SURVEY OF OFFICE OF POLICY COORDINATION BY DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R001100120001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 24, 1951
• Content Type: MF

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24 May 1951
MEMORANDUM TO THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Survey of Office of Policy Coordination by Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence
Introduction
During the period 16 April to 7 May 1951, a survey was conducted of
each Division and Branch of the Office of Policy Coordination by DDCI.
The purpose was to develop the facts applicable to OPC's organization,
workload and efficiency to discover both weaknesses and strengths in order
to correct the former and exploit the latter. A memorandum issued by ADPC
at the beginning of the survey is at Tab "A"' of Appendix.
Survey notes were made as each OPC element was covered during the
survey (Appendix Tab ""B"') . A summary of detailed findings from such notes
was prepared by Colonel Johnston (Appendix Tab "C"). ? was also prepared by Colonel Johnston who gave me mostAvaluablefass tance
throughout the survey. Although this draft expressing and recommendations and in part those of ColonJohnston,l ispart
superseded by
this memorandum, the draft is submitted herewith (Appendix Tab "D"").
The mission of OPC and its accomplishments from 10 September 1918 to
1 September 1950 were fully and accurately stated by Mr. Wisner in the re-
port he made to you at the time you assumed the duties of DCI A
Tab "ER"). A further report containing a summary (uringit
third quarter of the fiscal year 1951 has also een ubmitteds touyou by
ADPC (Appendix Tab ""F""). These reports and the memorandum, dated 8 May
y
:1951, to the National Security Council on the Scope and Pace of Covert
Operations ("Magnitude Paper"-An ""
the present broad scope and importance PPendix Tab G ) offer convincing proof of
increase in magnitude of theses operations inetheCnearsfuture. tIe
personnel now on duty, exclusive of its deep cover probable terms of OPC In personnel, employs
5X1 of CIA. Its percentage of personnel on duty,awaitinetrancee on
5X1 duty and pending security clearance is 0 on
in 1
c
d
2 2 25X1
u
ed in the Agency's annual budget for OPC activities whichreresents
# An of the total Agency's detailed 1952 bud et.
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Findings
A. General
1. Despite confusion as to the responsibility of the DCI for the
operations of CIA resulting from Admiral Hillenkoetter's interpretation of
NSC 10/2 and often a lack of sympathetic support from central administration,
there has been outstanding accomplishment by Mr. Wisner and the Office of
Policy Coordination in the face of almost insuperable obstacles and diffi.>
culties. This Office has shown great initiative, imagination and devotion
? to duty unsurpassed if equalled anywhere in the Agency.
2. OPC is undermanned for the proper discharge of its current
workload. The principal causes are the inadequacy of the security clearance
machinery and the failure of the recruiting service to produce sufficient
candidates of adequate caliber,
Be Staff
3. a. The OPC Staff is acutely undermanned qualitatively
especially in the Strategic Plans Branch and the Logistical
Plans Branch. Staff officers, trained in the techniques of
operational and logistical planning for undertakings of the
magnitude contemplated for OPC, are badly needed. The best
and most available pool of such personnel consists of those
trained in the Armed Forces. The need here is urgent, with-
out regard to the final outcome of the NSC "Magnitude Paper,"
There is also need for strengthening the Personnel and Fiscal
divisions of the OPC administrative staff and the Operations
division of the planning and operational staff*
be Research and Development. The functions of technical
Research and Development are presently being performed by an
undermanned branch of Logistics Division where it tends to be
submerged and relatively ineffective. This function should be
separated from the Logistics staff and given greater emphasis.
