Cultural Intelligence . 5
V. Armed Forces Intelligence . . . . . . . 6
VI. Economic Intelligence . . . . . . . . 8
VII. Scientific and Technical Intelligence. . 10
VIII. Psychological Intelligence . . . . . . . 13
IX. Geographic Intelligence . . . . . . . . 14
X. Basic Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . 15
XI. Warning of Attack. . . . . . . . . . 16
XII. Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
XIII. Support and Collation Facilities . 22
IAC-D-55/4
(Revised)
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SECURITY INFORMATION
CIA 36312
IAC-D-55/4
(Revised)
For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of
the several Government departments and agencies in the interest
of national security, it shall be the duty of CIA, under the direction
of the National Security Council-
(1) to advise the NSC in matters concerning such intelligence
activities of departments and agencies as relate to the national
security;
(2) to make recommendations to the NSC for the cooordination
of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies
as relate to the national security;
(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the
national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemina-
tion of such intelligence within the Government using where
appropriate existing agencies and facilities: provided, that CIA
shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers, or
internal security functions: provided further, that the depart-
ments and other agencies shall continue to collect, evaluate,
correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: and pro-
vided further, that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be
responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure;
(4) to perform, for the benef it of the existing intelligence
agencies, such additional services of common concern as the
NSC determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;
(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to
intelligence affecting the national security as the NSC may from
time to time direct.
-National Security Act of 1947,
as Amended
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SECURITY JJINFORMATION
CIA 36312
IAC-D-55/4
(Revised)
1. Coordination among the intelligence agencies, so essential
to producing adequate intelligence for national security purposes
and to reducing cost by avoiding duplication, is improving. There
is still some duplication of effort which adds to the cost of intelli-
gence, but steps are being taken continually to reduce this to a
minimum.
2. On March 7, at the recommendation of the Director of
Central Intelligence, with the concurrence of the members of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee, the NSC issued NSCID No. 16,
directing the DCI to ensure coordination of procurement and process-
ing of foreign language publications. No other recommendations for
coordination have been made to the NSC during this period; however,
several improvements in intelligence coordination have been accom-
plished by mutual agreement among the intelligence agencies and
others. There are at present, in addition to the Intelligence Advisory
Committee established by NSCID No. 1, nine interdepartmental
committees to coordinate important intelligence programs in atomic
energy, domestic exploitation, defection, watch procedures,
economic intelligence, economic warfare intelligence, scientific
intelligence, clandestine intelligence priorities and foreign language
publications.
IAC-D-55/4
(Revised)
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SECURITY INFORMATION
CIA 36312
IAC-D-55/4
(Revised)
1. The organization and procedures established since October 1950
for the production of national intelligence estimates continue to operate
satisfactorily. The totality of resources of the entire intelligence com-
munity is drawn upon to produce national intelligence estimates, and they
can be improved only as we strengthen these resources. These estimates
derive authority from the manner of their preparation and from the
active participation of all the responsible intelligence agency heads in
their final review and adoption. Agency dissents are recorded where
estimates would be watered down by further efforts to secure agreement.
2. A production program for national intelligence estimates is
prepared annually and reviewed quarterly at which time obligatory
changes are made. This program provides for a re-examination of
existing estimates on critical areas or problems as well as the produc-
tion of new estimates designed to improve the coverage of important
topics. Continued emphasis is placed on the completion of basic estimates
on the USSR in advance of the review of US budget estimates and NATO
plans.
3. Close coordination between planners and policy-makers on the
one hand and the intelligence community on the other is continually being
pressed in an effort to make the intelligence produced both useful and
timely. The IAC mechanism is most useful when the NSC is furnished
with a coordinated intelligence view in advance of the time when the policy
is fixed. This is being done with increasing frequency and directness of
application to the policy issues.
