DIPLOMACY AND THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE A REPORT ON THE VIEWS OF LEADING CITIZENS IN TWENTY-FIVE CITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R001200030036-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 56
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2003
• Sequence Number: 36
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
DIPLOMACY AND THE COCiIMUNIST CHALLENGE
A REPORT ON THE VIEWS
OF LEADING CITIZENS
IN TWENTY-FIVE CITIES
Edited by
Joseph Barber
58 East 68th Street? New York 21
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
John J. McCloy
Chairman of the Board
Henry M, Wriston
President
David Rockefeller
Vice-President
halter H. Mallory
Executive Direc or
Frank Altschul
Vice-President & secretary
Elliott V. Bell
Treasurer
George S. Franklin,, Jr?
Executive Director
Frank D. Caruthers' Jr.
Assistant Treasurer
Hamilton Fish Armstrong
William A.M. Burden
John VV. Davis
Lewis W. Douglas
Allen W. Dulles
Thomas K. Finletter
W, Averell Harriman
Joseph E. Johnson
Devereux C. Josephs
Grayson I.J. Kirk
R.C. Leffingwell
Philip D. Reed
Whitney H. Shepardson
Myron C. Taylor
Henry M. Wriston
Chairman
Hamilton Fish Armstrong Thomas H. lulcKittrick
Arthur H. Dean Stacy May
Byron Dexter Philip E. Mosely
Grayson L. Kirk Whitney H. Shepardson
John H. Williams
Copyright' 1954, by Council on Foreign Relations, Inc?
Printed in the United States of America
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
FO1tEVJORD . . . . . . .
. a .
v
I. The Inquiry #
.
1
II. Summary of Findings, ? ? . .
, . .
7
III. Statistics of the Response .
. ? ? .
10
IV. Supplementary Comments . .
? ? ?
41
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
The Council on Foreign Relations is a non-prof'_Lt
institution devoted to study of the international
aspects of American political, economic and strategic
problems. It takes no stand$ expressed or implied,
on American policy.
The Council does not assume responsibility for
expressions of opinion contained in this report; the
Council is responsible only for determining that they
should be presented to the public.
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
This survey of opinion on our policy toward the Soviet Union and
Communist China, and on our relations with our allies, appears most opportunely,
For officers of our State Department and of the foreign offices of Great
Britain, France and other nations, will soon be meeting in Geneva with
Russian and Communist Chinese representatives. Our diplomatic officers much
more than their opposite numbers across the conference table will be conscious
of responsibilities to an unseen audience. They will be aware that the Ameri-
can public is looking over their shoulders. In closed sessions they may
temporarily escape this surveillance but they know that American opinion will
hold them to account. Thus they operate within an area of maneuver bounded by
the insights and the misunderstandings, the hopes and fears, the prejudices
and the sympathies, of the people back home.
A careful reading of this survey will throw much light on what a
cross-section of influential citizens in twenty-five cities thinks about issues
dividing the free and communist worlds. li~ithout antiqipating any of the find-
ings in Mr. Barber's excellent summary, I would like to point out one general
feature of the replies which seems significant:
The answers of the businessmen, lawyers, educators, editors, and other
citizens who took the time to ponder the Council's seventeen questions, showed
overwhelming approval of the government's present policy toward the Soviet
Union and strong support for its policy toward Communist China. Regarding
relations with our allies, there was much more division of opinion and con-
siderable dissatisfaction. For example, only 61% of the respondents -- not
an impressive majority -- thought that the United States is measuring- up to
the responsibilities of leadership in the coalition of free nations.
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
To find out what Americans really think about specific aspects
of foreign policy is a difficult task. It is much more difficult to find
out why they think as they do. This survey helps us to understand motiva-
tion as well as attitudes. For example, most of those who opposed the
admission of Communist China to the United Nations based their arguments
upon moral principles. Moral indignation was also strongly evident among
those who rejected the idea raised in Question 17 that the United States
make a deal with the U.S.S.R. for the division of Europe into spheres of
influence.
But elsewhere in the survey one finds that expediency dictated
answers. For example, the moral issue was seldom mentioned in answers to
questions on East-Kest trade, The discussion here was concentrated upon
advantage or disadvantage to the United States. Elsewhere, in replies to
other questions, there is evidence of a practical approach to questions
of foreign policy. Those who believe that Americans reduce all issues of
foreign policy to matters of right and wrong would do well to read this
survey.
Percy W. Bidwell
April 1, 1954
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
The Ip uirry
At his press conference on March 17, 1954, President Eisenhower
was asked about the "new look" in our defense and foreign policy. He author-
ized direct quotation of his reply, which in part was as follows:
"...the world is suffering from a multiplicity of fears. We fear
the men in the Kremlin, we fear what they will do to our friends around them;
we are fearing what unwise investigators will do to us here at home...we fear
depression, we fear the loss of jobs...we have got to look at each of those
in its proper perspective...the reason they are feared is because there is a
little element of truth in each, a little element of danger in each, and
that means that finally there is left a little residue that you can meet
only by faith in the destiny of America..."
When this inquiry on selected aspects of U.S. foreign policy was
begun last January, it was commonly suspected that fear of one kind or another
was an important element in the reactions of many citizens to problems con-
fronting the country. It was hoped that the inquiry would prove or disprove
this; that it would disclose the inter-play of emotion and reason in a cross-
section of responsible Americans. These objectives, we feel, have been achieved,
judging by the respondents' comments in the following chapters.