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C? Area Divisions
4. a. The OPC Area Divisions are undermanned quantitative)
even to carry their current operational workloads& y'
current planning is way behind schedule. Consequently,
vital areas are only just being organized;Fsome aretnon-existen
most of them are understaffed. In Washington, there is a general
shortage of operational and logistical planners
, of area special-
ists, and of key administrative personnel.
is a great discrepancy between the most highly qualifieedy, Divisi Chiefs and the least qualified. This same dicrep cynd lack
of balance is observable as between the highest and the least
qualified Branch Chiefs within each Division.
recognized by ADPC and his staff. It is a s the This fact is wn
well
of the organization and the speed with Which the burdens of opera-
e
tional commitments have overtaken the capacity to recruit highly
qualified personnel. y
b. Latin Amer;na ..,A o---. .
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Co Near East and Africa Division, though having a competent
Chief and more area know-hog, than
operational and logistical planners and in competent administra-
outline, organization has been staffed only in
d. Eastern Europe Division throughout reflects, at the same
time, the ability, zeal and impetuousness
lacking in qualified technicians inoperati nalsandilogistical
Planning. The lack of area know-how is most marked in this 1
Division, and is very thin in even its most sensitive Branch
i.e., U.S.S.R.
s
e. Far East Division is ahead of the other divisions in
quantitative stren th (partly by virtue of high
Korea an priorities in
balanced qualitative) than an It is also probably better
Europe. However, it is still n
y derstrengthtas agthan ainst there
tude and pace of its large high priority projects and is weak gin-
political and psychological warfare and in adminis-
trative know-how.
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D. Functions
5* a. Of three contemplated Fu
ti
nc
onal Staff Diii
vsons
(Commercial, Psychological Warfare and Para-Military) only one,
the Commercial Division
has been
i
,
organ
zed to dated tht
, ana was formed during my survey and is j
t b
us
ecoming optil
eraona.
It is in such a preliminary form that I w
as unable to evalt
uae
it except to find that it needs hel
fr
th
D
p
om
e
irector'ffi
s oce-
to staff it promptly to the point where it can begin to perfor
its important function.
b. The Psychological Warfare Di
i
v
sion is als bdl
oay needed.
? At present there is a nucleus of such a division in a Psychological
Warfare Branch of the Special Projects Division. But it is so
placed organizationally and is so undermanned that it is not
equipped to give adequate staff supervision to the psychological
warfare function throughout OPC.
c. The Para-Military function is, at present, represented at
the level of staff coordination by six junior officers in the
Plans Division of the OPC staff, none of whom is capable of
serving as chief of a special staff division in this field. At
the area division level it is spotty, depending largely on the
personal background and experience of the division chief and his
key subordinates. It is most fully developed in Far East as
might bee ect
organ ed from the bac
iza ion o a c Iona sta division in this field is The
urgently needed.
6. The Training function, although of more concern to OPC than
perhaps to any other office in CIA, is represented in OPC by one junior
staff officer, In Washington, all training of OPC personnel is the responsi-
bility of OSO's Training Division under Colonel Baird's
general
(although OPC has a voice on a joint training committee) supervision
7. The Communications function, which is the lifeline of covert
operations, is similarly covered in OPC by a junior staff officer, the
Communications Division being an 050 element,
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8, The Intelligence function is not, as such, a prime function
of OPC, but intelligence is a vital by-product of covert operations and
is a vitally needed factor in planning covert operations. I found
generally, throughout my survey of OPC, a deficiency in the necessary two-
way channel between OPC and the rest of CIA to insure that intelligence,
as an OPC by-product, is properly transmitted to the rest of CIA and to insure
that intelligence, as a vital factor in OPC planning, is properly siphoned
off the rest of CIA and fed into OPC. I also found that there is a detailed
level of area-operational intelligence required for covert operational
planning which is not available in CIA and which will require new mechanisms
and techniques to acquire.