4. Special efforts are being made to get greater precision and
clarity in estimates generally. As a particular case, considerable
progress was made in NIE-65, "Soviet Bloc Capabilities through 1957",
(16 June 1953), over NIE-64, "Soviet Bloc Capabilities through Mid-1954",
(12 November 1952):
a. Greater analytical precision in the section on political
warfare capabilities, which concentrates upon the critical
areas of the world, and which distinguishes between the capa-
bility tominfluence governments and peoples.
b. Greater emphasis on scientific and technical factors,
which occupy about a quarter of the discussion in NIE-65.
overthrow governments and the capability to
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SECURITY INFORMATION
CIA 36312
IAC-D-55/4
(Revised)
III. NATIONAL ESTIMATES (Continued)
c. Greater clarity in the military strengths and capabilities
sections, with fewer figures, more emphasis on military pro-
grams, and a more specific analysis of Bloc air defenses and
of Soviet capabilities to deliver atomic weapons in the U. S.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
CIA 36312
IAC-D-55/4
(Revised)
IV. POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE
1. The status of political, social and cultural intelligence has
been very good, due allowance being made for the paucity of informa-
tion on the Soviet Orbit and the difficulties of collecting it. Facilities
for the production of such intelligence, however, have been adequate
only for the needs of the NSC and the most urgent needs of the IAC
agencies. Less pressing demands have been met only partially and
inadequately.
2. The principal deficiency in this field, which varies from
slight to serious, has been in the resources devoted to the exhaustive
coverage and research on which sound estimates and analyses depend.
Coverage of the USSR, the Eastern European Satellite complex, and
China, has been most nearly adequate. Relatively lower priorit 25X6
has been given to research on other areas, wit
Ind Southeast Asia at the upper end of the scale, graduating
clown rd to Latin America and Africa. The inadequacy of resources
has been reflected chiefly in an inability to prosecute sustained
research programs at all desired points. Nonetheless, there has
remained sufficient flexibility to produce individual studies of con-
siderable depth on selected major problems. World Communism,
outside the Soviet Orbit, has been satisfactorily covered with respect
to party strength, political maneuverings and relationships to the
Moscow propaganda lines. Research into matters of organization,
financial support and infiltration into political and social organizations
has been less satisfactory.
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SECURITY INFORMATION IAC - D - 5 5 / 4
(Revised)
V. ARMED FORCES INTELLIGENCE
1. Operational Intelligence
Intelligence covering the combat zone area for the support
of current military operations in Korea is generally adequate. There
still remains a serious deficiency in our ability to obtain timely
identification of or information on the movements or locations of
Chinese forces in all areas behind the immediate front line armies in
Korea back through Manchuria into China. Information on installations
and on developments in Manchuria, such as types and extent of train-
ing, reorganization and resupply of the Chinese Communist Forces
and North Korean units north of the Yalu River is inadequate. This
deficiency remains substantially unchanged. Reliable information of
the enemy's long-range plans and intentions is practically non-existent.
The extent of our information on Chinese Communist activities
in South China is inadequate. The United States is dependent on French
and Associated States sources for operational intelligence concerning
the Viet Minh and to a lesser extent for information on the Chinese Com-
munists in the border areas contiguous to Indochina. The present level
of information would be inadequate for support of operations by U. S.
forces, however; inherent in any commitment of U. S. forces would be
the rapid development of combat and operational intelligence efforts.
The Five-power Intelligence Conference exchanges have increased
U. S. knowledge of the Viet Minh.
A possible early augmentation of U. S. intelligence personnel
in Indochina should improve present U. S. coverage in that area.
However, the picture for the major target area in Asia, i, e. , Communist
China, is very dark.
The achievement of any major improvement must depend on the
increase in scope and efficiency of clandestine operations against
military targets.
2. Order of Battle and Equipment
Order of battle and equipment information on the USSR,
Communist China and -- to a lesser degree -- the European Satellites
is partial and inadequate, primarily because of the extreme difficulty
of collection. Intelligence on Communist Bloc units and equipment
in most areas with which the United States or nations friendly to the
United States are in contact is more nearly complete and reliable.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
V. ARMED FORCES INTELLIGENCE (Continued)
CIA 36312
IAC-D-55/4
(Revised)
Coverage on order of battle intelligence and equipment is
generally adequate in respect of nations outside of the Iron Curtain,
except in the case of some neutral nations whose national policy
restricts our access to such information.