It remains to add that this summary of opinions is not intended to
contribute technical knowledge but rather to illustrate the attitudes of the
respondents and the degree of importance which they attach to considerations
now the subject of controversy in the frea world.
The Participants
The views under inspection are those of 800 men who are leading citizens
in twenty-five cities from Boston to Seattle and from St. Paul-Minneapolis to
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
2,
Houston, All are members of informal discussion groups known as Committees
on Foreign Relations, which are affiliated with the Council on Foreign Rela-
tions in New York City,
Approximately once a month from October through May members of each
Committee come together for an evening of concentrated discussion with a
guest of special competence in the field of international affairs,. The pur-
pose of their meetings is to enable the men jointly to consider international
aspects of United States political, economic, strategic and financial problems,
so that when there is occasion for them to express their views elsewhere, they
may do so upon a basis of previous reflection and study.
Once a year the Council on Foreign Relations undertakes to ascertain
the views of Committee members on specific issues of major concern to the
United States. To this end it asks the members to express themselves in
writing, in response to a detailed inquiry prepared by the Council. This
report is based upon their replies to such an inquiry.
ihile a few of the men responding are "professionals" in the sense
that their daily work keeps them in more or less close touch with developments
here and abroad, the majority are to be considered as laymen without special
training or qualification as "experts" in the area with which this study is
concerned. Some are men of national.prominence; many are widely known through-
out their own states. All have this in common: a sober concern for the secur-
ity and well-being of the United States and the conviction that the better
informed the individual, the likelier the prospect of his being able to dis-
tinguish between measures which advance and which retard American interests.
Their Professions or Occupations
43% (343) of the 800 participants are businessmen. They include board
chairmen, presidents and other executive officers of a wide variety of American
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
3.
corporations -- large enterprises, moderate,sized and relatively small.
For example: public utilities; oil, steel, chemical, lumber= automobile
and insurance companies; aircraft and textile manufacturers; producers
of building materials, machinery and electrical equipment; banks and bank-
ing houses; brokerage firms; publishers; and retailers.
17% (137) are lawyers and judges in Federal., state and municipal
courts.
14% (112) are educators ?-- presidents of state and private universi-
ties and colleges, deans, professors, and public school administrators.
6% (46) are newspaper and magazine editors, editorial writers, and
radio and television news commentators.
20% (162) are engaged in other professions or occupations, none of
which is represented by more than three per cent-of the aggregate. They
include engineers, physicians, clergymen, retired officers of the regular
Army and Navy, representatives of labor unions, farmers, and holders of
Federal, state and municipal offices.
Geographical Distribution
The participants are members of Committees on Foreign Relations in
cities geographically represented as follows:
Northeast: Boston, Providence, Philadelphia
Southeast: Charlottesville, Louisville, Nashville, Birmingham,
Atlanta
Mid1E: Detroit, Indianapolis, St. Louis, Des Moines, Omaha, St. Paul-
Minneapolis
Southwest: Little Rock, Tulsa, Houston, Albuquerque
Mountain: Denver, Salt Lake City, Boise
Pacific: Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Los Angeles
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
4.
Nature of theInguiry
The inquiry on which this report is based consisted of questions
and declarative statements, carefully calculated to bring out the
respondents' views on U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union and Communist
China, relations with our allies, the requirements for admission of Commu-
nist China to membership in the United Nations, trade with Iron Curtain
countries, and fundamental principles governing the posture of the free
world.
The composition of the inquiry was such as to oblige respondents to
test for themselves the consistency of their replies. Since the drawing
up of an adequate questionnaire on these problem;3 presented unusual
difficulties, special pains were taken to bring out the respondents' views
generally, apart from questions designed to elicit a response that could
be represented statistically.
To encourage frank expression, the participants were assured that
neither as individuals nor as Committees would they be associated by name
with specific findings. To facilitate the classification and interpreta-
tion of responses, they were asked to indicate their professions and
occupations.
The respondents were reminded that the Council on Foreign Relations
takes no stand, expressed or implied, on any aspect of American policy.
General Observations
The inquiry was distributed by the Council in early February, 1954.
In the month allotted to completion of participants' work on the inquiry,
events occurred abroad and at home which may have influenced the nature
of some of the responses. While this report is concerned both with the
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
views of participants and with their reasons for holding them, it has
been impracticable to try to identify in relative order of importance
the factors causing participants to think as they do about the issues
under consideration. The diversity involved here is infinite, :rooted
as it is in professional outlook, political orientation, and knowledge
and degree of interest in the problems composing the inquiry.
Some of the participants responded in great detail; others indicated
their views succinctly. Some referred to press reports and other pub-
lished material which had influenced their thinking. Some drew upon per-
sonal experience abroad to point up their comments about American policy.
Some observed that they had little or no information upon which to base
judgments. Many complained that the inquiry was too difficult and that
they found it almost impossible to give meaningful answers to some of the
questions. In this connection, comments such as the following were by
no means rare: "My knowledge here is scant", "In spite of my reading and
experience abroad, I just don't know the answer"; "I could write a book
about this but it would be based on my prejudice rather than my knowledge";
"You could put what I know about this on the head of a pin."
