NATIONAL OPERATIONS PLAN TO EXPLOIT COMMUNIST BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE HOAX, MISTREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR, AND OTHER ATROCITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R001300220007-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2007
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: October 9, 1953
• Content Type: PAPER

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DRAFT SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
October 9, 1953
COPY_NO. 43
O P E R A T I O N S C O O R D I N A T I N G B O A R D
?
NATIONAL OPERATIONS PLAN TO EXPLOIT COMI,11FINNIST
BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE HOAX, MISTREATMENT OF
PRISONERS OF WAR, AND OTHER ATROCITIES PER-
PETRATED BY COMMUNIST FORCES DURING THE KOREAN
WAR
?
ENCLOSURES: (2)
TAB "A" - Basic Plan for U.S. Action to Discredit the Soviet
Bacteriological Warfare Campaign
TAB "B" - National Plan for Exploiting Communist Mistreatment
of UN Prisoners of War
Document No. .4 - - .. ,., I
Review of E 1s document by CIA to
determined that
p CIA Ias no ob;ection to dada s
p It contains Information of CIA
Interest that must rem
slatslfied at TS S 0
Astherttyi HR 7114
p M as~ti~ta~ips oothlnA of CIA
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NATIOTA.L OPRR.f!T'iONS PIAN TO EXPLOIT COMMUNIST BW HOAX. MISTREATMENT OF
POWS AND OTHER ATROCITIES PERPETRATED BY COMIvIUNIST FORCI'S DURING THE
KOREAN WAR
OBJECTIVE
S
I, REQUIREMENTS
To establish in authoritative fashion, without supplying the
?
To develop an integrated national program which will effectively expoee
the nature of Communist motives, character, methods and ambitions by coor-
dinated exploitation of all available materials on the Soviet fabrication
of bacteriological warfare propaganda, the character of Communist exploita-
tion and mistreatment of prisoners of war and other atrocities perpetrated
by the Communists during the Korean War.
Communists with further propaganda opportunities, the falsity of Communist
charges that the United States engaged in bacteriological warfare in Korea
and Communist China.
To neutralize unfavorable publicity concerning the U.S. treat-
ment of its returned prisoners of war and to undermine Communist propaganda
exploitation of any necessary disciplinary or penal actions taken against
any repatriated US prisoner of war.
c. To make clear in the United States that this government does
not condone cowardice or treasonable acts on the part of its military personnel
and that those individuals who avoided capture, or who, having been captured,
withstood Communist pressures, are more to be praised than those who, even
though they were subjected to limited physical or mental duress, succumbed
to Communist pressures and collaborated in the germ warfare hoax.
u"37
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d; To provide for the necessary medical treatment and protection
from U.S. public scorn of military personnel who succumbed to Communist
pressures under excessive duress while also providing for appropriate explana-
tions and information output with respect to punitive action ags3nct those
who are found to have been guilty of treasonable acts.
Through objective, factual information output, expose all
?
?
provable cases of atrocities or mistreatment and violations of the existing
rules of war which may be ascribed to the Communists, both against prist.ncrs
of war and other military personnel in Korea,
He ACTIONS CURRENTLY COMPLETED OR UNDER WAY:
a. As a result of experience gained from Operation Little Switch,
it has been agreed by all agencies that no distinctive medical or physical
treatment or segrevation should be accorded to returned prisoners of war on
the basis of apparent collaboration as revealed in communist propaganda?
b. Considerable material has been obtained from psychological
warfare, medical, psychiatric, or sociological interrogation of such prisoners
while these personnel were enroute from the Far Fast Command to the United
States. Additional material will be sought as required;
c. It has been agreed that specific depositions denying partici-
pation in bacteriological warfare and outlining the conditions and forms of
duress'by which such confessions were obtained are to be acquired from the
personnel involved and transmitted to the OCB for the Department of State and
other agencies as appropriate, for their use.
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d. It has been determined that the Department of Defense will
obtain such other information and- intelligence materials as may be desired and
make them available to all interested executive agencies of the Government
immediately upon receipt.
A special panel of intelligence and information officers has
0
been established to provide documentary and intelligence material required
by the U.S. United Nations Delegations and this panel is apparently operating
effectively?
f, A special panel of the Operations Coordinating Board which had
been established to prepare a national plan for the exploitation of Communist
mistreatment of U.S. prisoners of war, has been dissolved and a new panel
constituted to plan for and coordinate all aspects of the FOW exchange.
g? The Department of Defense has agreed to make availeble to
the Operations Coordinating Board all material which has been or may be
collected concerning any aspect of this problem,
h. The Department of Defense has also agreed to prepare story
and 14hite Paper material, radio, TV and movie material for such utilization
as may be required,
i. The Department of Defense has released an announcement out-
lining its position with respect to distinction between those prisoners who
succumbed to duress., those who refused to do so, and those who collaborated
openly.