3. Targeting
The assembly and analysis of encyclopedic target data on
economic and industrial vulnerabilities is well along for the Soviet
Orbit and is in intermediate research stages for Western Europe and
the Far East; increasing research emphasis continues on military
targets. Current target systems studies are reasonably adequate to
support joint operational planning but more vigorous data collection
efforts will be required to maintain these studies on a current basis
and to support extended systems analysis to meet detailed service
requirements.
Target intelligence required to counter the Soviet atomic
threat continues to be handicapped by gaps in current information on
Soviet weapons, stockpiling arrangements, delivery capabilities and
specific air base potentials.
Initial production of dossiers for priority combat targets is
almost complete for the USSR but coverage varies considerably for the
satellite and approach areas. Extensive tactical target coverage has
been completed on areas adjoining Korean theater but on other areas is
in various stages of completion.
4. Support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
NATO requests have been filled with the best available
intelligence consistent with the National Disclosure Policy. Intelli-
gence studies and intelligence to assist in the establishment of basic
intelligence files are provided to the NATO Standing Group and NATO
major commands. Releasable current studies and reports pertinent
to the area and the mission of the NATO major commands are continu-
ously provided.
IAC-D-55/4
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SECURITY INFORMATION
CIA 36312
IAC-D-55/4
(Revised)
VI. ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE
1. Foreign economic intelligence on the free world presents
few serious problems, mainly those that arise from the wealth of
material of variable quality and from the multiplicity of sources.
For the Soviet Bloc, however, such intelligence is far from adequate.
The Soviet government does publish some aggregate statistics of
uncertain reliability which, however, can be profitably utilized by
careful analysis. Apart from this source, the intelligence community
is confined to exploiting a diminishing flow of low-grade data, much
of which is becoming increasingly out of date. Only by taking advantage
of every possible item of information in the course of a comprehensive
thoroughly planned and coordinated study can national security needs
for knowledge of the Bloc's economic capabilities and vulnerabilities
be met. This may mean the subordination of short-term requirements
to the long-range program and a resolute and imaginative attack on prob-
lems of centralized indexing and exploitation of all pertinent materials,
whether overt or classified. Individual industry studies now being
produced will form the foundation for interindustry and other over-all
analyses. Maximum utilization of available data will result from the
application of improved statistical and other techniques.
2. In the field of economic warfare and support for allied
collective controls, intelligence coverage of movements of carriers
engaged in trade with the Soviet Bloc is excellent; however, informa-
tion on the cargoes of these carries is inadequate. Machinery has been
established to speed up the processing and evaluation of spot data into
intelligence on which action can be taken by the Economic Defense
Advisory Committee and the covert services. In this regard, increased
attention is being given to current trade transactions. There has been
established a coordinating committee which is assisting in bringing
available intelligence more quickly and fully to bear on questions
arising under this program.
3. The target analysis and production activities outlined in
Section V, Armed Forces Intelligence , continue to involve the
large-scale processing of foreign economic and technological data.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
CIA 36312
IAC-D-55/4
(Revised)
VI. ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE (Continued)
4. The heavy research requirements in the economic field
make it imperative that duplicate efforts be kept at an absolute
minimum. Closer integration of research programming among the
various agencies concerned with economic research for intelligence
is being developed through the Economic Intelligence Committee.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
CIA 36312
IAC-D-55/4
(Revised)
VII. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE
1. Scientific and technical intelligence regarding the USSR and
Satellites continued to make some progress during the first half of
1953. However, in the last analysis , production of realistic estimates
is still dependent upon securing information on Soviet objectives and
progress. There continues to be improvement in the analysis and
evaluation of available information; however, the flow of information
of a scientific and technical nature from conventional sources is
becoming increasingly inadequate. As a consequence, there is an
urgent need for the further development and utilization of new and
improved methods and techniques for the collection of scientific and
technical intelligence information. Efforts along these lines have pro-
gressed slowly in the past six months, notwithstanding present in the fields of g P potential
5X1
photographic reconnaissance.
