AN ESTIMATE OF SOVIET AND NON-SOVIET REACTIONS TO U.S. NUCLEAR ENERGY TESTS AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENT ACTIONS AND RESULTS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80R01731R001100140031-5
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
April 15, 2003
Sequence Number:
31
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 3, 1950
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 36.84 KB |
Body:
Approved (0 Release 2
2 io-F
!P80R01j,31 R001100140031-5
3 November 1950
)EMDRANDUM TO MR. JACKSON
SUBJECT: An Estimate of Soviet and Non-Soviet Reactions to
U. S. Nuclear Energy Tests and Probable Consequent
Actions and Results
Soviet diplomacy and propaganda, in developing its "peace"
campaign, would utilize forthcoming U. S. nuclear energy tests
as further proof of U. S. "aggressive" intentions, whether or
not these tests were announced publicly.
In Europe and Britain general reaction to such tests will
be favorable as an indication of continuing U. S. leadership
in atomic weapons.
There will be no significant reaction in the Near and
Middle East to such tests, except possible criticism by India.
There will be little reaction in the Far East, except for
drawing Japan into closer alignment with the United States.
.39
IA- R 6. P80RO1731R00-1100140031-5