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1. The Department of Defense has made available to the Department
of Justice all pertinent information on possible subversive elements in-
volving U.S. military personnel returning from Korea.
III. SPECIFIC PROGRAMS OR ADDITIONAL ACTIONS REfUIRED:
a. A,speeific program of U.S. action to discredit the Soviet
bacteriological warfare campaign. (Title: BASIC PLAN FOR U.S. ACTION TO
DISCREDIT THE SOVIET BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE CAMPAIGN.) This program will
integrate the aspectp of completed, continuing, and new actions which relate
to this purpose, including especially the bacteriological warfare aspects
of prisoner of war experience.
b. A specific program to exploit to the maximum degree appropriate
all provable cases of atrocities or mistreatment and violations of the
existing rules of war which may be ascribed to the Communists, both against
prisoners of war and other military personnel in Korea. (Title: NATIONAL
PLAN FOR EXPLOITING COMIX,JIST MISTREATIvENT OF U.N, PRISONERS OF WAR.) This
program will integrate the aspects of completed, contin4ing and new actions
which relate to this program.
A specific program to exploit to the maximum all evidence per-
taining to U.$. personnel in Korea captured by the Communists who steadfastly
withstood Communist coercion, threats of death - and other forms of physical
and mental pressure, without falsely confessing to actions which could be
used by the Communists against the interests of the United States; such per-
sonnel to be given appropriate public recognition by citation and decoration
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of their courage and devotion to the national, interest and to their duty$ and
that such recognition by citation and decoration be given thorough exploita<
tiozi in the United States and abroad as a significant reflection of the morale
and discipline of United States military personnel, and of the values of
American national life, The citation should in each case provide a detailed
account of the physical and mental pressures used by the Communists in their
efforts to obtain "confessions" or statements from U.S, personnel, and the
responses of the Americans to these pressures,,
c. A domestic program to re-establish that the United States
does not condone cowardice or treasonable acts onthe part of its military
personnel and to establish a balanced disposition of the several categories
of U?S. military personnel returning from Korea,
Material required by the Department of Skate for the United
?
Status United Nations Delegation and United States delegations to other inter-
national bodies should continue to be provided?
f, All other materials required for the implementation of these
programs should be obtained by the Department of Defense and provided to
other interested agencies,,
An of these requirements and programs should be coordinated
by a single authoritative point of contact,
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS; (To become actions when approved by OCB)
a. That the Operations Coordinating Board note the actions already
completed and approve the two specific programs called for in III a. and
III b,, above.
b. That the Board note the requirements in III c, and III d.,
above, and designate the Department of Defense as the action agency.
That the Operations Coordinating Board designate a member of
the OCB staff as a single point of contact to provide for the coordinated
exploitation of all these programs; that this officer will act as Chairman
for an interdepartmental working group; that the Department of Justice be
invited to sit with this group; and that the Chairman act as the point of
contact to receive all requests for information and disseminate all inforr
mation obtained to the interested agencies*
d. Member agencies should advise this group with respect to
policies to be followed in the implementation of this plan.
et That the Department of Defense and other agencies provide to
this point of contact all pertinent information collected to date, that this
provision continue. in the future, and that the departments or other agencies
? undertake to satisfy requirements for further Information submitted to
them by the designated point of contact only
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~URITY INFORMATION
DRAFT SECRET
9 October 1953
BASIC PLAN FOR U. S. ACTION TO DISCREDIT THE
SOVIET BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE CAMPAIGN
1. Problem and Opportunity
a. Through manufactured ftevidence", ostensible confessions extracted
from U. S. prisoners of war by physical and mental torture, investigations
and reports by psE3udo-scientific groupso and intensive propaganda hammer-
ing, the communists have achieved in the Free World, as well as within
the Soviet orbit, some degree of belief in their allegations that the
United States has engaged in bacteriological warfare in Korea and in
Communist Chinao
b. T.lhile various U. S. Government agencies have made efforts at
counter-action, the U. S. Government has not supplied the world with
authoritative documentation to refute the charge, and to exploit this
example to discredit Soviet propaganda in general,
c. While the various agencies of the U. S. Government have separ-
ately accumulated extensive amounts of information about this Soviet
campaign, the current return of prisoners of war in Korea provides very
important additional information especially useful as specific propaganda
and as foundation for the development of concerted U. S. action on this
matter.