2. A review of the effects of DCID 3/4 (which allocated primary
production responsibilities between CIA and the departments of the
Department of Defense and established the Scientific Estimates Com-
mittee (SEC))was scheduled for the first half of 1953. In order to provid
more time for an appraisal of the effects of this directive, the review e25X1
has been postponed until August 1953.
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SECURITY INFORMATION IAC-D-55/4
(Revised)
VII. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE (Continued)
4. Existing scientific and technical intelligence on conventional
Soviet armaments other than naval continues to be good so far as
standardized items in current use are concerned. However, intelli-
gence on weapons and equipments pertaining to the Soviet air offensive
and defensive capabilities remains generally inadequate. Information
regarding Soviet guided missiles programs is also poor, although cer-
tain projects based on German developments are becoming better
known. In general, knowledge of key scientists, test facilities, and
trends in military research and development remains too inadequate to
be a sound basis for predicting future Soviet weapons and equipment.
5. While the existence of a Soviet biological warfare program
has not been positively confirmed, there continue to be indications
supporting the belief that such a program does exist. Existence of a
Soviet chemical warf are program has been confirmed; however,
very little additional information related to this program has been
received in the past six months. The limited progress obtained in
chemical warfare intelligence has come from increased utilization
of Soviet open literature in related fields. The extreme scarcity of
intelligence in both fields offers an opportunity for the Soviets to
obtain technological surprise.
6. Some progress has been made in the exploitation of open
scientific literature and in research in depth on institutions, but
knowledge of basic scientific research and development behind the
Iron Curtain remains inadequate. Information on Soviet long-range
scientific development programs is similarly poor. Information on
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IAC-D-55/4
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VII. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE (Continued)
the quantity of Soviet scientific and engineering manpower is reason-
ably adequate, but estimates of its quality remain less satisfactory.
In view of the increasing importance of such basic scientific informa-
tion to the prediction of future Soviet potential, a concentrated effort
to improve intelligence in this field is planned for the coming months.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
VIII. PSYCHOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE
CIA 36312
IAC-D-55/4
(Revised)
1. Overt and covert propaganda and psychological warfare
programs have developed to an unprecedented degree in the past
two years. The intelligence needs of these programs fall largely
within the framework of political and sociological intelligence.
The orientation and organization of the material for the psychologi-
cal warfare user calls for unaccustomed depth and detail both in
the field reporting and in analysis.
2. The Department of State has created a Psychological
Intelligence Research Staff designed to increase coordination of
governmental and private research in this field.
3. The final report of the Advisory Group on Psychological
and Unconventional Warfare to the Research and Development
Board recommended methods by which research in these fields
might be better balanced and integrated within the Department of
Defense. Because of the pending reorganization of the research
and development structure in the Department of Defense, the
report has not been acted upon.
4. A major deficiency in this field is the lack of information
and of coordinated effort among intelligence agencies in determining
resistance potential, psychological vulnerabilities, and of our
propaganda effectiveness with respect to target audiences behind
the Iron Curtain. Encouraging progress has been made individu-
ally by intelligence agencies in the development of an intelligence
basis for the support of psychological warfare activities. The
results produced. thus far do not meet operational requirements,
in part because of the difficulty of defining those needs.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
IX. GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE
CIA 36312
IAC-D-55/4
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1. Geographic research of IAC agencies on foreign areas,
including evaluations of foreign mapping activities, is providing
(a) regional studies, (b) objective and area analyses in support of
covert operations, and (c) staff studies for policy and operational
planning. Coordinated geographic and map intelligence studies are
also undertaken in support of the National Intelligence Survey
program.
2. Current geographic and mapping information on the Soviet
Bloc and adjacent areas is inadequate. Geographic intelligence
research gives particular attention to the regional analysis of those
geographic facts that are required in support of planning and opera-
tional intelligence for these areas. Emphasis has been placed on
the exploitation and utilization of available Russian technical
literature in fillip critical gans. F_
V
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SECURITY INFORMATION (Revised)
X. BASIC INTELLIGENCE
1. The program of National Intelligence Surveys (NIS), which was
begun in 1948 as an interdepartmental cooperative venture, was intended
to meet with U. S. Government's demands for encyclopedic factual
intelligence on a world-wide basis. Since the NIS program was begun
1, 729 individual sections have been produced on 66 of the 108 NIS areas,
which is the equivalent of approximately 26 complete NIS. Of this num-
ber, 1, 224 have been published. For the first time during the history
of the program, the rate of production by contributing agencies equivalent
to 8 NIS, as established by the JCS, was attained in fiscal year 1953.
