STATEMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BEFORE THE NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE OF CANADA (MAJ. GEN. J. F. M. WHITELEY, COMMANDANT)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R001400140003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2002
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 11, 1948
• Content Type: SPEECH

Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 R001400140003-3
STATEMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLI-
GENCE BEFORE THE NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE OF
CANADA (MAJ. GEN. J. F. M. WHITELEY, COMMANDANT)
11 MARCH 1948
General Whiteley, members of the staff and
student body: I am greatly honored to have been invited
to come here and address you on the subject of strategic
intelligence today. I feel that the invitation and my
presence here has a dual significance. In the first
place, it represents a tangible example of the closeness
which exists between your country and mine. It means
that the great admiration and understanding which
developed through our joint efforts in the last ten
years are being projected into the future in the
interests of that type of strength which will greatly
contribute to peace in the world. If peace is not to
be our share, then we have laid the groundwork for that
type of joint association which will insure victory
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE LN CLASS.
^ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TOi TS $ C,^,
NEXT U V EW NATEt
AUTH. Hj-
DATEt 14 198 REVIEWS&i-
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
STAT
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
in any armed struggle which is forced upon us.
I cannot help but feel, as I am sure that you
must feel, that if there is to be a war it may well
start with an attack upon this hemisphere -- upon the
industrial cities of Canada and the United States and
the concentrated centers of population, whether in your
country or mine.
Secondly, I feel that there is significance
in my having been invited because it indicates that
intelligence has achieved the position which it has so
long deserved in your curriculum, as it now has in the
senior staff colleges of my country -- such as our
National War College, our Armed Forces Staff College,
and our Air University.
I feel that it is almost presumptuous for me to
come here to talk to you about intelligence. The long
association which you must have had with British
- 2 -
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 R001400140003-3
11t;Ii;'
Intelligence -- which I think is the finest in the
world -- makes it difficult for me to find things to
say when we are so young in the field. In addition,
the masterful job which was done by your people in the
case of the Soviet spy ring has strengthened our hand
immeasurably in securing popular support, by being
able to point to an example of what can be done in
the field. I am sure that our countries are earnestly
devoting their talents today to the field of intelli-
gence.
-3 -
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
I want to present the functions of the Central
Intelligence Agency to you in some detail so that
you may understand it as a vibrant going concern
rather than just another group of Washington letters.
Before discussing our task with you, however, there
are certain things I wish to say as background. As
I have indicated, there has been an enormous growth
over the past few years in the appreciation of intelli-
gence matters.
t . Y u 3 o o u t , t- 1
This increased appreciation is due in
part to a full realization of -ex- pre-war failures
in the field of intelligence. In Washington some of
it is due to the reduction of our armed forces as
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 R001400140003-3
they approach their peace-time complement. It is
axiomatic that the more the actual combat forces
are reduced the greater is the role that must be
played by intelligence. Commanders in all grades
have expressed a high regard for operational intel-
ligence.
As General Spaatz said recently, in testifying
.before the President"s Air Policy Commission:.
"I think Intelligence must be exploited
to the maximum. We must spend all that
is necessary to get the best Intelli-
gence. "
Testifying before the same Commission, Admiral
Nimitz suggested that the Commission
The greater the capabilities of our
. . give thought to the importance of
intelligence to our national security.
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 R001400140003-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
enemies for sudden attack, the more
important it becomes that our intelli-
gence agencies and activities be the
best that we can devise."
From this knowledge, gained through the exper-
iences of the past decade, an appreciation of intelli-
gence has spread through the highest ranks and agencies
of our Government.
All intelligence is not sinister, nor is it
an invidious type of work. There are many ways of illus-
trating just what intelligence is -- beyond the cold
definition of the word. A manner which I have found
particularly helpful is to consider the intelligence
estimate of a nation as a kind of super jigsaw puzzle.
When first seen, the pieces of this picture are all
confused; the analysts start working and eventually
there emerges a partial solution, about 75% of the
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
puzzle. This part is the pieces that are available
from overt sources -- books, charts, periodicals,
radio broadcasts, technical surveys, photographs,
commercial surveys, general information, etc. Now,
we have 75% of a picture, showing that much of the
capabilities and potentials of our target country.
There are still gaps and omissions and to fill these we
must resort to clandestine and covert methods. By
use of such means we can get perhaps 15% more, thus
making our picture 90% complete. At this point, by'
deduction we can get perhaps 5% more. The final 5%
is most probably unattainable as it consists of ideas
and policies not even formulated, existing only in
the minds of the leaders of our target country. How-
ever, the 95% we do have should give, within narrow
limits, the potential, the capabilities, and the
probable and possible intentions of our target.
