STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN DCI AND COLONEL LANSDALE 12 JULY 1956 AT 1230 HOURS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R000800210008-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: July 12, 1956
• Content Type: TRANS

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~, ..; ~
STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN DCI AND COLONEL LANSDALE
12 JULY 195b AT 1230 HOURS.
L-"...take over part of the process such as this marble silicate...
for lime."
D- "The feeling is...you ge
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you have others there
too
,
.
L- "Yes, Sir. I think though that we are reaching a point of diminishing
returns internally in Vietnam on that and the Vietnamese feeling
that they should help themselves more. And I think that we should
encourage that more...Vietnamese. And it might be wise to_Win.~?up
with a victorious effect here on this
and
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get out while the banners are all f],y1ng and so on. We might start
running into a law of dimishing returns for ourselves here."
D- "Well, your jadgment is good on that. I don't know it. But like
you say, the Vice President couldn't have gone further than he did
in his praise of this kind of thing in other places. This kind of
thing pays off. Now let's turn to the idea of economic warfare.
I'll get in touch with the people who are working on that. I
like the cooperative idea if we can do that. The question is if
the ICA should do it or whether we should do it. It runs into
big money, doesn't it?"
L- "It runs into big money. I think it's as ICA job but any economic
action taken out there in the next two years will be done in a
political atmosphere of neutralism and we, on our side, have got
to tie in our economic work whatever it is, just straight aid or
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grants or anything. We have to tie it in with the political
necessities of the U. S. everyplace and once we get into that,
we get into our own political warfare. In other words, co-ops
would probably be undertaken initially absentia with any organisations
that we ourselves are connected with or pushing or promoting in
any of these countries."
D- "Where did you think of doing that? You say the Communists are
doing it big scale up in North Vietnam? "
L- "In the North. I'd like to see us go to work in South Vietnam and
there are three thousand (billets) in there, or agrarian centers
and I'd like to see ua as a goal tzq and get as close to covering
all those (billets in) in, if not the next two years, in the next
three years."
D- "Are you going to run across the opposition of the local merchants
and so forth?"
Ir "It will cut into the money lending and usury of Chinese mostly
rather than the native Vietnamese and I think any opposition will
be politically unpopular among the people themselves. I don't
think there will be anything to really fear about. That, plus a
road program into the country which also has some military signifi-
cance, I think is far more important than our bearing down hard on
agrarian with farms and other types of activities that we have
undertaken because the reforms will follow any opening up of the
country and any giving people some means of helping themselves."
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D- "Have they got a program that they can finance? Or will we have
to help them on that?"
Ir "Well, I really don't know. This has been discussed by some of
your staff and with ICA in the past and apparently a decision has
been made that ICA will continue with it's present program in
Vietnam on cooperatives but they've established very few of them.
They've got their own plan there at the present and it doesn't
have the push to it and the development that is indicated by
political means today. I wouldn't be in favor of this unless it
was tied in politically and having the Ambassador be the man to
make the decision on these things."
D- "We had quite a discussion today on the basis of the Vice President's
report in regard to the size of the American mission in the various
countries, not so much in Vietnam because there we have been very
much restricted in what we do but in general that the ICA have too
many people wandering around and too many pro3ects and so forth.
Is that your impression there?"
L- "Yes Sir, very much so. I don't think it's a question of too
many people wandering around or even too many pro3ects though
Gosh knows they've got lots of them. I think it's mostly a question
of administrative procedures imposed on ICA which forces them to
take personnel into the field and instead of utilizing them in the
field in those countries, they have to stick in an office building
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and sit at their desk filling out forms and justifying and going
through many procedures."
D- "Now what countries have you in mind for putting in co-ops?
Southern Vietnam and Cambodia?"
L- "Now, on Cambodia we come into a political field. I think in
order to counter Sihanouk's organization if we start helping construct
or working with your political leaders or those who can construct
an organization that their geographical areas ought to get this
type of help from us on the economic side. And there are two
provinces there now up around the old ruins of Angkor Wat that might
possibly be the place we'd start putting in lateral roads which
could be just dirt roads scraped in by bulldozers opening up the
area so there's some advantage for people who will be going along
against the Communists and being on our side. Co-ops making them
have even further attachment to the lines and something that would
give them a little independence. In other words, if we would
strengthen them economically while they are coming along politically
with us, why, we'd wind up with pretty good counterbalance to the
neutralists there."
D- "We are going to set up this inter--agency ~rulir -v~-:,-~ shortly to
study the Cambodian situation and see what we can come up with.
That was discussed this morning, too; and I was thinking of calling
a meeting of that group and I'd like you sitting in on the first
meeting. Aefense has named General Erskine, we've Hamad our
I haven't heard from State who they want to put on that. If you
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could be present for the first meeting to give them your view,--
when do you go away?"
L- "Monday, Sir."
D- "Monday. If we have the meeting on Saturday, will that interfere
with your plans too much?"
L- "No, Sir."
(Using telephone.)
D- "Mr. Herbert Hoover, please."
L- "On our own part, Sir, other than the organizations that might be
used, I think that our main task as an agency would be to take full
advantage of the Communists coming out from behind the Iron Curtain
now and coming into these countries and do what they have done to
us where we have been in the same vulnerable position."