Based on this performance, a similar production program has been
established for fiscal year 1954.
2. NIS production is scheduled in accordance with JCS priorities
and intelligence agency capabilities. Limitations of the latter have pre-
cluded production of NIS on all JCS high priority areas and made it
necessary to undertake partial surveys on some other areas. However,
NIS production on the group of 19 areas and 4 ocean areas of highest
priority is approximately 54% complete, whereas the entire program
is about 28% complete. NIS on twelve individual areas are over 75%
complete, and five of these are in the JCS high priority list. Geo-
graphic research support for NIS has been excellent.
3. In general the quality of the NIS is good, and can be expected
to improve as the gaps in information are filled and revisions are
published under the Maintenance Program which was started in fiscal
year 1952. However, the time lag between production and publication
still remains a problem. Coordination within and between all IAC
and non-IAC agencies engaged in the NIS program is excellent and
suitable liaison is maintained with the JCS.
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SECURITY INFORMATION CIA 36312
IAC-D-55/4
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XI. WARNING OF ATTACK
1. Conclusions concerning Soviet and Communist intentions to
initiate hostilities at any given time must be tentative generalizations
drawn from inadequate evidence. They must usually be based on
estimates of the over-all situation, adjusted to available current
factual information.
2. The IAC Watch Committee provides an interagency mechanism
for assuring that new, detailed information is quickly pooled and
evaluated. Maximum use is thus made of partial and inadequate in-
formation. In supporting the work of the committee, the intelligence
agencies make careful cross-checks of information from all sources
against an elaborate analysis of possible indicators of Soviet intentions.
This method is not relied on exclusively; other approaches are con-
stantly being tried.
3. In general there has been improvement during the past two
and one half years in the ability of intelligence to provide prompt
notice and preliminary evaluations of events and developments in the
Soviet as well as in the neutral and friendly areas.
4. Intelligence cannot assure adequate warning of attack prior
to actual detection of hostile formations. Under certain circumstances,
some indications of defensive and offensive preparations on the Soviet
periphery may, however, be detected. Capability for detection of
indications of Soviet or Satellite attack varies from fair in the border
areas of Germany and Austria to extremely poor in the Transcaucasus
and Far East. Each agency maintains its own 24-hour Watch arrange-
ments to handle any information that is received.
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SECURITY INFORMATION CIA 36312
IAC-D-55/4
(Revised)
1. The Foreign Service
In general, the collection activities of the Foreign Service
have been satisfactory. Intelligence needs have been met most
adequately in the political field, less so in certain aspects of the
economic field, and least satisfactorily in the scientific, technical
and psychological fields. These deficiencies have been generally
attributable to a lack of specialized personnel in those fields which
are not closely related to the basic diplomatic functions of the
Foreign Service. Remedial action has been taken by establishing
a comprehensive economic reporting program and a continuing program
of providing Foreign Service posts with more complete and effective
guidance on intelligence needs. Additional remedial measures in
progress concern:
a. the greater use of overseas personnel of certain
operational programs in collecting basic intelligence infor-
mation, particularly in the psychological and sociological
fields, and,
b. the recognition of the role of the Foreign Service
in the national intelligence effort through the revision of the
Foreign Service Manual to include for the first time specific
and detailed intelligence instructions.
As a result of a recent study, measures to meet the needs for basic
scientific information are being carried out.
2. Service Attache System
The Service Attache System furnishes extensive useful
military information on countries outside the Iron Curtain. Attaches
in the Soviet Bloc countries obtain and transmit a considerable volume
of valuable information, although under the restrictions imposed on
them by Communist governments, the coverage which they provide
cannot be considered adequate. The Service Attache System has been
strengthened since the beginning of the Korean conflict through the
opening of new offices and the assignment of additional officers to im-
portant posts. Constant efforts are being made to improve the col-
lection capabilities of Service Attaches by the development of new col-
lection guides and techniques.