_7_
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
 t this juncture I would like
discuss 40 you the report of the Joint Congressional
Committee on\ he Investigation of the Pearl harbor
-i1~11t~[~14i 4
findings and conclusions o~ th$t Connnittee~
some failures which went to he very foundation of
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001400140003-3
Attack publishe4 in 19+6,
~~6*4t point out to you\the valj flity of many of the
our intelligence structur ;
exploit obVious source; the fa:19mre to coordinate
the collection and ssemination f intelligence
and the failure centralize Intel igence. One point
that the Co tee made, I think des rues particular
underl , and that is the statement that "efficient
intell ence services are just as essenti in time of
p e~ce as in war".
_ 8 _
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001400140003-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
In --1.+?Venee 160
the ,.ecmc3~i-~a-~f4int--..C~r~g~+es$ion~--Ce~mitte
studies of many other groups and conIait eea,, cused
c
fattentio ...
~r~ xQn.-the ?.. need for a 'centralized in ence
system.
As most of you know, a National Intelligence
Authority was established by President Truman on
22 January 1946, by Executive Directive. The Central
Intelligence Group was designated as the operating
.agency of the National Intelligence Authority.
Since the Central Intelligence Group has now been
legalized by the National Security Act of 1947 --
under the new name of the Central Intelligence Agency
-- I shall not discuss the old organization further --
-
10
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
but will proceed to the new.
With this background, I would like to discuss
with you the pertinent provisions of the National
Security Act of 191+7, insofar as they affect the
intelligence picture. This Act establishes -- for
the first time on a legal basis - a National Security
Council, the function of which is to advise the
President on the integration of foreign, domestic
and military policies relating to the national security.
The Council is to be presided over by the President
himself, or by any member he may designate. Its
membership is composed of the President, the Secretaries
of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force,
and the Chairman, of the National Security Resources
Board, together with certain others who may be
appointed at the option of the President.
- 11 -
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001400140003-3
The Central Intelligence Agency is established
under this Council. ,
ounces'ante
the :01 awe-af.--t~~~
H iw~^~?~r.'v.N M.Y'M~d/G`lny?e/yyyN.l.s~ln.: w[; ta2<
- abol~iehed b ..,t, . The law
does not set forth the powers of the Council as they
relate to our Agency, in the manner in which the
President's original Executive Order delineated the
powers of the National Intelligence Authority in
relation to the Central Intelligence Group. However,
the fact that the Agency is placed under the Council
would appear to give the Council the same general
authorities for directing the planning, development,
r'n'l coo--~dination,of all Federal foreign intelligence
activities which the National Intelligence Authority
had before it.
The Act specifically provides for a Director
- 12 -
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001400140003-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
of Central Intelligence, who is to be appointed by
the President, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, from either civilian or military life.
Certain additional safeguards are then included, so
that the Director shall not be subject to the usual
supervision, restrictions and prohibitions viich apply
to members of the armed services. It further states
that he is not to possess or exercise any supervision,
control, powers or functions -- other than those he
-.13-
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CjAgEJQJMWW1 R001400140003-3
would exercise as Director -- over any component
of the armed services. These clauses were included
in order to assure to the satisfaction of the
Congress that the Director would be free from
undue service politics and influence.
The law specifically provides that our Agency
shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement
powers, or internal security functions.
We have consistently urged that Central
Intelligence have nothing whatsoever to do with police
powers or functions connected with the internal
security of the United States. The internal security
functions are properly a part of the work of the F. B. I.,
and we have no desire whatsoever to interfere with
this. It is a burden which we do not wish to assume.
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : _ 1731 R001400140003-3
During the Congressional hearings which
preceded the passage of this Act, Central Intelli-
gence was under attack as a possible and incipient
Gestapo. We held that this argument had no basis
in fact, since a Gestapo can arise only when police
powers and intelligence are combined in one organiza-
tion. We pointed out time and again that our
interests are solely in the field of foreign intel-
ligence. Therefore, as I have said, we welcome this
provision in the law which eliminates any possibility
that our organization will merge intelligence with
police power, or assume any functions relative to the
internal security of the United States.