2. Definition of General Objective
a. Under the supervision of the Operations Coordinating Board to
assure integration with overall U. S. foreign and military policy and
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to assure government-wide integration of action on this subject, the
U. S. Government will undertake at once a program utilizing documented
evidence to expose the false and fabricated character of Communist
propaganda in general and Communist bacteriological warfare charges in
particular, as a demonstration of the insidious nature of Communist
propaganda and the brutal and destructive character of Communist methods,
b. The purposes of this program will be:
(1) To discredit this example of Soviet propaganda so effec-
tively ? that it can be used throughout the Free World and the Soviet
orbit to demonstrate the viciousness and falsity of communist
propaganda in general.
(2) To undo and reverse any belief in their allegations which
they may have achieved.
(3) To cause the Soviet bacteriological warfare propaganda
campaign to so boomerang that it will be dropped.
(Li) At the proper stage of success in such U. S. counter-
action, to use this example to the maximum for the broad purpose
of general destruction of the effectiveness of the Soviet propa-
ganda effort.
3. Guiding Considerations
a. The objectives defined above differ sharply from the view that
the Soviet campaign has been overdone to the point of self-,exposure,
that its true character will in time be naturally apparent,, and that
the best U. S. course is to let the Soviet campaign run out without
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SECRET
9 October 1953
concerted and positive U. S. counter-effort. The statement of objective
established here is a conclusion that U. S. interest now requires con-
certed positive counter-effort,
b. The Soviet bacteriological warfare campaign is based on the in-
human mental and moral breakdown of a small number of the U. S. person-
nel who have been captured in Korea. In this connection it is necessary
to note that Soviet methods of psychological coercion are capable of
? compromising most individuals whom they are determined to break, Whether
this reason is justification for the action of any individual is a matter
strictly for agencies of military or civil justice,, as the case may be.
However, there is a possibility of conflict between the general propa-
ganda objectives of the U. S. Government and the need for disciplinary
or penal action in individual cases. This plan will not attempt to pre-
judge individual cases but the following considerations will be carefully
weighed in each case prior to initiation of penal or disciplinary action.
(1) The overall propaganda objectives of the U. S. action set
forth here are best served by the avoidance of punishment of
military or civilian personnel who have been so exploited by the
? Soviet bacteriological warfare propaganda campaign,
(2) If the risk of adverse propaganda effect cannot be avoided
in cases of clear necessity for disciplinary or penal action, the
employment of public or publicly known investigations and proceed-
ings should be kept to the minimum required under law.
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SECURITY INFORMATION TAB "A"
9 October 1953
4. Courses of Action
a. The assembly of additional information and the development of
detailed courses of positive action by U. S. departments and agencies
will be accomplished by an inter-agency task force, as provided in
paragraph 5.
b. The processing of information will include:
(1) The identification and detailed study of the sources and
? methods used by the Soviets in the development of the subject
matter of this campaign.
(2) The identification of the propaganda mechanisms and tar-
gets used by the Soviets as a basis for specific U. S. counter-
action. Special attention will be given to the identification of
those influential persons and specialized opinion groups through-
out the Free World who have been especially susceptible to this
campaign.
c. The development of the U. S. positive action program will assume
the following general framework of timing, approach, mechanism and target
? selection;
(1) On the basis of the best current operational judgment,
without waiting for completion of an exhaustive analysis of the
total problem, counter-propaganda and efforts to induce credence
in US innocence of the BW charges, and the falsity of those
charges, will be initiated as a matter of urgency against persons
and groups where the Soviet campaign has been especially effective.
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SECRET
9 October 1953
(2) A dignified, continuing flow of corrective factual informa-
tion will be launched widely throughout the world, under overt U.S.
responsibility, increasing in tempo, intensity, and subject coverage
as the development and evaluation of information is accomplished,
Covert supplement to such overt action will be added as appropriate.
(3) The analysis of Soviet treatment of captured personnel will
be completed as a matter of high priority, the results to be used
as appropriate for both general propaganda and official action
through diplomatic instrumentalities and official international
organizations.
(4) A special effort will be made to carry U. S. propaganda to
the people of the Soviet orbit, by overt and covert means, wherever
possible with the cooperation of other Free World governments and
especially by the neutralist nations.
(5) As appropriate, a campaign will be launched by overt and
covert means to neutralize, over-ride, and destroy the Soviet propa-
ganda instrumentalities which purvey the myth, giving priority
attention to those which are currently and effectively active.