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Armed Forces Commands in Europe are acquiring extensive
information. While intelligence collection on the Soviet Union itself
is partial and inadequate, it is good in the Eastern Zone of Germany
and Austria. Considerable information is gathered by European Com-
mands from returned PW's, escapees and refugees.
Collection of intelligence in the Far East is adequate on
friendly and neutral areas but is partial and inadequate on Communist
China and Eastern Siberia.
4. Aerial Reconnaissance
Because of the overriding considerations of other than in-
telligence nature, the Armed Services have not as yet exploited fully
their overflight capabilities in aerial reconnaissance. Photo recon-
naissance capabilities have increased, with a resulting improvement
in contributions in this field. The contributions of radar reconnaissance
are only fair as compared to photo reconnaissance, but are being im-
proved. Photo interpretation capability is generally deficient in the
Armed Services; corrective measures are underway. The use of photo
intelligence in the analysis of economic and scientific developments in
respect of the Soviet Orbit is being strengthened. Research and develop-
ment effort is being expended on free balloons, piloted and pilotless
vehicles ("guided missiles" and satellites) to overcome a lack of special
reconnaissance vehicles. Research continues in the improvement of 25X1
various detecting devices.
* For security reasons, this section will not appear in the final version
published by the NSC Secretariat, but will be made available to the
President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.
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XII. COLLECTION (Continued)
b. Propaganda Analysis
Requirements of estimating offices and psychological
warfare activities have resulted in a slight shift in emphasis in the
propaganda analysis effort, leading away from the preparation of
weekly reviews of the whole propaganda field and towards the pro-
duction of more numerous specialized propaganda studies on substantive
intelligence problems.
8. Foreign Materials and Equipment
Collection of Soviet bloc items from overt sources has in-
creased appreciably during the past six months and has provided useful
data to economic and scientific intelligence and to the
program. While military operations in Korea have no e to e
capture of many important military end-items since January, plans
are under consideration for more intensive exploitation and analysis
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of captured explosives, propellants and other material available in the
Far Eastern theater. Significant information on aircraft components
was obtained from inspection of the MIG 15's
The
Joint Technical Intelligence Subcommittee of the JIC has absorbed the
functions of the former Joint Materiel Intelligence Agency in the col-
lection and exploitation of foreign materials.
9. Monitoring of Radio Jamming
Under NSC 66/1 the agencies undertook the construction and
organization of a monitoring system to obtain information on Soviet
jamming and related activities in the radio frequency spectrum. A
pilot operation involving a very limited number of stations is being
established. Adequate information as to the extent of Soviet jamming,
concentration of the jamming stations, and related information must 25X1
await the initiation and implementation of a much-expanded program.
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XIII. SUPPORT AND COLLATION FACILITIES
1. Availability of Materials
With few exceptions, all pertinent foreign positive intelli-
gence is distributed among all interested IAC agencies. In addition
to the distribution of current material, there is a continuing effort to
locate and extract pertinent information from the large volume of in-
telligence material that was collected during and after the war, both
in the United States and overseas. The sheer volume of these
materials present difficult problems of storage, analysis, and col-
lation before they can be made readily available for research analysts
and current intelligence purposes. The use of microfilm and machine
techniques is providing assistance in dealing with these problems.
2. Reference Facilities
CIA provides a central reference facility for the IAC
agencies through its collection of basic intelligence documents re-
ceived from all sources. In addition, separate files of specialized
intelligence data and materials are maintained to supplement the basic
collection of the IAC agencies. These include biographic data, in-
dustrial data, photographs and motion picture films.
3. Library Facilities
Library services in the IAC agencies should become in-
creasingly effective as a result of new measures for interlibrary
cooperation in publications procurement, indexing and reference
service.