Besides statistical representation of the total response in the
various categories, percentages of affirmative, negative and uncertain
comment by regions and by professions or occupations were figured, for
purposes of comparison. It was discovered that, on occasion, answers by
regional groups varied considerably. For example, the Northeast and
Pacific groups were sometimes quite close together but at some distance,
percentage-wise, from other geographical groups. The Southwest group was
farther above or below,,! the average more often than any other group. In
the statistical break-down by professions or occupations, educators were
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
6.
farther above or below the average more often than any other group.
It is perhaps wise to emphasize here that this study is not a survey
of "public opinion" in the areas represented. It is rather an amalgam of
the considered views of a group of men in positions of influence, whose
conclusions may or may not accord with those prevailing in their communities.
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
7.
Summary of Findings
Unless otherwise indicated, the findings below reflect the corn-
posite opinions of the majority of the 8 00 men who participated in this
inquiry, and are based upon considerations represented in all categories
of response, as reported in the correspondingly numbered sections of
Chapter Three:
1. Overwhelming general agreement (94%) with present U.S. policy
toward the Soviet Union. Pronounced tendency to take exception to specific
aspects of the U.S. posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.
2. General agreement (78%) with present U.S. policy toward Commu-
nist China. Greater disposition than in 1. to criticize U.S. policy, while
expressing general agreement with it.
3. Belief (69%) that from the point of view of achieving declared
objectives, time is on the side of the free rather than the communist
world.
4. Belief (53%) that proof of communist good faith should not be a
prerequisite to U.S. participation in negotiations intended to settle
specific issues; that "communist good faith" should not be the criterion
of whether the United States will or will not participate in such negotia-
tions,
5. Overwhelming support (95%) for continued diplomatic efforts by
the United States to settle issues on which it is in conflict with communist
countries.
6. Belief (61%) that, on the whole, the United States is measuring
up to the responsibilities of leadership in the coalition of free nations.
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
8.
7, Nn ma,j oriiy in answer to this question: Which of our allies
are F,vins_the_Unnted States as much support as they ought to? Britain
was listed by 32% of all respondents; Turkey by 26%; West Germany by 15%;
Greece by 11%; Canada by 10%; Netherlands by 10%; Belgium by 8%; no other
country was listed by more than 3%.
8. No majority in answer to this question: Which of our allies are
givi the _United S tateM le support rthe oght_ to? France was
listed by 44% of all respondents; Italy by 24%; Britain by 12%; no other
country was listed by more than 3%.
9. No majority in answer to this question: In dour opinion~_are the
difficulties of our exercising effective leadership in the free world likely
jal_to continue at about theoresent leyeor to increaseL_orJcJ_to
decrease? Answers: (a)--37%; (b)--45%; (c)--11%; uncertain--7%.
10. Belief (51%) that present U.S. policy reflects enough concern
rather than too much or too little concern for the national interests of
our allies.
11. Predominant opposition (82%) to the admission now of Communist
China to membership in the United Nations. General disposition to refrain
from commitment now to a firm posture of opposition, with respect to the
future,
12, Opposition (630) to having the United States agree to the admission
of Communist China to membership in the United Nations, if the Soviet Union
were to agree to the admission of such countries as Japan, Italy, West
Germany,
13. Opposition (56%) to having the United States agree to the admission
of Communist China to membership in the United Nations, if Communist China
were to withdraw its military forces from North Korea and release all.
Americans who are held as prisoners.
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
14. Predominant opposition (77%) to having Congress prohibit all
U.S. trade with Iron Curtain countries.
15. No majority in answer to this question: Should theUnited States
reduce the Dressure whichit has been exerting Uo n Western Euro ep an countries
to discourage them from trading with Iron Curtain countries? Answers:
Yes--50%; No--39%; Uncertain--11%.
16. Predominant support (75%) for having our allies in Western Europe
increase their sales of non-strategic goods to thy: Soviet bloc, if this were
to bring about substantial improvement in the allied dollar-balance position.
17. Vehement opposition (81%) to having the United States and its
allies be willing to conclude an agreement with the Soviet Union., providing
for a Soviet guarantee of non-aggression in Western Europe, in return for
allied recognition of Soviet hegemony in Iron Curtain countries.
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
Statistics of the Response
In the following pages the questions in the inquiry are printed in
italics. The percentages given in each section indicate the relative posi-
tion of the respondents on the issues under consideration. Statistics for
the various categories of response are best understood when read in the
light of the comments illustrating the range and diversity of opinions
within each category.
~.. Are you in,eneralpagreernent or disagreement with resE,nt U.S.
policy toward the Soviet Union?
General
Agreement
General
Disagreement
Uncertain
(percentage distribution)
All respondents.,... 996*4*609%
94
5
1
By regions:
Northeast,.....,..,.......
98
2
0
Southeast.... .............
90
9
1
Middle ...................
92
6
2
Southwest.................
93
6
1
Mountain ...............a..
92
6
2
Pacific...................
97
3
0
By professions or occupations:
Businessmen...............
92
6
2
Lawyers,. ...............,.
95
5
0
Educators .................
95
5
0
Editors .............
......
92
0
Others..,.....,....,,.
:.
92
6
2
In his Cleveland speech of November 18, 1953, Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles described the spirit animating the Administration's
foreign policy, and concluded his remarks 'r1th these words: "To carry on,
we need public support. We do not ask for uncritical support. But we do
ask for support which is understanding and which does not demand a perfection
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
which is humanly unattainable."