(6) The concentrated attention of official and non-official
U. S. facilities will be directed to the development of methods for
successful personal resistance to the Soviet techniques of psycho-
logical coercion,
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SECRET
9 October 1953
5. Implementation
a. Under the chairmanship of a member of the 0CB Staff as its rep-
resentative, an inter-agency working group is established to monitor the
development and execution of this plan. The membership will be repre-
sentatives designated by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense,
the Director of the United States Information Agency, the Director of
Central Intelligence, the Director of Foreign Operations, and representa-
tives of such other agencies, on a continuing or ad hoc basis, as the
membership herein designated may determine. Major aspects of such devel-
opment and execution will be referred for COB or NSC action as appropriate.
b. All departments and agencies of the U. S. Government will con-
tribute to the procurement and assembly of information and the provision
of operational facilities, as determined by the working group, including
the selective extraction of additional material from or other use of
returned prisoners of war.
c. In the development and execution of the positive action program,
the primary responsibility of participating departments and agencies will
be to advise the working group with respect to policies to be followed in
the implementation of this plan. In addition, with collateral participa-
tion and support from other departments and agencies as determined by the
working group with the approval of the COB, specific responsibilities
include:
(1) USIA: To develop and conduct the overt propaganda actions
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9 October 1953
(2) The Department of State: To develop and conduct the
aspects of the campaign to be accomplished through the instrumental-
ities of diplomatic action or official U. S. interjection of this
issue where appropriate into official international bodies, with
particular attention to the benefits and limitations of discussion
of these issues, in international bodies.
(3) The Department of Defense; To furnish the working group
sponsibility for devising counter-techniques to be separately
determined and assigned by the OCB*
and participating agencies, as rapidly as possible, the material
obtained from returned prisoners of war. With the cooperation of
the CIA, the FBI, and such medical agencies as appropriate, the
Department of Defense will analyze the experience of captured U.S.
personnel with Soviet methods of personality destruction, the re-
(4) CIA; As a matter of special emphasis in its intelligence
responsibilities, to identify, describe, and evaluate the Soviet
effort, instrumentalities and targets, and to provide such intel-
ligence for the purpose of determining tactical priorities;,f an
to plan and conduct all covert operational aspects of the general
programs
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CONFIDENTIAL ? TAB "B"
October 9, 1953
NATIONAL PLAN FOR EXPLOITING COMMUNIST MIS TREATMENT
OF U.N. PRISONERS OF WAR
1. OBJECTIVES
1. It is in the national interest that the full story of Communist
mistreatment of'-FCWS be made known to the American people. Implementation
of any plan to inform the American audience must take account of certain
foreign policy considerations.. Any official campaign directed to overseas
. audiences should be developed by the COB working group on the basis of a full
evaluation of the evidence. US efforts should be directed initially at
making information available and stimulating public discussion of this evidenoE
through private channels in the United States. Where use of such materials
will contribute to the achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives abroad
or in international bodies., they should be so utilized,
2. In general, it should be the purpose of the United States Government
in its programs for exploiting Communist mistreatment of UN POWS to:
a. Provide the American people with an accurate sober account of
the treatment accorded U. S. and other U.N. personnel captured by Communist
forces in Korea, particularly with respect to the cynical .1ommunist efforts
to intimidate and pervert these prisoners for political ends as a part of
the whole Communist conspiracy against the Free World'.
b. To disseminate the substantive materials on a global basis when
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October 9, 1953
such dissemination is to our advantage,
c, Educate U.S. troops regarding the U.S. experiences in the
POW field in the Korean war, and develop guidances appropriate for their
conduct as prisoners in possible future hostilities..
d.. To negate the effect of Communist propaganda developing from
their mistreatment of POWS.
e. To educate U.S. military personnel concerning the nature of
the Communist conspiracy with regard to mistreatment of POWS and to increase
their fighting spirit.
f. To inform the American public and peoples of the Free World
why UN soldiers are still missing after the completion of the prisoner of
war exchange.
