BUDGET PRESENTATION BEFORE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (OR REPRESENTATIVES) F.Y. 1951

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R000800150027-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2003
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: May 16, 1949
• Content Type: MEMO

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ER 0-4602
Navy Dept, Office of Chief of Naval Operations
Washington 25, D. C.
0p04/mb C
L1-1(1951) 0
Serial 3005P04 P
Y
(#29)
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT:
16 Lay 49
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Budget Advisory Committee
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Budget Presentation before Joint Chiefs of Staff
(or Representatives) F.Y. 1951.
1. Pursuant to preliminary discussions, it is requested that the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency arrange for an appropriate presentation ti
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (or designated representatives) to be held on Tuesday
31 May 1949.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are specifically interested in your
evaluation of the scope and reliability of foreign intelligence on which
United States force requirements and other estimates are in part predicated.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would also aplreciate your views as
to the present state of coordination between Intelligence Agencies and your
recommendations as to methods for improving such coordination.
4. It would be appreciated if you would discuss the proposed outline
of your presentation with me at your convenience*
s/ R.B. Carney
R.B. CARNEY
Vice Admiral, USN
Chairman
C
0
P
Y Original fwd to Cen Rec 6/10/49.
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Gentlemen, the question asked today= is an evaluation of the scope
and reliability on which foreign intelli Pence in based, and I presume,
rly, foreign intelligence relating to the USSR and its assooi-
ated states.
Such a question is very general? std it is very difficult if not
impossible to assign ae definite percentage such an exact, 80% true,
that can be done is to give an evaluation to individual
o perhaps on a percentage basis and than assemble the information
contained therein and use an overall arbitrary : stL,aate.
Further difficulties arise when One must consider intangibles.
for example, the information oonoernin r the number of - lanes, the number
of personnel, and the number of ships can be considered extremely accurate.
of such material or of such personnel rants h.?reat dif fi-
we have excellent tn#or .tion on the cumber of suh-sarincs
information by no means Is tiny where near con-
cluafve as to the fighting value of those sub ari es, Also our info aa,a-
tion an regards the number of planes in the Soviet Air Force is quite
reliable, but when it comes to judging the quality of thhose planes,
ficulties are encountered.
I think you must realize the immense task when one considers the
nt oontroveray in the ress concernin_= the abilities of Our own B--36
contrasted with the Navy fighters. When we oursslvas taresumably have
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 CON IDENTIA
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great divergencies of opinion as to the quality of our own materiel about
which all. of us are jresaz aab],y well informed , one can realize the reaat
difficulty in trying to obtain an exact, accurate estim to of the quality
of the materiel and the personnel of one's opponents.
When the Central Intelligence Agency is confronted by such a condi-
tion, there
one thing that we can do.--that i s to make the estimate
f avora4ble as possible to our opponents. Unquestionably, there is error
ors produce greater costs perhaps in amounts of
material end personnel on our side than would otherwise have been necee-
took the contrary view and took th., worst position in
regard to the intangible of our opponents, such un =3stiaate might prove
ca the existence of the United :Mates in case caw" wrar?. For example,
show that the rustier of
planes was not up to the Table of Organization and that by no eesns were
all of the planes in the squadron serviceable for co tinuad immediate use.
However, because such conditions prevailed in the
squadrons in question, the intelligence agencies can by no means say that
all air squadrons of the Russian Air Force are in a similar condition.
In this connection, we have never received fnfort: ation that under--
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But here again it is unsafe to generalize and stW from the above few
e piea that all Soviet planes cannot reach their rivertised ceiling.
information secured concerning the USS oozes from various sources
ludine; especially eansitive material.. reports as ;exits, reports by
defectorsp reports by viaitors, and information obtained froiL the press
of
io. These are combined together, str?:d=sin;* those which
fed as possible.
?o itical reporting is generally goad, and one can ive that a
cations and in amounts of material produced. In the quality,
centage mark for accuracy. The economic report:
aced again we begin to run into tit
items, respectively, conoarnin?: those
The security measures taken the USSR are Enoch more onerous and
ore difficult to circumvent than similar sures in the democratic
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countries and as a result stake the obtaintnr of accuritte information
a much more difficult task.
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The second question asked in the basic letter concerns "the presetit
of coordination botween intelligence agencies and recommendations
to methods for improvin ; such coordination." In this connection, I
should like to : oint out that a considerable degree of o )ordination of
the intelli enae activities of this =ovsrnment has alre~, c3 - been attained.
It is* of course, true that optimum coordination has not yet been reached.
however, not only t start but considerable progress orlon, the c;ath of
on has been attained. I earnestly believe that e have abolished
even though soma duplication remains. Ami on this subject, I
sure that you gentlemen realtae the very considerabl-:5 difficulties
encounter-ea. #ou hll know the difficuiti,,a that have oac4rred in re rd
to Unification; the Central Intelligence Agency has h=;d 4r, .' a