At the beginning of the second year of the Eisenhower Administration,
the overwhelming majority of respondents in this inquiry expressed general
agreement with U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. Many did so in terms
according with Secretary Dulles' request for "support which is understanding."
Their comments frequently disclosed appreciation of the magnitude and com-
plexity of the problems facing the United States. Thus: "Agreement -- we
should recognize that we cannot solve all of the world's problems at one
sitting, or indeed in one generation"; "Agreement -- no single policy is
going to work, as a formula, everywhere at every time -- as a framework within
which to conduct foreign policy, we are taking a real. step forward"; "Agreement no one, thinking in terms of a rational and peaceful world, could be satisfied
with our policy, but prevailing circumstances seem to offer no feasible
alternative."
Of the respondents who spelled out their position, however,, many more
than those in the above category made it clear that theirs was anything but
"uncritical support." For the most part, their comments were of the "agree,
but" variety, and could be placed in three main groupings, as follows:
First, those who favored taking a stronger -0osition vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union. "Agree -- but our policy ought to be more aggressive and
positive"; "Agree, although I do not think our policy is firm enough"; "Agree.--
but our policy should be more vigorous"; "Agree -- but we could be more
dynamic"; "Agree -- but we should stand up to Russia more."
Second, those who favored a more flexible attitude: "Agree -- but we
are not doing enough to explore and exploit the areas of agreement between
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. -- we seem to make the same efforts at obstinacy,
for which we criticize the Russians"; "Agree -- but we seem to be doing little
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
12,
or nothing to make it worthwhile for those who can to change Russia"; "Agree --
but we should not oppose everythi g the Soviets want, because on rare occasions
their demands are not unreasonable." .
Third, those who were disturbed by American emphasis on atomic weapons:
"Agree -* though I am fearful that the threat to use massive atomic power,
contained in Secretary Dulles' address to the Council on Foreign Relations
on January 12, 1954, may prove to be a dangerous turn in our policy";
"Agree -- although we have made too many threats about atomic warfare";
"Agree -- although I believe we err in making so much use of the atomic threat."
Very few of the five per cent who were in general disagreement with
U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union gave specific reasons for their stand.
Most comments in this category dwelt upon the "hot-or-cold" nature of U.S.
policy. Thus: "Disagree -- so vacillating as to be without substance";
"Disagree -- our policy was first complete trust and now complete animosity --
a middle-ground position is the sane course." A few felt so strongly about
the need for taking a stronger position vis-a-vis Russia that they were
impelled to register disagreement in this manner: "Disagree -- we are too
soft toward the Soviet Union"; "Disagree -- Eisenhower and Dulles have not
lived up to their campaign promises of liberation efforts short of war -- they
are following the old defeatist containment policy."
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29: CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
2, Are you in g neral agreement or disagreement with Present U.S.
policy toward Communist_China?
General
Agreement
General
Aisagreement
Uncertain
(percentage distribution)
All respondents...............
78
17
5
By regions:
Northeast .................
81
17
2
74
20
6
Piddle ....................
17
6
SOuth0est..!.,.....?......
80
80
15
5
Mountain ..................
83
15
2
Pacific .... . . .. .. ..... ... .
75
1'7
8
By professions or occupations:
Businessmen...............
83
12
5
Lawyers ...................
79
18
3
Educators .................
71
20
9
Editors ...................
79
13
8
Others ....................
79
18
3
Nearly four-fifths of the respondents expressed general agreement with
present U.S. policy toward Communist China.
As compared with the statistics
of their support of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, there was a drop
of sixteen per cent, There was, moreover, greater disposition to question
U.S. policy, while expressing general agreement with it. Comments of
respondents generally bore upon three issues: recognition of Communist China
by the United States, the admission of Communist China to the United Nations,
and the role of Nationalist China.
A great many respondents recorded them-
solves as being in general agreement with U.S. policy toward Communist China,
while at the same time deprecating official policy on one or more of these
issues. The following paragraphs illustrate their reasoning:
"Agree, though I would like to see more flexibility on the 'recognition'
question -- we have little enough to bargain with"; "Agree, but the time will
come when we will have to recognize the existing government in China, like it
Approved For Release 2003/07/29: CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
14.
or not"; "Agree, but I have decided reservations on the refusal to
recognize Communist China"; "Agree, but I feel that we are reacting on
moral and emotional grounds rather than on solid and diplomatic grounds
we should not foreclose the possibility of recognition, for it is our one
good weapon."
"Agree, but I do not favor flat opposition to Communist China's
membership in the U.N."; "Agree -- I do not favor Communist China's ad-
mission to the U.N. at present, but neither do I favor barring ourselves
from such a course later on"; "Agree, but I disapprove even of contemplat-
ing the admission of Communist China to the U.N."; "Agree, provided we
continue to oppose Communist China's membership in the U.N."
"Agree, but I have no faith in reliance on Chiang Kai-shek as a rally-
ing point for overthrow"; "Agree, but I believe we should support Nationalist
landings in China with arms, ships and planes."
Slightly more than one-fifth of the respondents put themselves on
record as being in general disagreement with, or uncertain about, U.S.
policy toward Communist China. It was clear from the remarks of many
respondents in these categories that their disagreement was based upon
considerations cited by the respondents in the preceding paragraphs, who
registered general agreement.
