AN ESTIMATE OF SOVIET AND NON-SOVIET REACTIONS TO U.S. NUCLEAR ENERGY TESTS AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENT ACTIONS AND RESULTS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80R01731R001100140031-5
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 15, 2003
Sequence Number: 
31
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 3, 1950
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80R01731R001100140031-5.pdf36.84 KB
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Approved (0 Release 2 2 io-F !P80R01j,31 R001100140031-5 3 November 1950 )EMDRANDUM TO MR. JACKSON SUBJECT: An Estimate of Soviet and Non-Soviet Reactions to U. S. Nuclear Energy Tests and Probable Consequent Actions and Results Soviet diplomacy and propaganda, in developing its "peace" campaign, would utilize forthcoming U. S. nuclear energy tests as further proof of U. S. "aggressive" intentions, whether or not these tests were announced publicly. In Europe and Britain general reaction to such tests will be favorable as an indication of continuing U. S. leadership in atomic weapons. There will be no significant reaction in the Near and Middle East to such tests, except possible criticism by India. There will be little reaction in the Far East, except for drawing Japan into closer alignment with the United States. .39 IA- R 6. P80RO1731R00-1100140031-5