And now I wish to discuss with you certain
provisions of the law relating to the specific duties
of the Agency. These duties were enacted "for the
purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 R0014001400G3-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
encyclopedic information of more or less permanent
nature and general interest, which, as a result of
evaluation and interpretation, is determined to be
the best available. The best example of basic intel-
ligence is what we call a National Intelligence Survey
-- an N.I.S. An N.I.S. is a concise digest of basic
intelligence required for strategic planning and as
the basis for initial higher level operational plan-
ning, and A Survey will be prepared for each important
foreign country and area of the world. It is a basic
intelligence production and maintenance program,
based in part upon priorities set by the,Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and in accordance with the capabilities of
the agencies within our Intelligence Advisory Committee.
An N.I.S. is divided into nine chapters, each of
which treats a major functional aspect of basic intel-
ligence relating to the country or area under considera-
tion.
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
This entire program is a coordinated venture
for which an ad hoc committee, representing the Intell:J.-
gence Advisory Committee agencies, has been set up;
it 4 determining the basic outlines for these
surveys and these outlines are coordinated with all
of the Committee Members. Because this is an im-
portant example of how CIA can coordinate in the field
of intelligence, I am going into it with-you in great
detat+1.
The ad hoc committee has determined that the
nine basic chapters of the N.I.S. surveys should be
broken doum as follows : Chapter 1 -- a Brief; succinct,
presentation of the salient, basic intelligence aspects
of the N.I.S. area as a whole. The succeeding chapters
encompass Military Geography, Transportation and
Telecommuulications$ Sociological, Political, Economic,
Scientific, Armed Forces and, finally, Map and Chart
- Approved For Release 2002/10/1.0 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 R001400140003-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
Appraisals, including a Gazetteer. Certain topics,
involving numerous details, are given a general treat-
ment in the N.I.S. itself and a fuller treatment in
supplements. It is proposed, initially, to have four
supplements -- namely, Ports and Naval Facilities;
Air Facilities; Telecommunications; and Towns.
To insure close coordination with the State,
Army, Air Force and Navy Departments, tentative alloca-
tions of responsibilities for production are made,
providing for a single agency to act as over-all
coordinator for each chapter. In each case, allocation
of responsibility involves the relative interest of
the agencies in a given section and their capacities
to produce. In some of these chapters, the assistance
of agencies outside the State Department and the Mili-
tary Establishment is needed. For instance, it is
obvious that a complete study of economic conditions
-a3
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
in a country can be made only with the assistance of
the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and the
Interior. Because these agencies do not understand
intelligence as we do, and because they do not have
available -- for reasons of security -- considerable
information of a highly classified nature, we have
tentatively designated the Department of State to
assume the responsibility of coordinating the economic
chapter, calling on these other departments for
appropriate information.
We try to limit a given N.I.S. to the borders of
a political entity. Sometimes, however, this is not
possible, particularly in Chapter Two, vtiich deals
with geography. For example, since the Iberian
Peninsula -- including the approaches through the
Pyrenees from France -- seems a natural geographic
concept, it should be considered geographically as a
whole. Thus, the geographic treatment of this area
-
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
would serve as Chapter Two for both the N.I.S. --
Portugal, and the N.I.S. -- Spain.
As I have stated above, it is the task of the
intelligence staffs of the State Department and the
agencies of the Nationa]. Military Establishment to
implement the N.I.S. production and maintenance pro-
grams in accordance with agency responsibilities. In
the exchange of drafts and information in connection
with this work, intelligence channels will be used.
Moreover, we do not disregard that vast amount of
intelligence already produced in such publications as
JANIS, Marshall Plan reports, and other basic data
with which you are familiar.
Quite properly you may ask, "Where does the
coordination lie of which you speak?" "What is the
role of the C.I.A. in this work?" Briefly, it is
this: If you will recall the chaos in the field of
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001400140003-3
competed to secure the best personnel, it was necessary
for each of them to back up its experts by asserting
that its reports were the best available, and that
the others might well be disregarded.
It is the task of Central Intelligence to see that
this type of duplication is eliminated by our over-all
coordination of the joint effort. It is for us to see
that these agencies do not engage in jurisdictional
border disputes among themselves in the production of
this work.
Central Intelligence has the responsibility for
editing the final. product of the National Intelligence
Surveys. After the responsible agencies have agreed
on a section or a chapter, our editors turn it over
to our research staff, with two questions to be answered:
One, "Is it correct?" and two -- "Is it comprehensive
enough, or are there gaps or deficiencies in the text?"
_a7,
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001400140003-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001400140003-3
We bear the responsibility and the burden of answering
these two questions and of the final editing, the print-
ing, and the dissemination of the final product.
Although I have been quite lengthy in what I
have said regarding the program for National Intelli-
gence Surveys, I have done so advisedly, because of
their vast importance. --
inte3-i
hope y will be able to rely on the survey for year
area as the basic intelligence Bible at hand. Our
work today is to compile these and maintain them at
the ready.