Thus: "I am in general disagreement -- it is beyond me how we could
fight, a war to a draw with a nation, deal with that nation on equal terms
in an armistice, invite the same nation to a general. 'peace conference',
and still say that we do not recognize the government which controls that
nation"; "Mao is de facto in control of China -- it is impossible to
negotiate with him on Far Eastern problems (including Indo-China) unless
he is recognized as a de facto ruler"; "To refuse to recognize a de facto
government may have some value in domestic politics, but I see no merit
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
15.
in it as a means of encouraging non-Communist Chinese to resist Mao, or
whatever it is that ,;e are to achieve by non-recognition"; "Disagrn ment --
we must recognize Red China as soon as we can get an adequate concussion
in return -- we must offer alternatives to China rather than to throw her
further toward Russia."
"Disagreement -- we should find some decent way to seat Communist
China in the UN -- which need not carry approval of the Reds"; "Disagree-
ment -- I think it is about time that we stated that the Unite, States will
not support, or give equipment for, any attempt by Nationalist China to
invade the mainland."
3. From the point of view of achieving kclod objective
do you
think that time is on the side of the free: or the communist world?
Free Communist Uncertain
W orld orld
(percentage distribution)
All respondents ...............
69
17
:14
By regions:
Northeast... ..............
65
12
23
Southeast .................
67
17
16
Middle. ...................
70
18
:L2
Southwest ...... ?.?40......
73
18
9
Mountain ..........?.....?.
71
16
:L3
Pacific .................e.
65
18
1L7
By professions or occupations:
Businessmen......... ......
71
16
1.3
Lawyers. ....? .............
61
17
22
Educators.................
76
13
1.1
Editors ...................
70
20
1.0
Others .....?..a.......... 0
66
21
13
A principal reason for asking this question was
to encourage the
respondents to express convictions based upon critical appraisal rather than
upon emotional commitment, The comments clearly shoved the respondents'
desire to avoid wishful thinking and to register their views dispassionately.
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
16.
That they were on the whole successful in this endeavor was evident in their
weighing of free world prospects versus those of the communist world. In
general, there was acknowledgment of the case for each world and no pro-
nounced disposition to state without qualification that time is on the side
of either. Representative comments of the majority, who felt that time is
on the side of the free world, were as follows:
"The free world has the advantage -- while admittedly the promises of
the Communists have far greater appeal to hungry, ill-clad, ill-housed people,
than the spiritual. appeal of freedom, the fact remains that the industrial
and technical strength of the free world is a deterrent which has yet to be
capitalized on to the very best advantage"; "Basically for the free world,
since I do not believe that a slave and godless people can in the long run
conquer a people who are free to progress through the exercise of individual
initiative and who have a belief in God"; "Time is on the side of the free
world, not so much because it is effectively organized to achieve its ob-
jectives as because the communist world is more subject to internal deteriora-
tion and chaos"; "Time is on the side of the free world, assuming that the
revolutionary ferment in many parts of the world is given direction and leader-
ship by the free world, rather than letting the Soviets lead by default."
Slightly less than one-third of the respondents felt that on balance
the advantage lay with the communist world, or that it was a toss-up between
the two. Their reasoning frequently took these forms:
"I lean to the feeling that time, unfortunately, is slightly on the
Red side -- I would like to think that truth, in thou long run, will win for
the free world, but many millions born in communist countries in the past
fifteen years have had no opportunity to hear the truth, or hearing it,
recognize it"; "Communist side -- it is easier to knock down than uphold the
status 22o"; "The communist world, due to our foreign aid program -- we are
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
17.
bleeding ourselves economically, which will eventually play into the hands
of the Communists, both here and abroad"; "Communist side -- the Soviets
have been the beneficiaries of all the time that has elapsed since the
signing of the San Francisco Charter."
"Time is on both sides and in time we may learn to live with Communism";
"Evenly balanced in the scale of time"; "I hope it is on the side of the
free world but I believe it is dangerous to assume that it is"; "It depends
on the length of time"; "It depends on who declares the 'objectives'.h
4. Should proof of communist good faith be a prer22u15i1e t(n Urtted
States participation innegotiations intended to settle s cificissuess?
(percentage distribution)
All respondents.... &.04#099009
42
53
5
By regions:
Northeast.................
32
64
4
Southeast .................
36
60
4
Iv:Middle.............a......
42
53
5
Southwest .................
60
37
3
Mountain..... ? .... of ... ?. .
54
38
8
'acific ...................
30
65
5
By professions or occupations:
Businessmen...............
47
47
6
Lawyers ...................
35
62
3
Educators.................
26
70
4
Editors ...................
42
55
3
Others....................
49
45
6
To the majority of respondents who explained their position here the
key-word in the question was "proof". Many asked, what do you mean by "proof"?
and commented that there is no such thing as "communist good faith." The
intent in posing the question was precisely to elicit the respondents' reaction
to this phrase, which has had wide popular use. Regardioss of whether they
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
18,
answered in the affirmative or negative, those who explained their reason-
ing usually took pains to convey complete distrust of communist intent.
Thus: "The obvious answer to the question is 'yes,' but the very concept
of 'good faith' is totally alien to the whole Communist ideology -- I
cannot grasp the logic of many of my fellow-citizens who constantly clamor
for 'reaching agreements' with the Soviet Union"; "Definitely no -- any such
proof would have to be forged -- we have conclusive proof that 'good faith'
and Marxism (or Soviet Communism) are incompatible."