E. Organization
9. OPC Organization. The present outline organization of OPC is
sound but it has not yet been staffed to the point where it can be fully
effective (Memorandum Exhibit 2). It is basically a staff-line organization,
with the chain of command running directly to the Area Division. A typical
organization chart of an area division is at Exhibit 3. The staff assists
ADPC primarily in the fields of research, planning, coordination of opera-
tions, inspection, review and evaluation of results, and in the administra-
tion of men, money, materiel and services. However, the staff is not yet
fully effective, partly because of its newness but more importantly due to
a tendency toward over-centralization of administration in CIA. This leaves
? the OPC staff in the position of responsibility for results but little
authority over means, The Area Chiefs have tended more and more to short-
circuit ADPC's office and staff and to deal directly with the administrative
elements of CIA headquarters, where there is authority over means though no
responsibility for results. This has resulted in uncoordinated staff actions
and in important OPC matters, involving command decisions, being referred to
DDCI and DCI through the administrative channel, which have never been in
the command channel (ADPC - DD/P) at all.
10. Organizational Anomaly in CIA. The situation described in
paragraph 9 above is due in large part, in my opinion, to an organizational
anomaly in CIA. The central organization for administration is eminently
satisfactory for the overt intelligence offices, which receive their missions
and means through the same channel, i.e., DDCI, who has coordinate authority
and responsibility over them and over the Deputy for Administration. In
other words, DDCI, who has responsibility for the intelligence mission per-
formed by the overt intelligence offices, is also in a position to insure
that this mission receives adequate administrative support. Yet, DD/P, who
has responsibility for covert operations, has no direct control over the
resources demanded by these operations. The intelligence offices are
essentially central offices whose resource problems are comparatively un-
important and do not run to the essence of their missions. They lend them-
selves readily to central administration and to the type of staff coordination
which a single DDCI can give without necessity for a well-developed opera-
tional staff above them. Whereas the covert offices, especially OPC, are
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not essentially central offices at all, but are global command-type
operations. They require a command and staff for their coordination
which requires daily adjustments of means to mission. Their present
mission is largely one of building an apparatus, i.e., welding men,
money and materiel, into a world-wide machine, comparable in many ways
to a military force, in terms of the logistical and administrative prob-
lems involved. OPC has nevertheless little effective control over covert
personnel procurement or covert training, or over covert logistical pro-
curement or covert communications, all of which are the essence of
building the covert apparatus. These essential functions are almost
wholly controlled by CIA central administration or by OSO. Thus OPC has
its mission requirements imposed through one chain of command (which has
no control of administration), and gets its means resources through
another chain of authority (which has no responsibility for operations).
Much of the criticism of OPC's,administration and much of the weakness
of OPC's administrative staff is due to this split between responsibility
and authority between responsibility for results and authority over the
,means to accomplish those results,
F. Administrative Procedures
11. Administrative Relationships and Procedures (CIA-OPC).
a. I was unable to discover any clear understanding of
the divisions of responsibility and authority for administrative
matters between OPC and the CIA administrative agencies. The
CIA manual merely puts DD/A, "in charge" of personnel, materiel,
money, services, etc. But it does not relieve ADPC of any
responsibility for those matters in the field of his operations.
There seems to be no clear distinction or common understanding
as to what:
(1) CIA Administration does as a central "service"
to OPC under OPC's responsibility and authority--if any.
(2) CIA Administration does as "administrative
support" to OPC, i.e., taking up responsibility and
authority in the administrative process, where OPC
leaves off,
W
(3) CIA Administration does as DCI's "Staff
Office" for administration, i.e., exercising "staff
supervision," review, audit, inspection, etc., over
OPC's delegated responsibilities and authorities for
the administration of men, money and materiel,
b. Due to the lack of such distinctions between "staff,"
"support" and "service" functions, CIA Administration apparently
tends to perform many functions directly as a central operation
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to the exclusion of any ADPC responsibility or authority.
Yet, ADPC continues to be held responsible for operational
results and OPC continues to be criticized for administrative
deficiencies. Specifically, it is not at all clear to me
just what authority, if any, CIA Administration has or ought
to have over OPC's Area Divisions to the exclusion of the
responsibility and authority of ADPC's office and staff.