D- "How would you get at that? Are you talking about the Chinese
Communists coming down?"
L- "Well, Chinese, any of the missions. I don't see mooch harm if a
group of natives would overturn a car or something and burn it up
and the attendant publicity for soma reason or other."
D- "It would be a very good thing."
L- "I think that's very much in our province and something that we
might bring out ways and means of achieving."
D- "Have you got any thoughts as to a program for Cambodia?"
L- "Not definitely, no, Sir."
D- "We haven't many assets and it isn't going to be very easy to build
them up, is it?"
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L- "No."
D- "Who has assets there? MAG? There's quite a MAG mission there."
Ir "No, Sir, they really haven't. Theq haven't gotten any place
there. I think we are going to have to start tackling the problem
at least half of it from outside Thailand and Vietnam, both for
getting a pretty careful reading on it and for the information and
also for possibly some political actions on that."
D- "Aren't they pretty hostile though to both the Vietnamese and the
Thailanders?"
L- "Yes, I was thinking there of, that one of them, the opposition will
run to either country though for asylum you see; and that might
open up some possibilities where we at some point would have to
m enter in on the deal. I don't see that either the Thai or the
Vietnamese can undertake political actions themselves other than
just initiating the initial contacts."
D- "You mean, should we try to urge that
go back to his own
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country via the iTnited States? He's a very impressionable fellow,
I understand. He's the kind that the last thing he seas may be
the thing that makes the impression on him. Has he ever been in
this country?"
L- "I think that it would be very helpful--. Not that I know of, he
never has. And I think it would be extremely helpful depending on
who is in his party. He got along very well in the Philippines,
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., ~.f.
he left feeling very well; and on the flight back he had two people
with him who wrote his opening remarks as he got off the aircraft
when he got home and he had just changed completely. So that it
depends on who it is.
if he is with him, why a trip
to the United States wouldn't help."
D- "Who is he?"
L- "Well, he is a Frenchman who xe exiled out of Vietnam and is now
a close friend and advisor of Sihanouk's."
D- "How do you spell his name?"
with an accent."
D- "Oh, yea, I've heard of him."
I,r "He's a very clever psychological xarfare man. One of the best."
D- "9nd 1s he pro-Communist?"
L- "I think he's anti-U. S., possibly pro-Communist but anything that
would hurt us would be--."
~ I think he's a journalist
and I think he's as independent as any I~ench Communist might be."
D- "Is he with him on this trip as far as you know?"
Ir "I don't know, Sir."
D- "I think that he's in Paris now, isn't he, Sihanouk?"
L- "Yes, I think so."
D- "He's been taking a month's leave, I believe, in Paris."
L- "Well, if he came to this country I think the places he'd go would
be strictly play boy style, New York and Hollywood."
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D- "You mean you think that's what he would do or what we should--."
L- "I think that that's what he would like to do and I think that's
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going to leave?"
L- "He was leaving-fir gosh, it was six weeks after I left there and
I was there about the middle of June so he might be coming out about
the end of this month."
D- "Well, who have we got to take his place?"
know it."
D- "Do you know this fellow?"
Ir "Well, he's coming up from I forget his name. I don't
L- "No, I don't know him. No. Well, Sir, this dispatch that's coming
in from USIA citing...dispatch...written by others who are up there
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where we'd have to work with him.
has got some very definite ideas and proposals
on a visit here. He was definitely in favor of it."
is the one that was up in
fob. He impressed a lot of the people. I remember,
He did quite a
talking to me about him. (Buzz, answer squawk box--)
Well, Herb, in the light of the discussion this morning, I'm anxious
to get going on this little committee for "C". Defense has told
me that they want General Erskine to work on it and we are putting
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and I want--. Colonel Lansdale's with me now, and I
want him to attend the first meeting and give his impressions as
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to...for route "C". (Pause) Well, he called me and I thought of
calling the first meeting and sitting in on it self and then
letting them organize. I believe that you should chair these
meetings and have your man the chairman of it. Or maybe they
don't need a chairman, but they've got to have somebody to call the
meetings and so forth. Is
~ailable or is he not appro-
priate for this? I know that. I know that. Yes, I realize, I
was afraid that was it. All right, I thought of calling a
meeting Saturday. It may not be such a good day. It's a good day
for me and I'd like to sit in on this thing and get it going.
Saturday morning. I thought. Well, I'll come over to your office
then. Thanks Herb, right. (Hung up) ...on his trip. Well,
I'll be in touch. Will you be able to make it then Saturday
morning? I think we'll call a .., meeting on Saturday morning
and talk it over here. Have we got any kind of a paper yet, do
you know?"
L- "Gee, I don't know, Sir. I'll be down there this afternoon and
check with them."
D- "Will you see
"Yea, Sir. I'll see him."
"I'll probably talk with him on the telephone for a moment."
(Cut off)
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.~a.._~ -
The Director asked that qou note the
attached and return it to me. There is.
of course. no ob'ection to showing it
to Dick and
237 xeviaces g~c~n a~ 4
FON MNO which may he used.
U 5. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 7955--~ 342531
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