On the whole, 'those answering in the affirmative were less disposed
than those in the negative to cite reasons in support of their position.
Scores of respondents limited themselves to a succinct 'yes'. Typical
responses of those who spelled out their affirmative stand: "Yes -- past
evidence of Communist lack of good faith makes it necessary that some
guarantee of performance accompany any future settlement"; "Yes, but their
basic philosophy is such that they never tell the truth"; "Yes, though some-
times, where the risk is not too great, we shall have to take their 'good
faith' on faith,"
As the percentages indicate, more than half of the respondents
answered in the negative. A great many of them expressed their lb(-,lief that
regardless of the issue of communist 'good faith,' the United States should
continue to try to settle specific issues by negotiation. Thus: "No --
negotiating is preferable to warring -- the-possibility of war is somewhat
deterred and some understanding is achieved"; "No -- we should negotiate
whenever the opportunity arises, even though no specific issues are settled,
for we learn something if we are wise and they learn something about the
strength of free men"; "No - to expect good faith is chimerical -- we should
negotiate whenever it would seem that we might improve the situation"; "No --
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
19.
I doubt whether any side has ever felt that its opponent was motivated by
good faith"; "No -- proof is a myth -- get as much as you can, but still
negotiate"; "No -- we err in attempting to superimpose a moral judgment on
other nations before even deigning to discuss a matter with them"; "No --
if the United States ceases to participate in the negotiation of specific
issues, because of a lack of proof of communist good faith, nothing will
be gained -- we have no alternative but to continue: attempts at negotiation,
if for no other reason than to demonstrate again and again that communist
words do not correspond with communist deeds."
5. Should the United States continue to seek the settlement by
diplomacy of issues on on vhich it is in conflict with communist countries?
(percentage distribution)
All respondents...,,,,,,,,,,,,, 95 3 2
By regions:
Northeast ................. 99 1 0
Southeast,.,,,.+rar.-,?..? 94 4 2
Middle...........+.......+ 96 3 1
South rest,, ............... 94 4 2
Mountain .................. 90 2 8
Pacific ................... 95 3 2
By professions or occupations:
Businessmen ............... 94 3 3
i,dZryers....., r..... ~...... 96 2 2
Educators ................. 97 3 0
Editors ..............+,,,, 100 0 0
Others... ................. 94 -4 2
When the question of whether or not the United States should continue
to try to settle issues by diplomacy was posed, very few respondents indeed
were willing to answer in terms other than affirmative. Among the five
per cent who were uncertain or who replied in the negative, the chief mis-
givings seemed to be as follows: "No -- the seeking of settlements is
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
20,
regarded by the Communists as weakness on our part"; No -- any settlements
so obtained would merely be a breather for the communists, while they pre-
pared for still further pressures against the free world."
The attitude of the overwhelming majority was that, on balance, the
United States stands to gain rather than to lose from continuing efforts
to settle issues by diplomatic means. Many who answered in the affirmative
had in mind considerations other than the successful settlement of specific
issues. For example: "Yes -- not with the expectation of any immediate
results but to show the world that it is the Communists who block peace";
"Yes -- we should not be in the position before the world of refusing to
negotiate"; "Yes -- diplomacy can persuade the Communists that peaceful
strength is a force beyond their power to overcome"; "Yes -- words are cheaper
than lives or bombs"; "Yes - there is real value in becoming better acquainted
with the methods of communist leaders"; "Yes -- I underscore the value of
diplomacy as a means of educating world opinion."
The views of a substantial number of respondents on the posture which
should characterize the U.S. position in diplomatic negotiation with the
Communists were set forth in these terms: "Yes -- but we should not surrender
any point in the position of the capitalist world"; "Yes -- diplomacy backed
up by sound and dependable counsel from business and military leaders, not
by the State Department brand of diplomacy"; "Yes -- but this does not mean
that we should make concessions"; "Yes -- but we should display the iron
hand within our somdtimes too-silken glove"; "Yes -- but with the United
States becoming stronger and more aggressive in demanding freedom for en-
slaved peoples"; "Yes -- but with a much firmer hand and with a definite
policy to the effect that we must have certain results, for else,101
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
6. Do .you think that the United States is moasuring_,un to the
responsibilities of leadershi in the coalition of free nations?
Yes No Uncertain
(percentage distribution)
All respondents ............... 61 33 6
By regions:
Northeast...... ........... 64 31 5
Southeast.........,-.,..,.. 49 38 13
Middle .................... 64 30 6
Southwest................. 66 29 5
Mountain ..............~.?. 60 31 5
Pacific . ....... . ... ... .. .. 60 37 3
By professions or occupations:
Buoinoo nmon, , . , , , , . , . ,.., . 61 31 8
Lcivyers...........,....... 65 34 1
Educators...,....,,,..,,... 60 31 9
Editors.................. 64 33 3
Others .................... 59 35 6
So far as could be determined, a majority of those answering in the
affirmative had in mind the immense complexities of free world leadership,
and felt that, on the whole, the United States is measuring up as it should
at this stage. A great many respondents in this category tempered their
affirmative response with references to developments at home and abroad which,
in their opinion, hinder the full exercise of U.S. leadership. The two
following paragraphs illustrate the considerations v:hich were most frequently
cited:
"Yes within the framework of existing international tensions and
often conflicting loyalties, I think je are steering a pretty clear course";
"Yes -- we are gaining maturity the hard way"; "Yes -- the leaders of friendly
nations respect the soundness of our official acts."