However, this is a spotty, makeshift type of symptom-treatment which does
not attack the causes of the malady. In fact, it actually tends to aggra-
vate those causes by serving as a short circuit between ADPC's line sub-
ordinates and DD/A's subordinates to the exclusion of ADPC's Office and
Staff. This results in piecemeal, uncoordinated solutions to piecemeal,
unsatisfactory situations as they arise. This is in no sense in derogation
has, by his personal intervention as a trouble shooter, tended to mini-
mize many difficulties arising from these unclear and unsatisfactory
administrative relationships, which otherwise would be insufferable
12. The Deputy Director Administration (Special). Mr.
organizational relationships, have probably saved the day up to now,
13. The recently revised Project Review Committee will tend to
remedy part of the basic organizational deficiency, in that it will make
project approval largely a command decision, in which DDCI and DD/P will
? participate with DD/A in such a way as to effect balance and priority
among operational requirements and resources, which is not provided for in
the basic organization or procedures. However, this device will tend to
remedy the problem at the level of project approval only. It will not
attack the basic organizational and procedural problem of achieving a
balance between operational necessity and the careful administration of
resources, in the daily course of project execution and administration,
This requires an operational and administrative staff groupment under an
executive who has coordinate authority over covert mission and means.
Under our present organizational scheme, the logical place for such a
staff groupment is under DD/P. The lack of such a staff limits DD/P to
the potential of one man's abilities as a coordinator, special project
sponsor or operational trouble shooter. He is, of course, further limited
by lack of authority over operational resources, The command and staff
techniques developed in both commercial and military organizations would
seem to offer a solution to this problem,
14. Merger. Although sufficient facts to form a definitive
conclusion could not be obtained without a survey of OSO, my survey of
OPC indicates that:
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a. Ultimately, Covert Intelligence and Covert Operations
should be administered through a single command chain down to
the Station level and then should branch into separate chains
of specialized operatives. But, distinct and strong separate
staff elements for intelligence and for special operations
should be preserved at each command level to provide the
necessary guarding of the valid peculiarities of each, and to
prevent one swallowing the other. Unnecessary duplication is
undoubtedly using up badly needed administrative resources due
to the present degree of separation of OPC and OSO. The same
conclusion is indicated with regard to the question of how
best to organize for para-military activities as distinguished
from political-psychological activities, i.e., a single command
chain down to the level of specialized field operatives but
with strong staff elements to preserve the expert qualities of
each. This finding coincides with the report of an ad hoc
committee appointed by Mr. Dulles (Committee Report on "Inte-
gration of OSO and OPC," Appendix Tab "H").
b. However, reorganizational steps should be most care-
fully phased toward this ultimate solution so as not to destroy
the morale of the separate OPC and OSO Area Division Chiefs or
unduly disrupt operations at this critical time. I found that
an integration of the Latin America Divisions of OPC and OSO
is contemplated on a trial basis as a pilot model. Geographical
boundaries are already being made coterminous and the OPC and
OSO area divisions are being moved to contiguous office locations.
co Despite nay finding of the necessity for a very care-
ful phasing of the merger of OPC and OSO at the area division
level, I found that the need for the creation of a planning,
operational and administrative staff at the DD/P level is
immediate and urgent. A summary of the reasons supporting this
is as follows:
(1) The job of DD/P exceeds the capacity of any
single man.
(2) There is a serious discrepancy between DD/P's
responsibility for operational results and his lack
of authority over means. The introduction of an
administrative staff element in his office is an attempt
to give him some measure of control or at least close
liaison with his administrative support.
(3) There are many functions of common concern
to OS:O and OPC such as communications, training and
research and development, and commercial activities
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which are now either operating on a cross-service basis
or as a duplicating service which could be more economi-
cally and efficiently administered as common services
under DD/P and the proposed staff. One of the main
reasons why these services have not been so organized has
been the absence of physical capacity on the part of DD/P
to take on the extra load without staff assistance.
(4) There are issues between OSO and OPC which have
not progressed satisfactorily to a solution because of
the absence of staff assistance at DD/P's level.
(5) Such a staff is a necessary first step in any
closer relation between OSO and OPC.
