MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM ALLEN W. DULLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R000900120036-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2003
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: July 12, 1954
• Content Type: MF

FRET
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1. In the light of existing intelligence we consider
the following to be the most probable developments in the Indo-
china situationiM. Tbu. R .w4.cA.. a_CtAA 4( % '~LUA 7'+
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a. The USSR, Chinese Conununists, and Viet Minh will
make proposals which 'Msendes France (boxed in as he is by his
own deadline, his political maneuvering, and the critical French
military situation) will accept, with perhaps a few modifications,
rather than risk a continuation of the battle. The British will
probably go along with him rather than actively intervene in the
Indochina fighting.
b. The agreed arrangements will vary substantially from
the seven-point US-UK program. Such arrangements may save French
face by leaving a temporary semblance of French influence in parts
of the area. However, we believe that such arrangements will not
prevent Communist infiltration into and eventual control of most,
if not all, of Indochina.
c. The Vietnamese government of Diem will reject the
arrangements, but Bao Dai's acceptance of them will be bought by
the French, and a new Vietnamese government formed which will
acquiesce.
d. US rejection of or non-acquiescence in the arrange-
...ents accepted by Mendes-France will be represented by the Communists
as an example of US inflexibility, lack of sympathy for nationalist
aspirations in Asia, and lack of understanding of the problems of
his allies but the Communist will probably go along with the arrange-
ment, nevertheless. The fact that the Indochinese war was speedily
brought to an end as soon as the US withdrew from active participation
in the negotiations will probably be emphasized. This propaganda will
noct >y err 7-hap, ,piable effect in parts of the non--Communist world.
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2. '4'dhile we consider the foregoing to :.>e the most likely
general line of Communist action, it is possible teat the Com-
munists may undertake a ,Ruch more dangerous policy, as iollo:rs:
a. Upon US rejection of or non-acquiescence in arrange-
ments accepted by tIendes-France, the Co_n.iunis s may sta&e
that it is not worth their wni.le to enter into an agreement
not accepted by all the major powers rep ?esented at Jeneva,
and the US policy, together rti.th Diem's :attit-"de, r, cases any
agreement impossible.
b. The Viet Minh fort Ws will then :,lake an ail-out attack
on Hanoi with the possibility, that they could isolate it and
turn it into another Dien mien Phu. The bre,ich mnir ht of
course succeed in evacuating from Hanoi a part of their force
and some of the loyal Viet Narn, civilians.
c. The Comuunists would, so maneuvar as to ;place the
blame uon the United States for this situation and this
would be widely accepted in France and to sou; extent in
-.nglarnd.
3. Our analysis of the situation in Hanoi is treat the Viet
Minh forces could probably take tiie city wnicu is on the south
side of the Red River and highly vulnerable, within a few weeks, or
6n the alternative they could shortly cut off the rail line from
Hanoi to Haiphong. Even assuming that Miendes-France rejected the
Communist proposals and fought on it is unlikely that the French
Union forces could hold Hanoi until. conscript reinforcements arrive
next September or later, unless Inerican air and naval forces were
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Di_rectd
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CENTRAL INTELLI CENCE ,AGENCI
12 July 1954
1EMORANDUN FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUD.'PECTs Critical Factors Underlying the Viability of a South
Vietnam State
THE PROBLEM
To estimate what factors would be of critical importance in the
establishment of a viable South Vietnam state after the withdrawal
of the non.Communiats from North Vietnam.
DISCUSSION
1. We consider the following factors to be essential in the
establishment of a viable South Vietnam state:
a. That the Vvsrnment of South Vietnam receive inter-
national cognition and support. It would be particularly ad.
vantageous if the military strength of the US and UK were committed
to protecting the integrity of the South Vietnam state and if the
Colombo powers extended diplomatic recognition and support.
be That the line between North and South Vietnam and the
borders of Laos and Cambodia be secured. In the event of a cease
fire, this would have to be done by means of an international gmarm.
too (preferably including the US and the UN), combined with inter,-
national supervision. If no cease fire obtained, substantial out-
side forces would be rsquired to seoure the borders. The location
of the north-south border is not a critical factor so long as its
(a) bisects Viet ;i north of Tou rane,and (b) is so drawn as to
facilitate international eup ,lion and military defense.
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That South Vietnam be independent of France and that this
be manifested in terms visible to the average Vietnamese. Although
the government probably could not maintain the necessary appearance
of independence while holding membership in the French Union as
presently constituted, the Vietnamese might be willing to be members
of a less formal organization, somewhat siiedlar to the British Common-.
wealth. In addition, it would be important to assn's them that uni-
fication of Vietnam was the long-range goal.
d. That the government be capable of maintainIM
security. It would be essential that Viet Minh regulars and guerrillas
be withdrawn, preferably through international agreement under effective
international supervision, and that a competent national police force
be established. Provided that South Vietnam was not required for the
short term to assume more than a minor share in the defense of its
borders, adequate forces would probably be available from among present
Vietnamese forces in Central and South Vietnam,
e. That the government achieve short-term economic viability brt
(i) reducing share of national income being withdrawn from the coun-
try; (ii) exporting sufficient raw materials, principally rice and
rubber, to pay for imports of manufactured goods; and (iii) obtain-
ing the substantial technical and financial assistance required to
support Vietnam during the initial period,
f, That the new South Vietnam government quickly establish a
mutation for col etence and efficiency. There are a few individuals
ea.n-rr~ e ^ rr~o.?rrsr.~r..~~
who have displayed genuine leadership and others may emerge when an
_2 -
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independent South Vietnam state in established. In any event,
foreign administrative assistance would be required for an in.
definite period of time. Administrative reform of the extent
required would be impossible under the present leadership of Bao
Dai and his entourage.
2. We consider that it would be possible, if all the critical
factors listed above were present, to establish a viable South Vietnam
state. We recognize,, however, that the difficulties would be enormous.
Even assuming that the US and the UK were willing to support a South
Vietnam state and guarantee its integrity and that France relinquished
its political and economic dominance, it would be extremely difficult
to organize an effective Vietnamese goverment in the chaotic situation
which would exist following the signing of a cease-fire agreement be.,
tween the French and the Communists. Such a government would have to
establish itself as a rallying-point for non-Communist nationalist
elements, even though it had accepted the loss of Tonkin and a division
of the country, however temporary. Once establisheeds the new govermment
would be immediately confronted,, in addition to the security problems
already present in Vietnam,, with the task of coping with a Viet Minh
underground which would almost certainly be left behind as the Viet Minh
withdrew their regular troop formations. Moreover, even if international
supervision of the borders was effective in preventing the n ovement of
large military units, it would be impossible to seal the border against
the infiltration of individuals. The government would therefore be the
target of an increasing campaign of Conrmnist subversion in addition to
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overt political pressures from the north.
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SHERYAN KENT
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