"Yes -- although some of our trade ;~olieics and the mouthings of ambitious
politicians weaken our position among the rank and file of our allies"; "Yes --
but it will continue to be a difficult course between being accused of brow-
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
22.
beating our allies and leading them properly"; "Yes -- although lack of
unity in Congress is a handicap."
On the whole, the respondents who replied in the negative (one-third
of the total) tended more than those in the affirmative to spell out their
reactions. These may be classed in three broad categories, as follows:
Firsts "No -- although our failure is more the result of a badly-
divided American public opinion than lack of boldness or initiative on the
part of our policy makers"; "No -- we support too often the forces of re-
gression for our own ends, or for the ends of certain domestic groups"; "No --
too much latent isolationism is impairing the effectiveness of our leadership";
"No -- the real dangers of McCarthyism and the exaggerations of its dangers
in Europe are robbing us of a good measure of our intellectual leadership."
Second: "No -- we must 'firm up' our policies and not be pushed around";
"No -- leadership requires far more grit, determination and something of the
iron fist -- this is absolutely the only language which a Communist understands";
"No -- a leader should lead and should bring the recalcitrant free nations into
mutual agreement -- you cannot lead and at the same time let others lead
you around, which is what we are permitting."
Thirds "No -- we are assuming leadership responsibilities in areas
which are none of our business, and we are inviting a great many difficulties
which could and should be avoided by minding our own affairs"; "No -- we would
do a better job if we would streamline the ;hole business and cut out a lot of
the fat and wasteful methods?"
7. Which of our allies arriving the United States as much. su ort as
thoy_ ought to? ?--
Twenty-six per cent of the respondents refrained from identifying any
ally as giving the United States as much support as it ought to. A few of
the respondents in this category provided explanatory comment, which took such
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
forms as the following:
"I have no way of knowing"; "This is a highly difficult question to
handle -- what is the test for 'ought to?'"; "I do not feel competent to
answer this, but I do not feel too critical of any of them"; "One cannot
sort out allies"; "If we were being fully effective as a leader, they might
all be said to be doing less than they should -- their failure to measure
up may result from our failure in effective leadership"; "The assumption
that the United States has all the wisdom or can demand 'support' is dangerous";
"This is a tough one and I am not settled about it ?- I refuse, however, to
go 'all out' in condemning those UN members who failed to do a comparable
job with us in Korea."
Sixteen per cent of the respondents wrote the word, "None," as their
answer to the question. Seven per cent gave "All," or "Most," as their answer.
The remaining 51% listed one or more
countries which, in their opinion,
are giving the United States as much support as they ought to. Britain was
listed by 63% of these respondents (32% of all respondents). Turkey was listed
by 51% (26% of all); V1est GermarZ by 30% (15% of all); Greece by 21% (11% of all);
Canada by 20% (10% of all); Netherlands by 19% (10% of all); Bel iii by 15k
(8% of all). No other country was listed by more than 5% (3% of all),
8. Which of our allies arcivinethf United Mates less sub ort than
they-ought to?
Twenty-five per cent of the respondents refrained from identifying any
ally as giving the United States less support than it ought to. A few of the
respondents in this category provided explanatory comment, which took such
forms as the following;
"This is difficult to judge, as the situations in individual countries
are an important factor, and I am not familiar enough here to pass judgment";
"This question can only be answered if one assumes that all we do or propose
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
24,
is wise and just, and infers a moral 'ought' or 'must' that does riot exist
in fact"; "I prefer not to answer this -- why should we say how much support
other countries should give us? -- they act supposedly in their own interests
and assume that we do likewise -- a similar assumption on our part would
contribute to realism, at the expense of hypocrisy"; "From time to time
they all seem to be lagging -- it is part of our problem of leadership to
prod -- I think no categorical answer is possible."
Seventeen per cent of the respondents wrote the word, "All," and let
this stand as their answer. Similarly, four per cent gave "Most" as their
answer, without further explanation. Other categories of answers which
did not allude to specific countries totalled five per cent.
The remaining 49% of the respondents listed one or more countries which,
in their opinion, are giving the United States less support than they ought to.
France was listed by 90% of these respondents (44"' of all respondents).
Italy, was listed by 48% (24% of all); Britain by 2~a (12% of al.l). No other
country was listed by more than 5% (3% of all).
9. In your op7 nion. are the difficulties of our exercising effective
12.gdc 1 ip in the free world likely__a) to continue at about the I rese-nt
level, or Lb to increase s or(,c to
decrease?
6
a b
a
uncertain
(percentage distribution)
All respondents ...............
By regions:
37
45
ll
7
Northeast .................
39
43
7
11
Southeast.... ..????.......
42
41
12
5
Middle ....................
35
47
9
9
Southwest..........,.......
31
48
15
6
Mountain.......,..,....,...
39
45
10
6
Pacific...... ,,?....?.....
41
41
11
7
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
By professions or occupations:
Businessmen*..".........
38
45
10
7
Lawyers ...................
44
43
7
6
Educators.... .............