(6) The proposed staff does not represent pyramiding
in the form of an additional staff echelon. It is rather
the strengthening of staff at an existing echelon.
A. Strength
1. That every effort be made to speed up security clearances
and to improve methods of recruiting high level personnel.
2. That the Director and the Deputies assist OPC in filling the
following key positions at once:
a. Chief, Administrative and Logistics Staff
b. Chief, U.S.S.R. Branch
c. Chief, Commercial Division
d. Chief, Latin America Division
e. Chief, Para-Military Division
f. Six (6) highly qualified militarily trained
logistical planners (preferably two each from
Army G-4, Navy Supply Corps and from the Office
of the Deputy Chief of Staff Materiel of the
Air Force.
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g. Six (6) highly qualified area experts in
Eastern Europe.
h. Three (3) highly qualified area experts in
Latin America.
i. Three (3) highly qualified area experts in
Western Europe.
j?
Three (3) highly qualified psychological warfare
planners.
B. OPC Organization
3. That the Psychological Warfare Division of the functional
staff be activated with a nucleus drawn from Special Projects Division.
1, That an Economic Warfare element be created at the ADPC
Special Staff level (probably initially attached for administration to
the new Psychological Warfare Divisio.
5. That a Para-Military Division be activated as soon as a
competent Chief is found.
? 6. That a more detailed survey be directed to discover ways
and means of improving the two-way channel of intelligence between OPC
and the rest of CIA.
C. CIA Organization
7? That the office of DD/P be immediately staffed with a
Planning office, an Operations office, an Administrative office and a
small Secretariat.
8. That the present DD/A (Special), while
continuing in his present capacity, also be designated as a member of
this staff in order that close liaison be maintained between operational
plans and the logistical support and administrative assistance now supplied
by central administration.
9. That the Training and Communications Divisions be detached
from 080 and report to DD/P.
10. That the Research and Development elements and Operational
Aids Division be detached from OPC and OSO respectively and be combined
in a research and development division at the level of covert technical
service on a special staff division under DD/P.
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12. The above recommendations on CIA organization, which
may properly be considered the first phase in a continuing reorganiza-
tional development, are indicated by chart (Memorandum Exhibit No. 4).
13. That if adequate logistical and administrative s rt
I
cannot be obtained from central administration through
-acting 25
both as DD/A(Special) and as a member of DD/F's staff, the covert adminis-
trative elements of Personnel, Procurement and Confidential Funds should
be transferred to his office on the staff of DD/P. This change, constituting
phase II of a possible reorganizational development, is shown by chart
(Memorandum Exhibit No. 5).
14. That ultimately covert intelligence and covert operations
should be administered through a single command chain down to the station
level, provided a survey of OSO confirms the finding made on the basis of
the survey of OPC. Phase III of the reorganizational development could
then be accomplished as shown by chart (Memorandum Exhibit No. 6).
15. That a survey of 00 be made with a view to determining
whether or not this Office, less Contact Division and any other covert
elements, be detached from DD/P and added to the overt intelligence offices.
VVILUAW/ly. 77-90-N
Deputy erector of
Central Intelligence
25
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SIGNATURE- RECORD AND COVER SHEET
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
REGISTRY
f OUFIC&-- _ . _ . _
WTn.J&ckson
CIA CONTROL NO.
43999
DO C. N0. OPC-SuFvey Part
I)
DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
DOC. DATE 1
COPY NO. orig
LOGGED BY
NUMBER OF PAGES Z -
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS
Part II, Appendix
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FORM NO. 38-1
MAR 1951 v
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101ORANDUM EXHIBITS
1. Chart - OPC Budget, Fiscal Year 1952.
2. Chart - Present OPC Organization
3. Chart - Organization of Typical Area Division
4. Chart - Phase I in a Continuing Reorganizational
Development
5. Chart - Phase II of Possible Reorganization
6. Chart - Phase III of Reorganizational Development
?
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Plans Opns.
CIA Field
Reps
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