g.. With regard to the POW and PW issues, to support and reinforce
political actions and propaganda materials flowing from the activities of the
U. S. delegation to the 8th Session of the UN General Assembly.
h{ To minimize the attention given to UN personnel refusing repa-
triation or returning as Communist sympathizers,
i. To contribute to the determination of the free peoples of the
world to fight Communism,
II, OPERATIONS
3, The exploitation of Communist mistreatment of prisoners of war., and
the illegal retention of those not returned during the prisoners of war ex-
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change, is a positive and dynamic project which can achieve definite psycho-
logical gains. To be successful, the program must be one of continued and
coordinated actions rather than a single-shot saturation effort.. In ex-
ploiting atrocities, the program should emphasize actual atrocities and omit
cases of malnutrition, lack of medical care, and other hardships common to
both commu,ist troops and prisoners of war. At the same time, the program
should not generate war hysteria or take on the nature of a rabble rousing
? campaign. Foreign exploitation of the program should emphasize the implica-
tions, for all individuals and nations, of the cynical and calculated way
in which Communists exploit POWs to serve their political interests and that
this, among other things, justifies the resolute opposition of the American
people to Soviet Communist and Communist aggression,
4. In order to focus national and world-wide attention on this issue
and to stimulate continuing press coverage, a person of national television
prominence should initiate the program of exploitation of Communist mistreatment
of UN prisoners of war in a televised panel discussion at the earliest prac-
ticable date with a selected group of prisoner of war returnees and atrocity
investigators. This television broadcast should be preceded by calculated
.rumors and hints that such a program is coming and will c::~tta3tst IrcViously
classified material which has now been downgraded and released by the Department
of Defense,
5. The program will then be kept alive and followed up bys
Illustrated talks to domestic civic organizations, clubs and
similar groups by selected prisoner of war returnees.
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b, Domestic radio and television interviews of selected prisoner
of war returnees by radio and television commentators.
c. Domestic magazine and newspaper articles by-lined by prisoner
of war returnees.
d. Official domestic news releases of incidents and factual data
as compiled, including official photographs.
e. Exploitation by the U,S. delegation to the UN.
f. Appropriate distribution of the stories to foreign audiences.
6. The following tasks will be performed:
a, The Operations Coordinating Board will:
(1) Accomplish over-all coordination of plans and$ as
appropriate, timing of activities of the Department of
State, Department of Defense, CIA, FOA and USIA.
(2) Advise action agencies of necessary changes in plans and
activities,
b, The,-Department of State will:
(1) Furnish national foreign policy guidance to participating
agencies, to the U.S, delegation to the United Natiors,
and to U.S. missions abroad;
(2) Provide the U.S. delegation to the UN and U.S. missions
abroad with available docuz tinted information on atrocities
and prisoners of war illegally retained by the Communists;
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(3) Furnish the Department of Defense with all available current
(4)
information concerning:
(a) Foreign reaction to the program of exploiting Communist
mistreatment of pr} soner s of war;
(b) Communist intentions regarding prisoners of war being
illegally held since the completion of the prisoner of
war exchange;
Coordinate as appropriate with foreign governments for addition-
al exploitation of Communist atrocities against prisoners of
c. The Department of Defense will:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Take all necessary action to insure that the American
people receive factual information through all media in
order to achieve the objectives set forth in paragraph
2 supra;
Prepare the script and select the personnel to participate
in the initial telecast referred to in paragraph 4, supra;
Take necessary action to implement the follow-up pha*e of
the program as indicated in paragraph 5a through 5d;
In cooperation with other governmental agencies, assist
in the development of a coordinated over-all effort to
exploit Comma:-I st mistreatment of prisoners of war;
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CUW DENTI, L TAB 'B"
October 9, 1953
(5) Cooperate with the Department of State and USIA to
insure coordination of domestic exploitation of Communist
mistreatment of prisoners of war with exploitation arranged
by the Department of State through foreign governmental
and/or information agencies;
(6) Provide the Department of State, the USIA,, and CIA with
available documented information on Communist atrocities
against prisoners of war;
(7) Maintain continuing liaison vi the Department of State
and CIA to procure all available current information
concerning:
(a) Foreign reaction to the program of exploiting Communist
mistreatment of prisoners of war;
(b) Communist intentions regarding U.S, prisoners of war
being illegally retained since the completion of the
prisoner of war exchange;
(8) Collect and make available to all agencies all exploitable
military information concerning Communist atrocities
against prisoners of wart
The Central Intelligence Agency will:
(1)
Utilize available means to procure and apptvpriately
distribute current information concerning:
(a) Communist atrocities against prisoners of war;
SECURITY' INFCRXATICN 6
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 DRAFT SECURITY INFORMATION
CONFIDENTIAL TAB "B""
October 9, 1953
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(1) Provide world-wide distribution.'of information appropriate
to the support of the program of exploiting Communist
mistreatment of UN prisoners of war;
(2) Assist in determining foreign reaction to the programi,
f, The Foreipn Operations Administration will
(1) Participate in this program in such fashion as from
time to time appears feasible;
information pertinent to the program.
e, The U. Information Agency will:
(b) Number, location and identity of UN prisoners of
war being illegally held by the Communists since the
completion of the prisoner of war exchange;
(2) Utilize available means to procure current information
to support the accomplishment of the objectives stated
in Section 1.
(3) Assist in determining Communist reaction to the program;
(4) Make available to participating agencies all other
SECURITY INFORMATION
CONFIDENTIAL
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