(U) DISCUSSION ON ESTIMATE PROCEDURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R000800120017-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: August 30, 1954
• Content Type: MF

CONFIDENTIAL
pproved For Releasewa004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R000800120017-7 ,~secutive oisir9
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEAD
QUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
30 August 1954
MEMORANDUM FOR LT. GENERAL C. P. CABELL,
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: (U) Discussion on Estimate Procedure
1. I am trying to have our estimating effort follow
the procedure outlined in the attached discussion,
2. You said you would look it over with the possi-
bility that some variation of it might be helpful to us
all in IAC work.
3. If we did have some procedure that forced us all
to discuss the evidence in a common language, I believe
we would reach agreement more often and more quickly, or
identify more clearly why we disagree,
4. Our suggestions regarding Intelligence priorities
will use some of the language developed here.
1 Inca JOHN A. SAM OR
Estimate Procedure Major General, USAF
w/Tab "A" Director of Intelligence
USAF review(s) completed.
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/W: : +C.IA Q R01731 R000800120017-7
 Approved For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP80RO1731 R000800120017-7
30 August 1954
MEMORANDUM FOR
DLT. EPUTYNDRECTOR,~~ CABELL,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: (U) Discussion on Estimate Procedure
1. I am trying to have our estimating effort follow
the procedure outlined in the attached discussion.
2. You said you would look it over with the possi-
bility that some variation of it might be helpful to us
all in IAC work.
3. If we did have some procedure that forced us all
to discuss the evidence in a common language, I believe
we would reach agreement more often and more quickly, or
identify more clearly why we disagree.
4. Our suggestions regarding Intelligence priorities
will use some of the language developed here.
1 Inc1 /JOHN A. SAMFORD
Estimate Procedure Major General, USAF
w/Tab NA" Director of Intelligence
Approved For Release 2004/Q3L N I AJR01731 R000800120017-7
 Approved For Release 2007/08": CIA-680R01731 R0008-00120017-7
ESTIMATE PROCEDURE
1. Our estimating job concentrates upon actions,
and upon the factors which support or modify actions.
2. Actions can be of many kinds. Their impact on
our interests can be both good and bad. If an action
suggests substantial harm to our interests, we make an
estimate which labels the action as a threat.
3. Actions can also come from many sources, such
as countries, forces, peoples, factions, and individuals.
4. Sometimes we begin our estimating job with the
kind of action as well as its possible source. At other
times we begin with only the source.
5. The factors which support or modify an action
are strgnaths, motives, Judgments, and pressures. The
strengths are military, logistic, economic, industrial,
political, psychological, and governmental, depending upon
the kind of action source involved. For examples of the
kinds of action that these strengths can support for a
national action source, see Tab "A".
6. If we have in mind the action we want to estimate
as well as the possible source, we:
a. Set up the action as an hypothesis.
b. Measure the factors which can support or
modify that action (the strengths, motives, and judgment
of the source; and the pressures upon that source).
c. Test the action for probability consistent
with the factors and state this probability.
7. If we begin with only the source of action, we:
a. Measure the factors as comprehensively as
possible to stimulate awareness of all reasonable courses
of action.
b. List the actions that the factors suggest.
c. Test each action for probability consistent
with the factors and state these probabilities.
8. The above procedure:
a. Eliminates the vagueness of estimates entitled:
Approved For Release 2004/07/08, , Rj ,F ,731 R000800120017-7
 .: s
Approved For Release 2004/07 > 1731 RO0Q Q0120017-7
"Developments in such and such 'country or area"'.
b. Concentrates attention on what cam con-
ditions rather than the conditions themselves.
c. Provides a working language for discussion
and clarification of the evidence.
d. Provides action people with direct measure-
ments of the strengths which they must overcome or alter.
e. Makes individual contributions to all esti-
mates easier to delegate and produce.
f. Makes comprehensive coverage to all the actions
that may concern us more likely.
Provides a direct means of sensing and
establishing intelligence priorities.
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : G', A-RDP80R01731 R000800120017-7
UUNt IULN d IAL
 Approved For Release 2 idifflitAtIDP80R01 7318000, ROOQPS01 2
73.7
1WqMr
TAB "A"
The strengths of an enemy which clearly enable
him to do objectionable things are:
a. Military Strengths -- Obviously to conduct the
great variety of military operations that such strengths
are prepared for.
b. Logistic Strength -- To place the physical
resources of any other strength where they can be used
in chosen courses of action. (Used primarily in con-
nection with the resources of military strengths.)
Economic and Industrial Strengths -- To enslave
c.
the economy of other nations through skillful trade agree-
ments; to reduce the economy of other nations through
direct economic competition; to sustain or permit increase
in the expenditures of warfare; to outlast the corres-
ponding strengths of other nations as these become strained
or exhausted in warfare; and to advance the technology of
warfare equal to, or faster, than that of other nations.
d. Political Strength -- To increase and exploit
differences between the national aspirations of other
nations; to develop or increase suspicion between nations
that are allies, or potential allies; to subvert the gov-
ernment and the peoples of other nations through direct
infiltration of their governmental machinery; to develop
and maintain a convincing posture of benign and competent
leadership, both at home and abroad; to coerce other nations
by issuing threatening declarations, or ultimatums, and to
influence other nations through promises of benefits.
e, F cholo ical Strength -- To choose any course
of action includes adhering to a choice already made).
f. Governmental or Organizational Strength -- To
direct the independent or coordinated use of the military,
logistic, economical, industrial, and political strengths
of courseas may s of upon; be
uand to control the psychological strength as may
required.
n
Approved For Release 2004/07/O :
! A D FIT
8 l 731 R000800120017-7
 ILLEGIB
UNCLASITrtFiD Fv~iRrL T
pICTE S`7~ICr4
0
~~~; 1 80R01731R
pp RN
CY
'
A
G N
INTELLIGEN
.F
CENTRAL
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
INITI S
DATE
I
'
1 r a4
li
1.
U.4 A4
2
L4~ 1; E 1
c ? ~"tS l lI
3
[~ 5"wW~ kn.L
4
5
'/f /
FROM
INITIALS
DATE
'
J
I
Llg DIRECTOR
" IFT
2
3
APPROVAL INFORMATION II SIGNATURE
0 ACTION 0 DIRECT REPLY I1 RETURN
COMMENT Ii PREPARATION OF REPLY I DISPATCH
CONCURR?~ E COMMENDATION FILE
Remarks:
i > a 201Qd9MWI~GIA-R?R~6DiWWMR0
R~pprO
FORM NO.
) ?1
~'
SEP1947
16-68M8-I G. E. GOVERNMENT PRINTING GP CE
 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RD,80R01731 R000800120017-7
c J s