4. Biographic Information
Each IA.C agency maintains a file of biographic data on foreign
personalities in the categories for which they have been assigned basic
responsibility, and makes such data available to the other agencies
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XIII. SUPPORT AND COLLATION FACILITIES (continued)
upon request. Excellent data can be made available on political,
military, economic, and scientific personalities. The depth of
coverage varies with the intelligence interest, and with availability
of source material. In those Iron Curtain areas where information is
not easily obtained, the IAC agencies provide for more comprehensive
coverage of the press, radio, and scientific and technical literature.
There are extensive programs for the exploitation of displaced persons,
returning PW's, and defectors, as well as other personnel having a 25X1
knowledge of personalities in various areas. Every effort is made to
include in dossiers that biographic information which is needed
intelligence researchers, such as political orientation, ability
probable course of action, past
career, religion, marital status, associates, membership in cliques,
location, etc.
5, Industrial Information
Specialized data to meet departmental needs are maintained
by the Defense Agencies. CIA collates all other types of foreign
industrial information, including research establishments doing
industrial research and development work. The material is main-
tained by individual establishment and is controlled by a tabulating
card indexing system. References to industrial end-products are
being indexed by tabulating machine methods to speed the analysis of
data being supplied to all IAC agencies.
6. Photographs and Motion Picture Films
The several Defense agencies and CIA each maintain photo-
graphic and related documentary libraries, including motion picture
films, consistant with their requirements and responsibilities.
Except for post-war coverage of Soviet and Satellite Areas, the photo-
graphic support is nearly adequate for present needs,
7. Map Procurement and Reference Service
Procurement of foreign-published maps and information on
mapping abroad is coordinated b serving an inter-
agency map committee. Results during t e past three years have
proved the effectiveness of overt collection of maps and related
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information through the Foreign Service Geographic Attache program.
Increased emphasis is being placed on the collection of maps and
engineering drawings from domestic sources. Service Attache
channels are also being used. The currently published foreign maps
required for intelligence activities are received on a continuing
basis through exchange arrangements between the Department of
State and many foreign official mapping agencies. These exchanges
are in addition to those of an operational character maintained by
the Military Service. Excellent map reference service in support
of intelligence requirements are maintained by close working arrange-
ments between the map libraries.
8. Foreign Language Publications
Approval of NSCID 16 has given new impetus to cooperative
IAC activity in this field, and definite progress is being made toward
implementation of the directive. An interagency advisory committee
and its subcommittees are working on methods of improving the
coordination of procurement and exploitation of foreign language pub-
lications for intelligence purposes. CIA is taking action to centralize
its library, reference, and indexing services for foreign language
books and periodicals, and to facilitate the use of such services by
other agencies. Efforts are being made to coordinate operations,
apportion the workload, and reduce duplication between the following
activities: overseas abstracting by US missions to satisfy the local
and departmental needs; exploitation by various agencies of technical
and other publications to fulfill specific requirements; and exploitation
by CIA of foreign language publications for information of interest
to more than one intelligence agency. A central index of translations,
maintained by CIA, prevents duplication between the translating
activities carried on by each agency, and makes the translated product
accessible to other intelligence consumers.
Good coverage of foreign publications needed for the
intelligence effort is now being obtained, although further intensive
collection action should be undertaken with regard to Soviet Bloc
and Communist Chinese publications.
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Plans for developing further coordination of external and
contractual research in the social sciences (i. e. , non-governmental)
of interest to intelligence suffered modification when the Department
of State felt obliged to cut back severely its expenditure in the
External Research Staff. Contributions from CIA and the Department
of Defense will permit continuation of the existing program, but by
no means full realization of the scale of operation which seemed to
be in sight before the current budgetary allocations were determined.
For the foreseeable future, therefore, there will continue to be
imperfections in the efforts to minimize duplication in external
research, to insure community benefit from such research and to
facilitate the rational letting of external research contracts.
Positive recommendations for a better balanced and
integrated program of research in the fields of psychological and
unconventional warfare within the Department of Defense have been
made by an advisory group to the RDB. Action on the report has
been deferred pending reorganization of the research and development
program of the Defense Department.
The Economic Intelligence Committee plans to compile
a report of all government sponsored economic external research
on the Soviet Bloc classified through Secret. The report would in-
clude completed research, research in progress, and contemplated
research.
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