Now, because I think specific examples are impor-
- enfl-ict--
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001400140003-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001400140003-3
, let me just remind you that I indi-
cated that port facilities form a Supplement to each
N.I.S. This brings us to another example of coordina-
tion in the field of basic intelligence. Just a year
ago, the Chairman of the Joint Merchant Ship Statistics
Board-- which was created in 1944 as a Government Board --
addressed a memorandum to General Vandenberg, who was
then the Director of Central Intelligence. This
memorandum stated that the members of the Board were
interested in detailed data on all port facilities
in the world. Among the membership of the Board was
the U.S. Maritime Commission, the Intelligence Division
of the Coast Guard, the Offices of Domestic Commerce
and International Trade in the Commerce Department,
the Bureau of Customs in the Treasury Department, the
State Department, the Offices of Naval Transportation
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001400140003-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001400140003-3
C
Service and Naval Intelligence in the Navy Department,
the Office of the Chief of Transportation in the Army.
In addition, the Board had certain private members,
namely, the American Bureau of Shipping, the Associa-
tion of American Shipowners, the Shipbuilders' Council
of America, the American Merchant Marine Institute, and
others. The U. S. Maritime Commission has certain obli-
gations to these private shipping organizations to pro-
vide them with port data, so that they can tell where
private American shipping can sail and dock. The
interests of the various government agencies are obvious.
In the past, the port data required would have
meant duplications of requests to foreign missions
ad nauseam. A Naval attache in France might have had
half a dozen separate agencies asking him for data on
the harbors of Cherbourg and Le Havre. A commercial
attache in Australia might have had additional requests
-
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001400140003-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
from several agencies on port facilities in Australia --
and so on throughout the world.
What we did when we received this request from
the Joint Merchant Ship Statistics Board was to sit
down with all of the agencies of the Board and work
out a fixed reporting form for port facilities. It is
so detailed that it has taken us almost a year to com-
plete it, and it is now in its final stages of coordi-
nation. It is divided into a classified and an unclas-
sified section. When the information is returned to us,
the classified details -- such as harbor defenses --
will be turned over to the appropriate military
establishments. The unclassified data the Maritime
Commission can make available to American shippers
anywhere.
We have served two purposes here. The first is
to establish an over-all reporting form, covering
-31-
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001400140003-3
every conceivable piece of information one needs to
know about a given harbor -- the tides, the fortifi-
cations, the berthing facilities, the labor situation
as to the number of stevedores usually available, rail
lines coming into the port, grain elevators, customs
facilities, medical facilities and so on. One standard
form will serve the purpose. These will be made avail-
able in our missions abroad. The report forms will be
filled out and kept current and returned to us. Thus,
the attaches and members of the Foreign Service will
have just one request for-data on each given port in
their country. When that data comes back to us, it will
be our responsibility to disseminate it to the agencies
of the Government having need for the information. That
is what we mean by the coordination of intelligence
production. So much for basic intelligence.
Following basic intelligence, we come to current
intelligence. Current intelligence is that spot
-- 312 _.
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R001400140003-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
information or intelligence of all types and forms
of immediate interest and value to operating or
policy staffs which is used by them usually without
the delays incident to complete evaluation or inter-
pretation. As its contribution to current intelligence,
I-
CIA prepares a daily Top Secret summary of the most
pertinent data received each day which goes to the
President, his Chief of Staff, and the Members of
the National Security Council and the Chiefs of Staff
of the Armed Services. This daily summary may con-
sist of one or several "hot" items which are of such
current interest that they should receive this dissemina-
tion. In addition, the departments also have their
own internal arrangements for daily summaries to their
top officials containing information pertinent to
their on departments. Also, in the field of current
intelligence, I would list our. Top Secret weekly summary
-33 -
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
President and appropriate officials can draw a well-
rounded picture on which to base--their policies. And
it should be clearly borne in mind that the Central
Intelligence Agency does not make policy.
The estimates furnished in the form of strategic
and national policy intelligence by the Central
Intelligence Agency fill a most serious gap in our
present intelligence structure. These estimates should
represent the most comprehensive, complete and precise
national intelligence available to the Government.
Without a central research staff producing this
material, an intelligence system would merely resemble
a costly group of factories, each manufacturing component
parts, without a central assembly line for the finished
product.
An additional example of national intelligence
is a "Review of the World Situation as it Relates to
-37---
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140603-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
the Security of the United States" which we prepare in
advance of each meeting of the National Security Council.