35
46
13
.6
Editors.< .................
23
51
13
13
Others....................
37
41
13
9
In answer to this question, one respondent who was "uncertain," com-
mented thus: "The difficulties of our exercising effective leadership in the
free world will fluctuate, depending in part upon the Soviet program and in
part upon our own." If he appears to have been cautious in his response,
he nevertheless expressed a common reaction, for it was clear that most of
those who undertook to elaborate their reaction here -- and they were not
many -- considered that the question called for no more than one's best guess.
Such comment as was made indicated that the following considerations influ-
enced the respondents:
"Our difficulties will continue at about the present level, because
President Eisenhower has the right attitude of firmness and understanding,
and as his experience grows, we will grow in terms of the leadership qualities
required"; "Continue as at present, for leadership is a long, slow process
of winning confidence."
"Increase, because we are not prepared to do the things that will take
the pressure off our allies"; "Our difficulties will increase as long as the
isolationist spirit is so strong"; "Our difficulties will increase in direct
proportion to our activities in interfering with other n'ations' affairs";
"Likely to increase -- as Russian strength grows, Russian pressure will create
new difficulties and greater tension"; "Our difficulties will probably increase
as the pattern of the free world becomes more complex -- its very success will
increase the difficulties and responsibilities"; "Increase, because allied
nationalism and petty national interests are being placed above the necessity
to cooperate with us."
Approved For Release 2003/07/29: CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
26.
"Decrease, as the merits of our policies are realized and we gain
experience"; "Decrease, as long as we continue to be firm in our position
and have the military strength to back it up"; "Decrease as we improve our
policies under President Eisenhower's direction."
10. Does present-U, 5 policy reflect?~a enough concern. r b too
much conce n,A._;rn c too little concern for-the national inter_ests..of our
allies?
a b c uncertain
(percentage distribution)
All respondents ...............
51
11
27
11
By regions:
Northeast .................
53
10
23
14
Southeast,, ......... .......
52
14
24
.10
Middle ....................
47
11
33
9
Southwest...,.........r...
57
13
21
9
Mountain ..................
54
11
25
10
Pacific ...................
44
11
32
13
By professions or occupations:
Businessmen....... ...... so
50
17
22
11
Laviyers...................
61
6
23
10
Educators .................
44
4
41
11
Editors ...................
44
2
41
13
Others ....................
51
12
27
10
Roughly one-half of the respondents represented themselves as satis-
fied on the whole with the concern which the United States is displaying
for the national interests of its allies. Although the respondents in
this category were less disposed than the others to comment in support
of their views, their thinking generally seemed to be along these lines;
"I feel that Secretary Dulles is doing a pretty good job in following
orthodox diplomatic methods, combined with an occasional stiff warning which
almost amounts to an ultimatum"; "My impression is that on the whole we are
handling this satisfactorily, although our motives are not understood by
the people in other countries and certainly a large proportion of our own
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
27,
people has not the slightest conception of what our responsibilities entail";
"Our policy appears to be flexible and reflects enough concern -- in some
respects we have exercised rare forbearance in making allowance for national
interests -- where national :,.nterest is pursued by an ally in such a manner
as to point to the seeking of undue advantage in a crisis, we should be in-
stantly concerned"; "Generally enough concern, though a more discerning con-
cern for our mutual interests in the long-run would suggest a wiser creditor
policy on our part."
The group numbering ll$, who registered their belief that U.S. policy
reflects too much concern, was usually divided between those whQ replied
in very general terms and those who cited specific instances involving our
allies. Thus: "Too much concern -- we have our problems and should tend
to them -- we cannot support Europe and the Far East forever"; "Too much we should encourage our allies to do more for themselves 'the Lord helps
those who help themselves.'"; "Too much concern -- we should be concerned only
with our own interests, just as they are -- we have tried to take care of
allied interests instead of letting them do that"; "Too much concern for
France and Italy"; "Too much concern for Israel and Indo-China"; "Too much
concern with regard to the colonial affairs of our European allies,."
Slightly more than one-quarter of the respondents thought that U.S.
policy reflects too little concern for the national interests of our allies.
Here there was a much greater disposition than in air of the other categories
to provide illustrative comment. The main groupings were as follows: "Too
little concern, due to inadequate understanding of these peoples -- greater
understanding of their cultures, way of life, totality of traditions and
customs would advance our objectives"; "Too little concern -- we talk big
about promoting world trade among our allies but all too often Congress votes
Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
 Approved For Release 2003/07/29 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001200030036-1
28,
the way our special interests dictate"; "Too little concern -- the Executive
branch is sufficiently aware of this problem but Congress is not, and the
Administration's unwillingness to stand up to Congress is not encouraging";
"Too little concern -- most of our allies are 'have-not' nations at the present
time, and we are unable to put ourselves in their position to an extent suf-
ficient to understand their short-range national interests"; "Too little
concern -- an old saying is that 'rich folks sho got pretty ways' -- if we
were under the same economic stresses as some of our allies, our own ways
might not be so pretty."
11. Do you favor or oppose the admission now of Communist China to
mgMbersh in the Un o at os? _,111 h, do ~oua,~ oro e ,admiesiQnr ow?
Favor Oppose Uncertain
(percentage distribution)
All respondents........,........
16
82
2
By regions:
Northeast...........,,,,.,,..
16
84
0
Southeast.....