This is a seven to ten page analysis and evaluation of
trends in particular areas of interest to our national
security. In addition, from time to time we prepare
estimates of reactions to prospective United States
policies.
Now if you go out from here and become the J
of someNQrganization you may ask, `hat intelli
from the Central Intelligen
It is very hard tothink of anything Aich you will
receive specifically maned "Toff--2 from CIA". You
in your area. These/however, will come to you from
your departmen#,/-- be they Army, Navy o3~\the Air Force.
ed that they will contain sufficien\ informa-
-3~
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
 `/ Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CI 731 R001400140003-3
collection activities. This is the type of collec-
tion which can best be done by the experts of the
departments in their various fields.
The law provides one section which establishes
the right of the Agency to collect certain intelli-
gence material, and I shall quote this section
verbatim: "To perform, for the benefit of existing
intelligence. agencies, such additional services of
common concern as the National Security Council
determines can be more efficiently accomplished
centrally.This section is written primarily to
f' Y
allow the Agency to engage in foreign---clandestine
operations -- to give to the"United States, for the
first time, the .apionage system which is, unfor-
tunatei;.,-made necessary by conditions in the world
ay I eoc it , it allows us to perform certain
collection and-o ie functions which would other-
wise have to be done individually by each of the
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIPC RP80R01731 R001400140003-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : ClA D,R P80R01731 R001400140003-3
Recently the Arab League held a conference in
khkM~f!fl~+
Cairo. In a broadcast intercept
which apparently was an oversight in the
25X1
25X1
security measures of the Arab League Conference,
r
the text of the decisions was released. There were
no subsequent broadcasts or releases on the Arab
League Conference. Consequently without the monitor-
ing service of the FBIB this information would not
have been available to us for weeks, if ever.
In October of 19k7, TABS, the Soviet news
agency, broadcast a?commnntque which reported the
formation of the Cominform. The FBIB, having monitored
the TABS communique,, imnediately set to work to
determine the reaction of radios throughout the
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA=RDP80R01731 R001400140003-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP8 0731 R001400140003-3
world. On the following day the FBIB was able to
present a cress section of world reaction and within
the next two days the Soviet reaction was broadcast
as an excerpt from KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. CIA had
the information 2 or .3 days earlier thaw would have
been the case without FBIB monitoring.
At about the same time that the Cominform was
front-page news with Commercial press services the
FBIB picked up the first notice of the Communist
worldwide attack on Socialists when it heard Radio
Bratislava announce the arrest of Czechoslovakian
right-wing democrats..
Two examples of specific intelligence gleaned
from broadcasts over a long period are the reports
on the "Soviet Transportation System" and the "Status
of Soviet Agriculture", in which all of the data on
one subject from one source were presented in brief
-A# -
sa
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CI
form for use by research analysts making studies
based on all sources.
Finally, I have stated that this section of
the law, which instructs us to perform certain
functions centrally, is used as the cloak to hide
the right to operate the clandestine services of
the United States which have been assigned to us
by the passage of the National Security Act of 1947.
The collection of information by this means
has been over-dramatized, and unfortunately, over-
publicized. However, I believe we should frankly
acknowledge the need for and provide the means of
collecting that intelligence which can be obtained
only by clandestine methods. In this we only follow,
late by many years, the policy and example of every
major foreign power. When properly provided for and.
established, these operations must be centralized
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
 =3t3~3;:i;i:;a
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 :
in one organization. The experience of the British
Secret Intelligence Service over hundreds of years
proves this. The Germans violated this principle
-- as did the Italians and the Japanese -- with
disastrous results for themselves.
Failure always marks a multiplicity of secret
intelligence organizations. Study of many intel-
ligence systems throughout the world, talks with
those who have operated in the field of secret
intelligence for long periods of time, and post-war
interrogations of high intelligence officials in
the Axis countries, have shown conclusively that
when there are separate services, the result is
chaos, so far as production of information is con-
cerned. Internal bickering, with continual sniping,
develops between the various services. There were
too many German spy organizations, each of them
sZY
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 ROO1400140003-3
 Approved For Release 2002/10/10 :
jealous of the other. They all developed a policy
of secrecy, so that each might be the one to present
some juicy tidbit of information to the leaders.
Coordination went out the window.
If the United States is to enter clandestine
operations in any area abroad, then such operations
should be centralized in one agency to avoid the
mistakes indicated, and we should follow the experience
of the intelligence organizations of other countries
which have proven successful in this field.
25X1
_~rftjs}~;:;ckj
Approved For Release 2002/10/10 : CIA-RDP80RO1731 R001400140003-3 -